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**HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW**

VOLUME VII

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The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, J. H. Ropes, and Rev. Frederic Palmer.

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
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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VII



NUMBER 1

THEOLOGY AND TRADITION¹

WILLIAM R. ARNOLD

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It must be confessed that many a candidate for the Christian ministry nowadays enters upon his course of professional study with misgiving. He is quite clear as to his own purpose, to serve God in his day and generation most directly and effectively by showing Him forth in word and deed. But he has a vague feeling that the curriculum of the theological seminary has nothing very definite to contribute to the preparation for this life-work. A glance at the announcement shows him that it concerns itself largely with the distant past—the writings of the Old and New Testaments, the vicissitudes and controversies of the Church, the theological problems set by dead religious thinkers. While he is eager to rush into the thick of the fray, he is bidden to stay and devote some of his most precious years to a laborious survey of ancient ground. Would it not be better to leave tradition and the traditional disciplines on one side, and give his time and attention at once to the consideration of the present needs of society and of the men and women who compose it? to learn what there is to do, and how to do it?

¹An address delivered at the opening of Andover Theological Seminary and the Harvard Divinity School, September 23, 1913.

There is even a more serious difficulty. He feels himself separated by seemingly impassable barriers from the methods of study and the attitude of mind which he associates with theology. His life at college has already involved him in a certain degree of contradiction between his intellectual equipment on the one hand and his religious tenets on the other. He has received the mental—that is, the scientific—training of the day. He may not know much science, but he does know something of scientific method, and is completely in sympathy with the scientific spirit. All his college studies were sections of the one great domain of truth; and, in a general way, his knowledge of encyclopedics enabled him to assign to each subject its correlated place in the whole scheme of knowledge. In that scheme there appeared to be no room for even the minimum of elementary theology that he acquired in childhood, which he has accordingly carried along in a separate pocket on the outside. So far as it went, he could not assimilate it to the rest of his thought. Fortunately, it did not go very far. But he has no desire for more of the same thing to harass his spirit. The best his instructors can do for him now is to relieve him of the burden entirely. This they show no signs of doing. So he takes up his tasks with a sense of resignation tempered with anxiety for the survival of his intellectual ingenuousness.

For, do what he will, he cannot suppress a certain mental sympathy with the attitude of those outside critics, sufficiently numerous in modern times even in institutions of learning, who are frankly hostile to all theology and theologians, and whose understanding of the subject may be summed up in some such way as this:

Theology is nothing but tradition, and for the most part hollow tradition. It does indeed pretend to be a science, a discipline setting forth in comprehensible terms a systematized body of facts. Yet it differs

markedly from every science worthy of the name in that its chief appeal is to the testimony and authority of the past. In none of the sciences, to be sure, does wisdom claim to be born with the present generation—many men who are dead and gone have contributed to the existing stores; most of our knowledge is inherited; every science has its body of tradition; the sudden loss of all the books in the world would be an irreparable disaster in every field, and work incalculable harm to our civilization. But the sciences, while they welcome the contributions of the past, do not bow down before them. They appropriate, as a master appropriates the labors of a servant. They accept or reject the conclusions of former days, absorb into their own modern systems whatever they think fit, and march on to fresh trials of truth, which in their turn will be submitted to the judgment of posterity. It is always the present that sits in judgment over the past, never the past that imposes its judgment on the present. In the domain of theology this relation appears to be reversed. The past is the master; the present is the slave, even the worshipper. Tradition is not there a mere convenience, a book of record, a tool, a saving of useless labor; it is the vital principle, the foundation of the whole structure, the authority compelling assent. The truth is such and such because it has been said by men of old time. That these men of old time are esteemed prophets and apostles is not to the point; for where outside of tradition will you find prophet or apostle? In short, science has its traditions, but tradition unalloyed with nobler metal is to be found only in theology.

Moreover, theology bears on its face the evidence of its purely traditional, unscientific character. Truth is one, and science is one. There is not an astronomy according to the French and an astronomy according to the Germans, one European psychology and another

American. But precisely because theology is tradition and not science, there are as many theologies as there are distinct or divergent traditions. For, as we all know, mankind was for many thousands of years separated into distinct races and peoples, having little or no contact with each other. The leaders of each race were naturally confronted with much the same questions regarding the major problems of life and the origin of the ancient racial institutions. As they invariably made shift to answer, each people secured its proper body of tradition. This essentially mythological material was purged out of the sciences of Occidental countries long ago, but it took refuge in religion, and still persists in theology. The adherents of the respective traditions have cherished their several delusions, each increasingly at cross purposes with all the rest. So each community has its "sacred science," its theology. Many peoples; many traditions; many theologies. In later times, more than one of these has attempted to ally itself with the genuine science of mankind, but such attempts have proved abortive, as they were bound to do. There is an arrogance inherent in theology which science cannot abide. For, when theologians admit the unity of truth, it is only to identify the latter with their peculiar *a priori* system, while they vitiate their claim by profound ignorance of other systems, sometimes even by the conviction that to listen to rival claims is a grievous sin. How can it be otherwise? Truth is one and cannot fear itself; falsehoods are many and necessarily fear each other.

Besides being traditional and characteristically plural, theology is, like most uncontrolled tradition, fatally misguided. It professes to transmit truths which we could not ourselves by any possibility discover. These truths were at no time free to any one who chose to seek them. The arbitrarily favored few, even among the people of the remote past, alone had them; they told their fel-

lows; these told their sons, and so on. We of today may lose the precious truth, we may corrupt it; we may neither add to it nor improve it. Yet surely the very fact that we cannot by any possibility discover it should be sufficient to show that it was beyond the power of any former generation to discover. Nowadays men realize their limitations too well to make affirmations on certain subjects; whereas in former times they were less cautious, and they may have been less honest. Anyhow, they knew nothing of the method of ordered thinking; they emitted sentiments, and frequent repetition resulted in the sentiments being finally accepted for pregnant truth even by the originators themselves. In the prevailing dearth of knowledge, spurious information was greedily seized and was jealously transmitted to posterity. The very impossibility of verifying it contrived to render it more and more precious as time went by, till finally men were willing to die for it. It was magnificent, but it was not truth. Such convictions are utterly worthless, though acquired in perfect good faith, and though they come down to us clothed in the imposing language of a by-gone age and freighted with the prestige of the centuries of their vogue.

For the rest, it will already have been noticed that theology actually occupies a field which, but for it, would be left largely vacant. Scientific people, therefore, are disinclined to disturb theology, so long as theology does not attempt to disturb scientific people. In fact, the chief reason why the two camps do not more often come into open collision in modern times is that theology begins at the wrong end of things; it and science have not yet seriously come together, and probably never will. So that if only theology would surrender its claim to constitute a science and be content with the rank of *a poem*, all might continue well indefinitely. For, instead of starting with the aspect of things in the imme-

diate proximity of the observer and pushing out thence laboriously in the direction of the infinite circumference, which admittedly can never be reached, theology presumes to begin at the unseen circumference, which it foreshortens dreadfully, and straightway makes for the centre with a bound: *In the beginning* (which never was) *God* (of whom one cannot possibly have knowledge) *created* (an act which cannot be conceived by the modern mind) *the heaven* (which demonstrably does not exist) *and the earth* (the only actuality in the whole pronouncement). To be sure, theology is not the only sinner in this respect. Its emancipated sister philosophy also begins at the wrong end. But then no one pretends that the lucubrations of philosophy have any practical relation to human life. Theology does draw practical conclusions and make substantial demands. Herein lies its transgression.

Such is theology according to the critic, whose conception represents a curious but by no means rare blend of the opinions of misguided foe and equally misguided friend.

Not all of this denunciation is subscribed to by our candidate for the ministry, it is needless to say. But some of its implications (the contribution of the misguided friend) he has not learned to discard, and the rest he perhaps cannot easily refute.

Is theological truth necessarily traditional? Is it impossible to harmonize the religious with the intellectual life? Can we not break away from tradition?

The difficulty lies in the formulation of the question. The student of theology may not cut loose from tradition with impunity, and for this simple reason: that *theology is the study of religion, and religion—not theology—is distinctly a traditional thing*. Theology and religion are correlatives; the one in the domain of science, the other in concrete life and experience. Religion is essen-

tially traditional, and is not a science. Theology is a science, and can never be traditional without ceasing to be theology. This distinction, this analytical antithesis, which is not always exhibited in the table of contents of either religion or theology, is of the utmost importance. The failure to apprehend it clearly is responsible for most of the hostility of the outsider and much of the distress of the insider.

These institutions of learning are dedicated to the study of religion. There is nothing imaginary about their subject; there is nothing mysterious about their method. Religion, coextensive with the sphere of men's interests and the range of their imagination, has always existed in the world, since men first ceased to be animals and became men, and it exists today, an undeniable, an overwhelming fact. Its sentiments, its practices, its beliefs, have profoundly affected the history of the whole human race. At the present time, if we correctly estimate its scope and pervasiveness, we must admit that it exerts an incalculable influence in the affairs of men, although, owing in large measure to the sort of misapprehension we have just depicted, it is often disclaimed where it is actually entertained. For every hypocrite who professes religious sentiments that he does not possess, there are a hundred men who possess religious sentiments which they do not profess.

These sentiments, practices, and beliefs it is the business of theology to assemble, interpret, account for, reconcile, appraise, and (when proper) to commend. In good part they may themselves be the consequences of the theologizing of former ages, but contemporary theology is not responsible for them. Its task is to look them squarely in the face, as the other sciences do any set of facts in the world about us, and declare itself justly and truthfully concerning them in the language of the contemporary understanding.

Theoretically, there is nothing to prevent a thoroughly irreligious man, an atheist, or a depraved man, if you please, from making an excellent theologian. Actually, he would be as little likely to succeed as would a critic of music who had no music in his soul. But it is conceivable that such a man should be a first-rate theorist on certain aspects of the subject.

In all these respects, the study of religion, theology, does not at all differ from any other branch of learning pursued in the university. The study has its ultimate aim, to be sure—to promote and enhance the benefits which men derive from religion; but a corresponding aim may be accredited to every other science of consequence. We have confidence in the beneficent power of the uncovering of the truth concerning our subject. We need not be constantly, or even mainly, occupied in promoting our aim directly and immediately. We may study the principles and history of bridge-building, and conclude which and which methods have proved most useful, and we may determine why—the mathematics, the physics, the economics, the aesthetics, the ethics of bridge-building. But we need not build the bridges of humanity; we may leave them to be built when and where there is occasion, and when there is no time for study.

Now this sort of study of a department of human life and activity cannot be exhausted and its results stereotyped once for all. It cannot disregard the appearance of new material or the adoption of a new angle of view. The political, social, and intellectual life of our own civilization is ever on the move, affecting religion almost at every step; theology must be constantly enlarging its borders and adjusting its theory to meet the altered aspect and relations of religion. On the other hand, there is the accession of new material from the past or present institutions of other peoples, with whom our

intercourse is of comparatively recent origin. These cannot be excluded on any dogmatic principle. Our theory must be wide enough to embrace and harmonize all the facts, whether they relate to savages in the primitive state or to Oriental sages whose civilization and religion were venerable when ours were in their infancy. We are not justified in assuming that they have nothing of value for us.

A "traditional theology," one based upon an assemblage of facts or upon the application of a method other than those of the present day, is a contradiction in terms. Theologies have been cherished long after they have ceased to make intelligible the matter of religion; but when so cherished, they have proved their abdication of the function of theology by themselves becoming the greatest stumbling-block in the way of the understanding, and indirectly of religion. Then they have passed out of the domain of science into that of religious sentiment, and have themselves been transformed into matter for theological study and interpretation. For religious sentiment has a way of crystallizing around utterances which have once rendered signal service to the cause. To address my understanding, as I am at present constituted, that is what I have the right to ask of theology. Of course, I may not demand omniscience. It is no disgrace, but rather the ear-mark of thoroughness and candor, not to profess to know and understand everything. Like all other sciences, theology cannot pursue one tack very long without running up against a stone wall. In that case it will describe the stone wall as a stone wall. There will be no hocus-pocus about it. The study of religion, like the study of any other subject, is based upon the assumption that the human intelligence, in its natural state, may be applied to its understanding; and upon the further assumption that, as in every other department of life, so too in the

domain of religion, power is multiplied by the application of trained intelligence, however limited.

Needless to say that when we affirm that theology, as a science, must be one, though the religions which it studies are many and various traditions, we do not imply that all traditions are equally important or concern us all to the same degree. A man may be an historian, employing the scientific historian's method, reckoning at every step with the principle that all history is one and its true results in perfect harmony with each other. Yet he may consciously and deliberately limit himself to the investigation of the history, let us say, of the British Empire. He will be more likely to be interested in this if he be a British subject, and more likely to bring to his study patience, industry, and zeal, if he be an ardent British patriot, proud of British achievements and loyal to British institutions. But his history will not sacrifice truth to patriotism. Indeed, the more firm his faith in his country's integrity, the more eager he will be to let all the facts speak for themselves. So with theology. The scholar may consciously apply himself to the special study of Christianity as that section of the subject which has paramount interest for him. And the best theology of Christianity—I purposely avoid the expression “Christian theology”—will be that of the Christian man, if only because he alone can estimate the force and value of the Christian tradition at the present time.

But while it is true that the intelligence must be brought to bear upon the sentiments, practices, and beliefs of religion, it is equally true that the intelligence cannot take their place. In due time, theory may affect the facts, but meanwhile the theory must be based upon the facts. The actual content of religion, which the theologian does not create but finds, is the subject of his study.

Now what I wish to emphasize particularly at this time is that this actual content of religion is, to a very great degree, continuous and abiding. Changes here are relatively rare and invariably fractional. For the most part, they consist of additions to an existing stock, although subtractions and even substantial losses are not unknown. Religion is essentially an inheritance—if you please, a *great tradition*.

We must not let ourselves be frightened by this word "tradition." The most valuable, the most indispensable, the most undying things humanity possesses are traditions, incapable of being produced in a day, or a year, or a century, but requiring countless ages of human history to evolve. A few things, like the steam-engine and the electric battery and dynamite, are new. The things that are honorable, the things that are just, the things that are pure and lovely and of good report, are at least older than the apostle Paul; and, for us men, their age is of their essence. We may continue to think on them without disloyalty to the progressive spirit of the times.

A concrete illustration may help us to a better understanding of the matter. Imagine the world suddenly deprived of human language. It would be reduced to a state of pitiable impotence and emptiness; all society, all institutions, all law, all knowledge, all art, in time even all character, would be swept away. We should be animals once more, without the saving grace of animal instinct. Yet human speech is very distinctly a tradition, and nothing but a tradition. Men do not say to each other, "Go to, let us construct us a language." Nor are they born with it. They cannot originate it each for himself. It is handed down from one generation to another. The very faculty of employing the *vocal organs* in speech is dependent upon the hearing of *other men's* speech in the learner's infancy. Lan-

guage is an organism carried by the living spirit of the race, while the successive generations come and go. It changes constantly, to be sure; but the changes are infinitesimal when compared with the lexical volume of the whole and its persistent syntactical cast. Moreover, being only a tradition, it pleads guilty to the indictment brought against religion: it differs always, sometimes *in toto*, among people of different races; although contact between race and race results in the borrowing of words and the ideas which they represent. Sometimes, in exceptional circumstances, it results in the wholesale adoption of a foreign tradition. Language likewise exhibits strange irregularities and eccentricities. And the early stages of its history, particularly those which precede the age of written documents, are exceedingly difficult to trace. Altogether, it is a very complex organism, or rather, a discordant aggregation of organisms, which have only this in common, that they employ in the main the same organs of the body, follow more or less the same lines of growth and development, and correspond in some measure to one and the same conceptual background. Some languages are rich, others poor; some advanced, others backward. Some introduce us to the most lofty and ennobling thought and to poetic creations of wondrous beauty; others have been employed only for the grossest and most elementary purposes.

Nor is it an accident that language is traditional. It is inconceivable that it should be anything else. There literally is not time enough in a lifetime to produce it. After having yourself enjoyed the blessings of traditional language for half a lifetime, but not before, you may very partially invent an artificial language (like Volapük or Esperanto) on paper. But you will never get people that are quite sane to speak it, or even insane people to think in it.

The illustration need not be pressed. It serves well enough to demonstrate the proposition that tradition is by no means synonymous with fiction or worthlessness; that, on the contrary, it may be characteristic of the most valued and indispensable possessions of mankind.

Now religion is just such a world-wide tradition or congeries of traditions as language. It is an inheritance, which derives its power and importance from the fact that it is coextensive with the cultural history of the race, a sort of age-long correlative to our needs and faculties.

So far as mere volume is concerned, we are apt to exaggerate the proportion of new material to old even in what are known as the historic religions. No religion can be traced to its beginnings; least of all those "founded," as we say, by a great religious leader in historic times. Religious leaders have never, unless they were impostors or demented, conceived of themselves as "founding" a new religion. "I came not to destroy but to fulfil," said the greatest of them. In any case, to call a religion historic is to admit that its career began long ago, and that it owes something to its duration.

Christianity is no exception to this characterization of religion as tradition. It is an inheritance, whose power over our lives derives directly from the fact that it comes down to us hallowed with the associations of generations of religious experience; that it represents the emotions, the gropings and yearnings, the sufferings and the triumphs, of many times two thousand years.

It is hardly necessary to point out that, when we say religion is an inheritance, we are far from implying that it is something we receive in purely passive fashion, as into a receptacle, and pass on unaltered. A physical inheritance that fails to yield income loses, in so far forth,

the character of an inheritance. The same is true of an ideal inheritance. There must be profit while it is in our hands or there will be loss; though here too, fortunately for most of us, unearned increment is not unknown.

Finally, if religion in general or Christianity in particular is a great tradition, we cannot pretend to grasp or understand it adequately if we limit our survey to its present manifestation in human life; any more than the study of language and literature can be begun, continued, and ended in the market place. The life of the soul cannot be studied in space, but only in time; and time has but one dimension. It is the greater part of the actual task of theology to study and to rationalize the history and the historic products of religion. It must, for example, identify its prophets and teachers, not so much by name, as by correct delineation of their personality and correct determination of their historical situation, and so wrest from them the secret of their power. It must substitute the principle of sympathetic understanding for that of authority, and so render more fruitful the example of the great men of the past. It must thoroughly humanize the prophet, the apostle, the saint, the reformer—(may we not say?) the Lord Jesus himself. For only as they are humanized can we really be persuaded to emulate their lives and service. No one that has read the Epistles of Saint Paul doubts that he was an apostle; but the colossal labors of recent years have not yet succeeded in making him thoroughly intelligible as a man. No one that has read the Gospels doubts that Jesus of Nazareth was divine; the difficulty still remains to think of him as human. So with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel; as yet Old Testament studies have done little more than magnify the problems which they present. Theology cannot stop till it has completely humanized these generators and moulders of our faith.

When this has been achieved by patient study of the complex intellectual and moral setting in which they lived and labored, we shall know better what constitutes an inspired man of God, and what it is that we are to reproduce in our lives and characters. Nor can we doubt that themselves would be the first to welcome the achievement. "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known unto you." This is a prophecy of the time to come.

WHAT IS THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION?

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

YALE UNIVERSITY

In the October number of this *Review* for 1912 there appeared, as many readers will doubtless remember, a striking article by Professor Benjamin B. Warfield of Princeton Theological Seminary, under the caption "Christless Christianity." This is his rather clever designation for the religion of those who hold that belief in the historicity of Jesus, however valuable to the Christian, is nevertheless not absolutely indispensable to Christian faith. The article shows a wide acquaintance with the recent literature of the subject, is written in a spirited and forcible manner, and altogether makes an appreciable contribution, as it seems to me, to the clearing up of this interesting question.

As making for this devoutly-to-be-wished consummation, however, what we have chiefly to thank Professor Warfield for is the way in which, having chosen his pre-suppositions, he carries them through to their logical conclusion, and states the result with all the candor that could be desired. He plays the game; he is never "off side." And when he intimates that, in his judgment, the exponents of this "Christless Christianity"—among whom the present writer finds himself included—are not Christians at all, there is no just ground for complaint; it is all in the game. It is a case where, in strict logic, everything depends upon how Christianity is defined.

Dr. Warfield's definition of Christianity and the conclusions which he derives therefrom will be best stated

in his own language, which I quote as follows from the recent article to which reference has been made:

"There surely ought to be little difficulty in determining what Christianity is. . . . Unquestionably, Christianity is a redemptive religion having as its fundamental presupposition the fact of sin, felt both as guilt and pollution, and offering as its central good, from which all other goods proceed, salvation from sin through an historical expiation wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ. The essence of Christianity has always been to its adherents the sinner's experience of reconciliation with God through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ."

"He is a Christian, in the sense of the founders of the Christian religion and in the sense of its whole historical manifestation as a world-phenomenon, who, conscious of his sin, turns in faith to Jesus Christ as the propitiation for his sins, through whose blood and righteousness he may be made acceptable to God and be received into the number of those who are admitted to communion with him."

"Christianity as a world-movement is the body of those who have been redeemed from their sins by the blood of Jesus Christ dying for them on the cross."

"A Christianity without redemption—redemption in the blood of Jesus as a sacrifice for sin—is nothing less than a contradiction in terms. Precisely what Christianity means is redemption in the blood of Jesus. No one need wonder therefore that, when redemption is no longer sought and found in Jesus, men should begin to ask whether there remains any real necessity for Jesus. We may fairly contend that the germ of Christless Christianity is present wherever a proper doctrine of redemption has fallen away, or even has only been permitted to pass out of sight."

"From the Christian point of view it may very properly be said (though this is very far from all that needs to be said) that those who are advising us that Christianity can get along very well without Christ, are very much like men sitting by a brookside and reasoning that since we have the brook we do not need the spring from which it flows, and may readily admit the doubt whether there is a spring. If even this criticism does not seem valid to our Christless Christians, that can only be because they no longer occupy the Christian point of view."

"The point which needs particular pressing lies indeed just here—that in separating themselves from Jesus as the source and ground

and content of their faith, they sever themselves from Christianity and proclaim themselves of another religion."

Now by those who cling to the older orthodox, evangelical supernaturalism these statements will be accepted as a matter of course. Once the above definition of Christianity is adopted, understanding the term "redemption" in the narrow sense in which it is intended, there is no escape from the conclusion which the Princeton theologian draws. We would reserve the right to remark upon the simile of the brook and the spring in a later connection, but we would unhesitatingly grant that, from the point of view of Professor Warfield's definition, the opinion that belief in the historicity of Jesus is not indispensable to Christian faith is essentially unchristian, and that those who hold it should no longer be regarded as Christians. Speaking for himself, the present writer would say that, *with Christianity so defined*, he would have to confess not only that he is not, but that he does not see how he ever could be, a Christian. He would take the liberty, however, of expressing his own opinion, not indeed that his opponent is not a Christian, but that his opponent's theory of redemption is not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover essentially unchristian, because opposed to the principles of sound morality.

Precisely here then is the question demanding consideration: is the given definition of Christianity a fair one, or is it virtually a dogmatic begging of the whole question under dispute? Agreeing with my opponent so far as to regard Christianity, for our present purposes, as a religion—for it would be possible to view it not only as a religion which has had important consequences for morality, but also as a morality which has had important consequences for religion—I must undertake to raise once more the much-debated question: just what, essentially, is the Christian religion?

If we would avoid, as far as possible, dogmatic question-begging, our first inquiry must be methodological. Just how is the essence of the Christian religion, or, for that matter, the essence of any historical *quantum* to be determined? In general, either one of two methods is employed by those who claim not to be influenced by any practical interests in their solution of the problem. These methods are the method of comparative religion and the method of church history, or, as they might be called, the external and the internal method, respectively. The method of comparative religion is to treat Christianity as a species of the genus religion, and to define it in logical fashion, therefore, in terms of the qualities it shares with all religions, limited by those which are peculiar to itself alone. Now while such a definition would fulfil the requirements of formal logic, it might nevertheless yield a very inadequate working conception of the real nature of the Christian religion. The reason for this is that there are elements in Christianity which are neither common to all religions nor yet peculiar to itself alone, and it might very well be that some of these should turn out to be, as judged by practical standards, quite indispensable features of the religion in question. Still, it must be admitted that we cannot be said to have included all that is essential in any religion that is really best until we have mentioned something which is to be found in itself alone; and so this characteristic method of comparative religion, while inadequate by itself, may serve to test and supplement a definition arrived at in some other way.

But while the common fault of comparative religionists is to view the essence of Christianity too abstractly, the besetting temptation of the church historian is to repudiate the idea of essence and to present only a confused conglomeration of particulars. The variety of religious beliefs, practices, and experiences, the mutual

conflict and contradiction even, within what in the course of history has been called Christianity, is already, of course, sufficiently notorious. Still, it is difficult to take quite seriously those who contend that the only essence of Christianity is the totality of the phenomena that have been called Christian. *Theoretically*, this is what one would have to say from the standpoint of scientific history, which is supposed to be the absolutely disinterested investigation of the causal relations of the phenomena of human life and action. But even the most scientific historian must limit himself; he cannot make a scientific study of all phenomena, and as a matter of fact all historians in their own thinking do make a selection in accordance with the purpose and interest underlying their thought. The idea of a history in which phenomena are selected and their causal relations traced without regard to any practical interests and purposes, is a regulative idea of an end to be discreetly approached within definite limits, as the mariner approaches the fixed stars, never to be actually reached. The scientific historian, to be sure, often declaims against the concept of essence; but this is really because, when he finds the term "essence" used, it commonly reflects other interests than his own—practical interests which interfere, as it seems to him, with strictly impartial historical inquiry. But such interference is by no means necessary. All that is required for scientific history is that practical interests be kept from leading to an arbitrary selection of the causes by which the previously selected phenomena are to be explained. The selection of effects, like the original selection of the phenomena to be studied, not only may be controlled by practical human interests; it must be so controlled, if the history is to be interesting to practical human beings. Any history that is to be more than a mere indiscriminate chronicle of causally connected events, any history that is to select from the

events of the past what is of interest for any purpose in the present, must recognize some distinction between the essential and the non-essential elements of the total accessible phenomenon. Harnack, selecting from historic Christianity what he took to be essential for the religious life of the modern man, was truer to the idea of essence than Loisy in his attempt to avoid any such selection.

But in the present instance there is not even the supposed scientific-historical reason for identifying the essence with the totality of phenomena. The discussion is avowedly on the basis of present-day religious interest, and we must mean by Christianity what it is for that interest. Unless we can feel that all that has ever been called Christian is equally good and important for the true religious interest of today, a selection will be made in spite of ourselves, and ought to be made. Professor Warfield's definition is, on the face of it, the result of such a selection. The only question, therefore, is as to how—under the guidance of what principles—the selection is to be made.

If no universally valid normative principles can be found, then the whole search after essence will issue in unrelieved subjectivity. There will be as many different essences as there are different purposes underlying interest in the reality under consideration. There will be no essence but the "nominal essence," which in any particular case is simply whatever, for the purpose of the individual, it may seem necessary to select from the total phenomenon.

But we cannot readily resign ourselves to this conclusion as our ultimate position; for while we cannot disavow the practical nature of our interest in the inquiry, we are equally aware that what we seek is a universally valid or real essence, not what is of perhaps but transient interest to some particular individual.

Nor need we go far afield to find at least the beginning of a solution of our problem. If a selection for a purpose is to be made, if the essence is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose*, two normative principles are at once suggested. In the first place, the essence must be in the total actuality; and in the second place the controlling purpose must be the right purpose in the given situation, the purpose to realize what, under the circumstances, is the true ideal. In short, *the essence is whatever is both present in the actual and demanded by the ideal*. To guarantee that what is taken as essential is the real essence, what is taken as the ideal must be the true ideal. The formula will require modification, of course, in any case where, in view of the purpose concerned, the reality is essentially bad. In such a case the essence is that in the actual, the elimination or avoidance of which is demanded by the ideal. In the present instance, however, we are concerned with the essence of the Christian religion in the good or constructive sense, and, whatever else it may be, it must be that in the totality of the religious phenomena of Christianity which is a necessary factor in the realization of the true ideal for humanity, and of the true ideal for human religion in particular. The determination of the essence of the Christian religion has then as its prerequisites a descriptive and a normative task. It requires that one know on the one hand the varied phenomena of the Christian religion, and on the other hand the nature of ideal religion.

But there is one special condition which it is important to emphasize in connection with the essence of any reality. It must be able to maintain itself after it has been selected and separated from all that is non-essential, for an essence that did not exist would not have the required factor of actuality; it would not be a real essence. If there are in any reality elements which it is

essential to have eliminated, and if the reality is such that, when the elimination has taken place, what is left loses all vitality and power of self-maintenance, that reality has no good essence; it is essentially bad, for, so long as it endures, the bad will remain in it. If on the other hand there is a reality, some element of which is demanded for the realization of the true ideal, and such that that selected element retains its vitality after the elimination of objectionable elements, the reality in question is essentially good. Or, coming closer to our particular subject of interest, it may be that in the total phenomenon of some historic religion there are both that which it is essential to retain and that which it is essential to eliminate in the interests of ideal religion. In this case, it will have both a good and a bad essence, it being assumed that what is good can retain its vitality after the bad has been eliminated, or, in other words, that the religion in question is essentially good. If, however, there are in any religion both that which it is essential to eliminate, as, for example, superstition, and that which it might seem essential to retain, as, for example, its moral dynamic, and yet the moral dynamic cannot be retained after the superstition has been overcome, then that religion can only be said to be essentially bad; judged by sufficiently critical standards, it has no good essence; the good is not vital in dissociation from the bad. In addition then to being the highest common factor of the actual and the ideal, *the essence must be vital enough to persist in separation from all that must be eliminated.* In the case of religion the conditions of this vitality will be best discovered by historical and psychological investigation.

Let us now summarize the results of our methodological discussion. We seem to have arrived at four or five normative principles. (1) The essence must be found in the actual. Thus far is the would-be scientific his-

torian correct. (2) The essence is a necessary part in, or factor toward, the true ideal. What this true ideal is, must be determined by a critical philosophy of values. (3) The question as to what is essential has not been sufficiently tested until objectionable elements, such as irrational ideas, have been eliminated. (4) When this elimination has been made, what remains must be vital enough to endure in new and unobjectionable relations, if it is to be regarded as the real essence of the reality in question. (5) The essence of the best member of any group must contain something not found in the essence of any other member of that group. This concession to the comparative religionist is made, as likely to be practically helpful in working out the application of our methodological principles, although logically it adds nothing to the other four principles.

The essence of the actual then is that element in the actual whose continued existence is demanded by the true ideal, and which can retain its actuality and vitality after the elimination of all objectionable elements from the actual at the demand of that same ideal. We must now apply this definition of essence in the attempt to discover the essence of the Christian religion. In making this attempt we shall use the biological approach to the question; first taking religion as a special development of the actual life-process, and then Christianity as a special development of religion.

Life in general, and human life above all, may be regarded as a process or activity directed, consciously or unconsciously, toward the realization of certain ends or values. From time to time crises occur in which obstacles are met, which obstruct the realization of those ends and threaten to destroy experienced values. In this critical situation a new activity is called for, a new adjustment to the environment. Commonly this takes the form of a search for and discovery of some element in the

environment which can be depended upon as a means of deliverance from the obstacle, and an adjustment to this instrumentality, a use of it, in the way necessary to secure the desired deliverance. Then with the removal of the obstacle life goes on as before, save that now there is a new value appreciated, the value of that which has been a means of deliverance in the time of crisis. In the higher forms of life, and after crises that have been acute, there tends to be an appreciative contemplation of that which originally was of interest simply as means; it may even be recognized as a new value, experience of which is regarded as one of the ends of the activities of life. And then, as a result, primarily, of deliverance from the crisis, and, secondarily, of the new attention to that through which deliverance was obtained, there may arise new thoughts, new feelings, and new modes of action.

Now the question as to what kind of life-process religion is, is centrally the question as to the kind of deliverance or "salvation" experienced; but for the full understanding of the nature of the religious life-process the stages previous to and following this experienced deliverance must be taken into account. The values originally appreciated, or ends pursued religiously, may be, and in the history of religion have been, as various as the values and ends of human action; they may be grossly physical and purely selfish, or supremely spiritual and beautifully altruistic. A crisis is not religious, however, unless the obstacle is such as is not, or seems not to be, readily removable by one's own power, or through the natural means or human agencies within the reach of the individual. But when the natural and the human fail, there is called forth the feeling of absolute dependence. So long, however, as this is simply a realization of crisis, it is not yet distinctly religious. Characteristic religion begins where there is exercised, for deliverance from the obstacle, a definite active dependence upon some real

or fancied supernatural and superhuman power in the environment. According as this supernatural and superhuman factor is conceived, the adjustment thereto will be directed. When the desired deliverance ensues, it must be either because of the objective correctness of the adjustment, or because of a chance coincidence. In either case credit will be temporarily given to the religious object, the superhuman and supernatural Power, as interpreted in the thought by which the adjustment was guided. The deliverance, or "salvation," will be interpreted as a "miracle," i.e. as a "revelation" of the presence and activity of the supernatural, superhuman reality. There will be aroused, consequently, feelings of awe and appreciation of the higher Power by which one has been befriended. This is the attitude and experience of worship, attaining in its more highly specialized developments the distinctly mystical state. The state of dependence, with the consequent deliverance, is practical religion; the state of appreciation is mystical religion. The combined experience of deliverance and of appreciation of the supernatural, superhuman object by means of which it has been accomplished, may lead to new thoughts (beliefs, creed) about the religious object; new emotions with their expressions, at first spontaneous but later conventionalized (forms of worship, ritual); and new ways of acting under the influence of the religious consciousness (religious morality, obedience to the law of God).

If now we are to determine the specific nature of essential Christianity, we must have in mind not only the phenomena of the history of Christianity, but also a clear idea of the nature of ideal religion. Now one of the characteristics of ideal religion is rationality. By this term we do not mean the quality of being guided by "pure" or non-empirical reason; on the contrary, we would maintain that there can be no guarantee of

rationality in thought which has not been moulded upon reality as it is known through experience. Rational religion, as we mean it, is religion founded upon reality, religion criticised and modified until fully verified in the light of human experience.

Ideal religion then must be rational in the empirical sense; in other words, it must be scientific. But it must also be in harmony with all valid human ideals. It would not be ideal religion if it were unfavorable to any true ideal. But aside from religion itself, there is one element in the spiritual ideal that is uniquely important, not only as being an ultimate end, but also because its presence is necessary for the highest possible development of the other elements in the ideal. This element is morality. We can say, therefore, that if experience gives us warrant for assuming that there can be a radically moral religion, not only would it serve one of the most important, or the most important, of human ideals; in serving morality it would serve all true human ideals at once. Ideal religion, therefore, whatever else it may be, must at least be moral. This will mean that while the supernatural, superhuman Power depended upon for deliverance must be thought of as favorable to valid human ideals in general, the moral ideal must be included, and the deliverance accomplished through religious dependence must be, whatever else it may be, a moral deliverance.

We are now ready for the question as to the essence of the Christian religion. Unless the Christian religion is essentially bad, as it would be for instance if the irrational elements could not be eliminated without its vitality being destroyed, it must be in essence whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular. Turning now to historical Christianity, we find, along with other

features more or less intimately and permanently associated therewith, a deeply vital moral quality. The ends or values for the preservation and increase of which the religious relationship is invoked, are fundamentally moral. The situation in the face of which the feeling of absolute dependence arises is the crisis caused by sin, in one's self or in others, as an obstacle to the realization of the true ideal for the individual and for society. The supernatural, superhuman Power which is taken as the object of religious faith is conceived as favorable to the removal of sin and to the realization of true moral values. The adjustment to that Power is a moral adjustment. It is an adjustment too by means of which moral values are meant to be and can be promoted beyond what is possible without it. The mystical contemplation of the religious object is, according to the principles of this religion, to be controlled by what is demanded by one's moral duty to one's fellow-men. Finally, no expression of religion is countenanced which is at variance with the most conscientiously determined moral ideals. This pervasive moral element then, being common to actual Christianity and to ideal religion, must be viewed, tentatively at least, as belonging to the essence of the Christian religion. Christianity is the religion whose "miracle" or "revelation" consists in the experience of *moral* "salvation," or "redemption." If it be objected that a moral element is to be found in other historic religions also, the reply is that this does not invalidate what has been said as to Christianity being essentially the religion of moral redemption. The most essential thing in any religion may conceivably be the sort of moral deliverance experienced by its votaries through dependence upon a superhuman reality. If however we would distinguish the essential quality of the Christian religion from other religions more sharply, we can perhaps find no more accurate modifying term

than the word "Christlike." Christianity is the religion of deliverance from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike attitude toward a Christlike superhuman reality. This distinction would serve, we think, to mark off the essence of Christianity definitely from the essence of any other moral religion.

It may be remarked, in passing, that it would not be quite accurate to say that Christianity is, as Professor Warfield's "Christless Christians" are supposed to hold, "only a particular way of conceiving God, with the emotional and volitional accompaniments and consequences" thereof; it is centrally a kind of religious experience, of deliverance from a crisis, together with the way of conceiving God and the religious attitude which make that experience possible. There must be an essentially Christian belief, i.e. the belief necessary to mediate the essentially Christian experience; one must believe that the Christlike God is, and have sufficient knowledge of the right religious adjustment to be able to co-operate with God's work of moral salvation.

There is good ground to suppose then, we take it, that redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality and ultimately to a Christlike fellowship with God, accomplished in the life of man by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christlike dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual, is the essence of the Christian religion. It is that in actual Christianity which it seems undoubtedly necessary to retain, in order that ideal religion, and thereby an ideal human spiritual development, may be realized. But there is one condition which must be fulfilled before this supposition as to the essence of Christianity can be regarded as sufficiently verified. The elements selected from phenomenal Christianity for survival must be able to survive after the elimination of whatever is contrary to ideal religion. Can the vitality of Christianity as

a religion of moral salvation be maintained after the irrational features of historic Christianity have been removed? If not, then Christianity is essentially irrational, and therefore essentially bad. And what we are here especially concerned to maintain is that, if moral salvation is not possible through a religion which refuses to be guided by the particular idea of redemption insisted upon by Doctor Warfield, then the Christian religion is essentially bad; its supposed good essence is not vital when separated from all irrationality; it has no really good essence. Or, to express our opinion differently, if essential Christianity is what Doctor Warfield says it is, it is essentially bad, for the simple reason that it is essentially irrational. We would maintain however that his statement of the essence of Christianity is incorrect, and that the Christian religion is essentially good, that it has a real essence which is good, a good essence which will still prove to be vital when this and all other irrational elements have been eliminated from its theology.

There are many Christians today who fear for the life of Christianity whenever there is talk of any such radical and drastic operation upon the body of traditional Christian doctrine as this elimination of all irrationality. We would contend, however, that the operation must be performed some time, if the life of Christianity is to be saved. "The old that ages, he must let go who would hold fast the old that ages not." What we are interested in is the retention in full vitality of the spiritual dynamic of the Christian religion, in separation from the many irrationalities inherited from a less critical and scientific age. We would retain the spiritual dynamic of Christian supernaturalism, with its belief in a special, and in some sense miraculous, revelation. We would retain what we believe Professor Warfield is really most interested in conserving, viz. the undimin-

ished vitality of Christian evangelicalism, with its message of the historic mediation of the saving grace of God to the individual man. Moreover, we would retain the vital essence of Christian orthodoxy, with its view of the one divine Being, God the Father Almighty, revealing himself for the salvation of the world in Jesus Christ, his Son, and as the Holy Spirit operating in the lives of men for their regeneration and spiritual perfection. But it is too late in the history of human progress to seek to conserve *in toto* the old supernaturalism, the old evangelicalism, and the old orthodoxy. If then the result of the elimination of the irrational features of the older Christianity should be to make it in some sense, as our critic seems to fear, a new religion, we can answer with confidence that, unless Christianity should turn out to be essentially bad, our method expressly provides that this new religion shall still be essentially Christian. It will be a union of the essence of Christian supernaturalism, of Christian evangelicalism, and of Christian orthodoxy; a combination which must make our threatened "new religion" nothing less than a new Christianity.

First, then, let us try to make clear what we mean by *the essence of Christian supernaturalism*. Briefly stated, what we mean is religious experience guided by the belief that there have been, and still are, certain events of human history and experience which, as compared with other events, are of special significance, objectively as well as subjectively, as revealing the purposive activity of the supernatural, superhuman Being which is the object of religious dependence and worship; and that, other things being equal, the more closely events approximate in character the spiritual triumphs which, we have good reason to believe, were achieved by the historic Jesus through his cultivation of the religious life, the more centrally they are the result of the

direct activity of God and reveal his character and purpose. To give up miracle in this sense would be to give up revelation in the sense in which it has significance for modern practical religion.

It will be readily understood that we are not here defending the notion of that magical supernaturalism which would contradict our scientific knowledge of nature. On the contrary we would maintain that what Professor Warfield commends as the appeal "from a naturalistically biassed to an unbiassed historical criticism" is really the appeal from the presuppositions of the scientifically informed to the prejudices of the scientifically ignorant, or else to a more or less obscurantist, and therefore perverse, "will to believe." It is not logically essential to Christian faith that one should believe that human parthenogenesis, or the re-animation of dead bodies, or any such events as the miraculous multiplication of loaves and fishes, or the stopping of a storm, or the killing of a fig-tree with a word, ever really happened; but it is logically essential to the Christian, for the verification of his faith, that he be able to point to empirical, and therefore historical, evidence of the operation, within human experience, of a supernatural and superhuman Power. We can be religious in the Christian sense without the former beliefs, but not without the latter. Moreover, while it is difficult to see how the person of critical disposition and scientific training could ever be sufficiently certain of the truth of narratives of events of the former sort to be able to build a positive religious life upon them, even the scientific and the critical are not excluded from becoming practically certain that Jesus of Nazareth was a real person, whose spiritual triumphs were due in no small part to the essential rightness of his religious attitude, i.e. that there was an objective response to his dependence upon a superhuman and supernatural

assisting Power. But even if one could not be practically assured of this in the case of the historical Jesus—and this has been our central contention—we could find other empirical evidence sufficient for practical certainty as to the fact and the further possibility of spiritual miracle in the sense defined above. We can find this evidence, if in no other way, by ourselves reproducing as faithfully as possible the essential features of the religious attitude ascribed to Jesus by early Christian tradition.

It may be remarked in this connection that Professor Warfield's analysis of what he calls "Christless Christianity" can be shown to be quite wide of the mark, when he says, "Always there lie at the basis of the reasoning the twin assumptions of the old rationalism: the assumption of the adequacy of pure reason to produce out of its own inalienable endowments the whole body of religious truth which it is necessary or possible for reasonable men to embrace, and the assumption of the inadequacy of history to lay a foundation of fact sufficiently assured to supply a firm foundation on which the religious convictions and aspirations of reasonable men may rest." Without undertaking to speak for more than himself, the present writer, as one of those criticised, would simply call attention in the first place to how distinctly empirical and non-rationalistic is the basis of faith, as he views it; and, in the second place, to the fact that, feeling practically certain of the historicity of Jesus, he does not hesitate to appeal to the religious experience of that supreme member of our race as giving empirical support of quite unique importance to the essentials of Christian faith. But just because the demonstration of the truth of Christianity is fundamentally empirical rather than "rational," it becomes highly desirable to supplement the proofs that have served in the past. We must have Christian evidences

that cannot be reasonably called in question by the historical critics. The discovery of a rational demonstration is "once for all," in a sense that is not true of empirical proof. Empirical facts are not all equally accessible. Generally speaking, those belonging to the past are less accessible than those belonging to the present, and those belonging to the immediate experience of others are less accessible than those of one's own immediate experience. For these reasons repetition in the present and in our own immediate experience is called for. And inasmuch as repetition in present experience does really supplement those deficiencies of historical evidence which arise from the fact that it belongs to the past, the appeal to any one event of the past could only be indispensable in case sufficient empirical evidence in the present could not possibly be secured. But to say that the religious experience possible for the Christian today will never amount to verification of Christian faith, is to assume a position essentially sceptical rather than Christian.

But there must be included in the essence of the Christian religion not only the essence of Christian supernaturalism; *the essence of Christian evangelicalism* must also be conserved. Expressed briefly, this is the seeking of salvation—defined ultimately as Christlikeness of spiritual life—through a Christlike religious dependence upon and fellowship with a Christlike divine Being, "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

In its older form this Christian evangelicalism was associated with many irrational elements. God was thought of as having been made propitious by an artificial and external transaction other than the becoming righteous of the one who had sinned; the legal punishment was thought of as having been transferred by the divine Judge from the sinner to the sin-bearer,

a transaction involving the irrational notion of a transfer of guilt from the sinner to the substitute by an arbitrary fiat of the Almighty. God was thought of as being satisfied with the righteousness of the suffering substitute arbitrarily credited to the unrighteous. Redemption was thus regarded, not as a human experience, but as a wholly transcendent transaction. Now these irrational elements cannot be essential to Christianity, unless we have been mistaken in supposing that Christianity is essentially good. The guilt of sin is non-transferable, and so is the merit of righteousness. Any God who acted as if guilt and merit were transferable would be a God seriously deficient in moral discernment.

That these elements in the older interpretation of the Christian evangel are irrational is not all; they are distinctly antagonistic to the essentially Christian view of God. It is nothing short of humiliating to find it necessary to point out that the God of the Christian is an honest God, who will by no means clear the guilty; but it is this very element, this confused and sub-Christian notion of substitutionary punishment on the one hand and substitutionary justification on the other, to which Professor Warfield still clings, along with many others, in the mistaken idea that it is nothing less than the quintessence of the Christian religion. What Professor Warfield has stated to be the essence of the Christian religion has indeed been associated with historic Christianity; but being irrational, it cannot be of the essence of Christianity. Indeed holding, as it does in effect, that God's transactions for the salvation of man are not rigidly moral, it must be pronounced essentially unchristian.

We have been quite willing to admit that if Professor Warfield should prove to be correct in his definition of the essence of Christianity, he would also be correct in

his insistence upon belief in the historicity of Jesus as logically indispensable to Christian religious faith. But what we are concerned to point out is that whenever belief in the historicity of Jesus has been logically indispensable to Christian faith, it has been because of the irrationality of certain presuppositions in the minds of the believers. With the early Jewish Christians it was the irrationality of their apocalyptic eschatology and Messianism; with the early Greek Church it was the irrationality of their magical notion of the making of human substance immortal; with mediaevalism, to which apparently our opponent still adheres, it was the irrationality of an arbitrary externalism in ethics and jurisprudence. If however we have progressed far enough toward the universalizing of Christianity to have eliminated these irrationalities of Jewish apocalypticism, of pagan magic, and of mediaeval externalism, we can retain the essence of Christian evangelicalism, without having, as Christians, to commit ourselves beforehand to any one outcome of the historical criticism of the New Testament rather than another, as being logically indispensable to our faith.

It should be understood, of course, that what we have meant all along by the term, "Christian faith," has been Christian faith *in God*. There is, to be sure, a Christian faith in Jesus. What we know of him with practical certainty through history gives us the greatest confidence in his character and in the fundamental correctness of his religious attitude. We believe, indeed, that his religious adjustment and experience were such that we can trust him as our best religious guide in all human history. When we become his disciples in religion, we are led into fellowship with our divine Father. We truly express our trust in him, and our appreciation of his value for our religious life, by speaking of him as the historic mediator of our salvation; he is the revealer of God to us and our

saviour. Moreover, as we shall emphasize in another connection, we believe that the divine will and activity had such unhindered course through his life that his very person may be appropriately and truly described as divine; he was *the* divine man. Now to this Christian faith in *Jesus*, belief in the historicity of Jesus is, of course, logically indispensable. It is possible moreover and convenient, to set forth the essence of the Christian religion in terms of the Christian faith in Jesus; *convenient*, but, as we would still insist, not absolutely *necessary*. This may perhaps be more evident after we have indicated what we take to be the essential features of Christian evangelicalism.

It is essential to the Christian evangelical point of view that the Christian moral law of unselfish love be recognized as valid and binding upon every individual. This devotion to the spiritual deliverance and unification of mankind, which with practical certainty we may take as having been best exemplified in the moral example of the historic Jesus, is not the Christian gospel; rather is it the Christian law, but it is that without which no gospel is truly Christian. The righteous will of the God of the Christian can be satisfied with nothing short of the reproduction in the individual of a Christlike moral devotion. But the essence of the Christian gospel is not to be found in the moral example of Jesus taken by itself; it is to be found rather in the religious example of Jesus as giving the key to his moral achievement. The Christian evangel is the gospel of the power of God manifesting itself in a Christlike morality on condition of the cultivation of a life of Christlike religious devotion. It is the gospel of the universal possibility of redemption as a human religious experience, through following the religious example of Jesus, taking the attitude of *sonship toward* the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." If it be objected that this adopting of what we

are practically certain was the religious attitude of Jesus is neither possible nor appropriate in the case of one whose life has been full of sin, the reply is that the sinner's first step toward the Christlike religious attitude is the step of repentance and trust which marks his reconciliation with the Father. Since it is the divine power which is manifested in the Christlike moral life in response to the Christlike religious adjustment, the Christlike is divine, and the divine Christlike; and therefore the holy and righteous God is to be thought of, even by the sinner, as eminently approachable, in that he is also the God of Christlike mercy and love. The essence of the Christian gospel, then, is that God is full of love and grace; so that the repentant sinner has simply to come trustfully to God, to be reconciled to the Christlike heavenly Father. Then if he abides in a Christlike religious attitude of dependence and surrender, he will be enabled to progress triumphantly in the living of a Christlike moral life of unselfish service to humanity.

In thus formulating the essential elements of Christian evangelicalism we have not forgotten that so long as there fails to be associated with our religious teaching a strongly vital, regenerating, spiritual dynamic, our message can scarcely be called, in the full sense of the word, evangelical doctrine. There was nothing more essential in the older evangelicalism than its power of converting individuals to a Christian moral and religious life. It was a rainbow of hope, over against the dark clouds of fear. Neither the hope nor the fear, to be sure, was completely rational; traditional eschatological notions, exaggerated for effect, played too prominent a part in the whole "plan of salvation." But the evil of sin and its consequences, while it may be misrepresented, can never be exaggerated; and the insistent emphasis upon the imperative necessity of redemption, of regeneration, which characterized the older evangelicalism, must be

retained, albeit in rational form, if the newer Christianity is to be fully evangelical. There is a hell of possible human experience to be saved from; but salvation, redemption, other than regeneration and what can be defined in terms of human experience, there is and can be none. To *experience* salvation, however, we must follow the moral example of Jesus; and to follow the moral example of Jesus sufficiently to be saved, we must follow the religious example of Jesus. But in view of our sin, as we have seen, before we can do this, we must come in repentance to God, and trustfully depend upon him for forgiveness. Then do we experience reconciliation, at-one-ment with God, and to experience this is regeneration.

It ought to be clear that, from this point of view, while belief in the historicity of Jesus may be *psychologically* indispensable, temporarily at least, to the steadfast evangelical faith of many individuals, it cannot be shown to be logically indispensable to the retaining of the essence of Christian evangelicalism. With much of what Troeltsch says in this connection we can heartily agree, for what he has in mind for the most part is the psychological necessity of this belief. We should be very far from agreeing however that if, for good and sufficiently critical reasons, the historicity of Jesus had to be given up, the death-knell of Christian religious faith would be sounded. This is not the voice of Christian faith, but of unchristian distrust and fear. The values of essential Christianity are too great and too deeply appreciated by the experienced Christian ever to be given up universally unless it should become logically necessary. It is through defect of rationality that anything not logically necessary comes to be, for individuals and temporarily, absolutely necessary, psychologically, as a means to a necessary end. Wherefore, an essentially Christian evangelical faith being logically possible without the presupposition

of the historicity of Jesus, we can never show any reason, unless it be the intellectual deficiency of individuals, why Christian faith without absolute dependence upon belief in the historicity of Jesus should not become a universal psychological possibility. As logical necessities tend to become psychological necessities, as man develops in rationality, so what is not logically indispensable tends to become not psychologically indispensable. On the one hand metaphysics, which is logically necessary to the theology of Christian faith, is still in the case of many individuals by no means necessary psychologically; and yet, with the progress of rationality, it tends to become so. To the early Christian Church, on the other hand, the speedy visible return of Christ seemed indispensable; and to expect it *was* psychologically indispensable, perhaps. Indeed, according to their reasoning, it came to appear logically indispensable to their faith also. But as we now see in the light of later history, it was not really logically necessary to their faith, and was psychologically necessary only by reason of their misconceptions. The same thing may be said of the psychological and logical necessity of belief in the historicity of Jesus for the sustenance of the faith of the Christian. If belief in the historicity of Jesus should continue to be humanly indispensable—and *this* is something which I, for one, have no heart to deny—it will be because humanity cannot consent to give up that matchless personality, not as a means to Christian faith or to anything else, but simply as an end, a value conserved and cherished from ultimate and supralogical motives.

But finally in retaining, as belonging to the essence of the Christian religion, the essentials of Christian supernaturalism and evangelicalism, we are virtually bound to include also *the essence of Christian orthodoxy*. Now from the time of the first formulation of the Trini-

tarian and Christological dogmas, these statements have been regarded—and not without reason—as being the expression of the very quintessence of Christian orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it has for some time now been distinctly recognized by critical historians of Christian thought, and for a much longer time indistinctly felt, that these ancient dogmas also embody much that is very far from essential to Christian faith. It is our remaining task to seek to specify just what is the real essence of Christian orthodoxy, and in the light of our result to raise once more the question as to whether, for the sake of Christian orthodoxy in this modern sense, belief in the historicity of Jesus is indispensable.

One of the insights which is becoming increasingly clear as the result of the application of comparative and historical methods to the study of the early history of Christianity, is that this religion of ours was, in its origination, a fusion and further development, under the influence of the experience and thought of great religious personalities, of two great religions—Jewish ethical monotheism and the mystical-philosophical religion which had grown up among the Greeks. The Christianity which conquered the Greek civilization of the period was undoubtedly the result of the most important and far-reaching synthesis of the practical and mystical elements of religion that had taken place within human history, and the chief intellectual expression of this synthesis is to be found in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Christological dogma is to be understood partly as corollary, partly as complement, and partly as exposition of this Trinitarian dogma which preceded it.

Practical religion, as it develops, soon comes to demand a personal God. In the light of experience and reflection, this practical religion becomes less and less magical and more and more moral. Its God comes to

be thought of as thoroughly moral, first as the righteous Judge, then as the perfect heavenly Father. Mystical religion, however, tends to think of the ultimate religious reality as the All-One, the impersonal or super-personal Absolute. The God of practical religion is transcendent; the God of mystical religion is immanent, especially in the mystical experience itself. Here then was an apparent contradiction between the postulates of the moral, practical faith of Judaism and the intuitions of the metaphysical, mystical religion of Hellenism. Christianity, coming out of Judaism, and going forth into the Hellenic world, felt called upon and also able to retain the values of both points of view, and to reconcile the seemingly contradictory theologies.

The outcome was the Christian dogma of the Trinity. In this dogma there is the characteristically mystical affirmation of the super-personal divine substance, manifested in the deeper religious experiences of the finite individual, who becomes thereby partaker of the divine nature and endowed with eternal life. At the same time there is the affirmation of the almighty and fatherly personal God demanded by practical religion. The particular form which this synthesis took was chiefly due to the facts of Christian religious experience, interpreted with constant reference to the chief figure of Jewish-Christian tradition, Jesus the crucified and exalted Messiah.

Assuming the Christian tradition, Greek mystical religion by itself would have interpreted Jesus as a person in whom was manifested in remarkable fulness the inner presence of that same super-personal divine Being which is also inwardly presented in all mystical experience, and whose rational expression is indeed "the light which lighteth every man." It would have had the doctrine of one super-personal Absolute, manifested historically in Christ, the divine Man, the incarnation of the

Logos, and also manifested continuously in Christian experience, whether this last were expressed in terms of the "Holy Spirit," or not. To the moral, practical religion of the mere Jewish disciple of Jesus, however, the Master was simply a man, uniquely honored as the representative of the one personal God, the heavenly Father, and sending forth, by virtue of his death and resurrection and unique relation to the Father, his holy spirit, or invisible presence, for the assistance of his disciples. Attempting however to combine the Hellenic and Judaic points of view, the early Christian theologians devised the impressive but self-contradictory doctrine of the Trinity, with its one and only one supreme super-personal God, or divine substance, and its three supreme, eternally equal divine persons. Roughly speaking, trinitarian Christianity undertook to solve the problem of the conservation of the values of both mystical and moral religion by means of the simple process of addition. For the plain man, apart from the subtleties of Greek metaphysics, the upshot was the affirmation at once of monotheism and tritheism, the acceptance of which had to be enforced with the threat of eternal punishment for all unbelievers.

If we are to determine what is really essential in Christian orthodoxy, we must learn to appreciate the doctrine of the Trinity, not so much for what it accomplished as for what it attempted, viz. the retention, in one religious view, of the values of moral, practical religion on the one hand and of mystical, philosophical religion on the other. The essence of Christian orthodoxy is whatever element or factor of its theology is required for the realization of the ideal combination of moral with mystical religion, each at its best. The irrationalities of historic Trinitarianism must be removed, but its vital essence must be retained. Historic Unitarianism gained comparative rationality, but at the

expense of religious vitality. It did not keep all that was essential in Christian orthodoxy. It retained, in somewhat rationalized form, the originally Jewish ethical monotheism of Christianity, without an adequate mystical appreciation of the divine reality present in the historic Jesus and in the religious experience of the Christian. On the other hand there is in process of development today a form of mystical religion whose weakness is that it does not see how to retain, along with its mystical appreciation of the divine in the human, the practical values of dependence upon a moral, personal God. As distinguished from both historic Unitarianism and contemporary mysticism, the new Christianity for which the world is waiting, essential Christianity in rational, scientific form, will retain all that is valuable in both the moral and the mystical element. It will, we believe, because it must and ought, and therefore surely can. It will not give up the unity and personality of God. Neither will it abandon the faith that the divine Spirit is present and at work in the spiritual experience of the Christian. And granted the historicity of Jesus, it will not give up the divinity of that matchless human person.

It ought to be apparent by this time what our reply will be to Professor Warfield's remark that his "Christless Christians" are "like men sitting by a brookside and reasoning that since we have the brook we do not need the spring from which it flows, and may readily admit the doubt whether there is a spring." He has misstated the analogy. Rather is it that we know from experience and observation the value of the water in the brook of present-day vital Christianity, and it has this value whoever may have been the historical person or persons in and through whom it first made its appearance. Whether the "spring" was a group of Syrian mystics, or, as we have no doubt it was, Jesus of Nazareth,

the creative source of this water of life is none other than the very being and activity of God. It is interesting to note that we have here a modern version of the old *filioque* controversy which split the ancient Catholic Church. At the same time we have, in the position taken above, the key to the solution of the problem. The Christian religious experience, or the operation of the Holy Spirit, proceeds, metaphysically speaking, from God the Father alone, as the Greek Church contended. But if, accepting the results of scientific New Testament criticism, we hold to the essential historicity of Jesus, we must maintain that this Christian religious experience or operation of the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also, historically speaking, from the Son. So is the contention of Western Christendom, in its essence, at length vindicated.

Thus will the new Christianity retain in rational form and, we may believe, without necessitating any loss of vitality, the essence of Christian orthodox theology as well as of Christian supernaturalism and Christian evangelicalism. And one of its marks will be that, without insisting that belief in the historicity of Jesus is indispensable for Christian faith, it will nevertheless attain to a scientifically tested practical certainty with reference to the essential historicity of Jesus, and will thus be able to enjoy all the advantages that come from knowing that the religion proposed for our acceptance is the religion which Jesus lived, and the religion which has always found its highest individual revelation of God in the spiritual life of Jesus, the Christ. It will *not* be a Christless Christianity.

What then, essentially, is the Christian religion? What is it in actual, historic Christianity that is necessary for the realization of ideal religion, and that can retain its vitality after the elimination of all irrational and other objectionable features from its traditional

form? Christianity is in essence the religion of discipleship to Jesus; the religion of faith in Christ as the divine Saviour of humanity; the faith that finds God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself. Or, differently stated, Christianity is the religion of the experience of Christlike divine grace; the religion whose universally accessible miracle is the experience of redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike religious dependence upon and fellowship with the Christlike Heavenly Father. Or, again, Christianity is the religion of the regeneration and sanctification of the individual and of society through the indwelling presence and creative activity of God, the Heavenly Father—the Holy Spirit, whose presence and power in the life of Jesus of Nazareth made him the divine Redeemer, the Son and Christ of God.

RELIGION IN SOME CONTEMPORARY POETS

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PITTSFIELD, MASS.

William Vaughn Moody, *The Masque of Judgment*, 1900; *Poems*, 1901; *The Fire Bringer*, 1904.

Frederic Lawrence Knowles, *On Life's Stairway*, 1901; *Love Triumphant*, 1904.

Josephine Preston Peabody (Mrs. Lionel Marks), *The Wayfarers*, 1898; *Fortune and Men's Eyes*, 1900; *Marlowe*, 1901; *The Singing Leaves*, 1903; *The Book of the Little Past*, 1908; *The Piper*, 1910; *The Singing Man*, 1911.

Stephen Phillips, *Christ in Hades and Other Poems*, 1896; *Poems*, 1898; *Paolo and Francesca*, 1900; *Herod*, 1901; *Ulysses*, 1902; *Sin of David*, 1904; *New Poems*, 1907; *Nero*, 1906; *New Inferno*, 1911.

Alfred Noyes, *The Flower of Old Japan*, 1903; *Poems*, 1904; *Golden Hynde and Other Poems*, 1908; *Drake*, 1909; *Tales of the Mermaid Tavern*, 1913.

Rudyard Kipling, *Collected Verse*, Doubleday, Page ed.; *Departmental Ditties and Ballads and Barrack Room Ballads*; *Poems scattered through prose*.

With eager expectations and with wistful yearning men have always turned to the poets as to watchmen of the night. The great poets see beyond the sunset and the stars, and read the writing of the wind upon the darkness. They are our prophets. God has whispered his secrets to them. And what they hear in the silence of the eternal, they proclaim in the streets of men. The poets are the pioneers of the spirit. They wander in desolate places; they are voices crying in the wilderness; and by the rivers of Babylon they see visions. The poets, at their best, have been leaders in religion.

So for these reasons many people ask today, Who are the new poets, and what message do they bring? And some especially will seek to know what aspects of religion constitute their message, what vision of the eternal shines in their large symbols and prophetic words. This is a reasonable inquiry, because English poetry from the

days of Chaucer and Langland to Tennyson and Browning has been distinctly religious. Indeed, it is impressive to observe that our greatest poets have arisen when the English people were mightily concerned with some great religious movement. Chaucer was the contemporary of Wyclif. Shakespeare was the poet of the large humanity which gave a glory to the Renaissance. Milton was the organ voice of Puritan England. Wordsworth was the messenger of that new love for man and nature which in the history of letters is called the Romantic movement. As Stopford Brooke observes: "The poets of England ever since Cowper have been more and more theological, till we reach such men as Tennyson and Browning, whose poetry is overcrowded with theology."

Since this has been so distinctly the high argument of our English poets, we may reasonably inquire how our younger contemporary poets are maintaining this tradition. This provokes two questions: What do we mean by religion? and Who are our younger contemporary poets? By religion, I do not mean precise statements on dogma or polity, creed or church. We do not look for epics on original sin, or lyrics on the historic episcopacy. The poets, when they are obedient to the heavenly vision, will go to the fountains of the religious life. And so we find that the great traditional themes of English poetry in this respect have been God, Man, and Nature; God's love for man, man's need for God, and the guidance of the inner Light; God's vision of man through Christ, and man's vision of God through Christ.

And who are some of our younger contemporary poets? If we wrote down the names of all the choir, we should have a very long list. In America we have, for example, Ridgely Torrance, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Percy Mackaye, Josephine Preston Peabody. In England, to name only a few, we have Alfred Noyes, Rudyard

Kipling, Stephen Phillips, and William Butler Yeats. To speak of all these, not to mention others, would be the task of an anthology rather than of the brief essay. I shall therefore select several who have been most conspicuous in the affection and admiration they have received from those of our youth who are readers and lovers of poetry. I shall speak of William Vaughn Moody, Frederic Lawrence Knowles, Josephine Preston Peabody, Rudyard Kipling, Stephen Phillips, and Alfred Noyes. I present these simply as being those of our younger contemporaries who have most influenced the young people I have known.

William Vaughn Moody has so recently left us and was so highly esteemed by those who read his poetry that in a true sense it can be said that he is one who lives. He had published before his death a volume of poems and two lyric dramas. When one attempts to summarize the religious aspects in the fine work of this poet, the word most suggestive is, I think, "prophetic." He is a prophet of the ideal. He is a poet who feels consecrated to a high calling—the proclamation in classic language of eternal ideals. This is clearly seen in what many readers will consider his finest poem, one which was hailed by Richard Watson Gilder as the grandest ode in America since Lowell's *Commemoration Ode*—the poem entitled *An Ode Written in a Time of Hesitation*. The text is St. Gaudens's famous bas-relief of Robert Gould Shaw and his men on Boston Common, and the subject of the poem is the national character during the Spanish War. He refuses to disbelieve in the ideal character of the Republic.

"The proud republic hath not stooped to cheat
And scramble in the market-place of war."

He has the irony of the prophet Isaiah in his arraignment of unworthy politicians.

“Our fluent men of place and consequence
Fumble and fill their mouths with hollow phrase,
Or for the end-all of deep arguments
Intone their dull commercial liturgies.”

This ode is a noble plea for the righteousness which exalteth a nation. It is not shrill or high-pitched or wild in thought, but firm in phrase, stern in demands for righteousness, and nobly eloquent. Like much of his work, it is Miltonic in style; and this is natural, for he was a student and editor of Milton. It is a prophetic utterance of our larger hope as a country.

All his poetry has this prophetic character. The *Daguerrotype* is a beautiful recognition of the spiritual character of motherhood. *Gloucester Moors* is a vision of the world's woe and the world's need; it is a prophetic psalm, and echoes the old cry, “How long, O Lord, how long!” In some of his poems, like the *Brute* and *Jetsam*, he is a prophet of the Apocalypse, dealing with strange, unearthly symbols and veiling his vision with obscure beauty.

This prophetic sense of the eternal moving through time and space is given a larger form in *The Fire Bringer*. It is the ancient story of Prometheus. And from this classic text he draws the great lesson of that sacrificial love which brings to “stone men” and “earth women” the fire of heaven and the light of day, the blessed rain and the natural darkness. In this play we find beautiful descriptions of the light shining in darkness, and the darkness comprehending the light. There is a terrible glory in the commanding miracle of the morning and the ancient magic of the night. Prometheus is the prophetic soul who feels the eternal spirit moving in his heart, and who can therefore never rest until the heavenly visitant becomes flesh and dwells among all men.

Much of this drama and of all his work is cloudy and obscure. He is also, perhaps, too academic for the great congregations. But at his best he is a poet who felt the presence of the eternal in the world of mortals, and who expressed this ultimate dream in a grand style, in phrasing which was classic and Scriptural in its origins and likeness.

Of another poet from whom many expected a good harvest in song and who now lives only in his verse, we may speak here. Frederic Lawrence Knowles left only two volumes of poetry. But these gave such large promise that he is worthy of honorable mention among our younger contemporaries of influence. In his poetry we see a fine religious feeling. He is the poet of what Emerson called "Love, which is the essence of God." There is nothing sentimental, weak, or shallow in his vision of love. The love of which he sings is both Lord and King, robed with the majesty of many suns and with the light of all the stars. He is the poet of that love which is the soul of Christianity. The title of his second and last volume, *Love Triumphant*, indicates the character of his work. And he is a preacher also in his methods, for he follows the homiletical tradition of a text. The texts of his poems in this last volume are Emerson's words, "Love which is the essence of God"; a couplet from Whittier,

"Love scarce is love that never knows
The sweetness of forgiving";

and the line from Shakespeare, "I do love my country's good." His creed is brief: "I know no sin except the lack of love."

Behind all outward shows and symbols in our Christian religion he sees the essential life of love. Churches, sects, creeds, and rituals, these are the visible and transient glories of our time. Over all is the love of God.

"Yet the east is red with dawn
 Like a cross where One hath bled!
 And upon that splendor drawn—
 Gentle eyes, and arms outspread—
 See that figure stretched above!
 As God lives! its name is Love."

He is a singer of a brave love, for he sings on Calvary's slope. He is the singer of magnanimous love, for he sings of that forgiving love which prays God to forgive those who know not what they do. He is the singer of the love that gives.

Theologically, it is most interesting to observe that he is a poet of the immanence of God. This aspect of the Divine nature pervades all his work. It shadows even the lines where the word does not appear. And again and again he sings with passionate joy of the indwelling spirit of God. He knows the presence of God in ancient days and in holy lands. He knows that presence also in these our city streets and country lanes.

"From Horeb's bush the Presence spoke
 To earlier faiths and simpler folk;
 But now each bush that sweeps our fence
 Flames with the awful Immanence.

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But now to us each elm and pine
 Is vibrant with the Voice Divine;
 Not only from but in the bough
 Our larger creed beholds him now.

To the true faith, bark, sap, and stem
 Are wonderful as Bethlehem;
 Nor hill, nor brook, nor field, nor herd
 But mangers the Incarnate Word."

And so the Christ of whom he sings is the Christ of today. In our cities he sees the Master. In our homes he sees the Holy Child. In our lives he finds the roads

to Jerusalem and Golgotha. In the quivering hearts of men broods the divine spirit.

And his verse is crowned not only with such large themes as the Divine love and the immanence of God, but it is given here and there in devout tribute and beautiful phrase to very definite Christian themes. He writes of Easter, Christmas, and on such suggestive lines as "Out of the depths," "Above every name," "And he healed them." There is a touch of the religious poets of the seventeenth century in these short lines:

"It takes two for a kiss,
Only one for a sigh;
Twain by twain we marry,
One by one we die.
Joy has its partnerships,
Grief weeps alone;
Cana had many guests,
Gethsemane had none."

And many, having heard, will find it difficult to forget these lines on Golgotha.

"Our crosses are hewn from different trees
But we all must have our Calvaries;
We may climb the height from a different side,
But we all go up to be crucified.
As we scale the steep, another may share
The dreadful load that our shoulders bear;
But the costliest sorrow is all our own,
For on the summit we bleed alone."

This poet is indeed a poet of the Christian year and Christian thought.

So with delight we find this poet of the Divine love, the immanence of God, and Christian thought, bringing this clear and fine vision of the eternal into the service of his country. He has a noble exaltation in his prayer:

"O goddess, arctic-crowned and tropic-shod,
And belted with great waters, hear our cry—
More honest never reached the ear of God—
We'll serve thee, laud thee, love thee till we die."

In his *Patriot's Hymn* he sees both the glory and the peril of our land. And he speaks without any clap-trap of the rugged and huge democracy in the United States.

"Oft-times, Democracy, thou seem'st to me
Not what the poets paint—a virgin fair
With soft limbs, and pale cheeks of purity
Framed in the splendid noonday of her hair;

Nay, but some Western Titan, bare of breast,
Huge-legged, low-browed, and bearded as of old,
A man of mountain muscle, and a chest
Whose lungs indifferent drink the heat, the cold."

His longest and most pondered work is the ode on New England, a filial tribute to her godly men and women, her throbbing cities and her quiet farms, her austere moods of winter, and her glorious days in June.

All his work is expressed with clearness and simplicity. In spirit and in words he is thoroughly of New England. His verse has the simplicity and beauty of the white meeting-house. A wholesome, good, effectual purpose is the prevailing character of his work. His lines are sinewy in strength and athletic in movement. Through his poetry comes the light of God, uncolored and untouched, just as the sunlight comes through the plain window glass of the New England meeting-house. He is a poet of the Divine love, the Divine Spirit, of his dear and blessed country; a poet of Christian faith and courage, knowing no failure except the failure to dare, knowing no sin except the lack of love, who out of the depths can lift his prayer to God, and on the heights can pray for those who fail.

With Josephine Preston Peabody we come to one who has gained high recognition on both sides of the Atlantic, and whose name, no doubt, would appear in every serious estimate of American literature. She has had for a dozen years a wide circle of friends who have known her as a lyric poet of a refined art, and as a dramatic poet of unusual promise. This promise was exceptionally fulfilled in her poetic drama, *The Piper*, which won the Stratford prize in England and immediately brought her name before a larger public.

Perhaps it is just to say that the religious aspect most conspicuous in her poetry is that second great commandment, the love of man for man. She sings of little children, of tender mothers, of very noble fathers, of lovers singing in the candlelight. She is one who has compassion on the multitude, on all who without a shepherd look up and are not fed.

Scattered all through her books, in many lyric poems, in her play, *The Piper*, in the *Book of the Little Past*, we find endearing visions of childhood. And this suggests that one of the finest contributions of the Victorian period and of our time to the more abundant life of our literature has been the artistic expression and spiritual discernment of the child. It has been, in one sense, the century of little children, and it is named in literature with the name of a great mother. It has been the age of children's schools and hospitals and playgrounds. The children have had their painters and their poets. Stevenson, for example, has been one of their poet-laureates. And Josephine Preston Peabody has written with the same grace and winsome humor and blithe and bonny spirit. Beyond all other mortals, the children are such stuff as dreams are made of, and to their airy imaginations this poet has given a local habitation and a name. The poem called *The Busy Child* will illustrate this quality in her work.

"I have so many things to do,
I don't know when I shall get through.

To-day I had to watch the rain
Come sliding down the window-pane.

And I was humming all the time,
Around my head, a kind of rhyme;

And blowing softly on the glass
To see the dimness come and pass.

I made a picture, with my breath
Rubbed out to show the underneath.

I built a city on the floor;
And then I went and was a War.

And I escaped from square to square
That's greenest on the carpet there.

Until at last I came to Us.
But it was very dangerous;

Because if I had stepped outside,
I made believe I should have died!

And now I have the boat to mend,
And all our supper to pretend.

I am so busy, every day,
I haven't any time to play."

This love for children and this knowledge of the little past are given a larger expression in her well-known play, *The Piper*. Back of all the life in this drama is the figure of Christ, to whom she has given the child's name of the "Lonely Man." Hamelin is the city of greed where the people whine:

"Five mouths around the table;
And a poor harvest, and now comes one more!
God chastens us."

Hamelin is the city of selfishness, and regards the child simply as

"Some one to work for me when I am old,
 Some one to follow me into my grave,
 Some one—for me."

And Hamelin is punished for its greed, selfishness, and injustice by the loss of the children. The Piper and Veronika are the lovers of the children. The Piper cries:

"I love thy child. Trust me, I love them all.
 They are the brightest miracle I know.
 Wherever I go, I search the eyes of men
 To find such clearness, and it is not there.
 Lies, greed, cruelty, and the dreadful dark!
 And all that makes Him sad these thousand years,
 And keeps His forehead bleeding."

The Lonely Man subdues the passionate resentment of the Piper, and the children are restored. The last word in the play is significant: "the Lonely Man." And so a preacher might say that this exquisite and noble poem is written on the ancient word, "Suffer the little children to come unto me"; for when the spirit that was in Jesus is in the hearts of men, they do indeed suffer the little children to enter their homes, and they in their turn enter into an understanding of little children.

Not only of the children but also of men and women who bear the burden and heat of the day is she the radiant singer. Her drama *Marlowe*, fashioned in the likeness of an Elizabethan play and filled with the men who bore a large part in those spacious days, belongs to the poetry of humanity. The religious issue is the tragedy of Marlowe. Condemned as an atheist by the orthodoxy of his time, he seeks God in his own way. He gropes through darkness for the Light. He is the bold thinker, the adventurous poet, who has searched and never found his God in power, in fame, and in high places. At last he learns that peace is the great boon and this

is given not as the world giveth. His last words and the last lines in the play are:

MARLOWE: "O God! God! God!"

HOST: "Did ye hear the oath?"

GABRIEL: "I heard the cry."

There in poignant phrase you have the summary; those who did not know the man heard only an oath, and those who knew him best heard a cry for God.

This compassionate understanding of her fellow men is the subject of her last book, *The Singing Man*. The majority of the poems in this book refer to present social conditions. Her poet's heart has understanding of the wrongs of men and knowledge of the old woe of the world. She herself says in a foreword in her last book:

"We make our songs as we must from fragments of the joy and sorrow of living. What life itself must be we cannot know till all men share the chance to know. Until the day of some more equal portion, there is no human brightness unhaunted by this black shadow—the thought of those unnumbered who pay all the heavier cost of living without knowledge that there is any joy of living. No song could face such blackness but for the will to share and for hope of the day of sharing. Upon that hope and that mindfulness the poems in this book are linked together."

And attention should be called to the fact that the mortal of whom she writes is the *singing* man. He is the man who ought to be able to pass through even the darkness of life with a new song on his lips.

On the whole, her lyric poetry is kindred to the best in our English literature, and her dramatic poetry traces much of its inspiration and artistic quality to the lofty lines and passionate intent of the Elizabethan plays. Her religion is concerned mainly with the love of man for man. It is a religion of faith, hope, and charity. She knows the darkness, but she always sees the gleam. The city smoke becomes glorious in the sunset, and "one grey

dove" by magic of the light becomes a "flock of golden and silver wings."

When we attempt to summarize the religious aspects of these three American poets, we find them grouped into three great expressions of the religious spirit. The religion in the poetry of William Vaughn Moody is that of the prophets. He is concerned with the eternal. He writes of judgment and creation. He speaks as one who has come from Sinai or the New Jerusalem. Like Milton, whom he knew so well and to whose ample and resounding lines he looked as to a master, he sings of vast designs, great arguments, eternal Providence. And to him was given genius to conceive the amplitude of figure and solemnity of music, harmonious with his adventurous thought. In Frederic Lawrence Knowles we find the religion of Saint John and Saint Francis. He sees the immanence of God. The word is life, and has come to dwell with him, and he has seen the glory and left it shining in his verse. He is the poet of divine love, and with Franciscan piety he calls Pain his brother and Sorrow his sister, and holds there is no sin except the lack of love. In Josephine Preston Peabody we feel the atmosphere of the gospel stories. In her poetry we find the lilies of the field, the birds of the air, the angels singing in the night, the little children, the poor, the sick, the broken-hearted, and those who sing no more. And over all the darkness is the light, and in the midst of men is one who is able to put a new song into their hearts.

II.

In England there is one poet who has had, it is probably safe to say, more influence over our youth than any other contemporary poet. Rudyard Kipling has had an extraordinary career. During the last few years he has suffered an eclipse in fame, and he certainly has

not continued the fine quality of his best creative work. He has also suffered from an extreme attack of popularity. It seems only yesterday that Charles Eliot Norton was introducing him to America with high and generous praise, and everybody was reading Rudyard Kipling. And now it is rather the fashion to speak of his "brass-band tunes." But when the balance is struck between undue exaltation and unfair depreciation, a goodly account will be left to the credit of English literature.

His work is so well known and its characteristics have been so frequently and effectively remarked that it will be unnecessary to dwell at length upon the religious aspects of his poetry. It is fair to say that the religion in the poetry of Mr. Kipling is the religion of the Old Testament. In this fact will be found the source of his weakness and of his strength. For the religion of the Old Testament, although vigorous, virile, reverent of the law, is for the larger part tribal and racial. The glory in the religion of the Old Testament is concreteness, force, personality, obedience to the covenant; and these are the glories in the religion of Mr. Kipling.

Perhaps the deepest note was struck in the famous *Recessional Hymn*; for in these lines we hear the deep note reverberant in the Psalms. "Have mercy on Thy people, Lord." This is the same piety as in the 51st Psalm: "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to Thy loving kindness." Kindred to this thought of absolute dependence on God is the thought of communion with the Eternal. Man has many helps and companions in his approach to the Father. But at last and in the highest places he must walk alone. All alone he enters the deepest communion with the Eternal. All alone Abram communes beneath the stars with Jehovah. All alone Jacob wrestles with the angel. In solitude Elijah hears the voice. Christ kneels alone in Geth-

semane. The path between man and God is wide enough for one and only one. This thought of communion, one of the deep notes in religion, we find many times in Kipling's poetry. In a poem which appeared as early as 1888, and which begins, "Lo, I have wrought in common clay," we have simple and forcible expression of this feeling. His conception of God is the Lord of Hosts, Judge of the Nations, Jehovah of the Thunders, Lord God of Battles. It is the God of Moses, of Joshua, and of Gideon.

"Ere yet we loose the legions,
Ere yet we draw the blade,
Jehovah of the Thunders,
Lord God of Battles, aid."

There is nothing of the Absolute and the Abstract in this religion. And it is curious that so little of the philosophy of India, with its vast, cloudy symbols of the ultimate, ever got into the religion of Mr. Kipling. His poetry remains impenetrably Anglo-Saxon and Hebraic. His religion is the faith of Beowulf and Gideon.

Very little of traditional philosophy or theology is found directly expressed in his verse. Perhaps the nearest approach to it is found in *McAndrew's Hymn*, where in the words of the old Scotch engineer he seems to show a fondness for Calvinism.

"From coupler-flange to spindle-guide I see Thy hand, O God;
Predestination in the stride o' yon connecting-rod."

When we turn from his ideas of God to his doctrine of man, we find ourselves again in the Old Testament. His men who sing the *Hymn before Action* are made from the same clay as Joshua and Gideon. Their psalms are battle-psalms, and in the lines we hear the clash of swords and the rush of warriors. Naturally, such a religion is emphatically masculine. Even his little

children speak like officers of the regiment; and even his gods in that prose-poem, *The Children of the Zodiac*, are distinctly human.

But the best in his doctrine of men is the capacity of his heroes to exercise the will to refrain. His noblest men are always doing the work for the work's sake, for the approval of God and not for the praise of men. They are willing to endure hardships, to be forgotten, or to see other men receive the reward for their work. All they desire is to do their best and receive "Well done!" from God. There are inspiring values in his young subalterns, bridge-builders, famine-officials, soldiers, and sailors, quietly and faithfully doing their work as in the presence of the "Great Overseer."

"By my own work before the night,
Great Overseer, I make my prayer.

If there be good in that I wrought,
Thy hand compelled it, Master, Thine;
Where I have failed to meet Thy thought,
I know, through Thee, the blame is mine.

One stone the more swings to her place
In that dread Temple of Thy Worth.
It is enough that through Thy grace
I saw naught common on Thy earth."

Last of all, we may look at Mr. Kipling's idea of the future. His heaven is also vigorous and virile. You cannot enter that estate unless you have done something. His idea of hell is no less virile and vigorous. For you cannot enter that abode unless you have done something worthy of damnation. His poem, *Tomlinson*, is the story of a man who was not able to enter either of these strenuous places because he had not done anything, either good or bad. His finest description of his heaven is found in the Envoi to *The Seven Seas* and in *The Last Chantey*.

His religion then is the religion of the Old Testament. It is concrete, vivid, and personal. His God is the Judge, the King, the Lord of Battles. His men, at their best, are those who toil and fight as those who must give account to Jehovah. His heaven and hell are what Mathew Arnold called the German critics—vigorous and rigorous.

In the poetry of Stephen Phillips we enter quite a different atmosphere; for we move from ballads and battle-psalms into the drama and the lyric. This poet is a skilful story-teller. He takes the old familiar tale and rewrites it with new beauty and in lyric lines. He tells the old story of Ulysses or David with simplicity and often with unforgettable lines. As every preacher knows, the narrative is a powerful weapon; so much so that people are often in danger of remembering the illustration and not the thought. Through narratives then and as the expositor, this poet reaches his congregation. *Paolo and Francesca* is, I think, the best. This haunting tragedy from Dante is told with delicacy and skilful power. You feel the great temptation and you feel no less the great sin. He succeeds in making you realize the impelling love, the shadow of wrong, and the approaching woe. This is also evident and emphatic in *The Sin of David*. This is really a sermon in an English setting, founded on the Old Testament story, and having for its text, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." In *Ulysses* we have a beautiful and strong idealization of the love between husband and wife.

"Yet we are bound more close than by a charm;
By fireside plans and counsel in the dawn,
Like gardeners have we watched a growing child."

"Thou knowest the long years I have not quailed,
True to a vision, steadfast to a dream,
Indissolubly married to remembrance."

In all these dramas he does not point the moral, but leaves the lesson to the narrative itself.

Still another quality of religious value his verse possesses. This is the ability to make the unseen things appear as the imperishable realities of life. This ability does not rise to great power, and seems to spring more from the heart of the story than from the heart of the poet. But if he could increase this talent of expressing the life of the spirit, he would be a great poet. You feel very strongly in *Paolo and Francesca* a sense of Will behind our will, a Purpose overruling our desires. In all his plays you are haunted by the presence of the unseen fate and destiny.

In his poems as well as in his dramas he is at his best in narrative. He does not seem to have the vigor of effectual convictions. He is, after all, a teller of old tales, in lines of grace and beauty.

The disappointment which has attended the work of both these English poets—for one is too strenuous and the other is not strenuous enough—finds a compensation in the work of Alfred Noyes. He is a young man, just over thirty, and already he has become conspicuous in achievement and reward. He has even been hailed as “the young Tennyson.” When we read his verse from the point of view of religion, we find ourselves richly rewarded. For here is a poet who, while keeping all the vigor of the Old Testament, rises into the tenderness of the New. He is a Christian poet. He has written an epic on Protestantism. He is a herald of peace. He is a lover of little children. I am inclined to think that his poetry is more prophetic of the poetry of this century than the work of any other of our younger poets.

His most ambitious work is the epic poem, *Drake*. This had the unusual distinction of running for a year as a serial in one of the English magazines. The poem rings with the glory of Elizabethan days. All the magic

phrases are present in his lines: "pieces of eight—gentleman-adventurers—the Spanish main—poops—pavisades—escutcheons—Gloriana's Knight." It is distinctly an epic of Protestant England and her victorious struggle with Rome and Spain.

The glory of the Protestant movement is most conspicuous in the historical setting of the poem. For on the one hand you have Elizabeth, Drake, and England; and on the other hand Philip, Spain, and Rome. And the poem rings with battle. Drake is the Lion of England, Gloriana's Knight, the sword and shield of Protestantism, the Dragon of the Apocalypse, the dread antagonist of Rome. He laughs at priestcraft and great galleons and magic waters sloping to the west. His fearless and adventurous voyage brings the great debate to open combat on the seas.

"Day by day there came as on the wings
Of startled winds from o'er the Spanish Main
Strange echoes as of sacked and clamorous ports,
And battered gates of fabulous golden cities;
A murmur out of the sunsets of Peru,
A sea-bird's wail from Lima. While no less
The wrathful menace gathered up its might
All round our little isle; till now the King,
Philip of Spain, half-secretly decreed
The building of huge docks, from which to launch
A fleet invincible, that should sweep the seas
Of all the world, throttle with one broad grasp
All Protestant Rebellion, having established
His red foot in the Netherlands, then to hurl
His whole world-empire at this little isle,
England, our Mother, home, and hope, and love,
And bend her neck beneath his yoke. For now
No half-surrender sought he. At his back
Robed with the scarlet of a thousand martyrs,
Admonishing him stood Rome, and in her hand,
Grasping the cross of Christ by its great hilt,
She pointed it like a dagger at the throat
Of England."

This attack is confronted with a militant Protestantism, which prays to God before it goes to battle. And in the great sea-fight with the Armada they are strong because they are surrounded by the host of God.

“Ten thousand times ten thousand! What are these
That are arrayed in yellow robes and sweep
Between your prayers and God, like phantom seas
Prophesying over your masts? Could Rome not keep
The Keys?”

The battle, moreover, is considered as more than a duel between England and Spain. It is a struggle between Light and Darkness. And when the victory is won, the epic closes with a prayer:

“‘Not unto us,’
Cried Drake, ‘not unto us, but unto Him
Who made the sea, belongs our England now!
Pray God that heart and mind and soul we prove
Worthy among the nations of this hour
And this great victory, whose ocean-fame
Shall wash the world with thunder till that day
When there is no more sea, and the strong cliffs
Pass like a smoke, and the last peal of it
Sounds thro’ the trumpet.’”

It is also worth while to remark that we find in the poem the very spirit in religion for which the Protestant churches have bravely contended. They have insisted upon a free approach of man to God. They have nobly stood for the truth that in the highest communion man is alone with God. So we find Drake at a critical period in his voyage going out into solitary places to be alone with God. His prayer is the Christian prayer, “Show me Thy ways, O God, teach me Thy paths! I am in the dark. Lighten my darkness!” And his experience is that of the Christian:

“And there by some strange instinct, oh he felt
God’s answers there, as if he grasped a hand.”

And all the troubles and joys of his life lift him into that eternal life which is in and through and over all the temporal sway of circumstances. So in this English epic we have both the fact and spirit of that movement which made England both Protestant and modern.

One great religious value which is prominent just now in our public life is given a noble and frequent expression in his poems—the question of peace. These poems are not meek and mild. This poet is a trumpeter for peace, and his trumpet gives forth no uncertain sounds. *Lucifer's Feast* is a savage sarcasm on war. *In Time of War* is a realistic picture of the ghastly horrors of the battlefield. *To England in 1907* is a prayer that she might speak for peace. *The Dawn of Peace* is a ringing proclamation of the reality. He urges England to hasten the coming of that day when all the kingdoms shall be the kingdom of God, and we shall have one banner and “one emperor whose name is love.”

“Ah, God speed that grander morrow,
When the world's divinest sorrow
Shall show how love stands knocking at the
World's unopened door!”

Like our American poet, Josephine Preston Peabody, he is a lover of little children. One volume, *The Flower of Old Japan*, is a vision of the world as seen through the eyes of children. It is, as he says in his preface, more than a collection of fairy tales. It is “an attempt to follow the careless and happy feet of childhood back into the kingdom of those dreams which are the sole reality worth living and dying for, . . . for which mankind has endured so many triumphant martyrdoms that even amidst the rush and roar of modern materialism they cannot be quite forgotten.” His religion is one in which men are constrained to be as little children in order to enter the kingdom of God.

In this young English poet we find the expression of our Christianity which unites the vigor of the Old with the tenderness of the New Testament. It is a religion of courage, manliness, and freedom, of tenderness, peace, and love. It has reality, and that is something the poetry of Stephen Phillips has lacked. It has the apprehension of the Divine love, and the peace of Christ, and the heart of childhood; and these are qualities which have not been conspicuous in the poetry of Rudyard Kipling.

And now having spoken in detail of the religious qualities in the work of these English and American poets, it will be fitting to regard them in the light of a larger significance. What is their relation to the sovereign ideals of our time? Are they a part of the great spiritual movements which are sweeping through this period? They have this larger value. They are indissolubly a part of the idealism which will give this period its distinction. For students of serious thought are well aware that in this the first part of the twentieth century we are under the influence of two great spiritual movements.

The first is the social or humanitarian movement. In these poets, in our most prophetic leaders, we have a passionate expression of this new vision in humanity. We have with us a chivalric defence of the weak against the strong. We feel keenly the burden of poverty. We hate with perfect hatred the dominion of vice and the government of sin. It is this ideal which already has commanded the century to write reform bills, to abolish a most ancient slavery, to break the old wrongs with a rod of iron and to dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel. Man's vast concern for man, the love of his neighbor, the commandment of brotherhood, the care for children, the beauty of the home, the fraternity of nations—this social ideal is unquestionably a great force to-day.

Unquestionably also it has received an undue emphasis. The social problem has frequently and arrogantly excluded all others, and modern humanitarianism has often descended into futile sentimentality. It is the distinction of these poets whom we have considered to have given a noble utterance to this idealism, without the extravagance and decadence too often foremost in some other moderns. For this great ideal is in serious danger of paganism. Many of its advocates urge on us the conviction that this world is man's abiding home; and to persuade man that this earth is his home is supremely the effort of paganism. Christianity is exactly the opposite—God's supreme effort to make men realize that this earth is not their home. Here we are pilgrims and sojourners as all our fathers were. This world, says Christianity, is a way to the eternal. Jesus called himself the Way; his religion was called the Way; his disciples were those who walked this Way. One of the earliest church manuals, the *Didache*, was a guide-book for this Way. Make this Way glorious, make the crooked straight and the rough places plain, but never forget it is a road leading to a city which hath foundations. This is the classic experience of humanity. This is the Christian ideal. This is the restraint so necessary in the expression of the modern social ideal. This is the fine tradition which gives these poets a large significance.

The second ideal is the anti-intellectual—romanticism. In its negative aspect it is a protest against the scholasticism of science, a rebellion against the dogmatism of the intellectuals. In its positive aspect it places the emphasis on the world of feeling, on the priority of the inward life, on the authority of the inward light. For example, those who follow this ideal welcome the assistance of Bergson in breaking down the dogmatism of science and in placing the emphasis on the "vital im-

pulse." They welcome the assistance of Eucken in his attacks on materialism and his defence of spiritual reality.

This movement at its best has the spirit of Platonism and of Christian mysticism. Its theology is kindred to that of Schleiermacher, the great leader in the romanticism of the last century, in its valuation of feeling.

And this ideal, like the social movement, is receiving too frequently at present a wild emphasis. In poetry, for example, we have the undesirable extremes in the "barbarisms" of Masefield, in some of the "lollipops" of Yeats and Synge, and the unreasoning enthusiasm which in London has greeted the Bengali poet, Tagore. Even of Bergson it may be said, "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*." For the Christian ideal cannot agree with the teaching which places the emphasis altogether on the life of the many. We emphasize the life of the one. Neither does the Christian ideal agree with the teaching that the things to be studied are the things that flow. These indeed require serious attention. But the things we study above all are the things that cannot be shaken. So there is in this modern anti-intellectual movement much of the excess which in the poet has always attended romanticism.

With this extravagance, either in the social or the anti-intellectual movement, the poets we have considered are not concerned. They have chosen the better part. They have given the classic expression to these ideals. In Knowles we see the emphasis on the Divine immanence, the very heart of the anti-intellectual movement. In Moody we see the emphasis on the Divine sovereignty, which must ever serve as a supreme restraint to that movement. In Kipling we see a robust and virile appreciation of that world of man, his ships and machines, his soldiers and sailors, his land and sea, that actual world in which the social ideal lives and moves and has its being. In Josephine Preston Peabody we see that

sensitive knowledge of the injustice, the woe of the world, which is the prophetic cry of our humanitarianism. And yet she walks in reason where other moderns stray, for, however gross the darkness, the inhabitant thereof is the singing man. However deep the pit, man can be lifted up and a new song placed upon his lips. In her lines also we read a woman's skilled interpretation of the inward life, especially of the inward life of childhood. And the heart of the child is the entrance to the Kingdom. In Noyes also we find this emphasis on the inward life, expressed in beauty and melody and with a wholesome love for reality. And in his verse also we see what the social movement must learn and acknowledge as its true utterance—a reformation of man only through the help of God. The Armadas of unrighteousness are scattered not altogether by our puny vessels. At the last, they are driven by the winds of God on the ultimate Hebrides.

These are the characteristics of the religion predominant in our time and in these poets. It is a religion of men who labor, if need be, in solitary places and in far-off lands. It is a religion in which the child, the home, and the love which is the greatest of all have a large place. It is a religion in which God's peace is no religious romance, but an overwhelming reality in the parliaments of man. It is a religion of freedom and liberty, insistently assuring man that on the path to the eternal he has in the highest stages no guide but the Divine light. It is a religion which maintains a high ideal for man and for the spirit in man. It is a religion which holds both the Divine sovereignty and the Divine immanence; for the more we find the Divine spirit within us, the more assured we are that the same spirit guides the world.

THE FITNESS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

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When Darwin first turned the search-light of his genius upon the world of Nature, and under its illumination men were compelled to replace their static views of organic creation by a dynamic representation that made the history of life a connected and, in great part, progressive process from the beginning, attention was mainly concentrated on the fitness of the organism to its environment. The fact of such fitness had long been obvious in differing degrees, but the problem of its causation as a factor in survival was then for the first time philosophically treated in the doctrine of Natural Selection. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that through all the earlier discussions that ranged round these topics the point of view was more or less one-sided. The fitness of the organism to its environment was stressed and stressed again; the question of the fitness of the environment to the organism was seldom raised, or even realized. In some cases, along with views advancedly transmutational, a conception of the environment was maintained that was almost static. The organism, isolated from its environment, was ransacked for its history in the laboratory or made the subject of experiment in order to elucidate its behavior. The conception of the organism and its environment as vitally and reciprocally connected, as a single system undergoing change, had not yet been reached. This does not mean that certain broad features of mutual adaptation and compensation between environment and organism were not appreciated, and even some-

times doctored into dubious demonstrations of divinity. The writer has some recollection of an apologetic lecture delivered seventeen years ago by a man of justly international reputation, although on other grounds, who detailed the composition of the atmosphere as then known, and argued for the existence of God in that it was not "sticky," and that, while animals were all the time breathing out carbonic acid gas and taking in oxygen, plants were engaged in the reverse process. With greater breadth of detail and a more admirable logic, attention had been directed even earlier in some of the famous Bridgewater Treatises, concerned as a series with "the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation," to the remarkable and in some instances unique properties of water, air, and the ether in their relation to the maintenance of life. Yet the conception of fitness was usually that of an externally arranged environment, prepared in complete detachment from that which was, just as extraneously, later introduced to inhabit it. There was little thought of a close and mutually determined development of organic and inorganic after a stage in which the latter by obvious history had become fitted to be at once part-parent and cradle of life.¹

It was inevitable, however, that with advance in understanding of the characteristics of the essential elements in the environment of living things, the degree of the capacity of these elements to serve in this respect should come into clearer light, while the rise of biochemistry made it impossible any longer to treat as of secondary importance their rôle when incorporated in the organism. But, in particular, the immense elongation of the environmental history as the results of modern spectroscopy and astronomical physics—the realization that the

¹ There have been of course many notable exceptions to this statement, as, e.g. A. R. Wallace, *Man's Place in the Universe*.

elements so essential to life had themselves undergone a long process of evolution—has gradually forced into the foreground the suggestion of the mutually unique fitness of environment and organism. Urged with keen logic and supported by a wealth of original research, this is the thesis of a recent brilliant study by Professor L. J. Henderson of Harvard.² “Darwinian fitness is compounded of a mutual relationship between the organism and the environment. Of this, fitness of environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which arises in the process of organic evolution; and in fundamental characteristics the actual environment is the fittest possible abode of life.”³

So daring a proposition could only be based on a restricted sense of the term “environment” as ordinarily understood, and it is at once made clear in the volume in question that this superlative fitness is only asserted of those physico-chemical elements that are ordinarily associated with life, and, further, this fitness is considered only with reference to a certain restricted series of organic characteristics. In fact the investigation is narrowed down to this specific inquiry: “To what extent do the characteristics of matter and energy and the cosmic processes favor the existence of mechanisms which must be complex, highly regulated, and provided with suitable matter and energy as food?”⁴

It may be at once admitted that the detailed answer to this question as based on modern chemistry is singularly impressive. The progress of science has served only to accentuate what was already known and to bring out even more profound correspondences and mutual relations between the organism and its environment. Further, the realization of the import of these data tends to the reconsideration of cognate problems, such as the

² *The Fitness of the Environment, an Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter* (The Macmillan Company, 1913).

³ P. v.

⁴ P. 37.

origin of life, while the whole series of phenomena calls for an interpretation. None of these topics has been overlooked in Professor Henderson's treatise.

Let us first consider the nature of the evidence. Of substances necessary to life, water perhaps holds the first place. In some instances the bodies of organisms are composed of it to the extent of ninety per cent, and as an actual organic medium it occupies about three-quarters of the surface of the earth. Because of its very high specific heat, all bodies of water have a tendency to maintain a nearly constant temperature, while the comparative moderation of summer and winter temperatures, and the promotion of marine currents and winds are directly and indirectly in part connected with the same fact—effects which go to make the earth peculiarly habitable. The same property is of extreme importance, further, in regulating the heat of the human body, of which water is the chief constituent; because of the high heat-capacity of water, man's exertions do not raise the temperature of his body as they would if it were otherwise composed. And in all these respects water has a fitness shared only by ammonia, which in other vital relations is far inferior.

Again, the freezing point of water, although low to the human organism, is really very high compared with that of similar substances; ammonia, for example, freezes at 75° Centigrade, a point at which most of the chemical activity known to us would cease. On the other hand, water cannot get colder than 0° Centigrade, however much heat is abstracted; that is, the cooling of oceans and lesser bodies of water is limited by its freezing point. In connection with the extraordinary evaporation going on over the surfaces of water, "no other liquid could . . . bind so much (latent) heat; no other vapor could yield so much heat upon condensation."⁵ In these last two characteristics, as in certain meteorological

⁵ P. 102.

logical relations, water produces maximum beneficent effects as compared with all other substances. Further, its unique quality of expanding when cooled at temperatures near the freezing point brings a whole train of benefits in its wake. As a solvent nothing can compare with water, and, gases apart, practically all the food of plants and animals is water-borne. Water has also the greatest surface tension of all liquids with the exception of mercury, a fact of peculiar importance in connection with the functioning of the colloidal structures in living matter.

Massed, as the ocean, it is further significant. Practically constant today in temperature, alkalinity, and concentration, this character of constancy is even more important biologically in relation to the chemical composition of sea-water. Of all balanced solutions of salts, "sea-water is by far the best." The constancy of the osmotic pressure of sea-water is another biological factor of primary importance, while the size, the mobility, the richness and varied nature of its constituents, all make the ocean uniquely adapted to life. In connection with the question of origin it is important to note, as Professor Macallum of Toronto first pointed out, that there is a quantitative correspondence between the various saline constituents of sea-water and mammalian blood which is more than accidental, while the regulatory processes of ocean and of organism, although differing greatly in degree, are not dissimilar in one or two respects, e.g. temperature-regulation by evaporation, and regulation of alkalinity. "Is it not possible," asks Professor Henderson, hinting at a point of view developed at a later stage of his study, "that in the case of the organic processes some have now and then been regarded as adaptations which in reality arose automatically and quite inevitably?"⁶ Waiving the question for the moment, we are confronted with the basal fact that in practically

⁶ P. 189.

every particular no other known substance could take the place of water in its various massed arrangements and meteorological phases without grave restriction of vital possibilities as we know them. Nothing can even approach it in fitness as an environmental factor.

Yet water is not alone in possessing a marked fitness for the life-cycle. Carbonic acid gas,⁷ because of its unusual solubility, is "the one substance which in considerable quantities relative to its total amount everywhere accompanies water;" indeed the two together make up "the real environment." Extraordinarily useful as a food with its maximum mobility and all-pervasiveness, carbon dioxide, because of the precise degree of its weakness as an acid, further has the remarkable and unique property "of preserving a neutral reaction whenever it exists in solution with its salts, provided there be an excess of acid." To this is due the characteristic chemical inactivity of water, which is all the more wonderful, since "acidity and alkalinity surpass all other conditions, even temperature and concentration of reacting substances, in the influence which they exert upon many chemical processes." Almost entirely as the result of this mechanism the oceans are always nearly neutral, and protoplasm and blood possess an unvarying reaction. In connection with the last circumstance an interesting theoretical point emerges. The equilibrium between carbon dioxide and bicarbonates has a first place in the regulation of the reactions both of blood and of protoplasm. Now this significance of carbon dioxide is not an adaptation, for "natural selection can have nothing to do with the occurrence of CO_2 in the living organism, or, presumably, with the nature of the original living things upon the earth." In the day of few things, carbon dioxide was there and simply had to be a constituent of primeval life.

⁷ Now usually known as carbon dioxide.

Very naturally, out of the interactions between water and carbon dioxide arises the study of the infinity of compounds into which their elements—carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen—can be transformed. Here the demonstration of fitness for life becomes more technical, but none the less impressive. Carbon compounds are unique not merely because they are numerous; “they are uniquely numerous because they are compounds of carbon with hydrogen, oxygen, and in some cases certain other elements,”—compounds unique and peculiar in their chemical relationship, resulting, for example, in the stability of complex organic substances. No other elements apparently can readily form compounds comparable in number, variety, complexity, and capacity for chemical change, with those of the elements under consideration. That the very elements which make up water and carbon dioxide, and apparently they alone, should possess these wonderful properties, is, to say the least, very remarkable. Without the burden of detail it may be stated that there is a basal transformation which underlies the life of plant and animal alike; whereby in the laboratory of the leaf-cell by means of solar energy, the carbon dioxide of the atmosphere and water are reduced, so that a carbohydrate, sugar—in reality a system comprising some two hundred substances of great chemical activity—is formed with liberation of the oxygen and storage of energy. “This is the one chemical process which is open, if any transformations whatever are to be accomplished with carbon dioxide and water; and this leads directly and to all appearances necessarily to the greatest chemical complexity that has been found in any one chemical process.” It leads, in short, to the full intricacy of organic chemistry, and that, so far as can be seen, as the result of the native properties of the three elements. Finally, in connection with the reductions and oxidation that go to constitute the vital transfor-

mations of energy, it appears that carbon and hydrogen make good reservoirs of energy to be liberated by oxidation; that oxidations are the best chemical source of energy (reactions with fluorine excepted); that reductions are the best means of storing energy by chemical processes; and that amongst possible oxidations and reductions, those of hydrogen especially, and then those of carbon, are associated with the largest transformation of energy. In other words, "the very chemical changes which for so many other reasons seem to be best fitted to become the processes of physiology, turn out to be the very ones which can divert the greatest flood of energy into the stream of life; and these are the reactions automatically provided for by the cosmic process."⁸

Water and carbon dioxide, occurring in vast quantities outside the crust of the earth, have then both in themselves and in compounds formed from rearrangements of atoms of their component elements a maximal number of qualities, many of them unique, for coöperation in the complexity, regulation, and metabolism of life. What reflections, rather than conclusions, may be suggested by this and the cognate data that have been outlined above?

To begin with, they certainly bring the inorganic and the organic into the closest of relationships. The former is shown to consist initially of a nebula composed of a comparatively small number of "proto-elements," which increase in number and gradually evolve into the elements of modern chemistry. At a certain stage in the history of the planet into which this primal nebular condition cools and concentrates, life draws into being, at first, let us suppose, in specific colloidal molecules. The material connection appears to be so direct that the differentia must be energetic. This is not, however, the view taken by Professor Henderson. "There is certainly no reason to ascribe greater importance to energy than

⁸ P. 248.

to matter in the vital processes.”⁹ On the contrary, we believe there is every reason. The sole difference between a living cat and the same creature a moment after death is an energetic one—not quantitative, but in the control and direction of its stock of energy. The energy of the dead cat is dissipated by heat-radiation and slow combustion of the tissues; that is, it flows along paths which are determined by external agency, and in time a state of equilibrium is reached. The energy of the living cat flows along paths which are only indirectly determined by outside conditions. Fling it up alive, and it will always land on its feet; fling it up dead, and it will come down “any old way.” Further, the organism is a centre at which the ordinary tendency to degradation of energy is resisted, while the phenomena of reproduction and of consciousness, of which no energetic explanation is at present possible, are left entirely out of consideration.

“Energy, like matter, is in general well known to us. Its manifestations are few, and they are universal.”¹⁰ Again, we would, on the contrary, maintain that in the light of present knowledge we know much more about matter, and the knowledge is different from that in regard to energy. Of the latter there is no thorough-going theory available. The older teaching laid down a division into energy of motion (kinetic energy) and energy of position (potential energy). Some of the stock examples of the latter are not, however, forms of energy at all, but only, as Professor Benjamin Moore says, “potentialities for the development of energy,”¹¹ as in the case of water stored at a height. Beyond the important fact that measurements of different forms of energy in different units bear a constant relationship to one another, little is known as to what is actually in-

⁹ P. 209.

¹⁰ P. 18.

¹¹ *The Origin and Nature of Life*, p. 36.

volved in the transformation of energy; whether in some cases it is an actual transformation at all or merely an exchange comparable to that which obtains at the merchant's counter. Further, the doctrine of its conservation, while demonstrably true of certain closed systems, can only be extended to the universe by a gigantic act of faith conveying at the same time data inconsistent with the doctrine.¹² It is even probable that in the ultimate analysis matter is electrical, that is, energetic, in origin; that the ether, particulate or non-particulate—more probably the latter—when associated with energy, serves to produce the electron, the initial visible stage in the creation of matter. But the *sine qua non* would appear to be an eternal source of creative energy which, operative as kinetic energy, thus produces matter of lowest atomic weight, into whose units it packs itself as potential energy. In the furnace of a nebula such a process, it may be, is in operation with constancy, and likewise with critical pulses of action that have issued in the distinctive features of cosmic history.

A further reflection connected with this historically evolved environmental fitness concerns itself with the question of the moment of the origin of life. In the masterly address of Sir Edward A. Schäfer, President for 1912 of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the opinion was hazarded that “the possibility of the production of life—that is, of living material—is not so remote as has been generally assumed”; while the conclusion was held to be “forced upon us” that “the evolution of non-living into living substance has happened more than once, and we can be by no means sure that it may not be happening still.” The fact, however, that life even in its simplest manifestations is invariably organized, together with the full understanding of what is

¹² Cf. G. W. de Tunzelmann, *God and the Universe*, pp. 90–97; Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 22.

implied in the conception of a history of life, namely, that not merely life itself but the environment of its production and evolution have been correlatively subjects of a broadly progressive change, makes it difficult to believe that life will return upon itself, so to speak, even in the laboratory of the experimenter. A specific moment came when the organic colloid became possible, infinitely more complex than its antecedent inorganic relative, and characterized by marked lability, which means just so much more sensitivity to external stimulation. Even if we assume that inorganic colloids were first capable of formation at the time of the deposition of the sedimentary rocks when the temperature of the crust had already fallen to just under 100° Centigrade, the organic colloids came into existence shortly after that at a definite stage in the history of our earth, when many conditions were very different from the present and absolutely irreproducible. The ocean, for example, has grown colder and more saline since that era; its reaction has changed from faintly acid to faintly alkaline. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been enormously reduced since those days, and the sun is colder. In short, conditions of temperature, atmosphere, possibly even in some measure of chemical affinity and electricity, were greatly different, and in view of the peculiarly close relation and adaptation of every form of life to its environment it seems unphilosophical to look for the origin of life other than in the precise phase of planetary development under which it first arose. No form of life, once extinct, has, so far as we know, again appeared, and only in the most superficial of senses can it be said that history repeats itself.

There is, finally, a primary quality of environmental fitness, prior to the appearance of life, and therefore not due to the action of natural selection—an antecedent adaptation. Has this merely happened so, or is it in

the nature of a prepared environment? It is an old question, whose complete and final answer in terms of knowledge is unattainable on this stage of existence. There is absolutely no doubt that Professor Henderson is right in asserting that "Science has finally put the old Teleology to death."¹³ The question remains whether she has not supplied us in return with a teleology farther-reaching and more profound. Strictly, this may well be a question for the philosopher rather than for the man of science. *Qua* man of science, the latter is perfectly within his rights in holding to a mechanistic interpretation even as an ideal; he is only wrong when he pretends that even an approximation has been reached in the interpretation of life or its environment in terms of mechanism alone. From such assumption the volume in question is scrupulously free. Indeed, it is explicitly stated that there is "not one chance in countless millions of millions" that the many properties of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and their compounds, uniquely favorable to life, should occur simultaneously other than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together.¹⁴ The illuminating conclusion is even drawn that "logically, in some obscure manner, cosmic and biological evolution are one." It is one process yielding results not merely contingent, but "resembling those which in human action we recognize as purposeful." Yet of all this "an explanation is to seek; none is at hand."

It would not be difficult even in this balanced work to point out instances where use of the mechanistic interpretation simply covers a begging of the question at issue.¹⁵ A more important matter is whether "lacking any indication of what such an explanation may be, or how it is to be sought," it is of any practical use dogmati-

¹³ P. 311.

¹⁴ P. 276 ff.

¹⁵ Cf., for example, the sentence in conclusion of a paragraph, beginning "It is easy to see that, given an enzyme possessing the power to select," etc., p. 231.

cally to insist that even for science the explanation "must be purely mechanistic."

After all, the main question about an interpretation is not whether it is strictly supernatural or metaphysical or mechanistic, but whether it is complete, or even ever likely to be so under the limitations of the method pursued. It is only utility that makes us artificially speak of "the world of science." The world is one. And there is no limitation in the neo-vitalistic hypothesis that may not be matched by a corresponding one in mechanistic explanation, while the latter can never in any case be final when applied to life, since, as Oskar Hertwig long ago pointed out, it takes no account of the activity of the organism itself, the maintenance of which is the creature's object.¹⁶ The mechanical indifference of parts, as in an engine, is replaced by an "organic consensus." On the other hand we consider that it is inexact to say that in vitalistic speculations "the properties of matter and the process of cosmic evolution have no place."¹⁷ They have as much place as in any other explanation. What in any case is chemical affinity? Something that, intangible by ordinary methods yet demonstrable in its results, is to that extent akin to the directive tendency which the neo-vitalist finds necessary to supplement his explanation of certain massed results in the realm of life.

As already stated, Professor Henderson definitely realizes the limitations of mechanistic views. "Mechanism can never explain, cannot even face the problem of the existence of matter and energy."¹⁸ He even thinks it may be necessary to postulate "a bent, a direction of flow or development," in inorganic nature as in organic. But this philosophical excursion seems risky, and towards the close of the book he retires again within the scientific

¹⁶ Cf. J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, Chapter II.

¹⁷ P. 296.

¹⁸ P. 309.

compound, and puts his mind at rest by turning his back, to use his own phrase, on ultimate problems. "It is certain that physical science needs no teleology to explain its phenomena and processes." This may be true of any stage considered in isolation, with its prepared matter leading on to another stage; but it is hardly true of the whole, when we consider its character, to what it leads, and the simple fact that it does so lead.

This, however, is to enter "the realm of ends," to ask for a thorough-going exposition and criticism of causality, and to seek for a standard by which the advance or retrogression of various stages may be measured. All this and more will be found in Professor Hobhouse's "Development and Purpose," which, in thesis and treatment at least, makes a profounder appeal; for, while Professor Henderson considers evolution to be biocentric, Professor Hobhouse argues that it is psychocentric. He thinks that it "can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings under control."¹⁹ Or, as it is more conclusively phrased on another page: "There is a spiritual element integral to the structure and movement of Reality; and evolution is the process by which this principle makes itself master of the residual conditions which at first dominate its life and thwart its efforts."

Thus to seize on the most distinctive feature or product of a process and endeavor through its aid to arrive at some interpretation of the whole, gives greater promise of success than a method which, mechanism-bound, must continually work backwards rather than forwards for the limited explanation that in the end it can afford. Such a view alone has any prospect of being able to relate the empirical order to the underlying conditions of reality. It will further furnish us with at least some palpably plausible explanation of the environmental fitness for which on terms of strict mechanism "existing knowl-

¹⁹ P. xxvi f.

edge provides no clew." For it is nothing less than the insistence that a purpose is at the core of the world-process, conditioned it may be, at least to begin with, yet ever coming into fuller and completer expression of that Reason which is the ultimate cause of the various correlations and concomitances disclosed by the process. In its revelation of increasing values as characterizing the graded stages of evolution, as well as in its recognition that the future equally with the past may truly be said to be determining the actual present, it has an outlook that extends beyond the purely mechanical explanation with its naïve, linear conception of causation, indifferent to concomitants, to values, to ends. Not merely does the mechanical view fail to meet the demands of science; it does not satisfy the spiritual cravings of man.

A reconstruction both conceptual and experiential accordingly is called for, whose final secret Professor Hobhouse considers to lie "in the consciousness of development itself. . . . The essence of this reconstruction is the entry into the sphere of consciousness, previously concerned only with results, of the data and the processes by which results are obtained." This in turn, we believe, must inevitably lead to a spiritual interpretation of nature, based upon the environmental fitnesses detailed above and upon the gradual awakening and uprising of consciousness till it becomes not merely conscious of its life as a unity, but of the conditions under which it has come into being, and, controlling these, moves with a straighter course to the as yet dimly appreciated goal. Natural selection, which represents the play of physical forces and of life itself upon its own advance, gradually loses its force as the methods of that play are better understood and so controlled. That which was implicit in the process becomes more and more explicit, and more important and determinative; that which was operating

on consciousness increasingly becomes an object of consciousness, as the ultimate Reason, the basis of the persistent law and order of the universe, shows forth more and more of itself in human personalities and society, thus bringing their lives into ever-increasing harmony with one another and with itself. The individual's highest response to this transcendent influence and appeal lies in becoming like that which thus influences and appeals. So to think is to recognize in the words of the ancient seer no rush of rhetoric but a profound glimpse into the heart of things: "For thus saith the Lord that created the heavens; he is God; that formed the earth and made it; he established it, he created it not a waste, he formed it to be inhabited."²⁰ It is also to acknowledge the essential fitness of the apostolic injunction: "Work out your own salvation. . . . It is God that worketh in you."²¹

²⁰ Isa. 45 18.

²¹ Phil. 2 12, 13.

THE MODERN MAN'S RELIGION: A SOCIAL QUESTION

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The religious question of an earlier day was, "Are *you* saved, my brother?" Matters have changed since then. Religion at this moment is but slightly a matter for individual concern or query, while it is very decidedly of serious importance to social thinkers and sociological conferences. As matter of fact, a consideration of the "state of religion" in our present day is no longer a mere courtesy to constituted religion but is a necessary logical preliminary to sociological reconstruction as such. For consider the significance of religion from the social idealist's point of view. One may calculate to the nicest exactitude every needed remedy for our glaring maladjustments, yet that result all by itself will be of no worth until the crucial question is answered whether, after all this information and wisdom has been gained, people of the average sort are going to pay any attention to it, let alone act accordingly. It is or should be plain that in social betterment as in life in general, though men by the grace of science know all mysteries and all knowledge, yet if they have not love, all social panaceas are condemned to be but effervescent dreams and much-whipped syllabub. The perception of values is nothing, except there be a fundamental and innate recognition of values as absolutely and beyond argument binding. The many imposing models of desirable social machinery being prepared by skilled draughtsmen within and without

our universities and social settlements and the like, can never be made to *go*, despite all their glistening cogs and cams and innumerable clever devices, without a certain minimum of that spontaneous energy which we call religion. You may prove never so clearly how wages might be raised and taxes be more equalized and how at last, far off, poverty may be abolished. For those in the saddle there is easy reply, "Why give up our advantage? Why not 'let us alone'? What are our servants and tribute-givers to us? Why are we our brothers' keepers?" To such blustering self-regarding inertia as this, there could be no answer save the appeal to deep realities, which because they *are* cannot by any "why" be shouldered aside.

Still further let it be remarked that in discussing this available energy in the modern man which we call his religion, we are especially, and as sociologists necessarily, interested not in the high potentials of certain individuals or organized bodies of them, but rather in the average gauge-readings, so to speak, of the common run of men upon which—and particularly in a democracy—so much depends. Our concern here, that is to say—and this point should be borne in mind throughout—is not in the least with our modern idealists or our modern saints or our modern churchmen as such. The "modern man" includes saint and sinner, the university graduate and the man on the street, the church-goer and the non-church-goer; not only the idealistic philosopher but also the realistic and the pragmatic and even, if we can find him, the materialistic philosopher. We are inquiring here not into the religion of the conventionally and temperamentally religious, but precisely into the religion of the modern man in all his varieties at once.

To begin with the negative and less creditable aspects of the religion of today, it is to be remembered that the men and women of the present are near-sighted, unable

to grasp that which is less than obvious; to sum it up in a labelling phrase, they are decidedly and unquestionably lacking in religious imagination.

1. There is the current indifference to the fact of immortality. People dislike of course the thought of losing permanently their relatives and close friends; they care that much about immortality. As regards themselves however, the life after death is too far-away to be thought about. Mr. Lowes Dickinson could entitle his Ingersoll Lecture of a few years ago, very significantly in this connection, "Is Immortality Desirable?" To the same purpose is the fact that modern discussions of religion of the non-technical sort practically never include this question at all. Mr. Winston Churchill's recently published novel, *The Inside of the Cup*, for example, ranges over most social and theological matters under heaven. It even drags in by the hair of its head and in the closing chapter, a discussion of the religious view of marriage. It is loudly silent however as to immortality, for the reason that the modern man is not interested. In the very recent discussions bearing upon this matter from M. Maeterlinck¹ and Sir Oliver Lodge² and the considerable public attention excited by them, we have only an apparent refutation of the assertion that people nowadays do not care for immortality. For, I submit, the concern of these writers chiefly, and of their readers wholly, is in the validity of certain alleged messages from the dead. In so far, the modern man's interest is here not in the future nor religious, but present and scientific.

2. Modern lack of imagination in religion appears also no less in the present impatience of authority of every kind. The average man of today is restive under any dogmatic assertion; and this is especially true of

¹ "Life after Death," *Century Magazine*, September, 1913.

² Presidential Address (1913) before the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

religious assertions. Our instinctive reply to any downright dictum is, "Why is it so? Who says so?" And usually we add, "What of it if he does say so!" We have none of that deferring to the powers that be, which made life in general and religious life pre-eminently so ordered and so regular in the older days. We have lawlessness indeed everywhere. Who should know that better than the social thinker? It appears not only in lynchings, but in lawyers who specialize upon how to drive coaches and fours through the law of which they should be the guardians. It stalks among us in disobedient children and—the complement of them—careless parents; in easily loosened marriages, and what is called in general the "new ethics," especially the new ethics of sex, which is championed outright by Ellen Key, and less directly but no less really for American readers by Robert Herrick and Albert Edwards and Edith Wharton—not to speak of others much less able. All this chaotic confusion of our times crops out also and naturally in our religion. Self-expression here too is for us more important than loyalty to any authority or even to any consistent course of thought and action. The right to liberty, meaning the right to do as one pleases, is a right everybody thoroughly believes in and more or less universally exercises.

This lawlessness is yet, we must remember, no outbreak of desperate wickedness. It is only a result of the modern man's near-sightedness. He does not despise dignities and authorities as such; his difficulty is that he cannot in any of them discern any real right to command. Statutes are to him not hateful, but impalpable; abstract duty is not detestable but simply non-existent; while that value of a law-abiding attitude which was for Kant so clear and sure is not so much denied as utterly invisible and incomprehensible to him. Only actual force, so it seems, can keep these times in bounds,

and where, as is the case in religion, the old force, fear, has largely vanished, there authority may assert itself as it will; nobody really pays any attention to it whatever.

3. But the modern man's lack of imagination is best summed up and realized in the familiar and characteristic neglect at present of religion in its ecclesiastical forms. This neglect is not due, as in the eighteenth century, to any hostility to clerics and churches. Aside from Spain and Portugal and the countries under their influence, where conditions are peculiar, church leaders are not despised or distrusted. They are on the contrary approved and in financial ways often most generously supported. Yet despite this absence of bitterness the modern man has little to do with the church. The conventional thing, in our United States at least, is to ignore the church altogether. We may like this or not; it is the truth of the matter.

It is the old fault in a new guise. The trouble with the church for the average man today is primarily that it has too many ties uniting it with the past in its phrases and ideas and methods. It keeps open a line of communication in many directions between that which has been and that which is. It repeats creeds of centuries ago, with modern interpretations, to be sure, but with a vital interest in what it calls "the unity of the faith." It has symbols such as Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which are no new inventions but came into existence long before this twentieth century dawned, and as to which indeed many even of the church's own members have an interest which, to be frank, is but tepid. The church's services do not for the every-day man appear to be of any immediate practical value; they are, that is, neither lectures nor singing-schools nor entertainments. They have some of the traits of these—I am quoting the average standpoint—but in addition they are pervaded

and even drenched with the historic and the symbolic. The dead hand is upon the church, every church, as well as the living hand. Dead voices are heard there as a constant undertone. And all this which the modern man finds so repellent is not in the least accidental. The church as church rejoices in this solidarity of its present with its past. We church people want such a solidarity and believe that humanity will in the long run be the better for it. But the modern man decidedly does not want it. He is puzzled by all this interest in the remote. The value of the symbolic eludes him. He cares nothing and less than nothing for the historic as such. It is inevitable consequently that he should regard much that goes on in the church as a waste of time and energy. He cannot comprehend the fact that a church may be up-to-date while yet it is glad and proud to thrust its roots back into the immemorial centuries. He cannot realize how a dead-and-gone past may be of value to a living present. He has not sufficient imagination to realize it; that is the sum of his offending. It is again lack of imagination and nothing more sinister which is responsible at bottom for the present temporary ebb of interest in the church as church.

In a word then, to sum up our discussion thus far, one would not be far wrong in dubbing the religion of the modern man prosaic and still under the spell of him whom Dickens so detested—Mr. Gradgrind. Pragmatism, which may fairly be called the current philosophy of this generation, scarcely allows even being to that which is not immediately and rather obviously effective. Christian Science and what calls itself "New Thought," this modern day's contribution to religious thinking, are strong most of all in their suppression of those vain imaginings, as they regard them, which crop out in fear and sickness. Modern comforts lull the modern mind to forget its dreams and outreachings. Modern research

has cowed our imagination and clipped the wings of fancy for all but the infinitesimal few who are themselves engaged in research. The modern man is circumscribed of vision in every realm. How natural therefore that in religion too he should be a man of this world, eschewing all else; proud of his freedom from all taint of other-worldliness when he should rather be ashamed of his narrowness!

Enough has been said of what the religion of the modern man lacks. A much pleasanter task is the attempt to discern what is positive and virile in modern religion.

At the outset, it must be said and with emphasis that these very negative aspects which we have been considering are held true and believed not negatively and for themselves but as the obverse of other positive religious certainties. These obverses are often fallaciously inferred, but they are asserted as deductions and not arrived at in the first place as original fundamental convictions. That is to say, the religion of the modern man, though in certain respects negatively oriented, is not a scepticism; and this is in itself a significant and positive-facing description of the state of affairs. The modern man, for example, justifies his indifference to immortality by insisting upon his concern with present tasks and opportunities. He rejects authorities and dignities, both good and evil, because he is so filled with a sense of the value of the individual. He neglects church-religion because he prefers to be busied in what is to his mind more vitally practical. In a word, these negative aspects of modern religion which have been here enumerated—and they contain, be it remarked, the worst that can be said against present-day religion—do after all show this much that is encouraging, that the modern man even in his religious shortcomings is rather intel-

lectually unenlightened than either morally or religiously culpable.

But the positive reality of the modern man's religion is not merely a fact to be surmised and arrived at in this fashion from negatives. The emphatic and glowing religious spirit of the modern man is there in him as a fact in itself and immediately observable for those that have eyes to see and ears to hear.

1. There is what may be termed the creative energy of these days, an energy which always partakes, wherever found, of the divine. To speak in language which is perhaps more intelligible, I mean that the modern man intensely believes in doing what is practically possible for the increase of order and happiness in the world. This is a trait of our time so frequently met with that we regard it for the most part as a matter of course. But it is no commonplace. It is a religious attitude peculiar to these days and to our Western civilization. The average person in the Orient and even the pundit has none of this eager willingness for improvement, either in himself or in others or in the general life-conditions about him. He starves without complaint. He is wholly submissive; what is, is for him the measure of what must be. All he asks of life is escape in the form of release from the wheel of rebirth. There are of course historic and economic reasons for Eastern fatalism and quietism; but whatever the reasons, this is at all events the situation with him; while on the other hand Occidentals as a whole and Americans in particular take the opposite creative active attitude—not submitting to their environment, but altering it tirelessly; not waiting for things to happen, but going forth and making them happen; not yearning dumbly to elude existence, but improving existence with all their might in every possible respect. Pragmatism's note, here to the point, is downright noble and truly religious; insisting

that it depends upon each individual's sturdy loyalty whether or no the values of life increase or decrease; emphasizing robustly that God is a striving God who must be helped if he is to conquer. That note of practical self-reliance is not only one of the finest doctrines in pragmatism; it is deeply representative of these days, wakening as it does an answering chord in all the modern world. For the modern man is not only sure at the heart of him that improvements in things can be brought about; he looks upon himself as a partner in the project and desires nothing so much as to be up and at the business. He is religious in that he feels the task of bringing order out of chaos definitely and peculiarly laid upon him. The duty of accomplishing something tangible, the call to effect something worth while, does not in him find deaf ears, but on the contrary sets him at once into a high state of tension and action. Is not this a positive and splendid quality of present-day religion? If Jesus exalted the publicans and harlots above the Pharisees because the publicans and harlots were living up to what they knew, while the Pharisees were not,—in so far putting practical obedience above theoretical insight—may we not appeal to his authority for believing of the average man, wofully blind though he often is, that his religion is yet real, since he too is energetic and downright in his pursuit of the charity and usefulness and righteousness which he does see?

So far as our social thinkers and plan-makers are concerned, let them be well assured that the modern man will undertake at their behest any social helpfulness which promises sure returns of enhanced social justice. Our social experts must make their proposals and the reasons for them very, very plain. They must not scold if the average man cannot at once take their point of view. Only let them still be patient and persistent,

since, when they do convince him at length, they will have gained an immediate partisan and an enthusiastic co-worker.

2. Then for another religious quality of the modern man, there is his pity for the needy, his fellow-feeling for the under-dog, his many points of resemblance to the good Samaritan whenever he meets one who has fallen by the wayside. One is not in these days obliged to prove by syllogisms or Biblical citations the brotherhood of man. Everybody knows its reality, for everybody lives by it. A woman taken ill in the railway coach always finds a coachful of friends immediately busied in ministering to her. A child lost is safe in appealing to practically any passer-by. A great tornado or flood will scarcely bring misery faster than express and telegraph bring clothing and money and sympathy. A clear case of injustice to any—as to Miss Ellen Stone or in the Dreyfus case—will put men by the thousands up in arms until the wrong is righted. The modern man cannot pass by suffering unmoved. The ancients could easily do so; heathen countries, most of them at least, still can; but the modern man cannot. The rise of pity, individual and social, is a characteristic religious trait of the modern Christian world. Our very temptation in these days to sentimentality in our sympathy, undeniably indicates a deep-lying sentiment of sympathy which must be there in order to be counterfeited and torn into tatters. The brotherhood of man is not a religious theory but a religious faith; it is not an assertion but a never-failing spring of action. Even our theologians appreciate this. At all events, most theologians in these days, if they will observe their mental processes, will find themselves tacitly, if not overtly, inferring the fatherhood of God from the brotherhood of man, and not *vice-versa*, as it used to be and as it is in the New Testament. This does not disprove in any sense the father-

hood of God, but it does show how basal and sure is our consciousness of human kinship.

It may be objected when one asserts roundly the sympathy of the present generation: "How about the social problems of this very day? What of the miseries of the poor which exist largely because somebody 'higher up' has sold them for a pair of shoes? Are there no black examples, blacker today than ever before, of man's inhumanity to man? Is this the sympathy of the modern man?" No, it is not sympathy, far from it! But let us bear in mind that these and other ugly forms of modern injustice are very largely the results of the immense enlarging and consequent depersonalizing of industry and commerce at present. If Northern capitalists could see in their own suburb the little children whose wholesome development is forfeited for the sake of their dividends, they would not allow child-labor in the factories whose stock they control. If the bargain-hunter had as her next-door neighbor the sweat-shop toiler whose loss is her gain, she would not need to be converted to the idea of the "consumer's label." If the waterers of stock and upholders of high tariff could realize the multitudes of poor who for years must go without many necessities of life to make up the tale of overabundant luxury which they, the privileged, enjoy, how soon would they sicken of their dollars, the emblem of success in their predatory businesses! Much, that is, which looks like an absence of sympathy is in reality a failure to perceive any need for sympathy. The distance is so great between such malefactors and their victims that many malefactors nowadays never dream that there is a victim at all! It is, then, not the modern man's religion but again his insight which is at fault. His old lack of imagination it is which vitiates, in such terrible fashion sometimes, a fellow-feeling for men which is yet in itself deep-rooted and exuberant.

3. Again, the religion of the modern man appears in the way in which life is for him skied over with an optimism which can scarcely be called anything but typical of these times. Our men of today are sure in general that things are "very good." In Germany Nietzsche the optimist has succeeded to the vogue of Schopenhauer the pessimist. In France Bergson is singing the praises of the "*élan vital*" and "creative evolution," that is to say, of life if we will but live. In Russia Artzibashev is as actual as Andreev and far, far more influential, as the Ssaninist movement, regrettable as it is, plainly shows. England has its Robert Louis Stevenson and the author of *The Road Mender*; America has its James and Royce and Christian Science. Each of these and many others are illustrations of the fact that there is among the men of thought today an undying growing confidence that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world!"

Or there are the doers of the present, the Napoleons of business, the inventors and scientific discoverers, the travellers in Africa or Thibet or to North or South Pole, the missionaries toiling unweariedly in and upon alien civilizations. All these phenomena of human activity in this time are even more clearly expressions of the modern irrepressibility of energy and spirits. Our explorers and pioneers are, as such, forever again and again removing mountains by their faith and hopefulness. This is a developing expansive age such as has not been since the days of the Renaissance. Pessimisms, even though now and then broached among us, cannot live. They pale and fade away for lack of suitable air and soil in our all-encompassing flamboyant optimism.

All this has, it is admitted, its dangers. Men are sadly forgetting the reality of evil and sin, and that often in highly hazardous degenerations. We are just now having to do without that antiseptic of dread which older

days had in their ghosts and banshees and were-wolves and, beneath all, a hell which burned real and sulphurous fire. There is, as everybody knows, all too much of a fatuous smugness in the optimism now met with. We have certainly some of the faults of this virtue of ours, but the virtue is here and we may confidently expect that optimism, broadened and sobered, cleansed and in its right mind, will yet do its part in bringing new victories to this age which is already in so many directions doing things.

4. Finally, it should be remarked that the modern man's religion is social in its ways of expressing itself. I mean by that not alone that we are attacking social evils socially, by dissemination of facts, discussion, legislation, but that in our deeper religious feelings we tend to draw together with those who, in any particular details, are like-minded with ourselves. The upshot is that today's religion is, probably with a thoroughness few of us realize, an organized matter. It is interesting and often even amusing to mark how closely bred to type in this regard modern humanity is. Religion today does not, it is true, much organize about the church, but it is, for all that, not an individualistic affair. Men find organization for their religious ideas by taking the daily or weekly organ of their hobby of reform; by putting their names down on a subscription list for a dollar or five dollars each; by forming a committee or bureau or conference in view of this or that intolerable situation; above all by frantically joining, joining, joining in every direction various organizations of any and every conceivable kind. Do any of us grasp the great number of these which have arisen and are now in actual existence to express and make practical a common faith which is only to be termed, if we will be accurate, a religious faith? Not to speak of the church in its various denominations, nor of its more or less affiliated societies,

as the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, the Young Men's or the Young Women's Christian Association, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the like; not to dwell upon the Socialists or the "Single-taxers" or the Labor Unions or the Woman's Suffrage attempts,—not to speak of any of these which are so well known as to occur to one on the spur of the moment, let me set down the names of a few out of many bodies which are so live and concretely prosperous that their names are to be found upon the list of national or international conventions for the year 1913,—the American Conference on Social Insurance, the American Prison Association, the Public Health Association, the International Conference on Infant Mortality, the International Congress against Alcoholism, the National Congress of Mothers, the International Sunshine Society, the World's Citizenship Conference; and all culminating duly in the American Peace Congress and the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Beside these taken at random—every reader will think of yet others—are the many clubs and "movements" and "agitations" which are frequently entirely spontaneous and, what is more important, are supported by voluntary and often by nation-wide contributions. It ought to be realized, as it has not yet been realized, that these various organizations for broadly religious ends are parallel to the conventicles and ecclesiasticisms of the more conventional and historic religious bodies. These are the churches of the religion of the modern man, so far as that religion has as yet gone. They are organized, as every church should be, not from above or by any hierarchy, but from below, from the midst of democracy, by the people for the people. This spontaneous democratic socialization of modern religion augurs well, does it not? for the steadiness of progress in the solution of the pressing social problems of the present and future.

This will suffice to suggest, in outline and broadly, what from a social standpoint the religion of the modern man is. It is devoid of that intellectual clarity which the Greeks at their best possessed, but it is strong in that active practical effectiveness of which the Greek knew little. We of today, taken as a whole, do not dream, but we live; we do not worship, but we clothe the naked; we do not pray, but we labor; we have but slight sense of the historic, but we have a virile sense of the present; we have no interest in the other life, but we have a decided interest in the "other fellow." If, as is certain, the two legs of human progress are represented by the seers and the doers, then there can be no doubt that the world is now on the "doing tack," filled to overflowing, as Kipling exults, with sons of Martha. We lack horizon as few ages have lacked it; but, despite all, the religion of men was never so free from selfish motives, never so vital and sincere, as at this moment.

Already that which is wanting in the religion of the modern man bids fair to be added to it. The Church of the present in its ablest and most influential thinkers and preachers is bending every energy, on the one hand, for the enlightening of men and, on the other, for the deepening of its own tolerance and its inclusiveness of every truth of modern thinking. And there are those, apart from the Church and quite indifferent to it, who are no less forces making for horizon and insight. Mr. H. G. Wells, contemptible as are some of his moral ideas, yet in *Marriage* and *A Modern Utopia* gives his readers the wise and peculiarly unmodern advice to think things over. Even more significant in this direction is Maeterlinck in his cloud-like poetizings and beautiful incitements to brooding upon life as a whole. These outcroppings are an indication that the modern man's religion may yet reach a stage where it will gain some sense of remoter realities. There is coming, there

is bound to come, in the average man an adequacy of insight that shall make possible in him an interest not only in the future—that is already dawning in our growing enthusiasm for conservation projects—but in the past, in the historic, in the symbolic, and even at length in the supernatural.

Only let us hope that, as these so desirable extensions of modern religion begin to appear, the modern man may not again let slip that immediacy of practical idealism which is so pervasively the glory of the present.

A CORRECTION

J. E. LEBOSQUET

There were, it is certain, many who traced with delight the intellectual and religious personality of Troeltsch the lecturer, immanent in Professor Miller's article in the October (1913) number of *The Harvard Theological Review*. That article contained however one misstatement which should be corrected as speedily as may be. It said,¹ "Theodor Kaftan, in his misleading brochure on Troeltsch, accuses him of being a pantheist," adding the probable reason why Kaftan does so. As matter of fact, in the book referred to—*Ernst Trölsch* with the sub-title *Eine kritische Zeitstudie*—Dr. Kaftan accuses Troeltsch of nothing of the sort. He refers indeed to Troeltsch as holding a doctrine of transmigration which is brought to an end by each soul's ultimate return to and absorption in God. Undoubtedly, this might easily appear to a vague recollection of the book as pantheism. Kaftan however mentions this very idea of Troeltsch, later in the critical portion of his study, as being not so Buddhistic as at first it seems, and as being in any case not an expression of the essential Troeltsch; and he concludes as follows: "I call this a turning aside (*Entgleisung*) the more confidently because otherwise there would appear here an outcropping of pantheism which Trölsch elsewhere so energetically attacks."² Indeed, far from accusing Troeltsch of pantheism Kaftan categorically in two other passages defends him from the charge. For example: "*Trölsch ist zweifellos Theist. Aller pantheistischen Verflüchtigung des Gottesbegriffes tritt er je und je entgegen*";³ and again "*Trölsch (ist) ein entschiedener Theist, der Front macht gegen alle pantheistische Verschwommenheit*."⁴

Speaking in general, Kaftan's pamphlet may be mistaken, as most of the readers of this *Review* will think, but it is scarcely misleading. For one reader at least, though that reader did not agree with it, this critique of Troeltsch was not only extremely interesting, but highly profitable, presenting as it did briefly and energetically the case of orthodox "positive" theology against modern scientific theology. The book is from its point of view a "Tract for the Times." Its vigorous polemic is not so much against Troeltsch as

¹ Page 431.² Page 66; italics mine.³ Page 32.⁴ Page 62.

against what Troeltsch represents—the modern *Weltanschauung* and in particular its “*Antisupranaturalismus*.”

Troeltsch, the man, is for Dr. Kaftan a person of deep and warm religious feeling, “moved at bottom by Christian and not Neo-platonic interests”; but Troeltsch’s basal points of view are and can be for Kaftan but anathema. Aside from certain inconsistencies of which Troeltsch is accused, and apart from certain abhorrent details, such as Troeltsch’s rejection of conversion and his suggestion that the church should confine itself to cultus, giving over religious education to the state—its teachers being trained by the university theological faculties—the argument is, summarily: Troeltsch lacks certainty, being condemned to relativism and subjectivism. He has no absolute, no revelation, no authority by which norms are “given”; instead, he depends upon the increasing approximation of values (“*Annäherungswerte*”), with which he operates as an absolute. He accepts in history that only which can be arrived at by strict historic method. He studies Christianity not as *the* religion but as a religion, and so, summing up all and most damnable of all, he is a philosopher of religion and not a theologian.

Kaftan for his part admits the value of science, but asserts in loud italics that science can never grasp the supernatural. He has developed his own program as to how science and revelation are to live together in regard to history. It is contained in his distinction between “*historisch*”—that which is established by historic method—and the equally valid “*geschichtlich*”—all that ever happened, including what revelation tells us of, as well as the “*historisch*.” This amounts obviously to denying science all right of veto—the very service of science and especially of historical science, which has been most salutary to religion.

In fact Kaftan’s book is for its readers itself a “*Zeitstudie*,” giving valuable assistance to the liberal religious thinker who is earnest in his desire to understand the conservative’s theological position. The main contentions of the book are an indication how far a passion for security and solidity will carry thought which yields itself up to it. Its condemnation is that it puts the feeling of certainty above the august austere truth. Clearly, Kaftan, like Cardinal Newman in a similar situation, had no actual certainty at the moment when he first decided to swallow this bolus of revelation, which is, from that moment on, his guarantee of assurance. Having made his initial induction, how has he the effrontery to object to Troeltsch’s own inductive procedure when he assumes norms to be true without apodictic proof, because he sees them increasingly

approximating truth? Has Kaftan never heard of faith? And surely the faith of Troeltsch and the modern man is not less precious and sublime for being wise and open-eyed and mindful of the forbiddings of science! As for Kaftan's declaration that Troeltsch is not a theologian, that charge can be borne with equanimity. It reminds one of a recent contention of Stephan⁴—though for different reasons—that the word Protestantism should be limited to the visible and so-called “church”; here also as against Troeltsch's broad conception of a “modern Protestantism” which includes all the spiritual forces and currents of the present. There is still prevalent something of the old prejudice of “*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*.” It cannot however long survive among the educated unless as they wax fat they ignore all cults of religion, as there are some signs of their doing. If that happens, conservative religious inanities will persist and ought to persist. For it is better to err intellectually in a two-compartment theology such as Kaftan's than to err spiritually because of the lack of historic religion. But best of all it is to have many scientific *and* religious men in our universities—men like Ernst Troeltsch!

⁴ Die heutigen Auffassungen vom Neuprotestantismus. Giessen, 1911.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY. JOSIAH ROYCE. 2 vols. The Macmillan Company. 1913.

Vol. I: The Christian Doctrine of Life; pp. xlvii, 426.

Vol. II: The Real World and the Christian Ideas; pp. vi, 442.

Lectures on the Hibbert Foundation, read at Manchester College, Oxford, January to March, 1913. The first series was previously delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston.

The encounter of the powerful current of Royce's thought with the Christian tradition is an event of the first importance. It was inevitable, in the steady growth of views first announced in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* in 1908, that Royce should come to terms with Christianity simply as the most conspicuous germane fact in contemporary life. It was characteristic of him that he should meet this fact honorably and objectively, "not as the one true faith to be taught, and not as an outworn tradition to be treated with enlightened indifference, but as a central, as an intensely interesting, life-problem of humanity." It could have been foreseen that Christian thought would receive at his hands a radical sifting and restatement—a restatement for which we were partly prepared by the address, "What is vital in Christianity?" printed in this journal in October, 1909. But there is here a freshness of treatment, a vigor and clarity, an accurate sympathy, and a breadth of interpretative power, which has outrun anticipation. Whether or not we agree that Christianity is best conceived as "the religion of loyalty," of loyalty to a "beloved community" which is the invisible Church, Christianity must henceforth mean something greater to all interpreters; and what is more, it must mean something nearer, more vital, and more acceptable to the modern man, "for the strengthening of whose heart" this book, in large measure, was written.

The appeal of the work to the modern mind will be due in part to the angle from which Royce approaches his subject; namely, from experience rather than from metaphysics, and from universal human experience rather than from the peculiar experiences of

individuals here and there. Three ideas he distinguishes as essential in Christianity: that of sin, both original and deliberate, from which the individual is powerless to free himself, and whose penalty is endless; that of atonement for sin; and that of the divine community, through which the atonement comes, and in which man must win his salvation. Each of these ideas, Royce insists, is a product of human nature in its moral capacity, quite apart from Christian or other theology. "If there were no Christianity and no Christians in the world, the idea of atonement would have to be invented before the higher levels of our moral existence could be fairly understood. . . . The problem of atonement daily arises, . . . is daily faced, . . . and in principle and in ideal, daily solved." And as for salvation in the community, "these considerations are based upon human nature. They have to do with interests which all reasonable men, whether Christian or non-Christian, more or less clearly recognize, in proportion as men advance to the higher stages of the art of life." This method has the immense advantage of giving verifiable substance and actuality to these religious conceptions, which the contemporary mind in its joy of recovery from an overstrained inwardness is prone to regard as alien and outworn. On the other hand, the method is apt to carry with it a foregone conclusion which is critical for the problem in hand; for the only content of Christianity that could be reached through such a general appeal to human nature is a content which has no necessary connection with Christianity, and our interpreted Christianity is in some likelihood of becoming a purely "natural" or philosophical religion. The historically unique elements of the religion, if any such are essential, are likely to be excluded by the conditions of the inquiry. I shall recur to this matter later.

As to the actual origin of these ideas in our own tradition, Royce is not inclined to attribute any of them to Jesus. "All three appear to be due to interpretations of the mind of the Master which came into existence only after the earthly period of teaching had ceased." The reflective teaching about Christ, as the spirit of the Church, seems to Royce more definitively Christian than the teachings of the man Jesus; and while it is clearly the Pauline formulation which chiefly impresses him, the true founder of Christianity, in his view, is no one person, but the early Christian community itself. Only through the transformation of the object of devotion in this community from the particular person to the living spirit of the community did the motive of religion find its true centre; which is not in the "love" of the synoptic gospels, undeveloped as this is

in its social bearings, but in the "charity" of the epistles—a motive founded in the conception of the community, wherein Christianity becomes the religion of loyalty.

Especially illuminating, in the first volume, are the treatments of moral evil and its penalties. It is not the "sick soul" but the clearly self-judging soul that finds sin and damnation to be its portion on the natural level of moral events. Original guilt is no invention of an artificial theology; it is an expression of the truth that the individual, endowed with self-consciousness by the human community with its laws and standards, is in this process necessarily also endowed with a self-will estranged from the community which has called it forth. Individualism is a by-product of communality, on the human level; so that our "very consciences are tainted by the original sin of social contentiousness." Powerless to deliver himself from the body of this death, salvation must come to the natural man through union with a non-legal community on another level, an essentially lovable community, divine in its spirit; loyalty to such a community, if it can be found, is the "only cure for the natural warfare of the collective and the individual will." But there is a deeper stage of guilt. It is the sin of the man who has known the meaning of adoption, who has received the grace and assumed the obligation of loyalty, and who has become traitor to the cause which was his. This is the sin against the Holy Ghost; unpardonable; not in the sense that an alien Deity has set an arbitrary limit here to his indulgence, but in the sense that the traitorous person cannot forgive himself, and that whatever his further attitude, his deed remains irrevocable, he remains forever one who has been a traitor. The view that such treason is possible and actual is the free, the non-Platonic element in the moral vista of Christianity. It is precisely the man who knows the good who is able to play the traitor; and on this tragic possibility depends the entire worth of our world, as a world of continuous freedom in the re-affirmation of our loyalty. And it is, furthermore, the opportunity for an atoning act, which must come from the spirit of the wronged community itself, an act which apart from the particular deed of treason would not be possible, but which, when it comes, makes the world better than without this treason it could have been.

Atonement, in this view, must be a repeated or continuous process, meeting sin as sin arises. The idea of a single atoning deed which at one stroke anticipates all possible future treasons, can mean no more to this philosophy than a type or symbol. Atonement is,

for Royce, a temporal process; but it is not, in the strict sense, historical.

Salvation then depends upon the continuous work of the divine community; and the practical issues of religion turn upon the metaphysical issues, Is there such a divine community? and Where shall it be found? This inquiry is the burden of the second series of lectures; and the argument here is of extreme logical interest, both intrinsically and as a development of Royce's own metaphysical position. With characteristic skill, he singles out an aspect of cognition, which proves in the end to involve certain decisive judgments as to the nature of reality.

This aspect of cognition is interpretation; and Royce, following out suggestions made by Charles Peirce, wishes to set interpretation beside perception and conception, or rather above them, as a third fundamental process of knowledge. Empiricism has sought to know reality primarily by perception, rationalism by conception; Bergson, basing himself upon a Kantian dream, attempts to define a third species of knowledge which he calls intuition, but this Royce regards as merely a species of perception. Interpretation stands in sharp contrast to these operations. Both perception and conception are solitary, implying a simply dyadic relation between the thinker and his object; interpretation is a social cognition, triadic in structure, as when A interprets B to C. The objects of perception are things; the objects of conception are abstractions, universals; the objects of interpretation are minds, or expressions of mind, signs which the mind offers for the reading of an interpreter. And minds can be known only by interpretation; they cannot be perceived, nor can they be known by conception, for they are not abstractions. Perception and conception terminate upon their objects and give rise to no further processes; but an interpretation is itself a mental expression, and so offers material for further interpretation, defining a never-ending task. Thus the life of an individual is a continual reinterpretation of his own past, a perpetual inner conversation in which the present self interprets the past self to the future self.

The self is thus an object of interpretation, no mere datum of perception; and time itself has no other existence than as the object of this interpretative process. Whether within the mind or between minds, the motive of interpretation is to bring about a unity among differing elements, accomplishing mutual understanding without abolishing their distinctions. It creates a social structure which is as different from the indiscriminate merging or Bergsonian "in-

terpenetration" of elements on the one hand as it is from pluralistic independence on the other. It creates, in brief, a community, in which the problem of the one and the many is solved.

Now the real universe is such a community of interpretation—this is Royce's argument. For by "reality" I mean simply the true interpretation of the conflicts and antitheses which experience presents, an interpretation not in my possession, but which I must believe to exist as I believe in reality at all. "Unless both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world."

This universal community, a necessary object of my loyal interpretation of life, though not at all of my perception, whether now or at any future time, is the divine community; it is the City whose maker and builder is God. As the ultimate object of devotion and hope on the part of all loyal souls, this community is the invisible Church. The world is the perpetual process of its spirit; and the salvation of the world is the progressive victory over evil through the reconciling and atoning deeds which this spirit makes possible. This is also the supreme object of the Christian faith: I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.

Of this conception of Christianity as a whole, it is inadequate to say that it is true; one must say that like every great interpretation it enlarges that which it interprets; and if I add that it is not the whole of essential Christianity, I am not forgetting that it must be received primarily as an enhancement of what Christianity may mean to us. I shall not dwell upon the tempting metaphysical discussions, though I must question in passing whether interpretation is a primary cognitive process. Interpretation is concerned with predicates, with the "what" of things; it has no original power over existential propositions. Further, as every interpretation, including a theoretical first one, presumes the existence of the minds addressed by the interpreter, the belief in the existence of minds beyond my present self cannot be a *product* of interpretation. The knowledge of other mind which, as Royce truly shows, cannot be completed without an infinite process of interpretation, must be present in some simpler and more immediate fashion before the interpretative process can begin; the goal in some diminished form must be present from the beginning. I mention this because it is entirely characteristic of Royce's thought; the infinite deferring of the goal is to him incompatible with its realization at any point in time. For this reason the essential can never become the historical, atonement can never be an accomplished fact, and the true Church can

never be found as an existent institution. Historical Christianity, for Royce, is the bearer of a true doctrine; it is not the continuator of any final historic deed. The memories of the Church, as an actual human community, go back to definite points of time, and constitute the Church what Royce calls a "community of memory"; these memories animate the particular historic statements of the creed as well as the commemorative acts of the Lord's Supper. But these particular elements disappear from the creed of the modern man who accepts our author's view; nor would he find in that creed a reason for identifying himself with the hopes and labors of any visible Church.

Neither the atoning deed nor the divine community is brought to earth by this doctrine in historically identifiable form, valid for all men as a common object. Christianity is left in the region of the universal; and thereby the foundation for a truly universal community, an historic unity of all particular spirits and their loyal endeavors, is not laid. If this is true, it may be because that one of all the characteristic ideas of Christianity which to many thinkers is most central has retreated into the background and at last eluded our author's grasp—the doctrine of the Incarnation.

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FOUNDATIONS: A STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN TERMS OF MODERN THOUGHT. By SEVEN OXFORD MEN. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. xi, 538. \$3.50.

It is sometimes supposed that the attempt to interpret the religion of a former day in terms of current thought is a modern endeavor. Yet this supposedly Broad Church aim produced one of the earliest documents of Christianity—the Epistle to the Hebrews. For that Epistle takes the doctrines and ritual of Judaism, and aims to show in them a deeper meaning than had been perceived. It declares they were originally figures for the time then present, and points out their "fulfilment" in Christ. In every age indeed, standing a step above the prosaic souls who make no distinction between the form of their belief and its spirit, are those who insist that faith must continually dress itself anew in order to be recognizable.

The last half-century has witnessed three such notable attempts. In 1860 *Essays and Reviews* created a storm of opposition through its affirmation that religious truth needed restatement. To many this seemed equivalent to the overthrow of Christianity. But

when after a quarter of a century the necessity of restatement had been grudgingly acknowledged, the attempt was made to recast its results more fully in their old unreformed form. To produce for the old a dress just new enough to be in fashion, was the aim in 1889 of *Lux Mundi*. And now again the same endeavor, though in a different spirit, to combine continuity and progress, to show a living and permanent meaning in doctrines which the present day is inclined to regard as outworn, has given rise to *Foundations*.

Seven Oxford men, clergymen of the Church of England, convinced that "Christianity is no mere survival of a romantic past but a real religion with a real message for the present and future," have set themselves "to a careful re-examination and re-statement of the foundations of their belief in the light of the knowledge and thought of the day." In theology, they say, the task of making experiments "must always be the special duty of the younger generation. The men whose position in the Church is such that they cannot speak at all except with authority can rarely venture on experiments outside the sphere of practice. It is otherwise with us. We fully recognize the obligations of loyalty to the traditions of the Church to which we belong; we make no claim to irresponsibility. But we are young men, and our responsibility is of a different kind. It is the responsibility of making experiments."¹

The authors and their subjects are as follows: the Modern Situation, by Rev. N. S. Talbot, Chaplain of Balliol College; the Bible, by Rev. R. Brook, Lecturer in theology at Merton and Oriel Colleges and Chaplain to the Bishop of Wakefield; the Historic Christ, by Rev. B. H. Streeter, Dean of Queen's College and Chaplain to the Bishop of St. Alban's; the Interpretation of the Christ in the New Testament, by Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson, Tutor of Keble College, and Rev. R. G. Parsons, Principal of Wells Theological College and Chaplain to the Bishop of Winchester; (1) the Divinity of Christ, and (2) the Church, by Rev. W. Temple, Headmaster of Repton and Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury; (1) the Atonement, and (2) God and the Absolute, by Rev. W. H. Moberly, Lecturer in philosophy at Lincoln College; and the Principle of Authority, by Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson.

Together with the differences of view and style which are inevitable, the authors have an attitude of mind in common. They all preserve a dispassionate calmness of tone, and their appeal is to intelligence and reasonableness. While holding to dogma they are not dogmatic. This is especially the case with the Essay on the Divinity of Christ, which is perhaps the ablest in the book. Here

¹P. x.

the author, after exhibiting the progress made in the classical attempts to solve the problem of who and what is Jesus Christ, wisely starts from a different side. "If we are to form a right conception of God, we must look at Christ. The wise question is not 'Is Christ Divine?' but 'What is God like?' And the answer to that is 'Christ.'"² "Jesus of Nazareth was born at a certain time and place; but in him there was active in the world the Eternal Spirit of God, and in him we touch the divine humanity which was always in the Godhead but only then was made fully manifest."³ The author traces Jesus' unity with God to that centre of personality, the will. "Christ's will, as a subjective function, is of course not the Father's will; but the content of the wills—the purpose—is the same. Christ is not the Father; but Christ and the Father are one. What we see Christ doing and desiring, that we thereby know the Father does and desires. . . . He is the perfect expression of the Divine in terms of human life. There are not two Gods, but in Christ we see God. Christ is identically God; the whole content of his being—his thought, feeling, and purpose—is also that of God. This is the only 'substance' of a spiritual being, for it is all there is of him at all."⁴ The author's whole position is an exposition of Christ's own words, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

Mr. Rawlinson, in discussing the Principle of Authority, has had a less profound insight into the necessities of thought. He is still hampered by the obligation which he feels to provide an external embodiment for authority; though he recognizes that its function in religion is "neither to compel assent nor to override reason, but to testify to spiritual experience." He is perhaps compelled to this obligation because his chief aim is to justify to opposing Protestants the "catholic" position. He shows an appreciation of what Protestantism has stood for; but what is really dear to him is that institutionalism which needs for its adequate expression the "catholic"—not necessarily the Roman Catholic—system. He sums up with much candor the contributions of each: "Catholicism stands in an especial sense for institutional religion; for the use and value, that is to say, of rites and sacraments as being neither dead forms nor illogical excrescences upon a religion otherwise wholly spiritual, but as being themselves spirit and life. . . . [It] witnesses to the glory of Churchmanship, the sense of spiritual kinship and unity, not with a section of Christendom but with the whole; to the idea of worship, as prior in religion to that of edification; . . . to the possibility of a

² P. 259.³ P. 251.⁴ P. 248.

science of the soul and a specific type of Christian sanctity, most characteristically mediated by the confessional and the Mass. . . . Protestantism at its best stands for the power of personal religion; for the spiritual freedom of the individual answerable in the last resort to his Maker alone; for the prophetic word as the dynamic which alone can vitalize the ritual of the priest. . . . It has warned us impressively, and not always unnecessarily, of the deadness of the letter except as expressing and mediating the spirit. The Catholicism of the future certainly cannot afford to disregard the truths of the Protestant witness, and must to a certain extent re-interpret and revalue (without abandoning) its institutionalism in the light of them."

The other seven Essays vary of course in the ability with which they accomplish their excellent endeavor. But one rises from the volume with the sense of standing before men of reality, most of whom have seen deep and found living truth where others have noticed only dead formulae or deadening ritual. The reading of *Foundations* tends to make the Bible a more living book than before, Christ more intelligible and precious, personality more mysterious and comprehensible, sin deeper yet more eradicable, the church more necessary, and God more wonderful and approachable.

FREDERIC PALMER.

CAMBRIDGE.

REVELATION AND THE IDEAL. GEORGE A. GORDON. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913. Pp. x, 427. \$1.50.

When Dr. Gordon's book was announced, one looked for a reasoned exposition similar to his *Religion and Miracle*. This anticipation was strengthened by the dedication, "To those who believe that the ideal is the shadow of God in the mind of man." In the preface one reads that for many years he "cherished the audacious dream of writing a book on the philosophy of revelation," but was reluctantly compelled to surrender it. Regret at this necessity becomes more poignant when he adds, "I have long felt that the secret of Revelation is in the keeping of the Ideal. . . . The greater introductions of God to the mind of man are through man's greater ideals. Moral idealism and revelation are but the concave and the convex of the same figure." Our regret is however qualified by his saying that "what could not be discussed in the form of a treatise might be presented in a series of visions close to life and warm with serious concern for the high possibilities of man." Accordingly,

he attempts an answer to two questions: Does the Eternal God speak to men? If so, how? After the first chapter on "What is Revelation?" each of the remaining chapters considers some aspect of the ideal as suggested by various texts from the Scriptures.

Certain great convictions underlie Dr. Gordon's thinking in this book. One is that of the living God. God is to him a reality with infinite moral purpose and moral deeds for men, at home in his world, Life of our life, Light of our light, Love of our love. Another conviction is that the ideal is the one omnipresent, omnipotent, transforming reality in our world. In this light he shows us one great person after another in the Bible and makes it clear how character, deeds, message, temptations and sins, struggles and conquests, indeed every single experience gets its significance from the divine ideal. His idealism is through and through ethical. He is a brave optimist but never at the expense of truth and virtue. Moreover, he conceives of each life as environed by inescapable responsibility, not for deeds only but most of all for character and ideals. Within every man's control lies the shaping of his destiny, and each day brings to him a more commanding task, the deep import of which is matched only by its joyousness. Finally, his belief in immortality sweeps away the barriers which hem in earthly existence and makes the soul at home in the eternal world.

It would be hard to judge whether thought or emotion or will is uppermost in his message. Now it is the truth of his ideal, now the goodness and beauty of it, and now the irresistibleness of its imperative appeal. The sermons let us into the secret not alone of God's purpose and of the characters portrayed, but also self-unconsciously of himself. Here we are in touch with a mind enriched by familiarity with the greatest thinkers, valuing their vast treasures both for themselves and for their bearing on life, to whom the Christian ministry is the ministry of God to men in terms of human speech. History, philosophy, poetry, art, social science, the homely interests of human life, all bring their choicest gifts to enforce his meaning. Dr. Gordon is a lover of the sky with its stars, the sea tumultuous and awful, mountains with their majestic strength, and natural beauty in a thousand forms; these are the living garment of God, the vehicle of his revelation. Not once only but many times we are impressed by the extreme felicity in the statement of the theme, the choice of the text, the natural development of the thought, and the richness and beauty of the treatment. No one sermon in the book is as great perhaps as several sermons in his *Through Man to God*; but they are all of the same

texture of belief in God, of ideals and loyalty to them, of the high and serious privilege of living, and of immortal hope. Some readers may wish there were a more pronounced emphasis upon the social ideal.

One after another the chapters read like successive cantos in an epic of human life; they have the human interest, the imaginative splendor, insight into and use of natural beauty, power to lift the single event into world-wide and permanent significance, and the discovery of its secret in the dramatic unfolding of the purpose of God, which belong to great poetry. That he has chosen the prose instead of the poetic form for his message affects in no way its essential content.

CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH.

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST. H. P. MACKINTOSH, Ph.D., Professor of Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Scribners, 1912. Pp. 540. \$2.50.

The object of the author in this book is to provide the student with a manual which will serve him to take his bearings in the world of Christological thought, and to acquaint him with recent discussions. He divides his book into three parts. In the first he gives the Christology of the New Testament, and expounds all the more significant passages in a conservative spirit and with the tendency to emphasize their metaphysical import. In the second part he rapidly sketches the history of Christological doctrine from the sub-apostolic period to our own day. Here he is much freer in his treatment of the material than in the first part. He passes judgment on the creed of Chalcedon and holds that the doctrine of two natures is untenable on any true psychology. The third part contains his constructive statement. It treats of the immediate utterances of faith and their transcendent implicates. He makes a strong plea for thorough-going thinking on these matters. He girds against current theological positivism and disparagement of reason. He maintains that the utterances of faith regarding Christ as the Object rather than the Subject of faith, his absolute sovereignty as exalted Lord in all the affairs of the universe, and his perfect manhood and full divinity as Godhead, are essential elements of the Gospel. Their transcendent implicates, he contends, involve a real pre-existence and an incarnation, which means a self-reduction of God. Christ was not only God *incognito* to men on earth, but even to himself, except in

rare moments at the close of his life, when he became aware of his Godhead. This kenotic position is expounded and defended at length and accepted whole-heartedly. The author has taken his task seriously, and succeeded in making his book a serviceable manual for the student. For this purpose, however, it loses much of its value by its failure to give greater weight to the sifted conclusions of New Testament critical study, and to recognize the pressing problems raised by the new emphasis on the eschatological element in the Gospels; still more, by the author's acceptance as immediate utterances of faith of ideas and expressions of experience which were real enough for the early Christians but no longer have the same reality for us. He takes New Testament theology as if it were not only the immediate utterance of faith, but its final utterance. He has recourse to psychology in his criticism of traditional constructions of Christology. Why not do the same in dealing with the thought of the apostles? The same question arises in the discussion of kenosis. His treatment of Christ's omnipresence shows to what hard straits the author is pushed in carrying through his interpretation, when he makes omnipresence to consist not in the ubiquity of the person but in the universality of the work of Christ.

DANIEL EVANS.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE MYSTIC WAY. A Psychological Study in Christian Origins. EVELYN UNDERHILL. J. M. Dent & Sons. 1913. Pp. xi, 395.

The author attempts to show that the mystic way, with its familiar three stages of purification, illumination, and union, stands for a perfectly natural process of growth into reality (natural, that is, for those who have been regenerated into the spiritual order), which is exemplified in the history of Jesus and Paul, represented in the experience underlying the Fourth Gospel, and perpetuated in the ritual of the Mass.

The book may be regarded as an essay in history or in philosophy. Considered historically, as a psychological interpretation of the New Testament, it has no appreciable value. The writer takes an occasional fling at the "higher critics," but the missiles have a boomerang flight, for historical criticism was never so capricious as this which aspires to be psychological. The treatment of the eschatological element in the life and teaching of Jesus, for example, is so utterly unhistorical as to be psychologically foolish. To interpret the baptism

of Jesus as the stage of purgation, the transfiguration as the second stage of illumination, and the passion as the dark night of the soul in which there is a purgation of the will immediately preceding the final ascent into unity, and to find the same three stages in the life-history of Paul and the successive groups of his Epistles, is simply whimsical. However edifying it may be spiritually, historically it is fantastic.

Philosophically, however, the book is of interest because it differentiates sharply two types of mysticism: the one purely contemplative, reaching a transcendent Absolute of pure Being by the *via negativa*; the other both active and contemplative in rhythmic swing, attaining union with God considered as both immanent and transcendent, both Being and Becoming, through living participation in the rhythm of reality. The former type of mysticism is Neo-Platonic; the latter is "true" Christian mysticism, which, however, was speedily contaminated by its Greek neighbor. Thus the Christian life was corrupted by Greek mysticism, as Christian thought by Greek philosophy. Hence the writer contends, and this is an interesting point, that the line of Christian mysticism should be traced historically through Macarius of Egypt rather than Dionysius the Areopagite, although one may well doubt whether the actual influence of the former upon later Christian mystics was at all comparable with that of the latter.

The book was manifestly written under the spell of Bergson and Eucken, particularly Bergson, but there is no serious attempt to grapple with the philosophical problems involved. To take but a single instance: that mysticism is a way of life rather than of thought is undoubtedly true; but life pertains to thought as well as to feeling and conduct, and the defender of mysticism must consider whether the mystical experience contributes to knowledge, and also whether the reality which it apprehends is reality in its wholeness or, at best, but a single aspect of it. Although it is frequently urged that "true" mysticism consists in the apprehension of the full-orbed reality by the unified whole of man, there is a quite inconsistent leaning towards anti-intellectualism. The book is mysticism-up-to-date, but the date is the flourishing of Bergson.

W. W. FENN.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE CONCEPT OF SIN. F. R. TENNANT. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 284.

When one compares current theological literature with that which was issued a century ago in New England, nothing is more striking than the difference in respect to the prominence of the doctrine of sin. Then both preachers and theologians were concerned mainly with original sin, its origin, transmission, and guilt, and with the cognate doctrines of atonement, future punishment, and salvation. Now we seldom hear even in revivals of deep conviction of sin; men no longer grovel at the altar, but "rise for prayers" with the air of doing something handsome for the preacher and the Lord. Who knows what is meant by the "law-work" once so firmly insisted upon as the prelude to gracious regeneration? The anxious seat and the mourners' bench are no longer in fashion.

It is noteworthy that Dr. Tennant had given us two valuable treatises on sin before attempting to define precisely what the term means. This is characteristic of current theological procedure. In his latest book, however, the concept is defined with a thoroughness which leaves little to be desired. Sin is defined as "moral imperfection for which an agent is in God's sight accountable," or, more accurately, as "imperfect compliance (in single volitional activity or in character resulting from such activities) with the moral ideal in so far as this is, in the sight of God, capable of apprehension by an agent at the moment of the activity in question, both as to its content and its claim upon him; this imperfect compliance being consequent upon choice of ends of lower ethical worth when the adoption of ends of higher worth is possible, and being regarded in its religious aspect (which may in some cases be wanting)" (p. 245).

Plainly this definition emphasizes the volitional and intentional character of sin. Sins of ignorance are not sins at all. Imperfection is not sin, for in boyhood Jesus had not attained the perfection of mature years, yet he was without sin, and besides perfection includes elements like emotional warmth and soundness of judgment, which are non-ethical. In addition, to regard sin as imperfection flies in the face of evolution.

One may ask what justifies such an elaborate effort to define the concept of sin. The result is of little practical value, for the very inwardness of sin makes it impossible for us to pronounce any particular act a sin or any particular man a sinner. Over and over again it is affirmed that only the omniscience of God is sin certainly known. This indeed teaches charity of judgment, but it

is of little practical benefit to define a concept of sin in such a way as never to be able to tell where it applies. Nor is it possible for the sinner to pronounce judgment on himself; for (to adopt the author's terminology) he may have psychically a consciousness of sin although psychologically and in the sight of God he is no sinner. Here again, the concept may give relief to over-sensitive consciences; but if neither the man himself nor another can surely apply the concept, it might seem better to drop the term altogether instead of taking such pains to define it. But here we come to the heart of the matter. Dr. Tennant holds that there must be such a thing as sin because church doctrine and the Bible speak of it, and hence it is necessary to define the term accurately that we may understand both it and the context of revealed truth in which it is contained. This indicates a radical squint in the book, of which the author seems quite unaware. It would seem that the concept should be derived from the use of the term in the context of revelation, defined, that is, mainly by exegesis applied to the Scriptures and the Symbols of the Church; but the author grants that Paul has two inconsistent ideas as to sin, and admits that usually Christian thinkers have worked on a false theory. Hence the meaning of sin in its context of revelation is to be corrected by ethical reflection governed by our present moral standards and ideals. The dilemma is this: if a doctrine of sin is part of revealed truth, the definition of the term should be sought only in the revelation; if not, then in view of the many different meanings which the term carries and the resulting difficulties of comprehension, perhaps it would be well to describe accurately the moral experience with which one proposes to deal, instead of trying to define a concept, especially as there is little hope that the definition will be unanimously adopted and consistently employed even by theologians.

W. W. FENN.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE EARLY PERSECUTIONS OF THE CHRISTIANS. LEON HARDY CANFIELD, Ph.D. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. LV, 2. 1913. Pp. 215. \$1.50.

In this interesting study Dr. Canfield reviews with care and thoroughness the whole material for the history of the so-called Christian persecutions down to the close of the reign of Hadrian. He accepts as true what has long been the general conclusion of scholars, that the attitude of the Roman government towards alleged Christians was not definitely determined until a fairly late

date. He inclines to set this date at the time of Trajan, and to attach great and decisive importance to that emperor's famous rescript in reply to Pliny's inquiries. Down to this time he thinks that what appear as "persecutions" were measures of ordinary police administration, taken to meet popular demands and implying that Christians were on many accounts objects of general dislike, but were not, as a religious body, subject to any specific legal penalty. After Trajan, however, there was at least a precedent, and the mere name of "Christian" sufficed as a basis for action in a specific case. This furnishes a workable hypothesis from which to proceed to a study of the more notable reported cases of procedure against Christians, from Nero to Hadrian's letter to the provincial official Minucius Fundanus, the genuineness of which Dr. Canfield accepts after a careful examination of the arguments for and against it.

It was distinctly worth while, in view of all that has been written in recent years, to bring together in brief compass the original material and to summarize the opinions based upon it, if only to show once again how meagre and fragmentary this material is, and how impossible it is, therefore, to reach any very solid conclusions as to the exact relation of the parties concerned. Dr. Canfield leaves us in no doubt as to his opinion on every point of controversy, but we could wish that he had seen fit to examine also the motives which have determined the attitude of modern writers on these points. It is not quite enough to say of M. Allard that he is "very conservative" and of M. Aubé that he is "very radical." It is important to know what these terms mean. It is essential to any real understanding of a writer's opinion to know, not merely his formal arguments on specific questions of text criticism, but the underlying motive which may have determined his opinion in advance. Throughout these discussions about the persecutions there runs the thread of an ardent and sincere desire, on the one side, to view all the evidence as bearing upon the glory of the martyred saints, and, on the other, to counteract this tendency by neglecting or minimizing the importance of any such consideration. Dr. Canfield seems intentionally to avoid all allusion to this line of demarcation. Perhaps he regarded it as lying outside the object of his study; but in any case this omission leaves his problem hanging in the air quite as hopelessly as ever. It still remains a puzzle to the modern student, as it was to Tertullian himself, why, if the "Name" implied crimes, the Christians were not to be punished for these crimes, and if it did not, why they were to be punished at all.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND LIFE OF GEORGE TYRRELL. Edited or written by M. D. PETRE. Longmans, Green & Co. 1912. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 280. Vol. II, pp. xii, 512. \$5.40.

This life of George Tyrrell contains a record of an extraordinary religious experience within the soul of a great man, and the most interesting chapter yet written of the Modernist revolution, or at least insurrection, within the church of Rome. Of this insurrection indeed we doubt if we shall ever have a more fascinating or more pathetic description. For Loisy, the one other figure of any size or moment in the movement, has not only given us in *Choses Passées* a comparatively pale and disappointing account of it, but has completely abandoned Modernism for a position which can be called in no sense Christian, if even theistic. Modernists, it is true, are still active, appealing now for democracy within the church, again for liberty of study and research, and still again for disciplinary reforms, such as a mitigation of clerical celibacy, or a removal of devotional abuses; but cohesion, system, or a clear programme they have none. The promise of that died with Tyrrell. In him Modernism had a leader, religious to his last fibre, and a thinker not incapable of formulating a philosophical reconstruction of Catholic dogma, if such a reconstruction be possible. Two principles he left behind him as a propaedeutic to this reconstruction, principles on the elaboration of which his claim to a place among philosophic theologians will rest. The first is, that revelation is a felt experience of the divine, whereas theology is the stammering speech of the reflective intellect striving to articulate this experience. In Jesus and the apostles this experience is supreme and normative; and the commission to keep it so and to check theology from using such language as would injure either its supremacy or its normativeness is the sole justification of the church's authority, papal, hierarchical, or sacerdotal. And the second principle, central and essential in Tyrrell's apologetic for Catholicism, is that social unity and solidarity are necessary for the full conservation of the religious experiences derived by Christians from Christ, and learned in their search for Christ. Hence schism is the unpardonable sin. To depart from the one church is to impoverish religious life in general; it is to forfeit the massive corporate power and grace of the Christian Commonwealth for a specious individualist liberty which can end in but shallowness and anarchy. Popes and prelates, therefore, Tyrrell admonishes to abandon their despotic pretensions, their infallibilities, their condemnations, since their office exists only to safeguard the integrity, not of theology, but of revelation. And

those who are either tempted to leave or have left the Roman Communion, he warns of the danger of deserting Christ in deserting the historic body of Christ. In the development of both ideas he permits and commits a latitudinarianism in interpreting doctrinal formulas which the authorities of his church hold to be deadly heresy, and those outside his church consider an impossible and objectively dishonest compromise. By neither party was his voice heard, and great as his attempt was, brilliant as it was, earnest as it was, it has ended in what we cannot but think a final failure. It is essentially an attempt not sprung spontaneously from an original and creative conception, but a manoeuvre of defence, a desperate effort to save the citadel of a city whose walls are taken and whose streets are thronged by the foe. And never has a mere defensive tactic either produced a new religious movement or renovated an old religious system. But if one reads Tyrrell, the Modernist theologian, with misgivings, one follows the story of Tyrrell, the man, with fascination. Never was there a man more honest, nor more detached and severe in self-analysis, nor more shrewdly on guard against delusion. He pictures himself, and when his record fails Miss Petre pictures him with quite extraordinary competence, in the very garb and gesture of naturalness. He tells us his failings merrily, his merits humbly, his follies whimsically.

He was a Celt, and the gods gave him his race's full measure of humor; gave him too the Celt's indestructible passion for the unseen. A lovable and great soul was George Tyrrell; and those who read in the pure and swiftly moving English of these volumes the account of his few joys and many griefs, of his ardent hopes and dreary disappointments, of his hunger for peace, and of his fate to be a leader in the most heart-breaking of warfares, of his long spiritual exile as an excommunicate, and of his sorrowful death, will feel the whole heart moved to reverence for so true a man. His pen was forever reminding us to look from contending theology to the inward-abiding God—but had he never written this in words, his life would teach it.

WILLIAM SULLIVAN.

NEW YORK.

THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH. SAINT AUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY.
SIR HENRY H. HOWORTH. E. P. Dutton and Co. Pp. 451.

We have here an amount of authoritative and exact information with regard to the missionary relations of Pope Gregory the Great, to Pagan England, and also to the Celtic Church in that country,

which it would be difficult to find in any other single volume. There is no drawing on the imagination, either for edification or for any other purpose. Sir Henry Howorth has preferred to set down the facts of the case. Having searched widely and dug deep among the authorities, near and remote, the President of the Royal Archaeological Institute, after the scientific manner of his kind, makes the present work a sifting place for his collected findings, and does so not only with absolute freedom from bias but with scrupulous scholarship, as if to justify the title of his book. Here is the actual truth of things as to the "birth of the English Church." The greatest figure was Pope Gregory. St. Augustine was not great. A sincerely self-denying monk, yet as head of the British Mission he was a small man in a great place; who planted along with the wheat he knew, unchristian tares which he did not know to be such, but which gave trouble later and are giving it to this day.

The author deserves our gratitude for having gathered together and focalized in this volume a large amount of trustworthy information, which except for technical scholars is difficult of access.

C. G. CURRIE.

PHILADELPHIA.

A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY. Edited by Canon S. L. OLLARD, M.A., assisted by GORDON GROSSE, M.A., and nearly seventy Contributors. London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Young Churchman Co. Pp. 673.

The preface emphasizes the somewhat remarkable fact that while English ecclesiastical literature has never so abounded in biographies, in extensive series, and in isolated monographs, as during the last thirty years, nevertheless the present "Dictionary" is the only attempt that has been made, either in English or in German, to gather together the results of those diffusely scattered labors and embody them in a single volume.

The dictionary form is an important point. Busy people in an age like ours need to have their knowledge easily within reach. They have not the time to ransack many books or to spend hours in libraries. Hence the multiplication in the last few years of encyclopaedias. These however cannot be of a convenient size, and at the same time be specialized enough, to go into the details of church history. As a rule, the points in church history that one wants to get at, either to turn a phrase or to enforce an idea or a doctrine, are the details of events rather than their main outline. It is surprising to what an extent English ecclesiastical history is to

be found flowing in the depths of the springs of modern affairs and controversies. Questions of politics, questions of social reform, drive one back to it continually.

The trustworthiness of this book, so far as leading facts are concerned, is approximately guaranteed by the large number of contributors—no less than seventy. As one reads over the list, their university rank and high ecclesiastical position are a hostage for their honesty. The fact too that these writers are recognized High Churchmen and express themselves from the High Church party point of view, is not necessarily as disastrous to the interest of truth as other people might naturally think it to be; by other people we mean other schools of Episcopalians and the scholars of other Christian Churches. Given, as to any subject discussed, the contributors' distinct honesty of purpose, given too their very distinctly limiting personal equation, as High Churchmen, as followers of Archbishop Laud, Dr. Pusey, and Mr. Keble, and it is always interestingly easy to calculate their eclipses. The legality and rigidity of High Churchmanship, fatal as it is in some ways, is not without its advantages in others. It is tolerably easy to prophesy that this Dictionary of English Church History will become in a short time a standard authority in the school of thought to which its editors and contributors belong.

C. G. CURRIE.

PHILADELPHIA.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LITURGY. J. H. SRAWLEY, D.D. Cambridge University Press. 1918. (The Cambridge Liturgical Handbook Series.) Pp. xx, 251. 6s.

How did the service of the modern liturgical churches develop from that of the Apostolic age? This book aims to give an answer by collecting the illustrative data which exist down to about the fifth century. All the services centre about the Eucharist; which, some may be surprised to learn, was not always a commemoration of the Last Supper. The details of the development of eucharistic services in different localities and centuries make the book useful to the student and dry for general reading.

MANUAL OF EARLY ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY TO 476 A.D. By CHARLES L. WELLS, Ph.D. The University Press at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee. Pp. xxxv, 259. \$1.50.

The book is published for people of the Episcopal Church, especially for students preparing for canonical examinations. The

general reader therefore may look at it with prejudice. Although the writer has thoroughly studied the origin of institutions, he is rather final on such tentative points as the origin of infant baptism and of the episcopate. The volume is arranged on the cross-section plan; it deals clearly with important episodes; it has excellent suggestions for advanced reading; it is interesting.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE MAKING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. B. W. BACON. (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.) Henry Holt & Co. 1912. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

By *The Making of the New Testament* Dr. Bacon means the process not of combining and canonizing the New Testament writings but of their rise and growth in the formative period of the Christian religion. Viewing the literature from the standpoint of the historian of religion, the author discerns therein two leading types of thought: (1) Pauline, which is characterized as the Greek-Christian gospel *about* Jesus and as the religion of the spirit; (2) Petrine or Apostolic, which is called the Jewish-Christian gospel *of* Jesus and the religion of authority. Both types of thought start from the common confession that Jesus is Lord. But the Petrine gospel, which is broadly characteristic of the Synoptic writings, rests upon the authority of the historical Jesus and regards christology as an "apotheosis doctrine." The Pauline gospel, on the other hand, is a doctrine of incarnation, appealing to the eternal manifestation of God in man, while the story of Jesus is a drama of the supernal regions, his earthly career being only a humiliating episode in the cosmic process. Furthermore, it should seem, though the distinction between christology and soteriology is not carried out in detail, that each type of thought has its own conception of salvation. In the Petrine type the stress is laid on the social ideal of the Law and the Prophets, the messianic hope of a world-wide kingdom of God; but in the Pauline type, salvation is individualistic and personal, union with the divine, as in the Hellenistic religions of the period. At the same time the kingdom of God remains as a social organism, permeated and vitalized by Christ's spirit of service, but freed from Jewish particularism in virtue of its transcendental and cosmic character.

Apart from what Dr. Bacon calls the "Matthaean" or "Dominical" Precepts wherein the gospel *of* Jesus appears free from admixture, and apart from the ten letters of Paul in which the gospel *about* Jesus is likewise pure (at least, no stress is put on Paul's indebted-

ness to the ethical utterances of the Old Testament, the sayings of Jesus, or the traditions of primitive Christianity), the writings of the New Testament present the Petrine and the Pauline types of thought in various degrees of combination, mixture, or blending. Mark, for example, is broadly assimilated to the Pauline gospel and "displays an attitude toward the growing claims of apostolic authority and neo-legalism which in contrast with Matthew and Luke is altogether refreshing" (p. 164). On the other hand, the pseudo-apostolic Epistles such as the Pastorals, Jude, the Epistles of John, and Second Peter, which reflect the docetic heresies of a later period than Paul, and such as First Peter (a Petro-Pauline product like Mark), Hebrews (written from Ephesus to Rome by a disciple of Paul), and James (written from Rome or Syria), which come out of persecution, are all characterized more or less by the note of appeal to apostolic authority.

"Both types of gospel," the author believes, "are justified in claiming to emanate from Jesus of Nazareth; but neither without the other can claim to represent fully the significance of his spirit and life" (p. 148). The synthesis of these two types is the creative work of the unknown divine who, in the "spiritual" (i.e. symbolical) Gospel of John, applies to the story of Jesus as tradition repeated it the Pauline doctrine formulated under the Stoic Logos theories, seeking thereby to rescue the Christians who were exposed to the dangers of both Gnostics and reactionaries.

Such in brief and mainly in the words of the author is Dr. Bacon's theory of the origin and growth of the literature of the New Testament. With the general contention that the Fourth Gospel contains a striking synthesis of distinctive Paulinism, both in its idea of Christ and its idea of salvation, and of Palestinian neo-legalism, there should be wide-spread agreement; but with regard to the details difference of opinion is inevitable because of the paucity of the sources. For example, it is at least an open question whether the tradition of Papias, to which Dr. Bacon clings, that Mark is *ab initio* a Roman gospel, is so good a working hypothesis as that which conceives Mark to be originally an Aramaic gospel reflecting the opinion about Jesus in the early church at Jerusalem. We may likewise question whether there is a trace of distinctive Paulinism in the soteriology or the christology of Mark. Indeed the mind that conceived the original sources of the early chapters of Acts may be precisely the mind of Mark.

Were we to venture one word of criticism, it would be that the author makes too great demands on the previous knowledge of the

readers of the "Home University Library." On the other hand, the volume reveals an intimate and long-standing acquaintance not only with the New Testament itself but also with the complex traditions about the same in the Fathers; it manifests alertness in literary criticism and fertility of resource in combining detached data; it is replete with incidental suggestions, as, for example, that in Philemon Paul requests that Onesimus be manumitted (p. 89), or that, when Paul went to Jerusalem to visit Peter, "the story he was interested to hear had even then more to do with that common apostolic witness of the resurrection appearances reproduced in 1 Cor. xv, 3-11, than with the sayings and doings of the ministry" (p. 154); and finally it displays a pioneer robustness in constructive work which is stimulating to American scholarship.

J. E. FRAME.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
NEW YORK.

JESUS. GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT. The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. xii, 321. \$1.35.

Dr. Gilbert has undertaken to write a life of Jesus which shall be at once critical and popular; which shall commend itself by the use of a sound historical method and by lucidity of presentation. That he was qualified by ripe scholarship and literary skill to perform this difficult task, his earlier works gave evidence. The present book surpasses them in grasp and in completeness, and is an important addition to the literature of the subject. It is likely to do valuable service in extending the knowledge of gospel criticism and its results among educated laymen. The introductory part dealing with the sources is of especial merit in this regard.

Dr. Gilbert's criticism and historical construction concern themselves simply with the Gospels. Their scope may be indicated by the following questions: What are the most trustworthy elements of these composite documents? and what may we learn from these elements about Jesus?

He assumes the validity of the criticism which has given the "two source" theory of the synoptics general acceptance among scholars. These older documents—the "Logia" (as, differing from most recent New Testament critics, he calls the collection of sayings used by Matthew and Luke) and Mark, he takes as the gospel in the Gospels. His supreme source is the Logia, which he calls "the fundamental Christian document," and the distinctive feature of his construction is the support found for his views in this document. The Jesus of whom the Logia informs us is the real Jesus.

The task which Dr. Gilbert set himself had rigid limits. It did not include historical questions underlying the oldest written sources of our Gospels and affecting their value. Such inquiries as Wellhausen and Harnack have made with regard to the genesis of the Logia (or Q), its relative age as compared with that of Mark, the evidences it gives of a modification of the words of Jesus—these were excluded by the author's aim.

In presenting the thoughts of Jesus he felt only at liberty to use the material given by the Gospels; and this he has done with admirable candor and great clearness. A broader presentation, giving Jesus' teaching in its connection with current Jewish thought, would have been more interesting; it was not called for by the important object for which the book was written.

The closing part of the book examines the statements made by the Gospels as to Jesus' birth, as to certain miraculous acts and events of his ministry, and his resurrection. The result reached is indicated by the title given to the section, "The Legendary Jesus."

One who admitted the soundness of Dr. Gilbert's criticism and accepted its result, might object, that regarding these stories as legends had not given him a different conception of Jesus. What was essential in his thought of Christ was not derived from accepting them as literally true, and was not lost when such acceptance became impossible.

EDWARD Y. HINCKS.

ANDOVER.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. I. China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, Rome. GEORGE FOOT MOORE. International Theological Library. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xiv, 637. \$2.50.

The International Theological Library, which has hitherto confined itself to Christianity, has made an advance into a wider field with its issue of the *History of Religions* by George Foot Moore; the first volume of which, excluding Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, embraces the religions of China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, and Rome. A second volume will treat the three omitted here, and we may be permitted to hope that a later volume will take up the religions of uncivilized peoples, the historical *prius*, from the point of view of comparative religion, of the subject-matter here considered.

But for the present we may be thankful for what we have already received. Professor Moore's work is a marvel of condensation and lucid exposition. He appears to be at home in each of the many

fields he here describes so well, and we regret only that so many fields had to be represented within the compass of a volume of six hundred pages. It would have been profitable as well as pleasant to hear the author more at length on various points which in this book could only be mentioned briefly. It is probably owing to limitation of space that one promise made in the preface, for example, seems to be barely met; namely, to show the relation of religions to race and physical environment. Thus the suggestion of Oldenberg that India's mental decay was due to the enervating climate of the Gangetic plain is not noticed. Greece in this regard receives much fuller treatment than Rome, Egypt than Babylonia.

Just what determined the order of treatment in this presentation of the religions of nine races is not obvious. But the author had to begin somewhere, and apparently thought that it would be well to start with the extreme Orient and work westward, doubtless strengthened in this course by the possibility of an approximate parallelism in chronology; which, however, holds only for the last links in his chain, except as Assyria may be regarded as an appanage of Babylon, and Japan of China, with part of India (Buddhism) introduced under the head of Japan. This last arrangement is the only really disturbing feature in the otherwise unobjectionable treatment of the nine religions as racial phenomena; for it forces the student into a study of the religion of Buddha from its later end, and presents Buddhism first of all in the phases of its most foreign development. But happily it is only Buddhism that has to be treated in this peculiar manner. The other religions, bounded as they are by racial and national limits, are presented as homogeneous wholes, or at least as products of one national or racial entity. The space devoted to each of the nine religions is reasonably allotted; seventy-eight pages to China alone, or one hundred and forty-three to China and Japan together (including Buddhism); about fifty-five pages to Egypt, forty-two to Babylonia and Assyria, one hundred and ten to India, one hundred and thirty to Greece, sixty to Rome.

Professor Moore remarks in the preface on the simultaneity of the appearance of the great religions; comparing the period from the eighth to the fifth centuries B.C. to a geological epoch, as if it represented a phase of periodicity. In other words, we are to expect another epoch, and such epochs may have come in the remoter past. But this is a doubtful doctrine; and, after all, three centuries do not comprise the limits of the great religions, nor is there any conformity in the rise of the great religious teachers. If

a wave of religious intensity rose in the mental world, it must have skipped about a good deal. Pythagoras came some time before Confucius, Confucius before Buddha, Zoroaster before either. The wave must have traveled from Persia to Greece and then back to China and then again to India. It is perhaps better to give up altogether this idea of a power sweeping over earth as a rising wave, and treat each religion as the outgrowth of its own precedent conditions. All these religions grew up independently (except for contiguous borrowing), and were severally based on the common human elements of each race. They represent, if anything, a wave of civilization or emergence from savagery, of which religion makes only a part, not a spiritual upheaval simultaneously felt in various places.

In the first section, which really includes China and Japan, Professor Moore draws a careful and legitimate distinction between the early gods of Shinto and the Chinese deities. He shows how the state organization conditioned the conception of the latter, and points out the difference in mythological development. As between the interpretation of the first Japanese gods as spirits and that interpreting them as nature-powers, he inclines to the latter, though without discussion of this mooted point. A considerable part of Japanese religion is devoted to Buddhistic sects, where brevity is an unfortunate factor in the demonstration, though what is said is excellently clear. Thus the Hosso sect is well described historically; but to say that a sect which today numbers its quota of adherents and is represented by several temples, was "supplanted or absorbed" in the Middle Ages is a little misleading. The Jodo and Shin sects (the latter the largest at present in Japan) are theistic, in distinction from the Zen, which is practically atheistic. These popular but real differences between the sects, as atheistic, theistic, and polytheistic, have value at least for the general reader, who may not be versed in the vocabulary of Buddhist metaphysics. The Tendai sect is thus described—"pantheistic realism"—but the other sects remain explained in rather too technical language.

It is impossible here to examine in detail the admirable exposition of all the religions treated in this volume. Professor Moore is quite right in saying that however much a handbook loses by not being written by specialists, it gains more through being composed as a whole by one scholar; we may add, by a scholar of Professor Moore's wide information and keen discrimination. The religions of India, for example, seem to have been written by one versed in the literature at first hand, and it is safe to say that few Sanskrit scholars

could have improved upon the presentation here given. Perhaps a specialist would not have passed the subject of the Atman without touching upon the question whether the All-soul included the material world or implicitly excluded it (as certain passages suggest); and he probably would not have left the subject of Buddhism without touching on the practical question of meat-eating, interesting as a typical case of growth in the pious usage of the church. But these minute points have little weight in comparison with the excellent discussion of the fundamental principle of the faith. Buddhism, the later stages of which were discussed under China and Japan, is here depicted historically, the dates being those usually accepted. The second council seems to be recorded as a fact, though in truth it is doubtful whether it ever existed. The date of the introduction of Buddhism into China is given as the second century A.D. on page 302, and as the first century on page 313. Neither date is certain.

Of the remaining religions it may be said that they are all treated conservatively, fully, and from a modern point of view. We hear nothing of the intellectual greatness displayed in Babylonian liturgies; rather we are warned not to believe in it. Zoroastrian "duality" is fitly analyzed. In Egyptian religion full account is taken of the work done of late by Professor Breasted. Greek and Roman religions are well summarized. A good bibliography and an analytical index are appended to the book, which is by far the best general handbook for the study of advanced religions that has yet appeared.

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CUNEIFORM PARALLELS TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. Translated and edited by ROBERT W. ROGERS. Eaton & Mains. 1912. \$4.50.

The phase of Assyriology which from the beginning of the study has attracted most readers is the relation of the subject to the Bible.

In *Cuneiform Parallels* Professor Rogers gathers a great mass of scattered material into a single volume, at once temperate, readable, comprehensive, and scholarly. The transliterations will be welcome to Assyriologists and to Hebrew students, and are so placed on the page as not to disturb the general reader. The bibliography, the introductions to many of the passages translated, the references to other publications and translations of the texts, and the forty-eight photographic reproductions, add greatly to the usefulness of the volume.

For the production of a work of this kind Professor Rogers is well equipped, and he has had the benefit of suggestions from some of his Assyriological brethren. He shows an admirable spirit toward his fellow-workers, is modest in asserting his own claims, and keeps to the straight road through a country in which many Assyriologists have lost themselves in by-paths.

The name of the book is attractive, but not quite accurate. Some of the selections are not taken from cuneiform sources, as those on pp. 76-78, 109-112, 239, 346-348, and 370-371. Nor does the word "Parallels" properly describe the contents of the work. There are cuneiform parallels to the Old Testament, such as the deluge story, the exposure of Sargon, and Sennacherib's invasion of Palestine. There is much other cuneiform material which illustrates the Old Testament, but is in no sense parallel. This is the case with a very large part of the present volume. We should hardly expect, for instance, to find the Babylonian Chronicle or the Eponym List in a book of parallels to the Old Testament. The Hammurabi Code contains a few laws very similar to Hebrew laws, but the great bulk of the code scarcely suggests Hebrew parallels. Yet this code fills seventy pages of the book, or about one-seventh of the whole. It must be admitted that it would be difficult to find a title, at once brief and adequate, for this book, which is a storehouse of material, mainly cuneiform, for the illustration and elucidation of the Old Testament, and perhaps we ought not to cavil at an author who gives so much more than he promises.

Cuneiform Parallels is not a discussion of the relations of Assyriology to the Bible, but restricts itself largely to a presentation of the cuneiform material, leaving it to the reader to make the application for himself. It thus enables a layman in the subject to become a semi-independent worker in this fascinating field.

The selections are grouped under six heads: mythological texts, hymns and prayers, liturgical and doctrinal texts, chronological materials, historical texts, and legal texts. The first and fifth heads naturally comprise about three-fifths of the whole. Under the first head are nine divisions, including the creation, the Gilgamesh Epic and the deluge story, the Descent of Ishtar, and other less familiar selections. The section on hymns and prayers contains twelve selections, but the author points out the necessity of caution in drawing parallels between these and the Hebrew Psalter. "The supposed Babylonian Sabbath" is the title of a selection under another head. The title suggests a negative attitude on the question, Did the Babylonians have a day similar to the Hebrew Sab-

bath? Under the title "The Pantheon" the selections are given on which some scholars base a belief that the Babylonians knew the doctrine of monotheism. The historical texts presented begin with Hammurabi (ca. 2000 B.C.), include some of the El-Amarna letters (ca. 1400 B.C.), and close with numerous extracts, mostly brief, from the records of the later kings of Assyria and Babylon (885-538 B.C.).

One need hardly say that a book like this, belonging to a young and growing science, has its imperfections. Such smaller slips as "sets" for "sits" (p. 88), the repetition of the word "due" (p. 325, top), *i-ra-ni* for *i-ra-mi* (p. 135, bottom), and *ma-še-e* for *na-še-e* (p. 328, l. 90), may be the result of accident. This explanation would hardly apply to the inconsistency in giving the names of the leading characters in the Gilgamesh Epic (see pp. 81, n. 1; 82, n. 1; 85, l. 5; 86, l. 8 from bottom; 87, l. 2; and 103, l. 17). The statement (p. 396) that the reader of the Hammurabi Code found it necessary to turn his head down sidewise in order to read the inscription at all, cannot be correct. The feat would be too difficult. The lines were read from above downward, as written. The stele containing the code was not set up at Sippar (p. 396), but at Babylon, as is expressly stated in a passage of column 40.¹ For "cast me into the river" (p. 136, l. 7) read "laid" or "placed me in the river." On pages 326, 329, and 331, the same phrase is rendered, "my men I set over them," "I set my officers over them," "I put my governors over them." The word thus variously given is in the singular, and should be rendered "general" or "officer." After recording the capture of certain Philistine cities, Sargon uses a word commonly rendered "I took" (p. 329, l. 7). While this is the usual meaning of the word, it seems in the present passage to mean "rebuild," as in a passage of the prism of Tiglath-pileser I. Sargon rebuilds the Philistine cities, and settles therein captives from other countries. There is confusion in the translation of the middle paragraph on page 459, though our author was not the first to make the confusion. In the correct translation a new sentence begins with the words, "That the strong might not injure the weak," and continues to the end of the paragraph. "Hammurabi . . . whom Shamash has endowed with justice am I" (p. 461) should be "Hammurabi . . . to whom Shamash has communicated the laws am I."²

In spite of such small defects as these, it is a pleasure to bear witness to the conscientiousness and general excellence of this work.

¹ See *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, xxvii, 128.

² *Ibid.*, xxv, 271-275.

The selections are all of interest to the student of the Old Testament, and the translations are on a level with the best standards of today. The book deserves a large circulation. Indeed, there is no other book on the subject which is so full, so thorough, and so sane.

DAVID G. LYON.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE SERMON: ITS CONSTRUCTION AND DELIVERY. By DAVID JAMES BURRELL. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 329.

The value of Dr. Burrell's book is in its frank disclosure of the methods of his own effective preaching. It is filled with concrete advice, very practical and useful, and enforced with homely and amusing illustration. It deals with texts and topics, the making of outlines, the "exordium," the "argument," the "peroration," and the delivery of the sermon, with counsels on getting attention and on sermon-power. The writer has little patience with manuscript in the pulpit, and no patience with liberal theology. The book is a prescription for a sturdily orthodox sermon, spoken without notes, scriptural, evangelistic, intended mainly to convert sinners, full of anecdote and apt quotation, admirably ordered, and punctually terminated at the end. Sermons grow like trees by processes mysterious and indefinable; but they need correctives and assistances such as are given to the trees by fertilizing and spraying and pruning. For such care of sermons Dr. Burrell gives plain and profitable directions.

GEORGE HODGES.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE PULPIT AND THE PEW. CHARLES H. PARKHURST, D.D. Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered, 1913, before the Divinity School of Yale University. Yale University Press. 1913. Pp. 195. \$1.50.

These eight lectures are not long, and they certainly are not dull. When spoken, they must have been effective, and the force is not lost in the reading. Colloquial language and illustrations abound, and some of these are apt to linger in the mind.

The lecturer is clear that the church has a work to do which no other institution is prepared to perform. He has not an exalted idea of the educational value of either the press or the stage. But the church of the twentieth century has for its duty the task of Elijah and Jeremiah: "To take eternal principle, and to measure existing conditions and institutions against that principle as stand-

ard." The aim of the pulpit is to emancipate men from sin. Its business is not to entertain or to instruct, but to resuscitate the conscience and to re-create the heart.

The author's well-known devotion to the cause of civic righteousness makes his discussion of the attitude of the church and the work of the minister toward social betterment, of special importance. He voices the well-known protest against an other-worldly individualism which "baptizes children over a font, but is dumb as an oyster to conditions that ruin children and youth faster than we can baptize them." But, on the other hand, he is wise enough to see that a ministry that exhausts itself in seeking simply to better conditions outwardly, never gets to the heart of the matter. "The policy of individualized work indicates the proper and peculiar function of the church. I know very well what the other kind means, and that for permanence and depth of result it is utterly inadequate. I have tried it, and I know its worth and its worthlessness. The business of the church is to bring people into the Kingdom of Heaven, one by one. The unit method is the only method."

Neither pulpit nor pew is flattered by the lecturer. If people do not go to church, we are told, "it is not the fault of the masses. People will fill the churches as fast as God fills the ministers." But, on the other hand, the young theologian is told that he needs to learn thoroughly before ordination that "while people have convictions, they are not very much given to making use of them, and treat them—especially moral and religious ones—very much as they do bric-à-brac, which is designed rather for decoration than for consumption."

Perhaps the most original and valuable lecture is the one on the Pulpit's estimate of the Pew, which every preacher would do well to read and to remember. But the lectures are all wholesome reading, and are calculated to carry out admirably the purpose of the lectureship.

RAYMOND CALKINS.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE MODERN CALL TO MISSIONS. JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 341. \$1.50 net.

Dr. Dennis has brought together in book form a series of papers written for various publications on the History and Scope of Missionary Enterprise. These articles have been largely rewritten in the light of current events and have been so correlated in the book as to make a connected history of missionary activities from colonial times to the present.

His discussion of the appeal of missions to the modern church is particularly timely and full of suggestion. His chapter on union movements and unity of spirit in missionary work touches on what many people regard as the crucial problem of Christianity in foreign lands. The foreign non-Christian must often be at a loss to know what Christianity is, since it is presented from so many view-points and under so many names. On this important point—the necessity of ultimate unity and agreement on the fundamentals of Christianity—many will consider Dr. Dennis rather non-committal.

One is rather inclined to resent the note of apology which now and then appears throughout the book. The Christian missionary fails to recognize the significance of his work if he is tempted to make any concessions as to its value in comparison with diplomacy and the ordinary adjustments between nations. The only apology that need be made for missionary enterprise is an apology for its failure to recognize the comprehensiveness and all-embracing character of its purpose. Christ is in the world to found a civilization. This is a fundamental proposition. Missionaries are simply his co-laborers in this work. When once the church is fully awake to the great fact that Christ's meaning for the world is not a call for any department of life, not a call to help this or that movement, but a challenge to restore to life itself its birthright as the dynamic source of government and diplomacy, of law and order, of grace and peace—when this is understood, then shall we advance with dignity, and without fear or apology, to make the kingdoms of this world the kingdom of Christ.

The emphasis on the church and on religion in the conventional sense must give place to an emphasis on Christ as he lived, and as he *practised* life. The subtleties of a theology shot through with unexplained and unexplainable mysteries, must be eliminated from missionary effort, and an emphasis placed upon Christ, the Brother and Master of Men, the Healer and Announcer of liberty to the peoples of the earth.

Jesus, let it be repeated, gave no distinct emphasis to the parts of life. He is the spirit of government, of diplomacy, and of world-advancement. He was a world-man, living a life of dynamic inspiration, destined to renew not only individual men, but all the agencies of men, and to make this world the kingdom of peace and good-will—the kingdom of God.

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SOCIAL PROGRESS AND RELIGIOUS FAITH¹

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There are not a few circles in our day in which social progress and religious faith are regarded as being in at least a semi-unfriendly relation. The leaders in the cause of the industrial classes indeed, like the Social Democrats and the Syndicalists, often thoroughly denounce religion. Workers for general social amelioration are frequently indifferent to religious faith. Great masses of people are convinced that religion does not help toward social progress and so regard it as at best a dead weight upon society. On the other hand, when churches or religious groups become vigorously active for social progress, the alarm is sure to be raised that their religion is becoming "mere social ethics." When social topics are considered in the pulpit or at the mid-week service, the fear is expressed that real religion is being crowded out. When religious leaders throw themselves into social causes, they are suspected of having lost faith in "spiritual" forces. Not infrequently we hear people say that they are "tired of the social uplift"; though it is barely more than a decade since there arose any wide-spread interest in our country in social questions.

¹ Address of installation as professor of philosophy of religion and Christian ethics in Oberlin Theological Seminary, September 25, 1913.

Even those who regard such positions as extreme are yet doubtful as to how much relation there should be between the two interests in question. They are apt to feel that, while social progress and religious faith have their points of contact, they also are often divergent, and that each may flourish very well without the other. In fact, the question of their relation is precisely one of the points where people are conscious of confusion of thought, and, consequently, of hesitancy in action.

There are certain underlying notions which go far toward explaining this confusion and hesitancy and the more extreme attitudes as well. It is these underlying notions that we are especially to take up for consideration.

In the first place, according to a widely prevalent view religion is inherently conservative.² This is a view which both the social worker and the defender of faith are apt to share. Let us listen to the way that the defender of faith is likely to put the matter: "Religion," he will say, "is not by nature progressive but conservative. It does not invent the new; it cherishes the old. It does not explore the unknown; it venerates the true and tried and well-known. Its work is not to originate but to consecrate, not to construct but to conserve, not to disturb the souls of men with infusions of energy, but to soothe them with anointings of peace."

"There is," the defender of faith may add, "a psychology supporting this view. Religion is a matter of feeling and instinct, and these are essentially conservative functions. The progressive, constructive faculties are the reason and the will, and the fruit of their activity is science and morality. The movements of the religious consciousness are different and betray a different origin. Religion broods and meditates, grows contrite, pleads,

² Cf. Baldwin's "Mental Development, Social and Ethical Interpretations," chap. X; and Marshall's "Instinct and Reason," chaps. VIII-XII.

adores. Such currents of emotion must have familiar objects around which to flow. Thus religion, having its source in the conservative side of our natures, must work predominantly as a conservative influence upon humanity."

But the worker for social progress, accepting this theory of religion, often goes farther. He says that because religion is conservative it is also obstructive. It gets in the way of progress, and is frequently found fighting against it. It anathematizes the progressive spirits and places upon the reactionary the robes of authority. And even where it does not take active measures adverse to progress, it still acts as a dead weight, a massive pressure in favor of things as they are.

One who takes this view will claim that the facts are on his side. He will point to the long "warfare between science and theology," and to the present attitude of hostility or timidity towards "modernism." He will point to those countries which are progressing towards fuller democracy as the ones in which the working classes are alienated from the church, and in which the church is inclined to support vested interests; and on the other hand he will point to the lands of reaction and oppression as those where religion has the undisturbed faith of the common people, and where the church is an instrument for keeping them in bondage. Thus he will urge that the facts themselves show religion to be both inherently conservative and practically obstructive.

The array of facts which the social worker who is distrustful of religion can summon for his justification is so formidable that it raises the question whether the theory on which the facts are being interpreted is sound, and whether the defender of faith, in admitting that theory, does not surrender his own cause. *Is* religion really conservative in its essence, and thus liable to be

obstructive in its workings? This is a question which we must consider carefully, if we are to gain a clearer understanding of our subject.

But, before taking up this question, another underlying notion must be indicated which helps to explain the idea of a semi-unfriendly relation between the cause of social progress and that of religious faith, and also the confusion of thought as to what the relation really should be.

This other underlying thought is that religion, being a relation between the soul and God, is essentially individual. It must have, to be sure—every one would hasten to add—its social expression in churches and forms of worship; but this social expression is apt to be thought of as being primarily for the sake of fostering the individual experience, which alone is religion. It must have too its social expression in the shape of an influence upon the moral activities of society. But this is understood as a product of religion, often only a by-product; this social activity is not something in and through which one has religious experience. So, after all, religion is something that might very well flourish without any social progress at all.

Here too the social worker and the defender of faith are apt to agree in theory. The one as well as the other is ready to assume that religion *per se* is an individual matter. But their very agreement becomes the source of a new estrangement. The worker for social progress is disposed to leave religion as a matter of individual concern out of account. Of course where this is done for temporary and immediately practical reasons, as in the case of many social settlements which are dealing with conflicting faiths, no exception can be taken. But often the social worker goes much farther and disregards religion altogether. He is likely to look upon religion as an elective in the curriculum of human education, which

fewer and fewer will take. He is disposed to think of the sphere of religion as being determined by taste, temperament, type of mind, rather than social need.

But frequently the social worker goes even beyond this neutral position and takes an aggressively hostile attitude toward religion. We find him insisting that religion, being individual, fails in what it claims as its own special work—the salvation of mankind. Man, he maintains, is a product of social conditions, of heredity and environment. He is played upon by many and complex social influences, which really determine what the individual man shall be. Hence in order to save the individual we must save society. This is a work that must be done by social forces. Consequently, religion is a negligible matter.

To all this the defender of faith raises a vigorous protest. He insists that society will never be saved until we save the individuals who make it up. And the salvation of each individual is a personal question. It requires conversion—a change of heart and a reformation of will. Of course, the converted man should be active for social ends, according to his ability. But the mainspring of such activity must be an inward experience of salvation. Hence the defender of faith urges, "Save the individual, and social progress will take care of itself."

Here again the fact of opposition in practical policy suggests that there may be a defect in the common underlying theory. Is religion at all adequately described when it is said to be essentially individual? When we say that true religion is inward and personal, should we assume this to mean that intrinsically religion is something quite different from the social side of our experience, so that social activity is an external product, or even a by-product, of religion? Clearly, these are matters that our theme requires us seriously to consider.

If then we are to do anything toward removing confusion of thought as to what should be the relation between social progress and religious faith, these two fundamental questions present themselves: Is religious faith essentially conservative, and hence, as many social workers claim, largely obstructive of social progress? And is religious faith inherently individual, and hence, as many defenders of faith insist, bound to make the salvation of individuals its chief direct object?

I.

In considering these questions, let us turn first to the facts themselves. We already have indicated the kind of facts which are brought forward to show the alleged conservative and individual nature of religion. But there are other facts of a most important character which lead to the opposite conclusion. Indeed they are of such weight that we may say: *Religious faith at its best, and therefore in its inherent nature, is a powerful force for social progress.*

The evidence which is earliest in origin and most striking in nature for this vital relation is to be found in prophetic religion; and by prophetic religion I mean particularly the religion of the great Hebrew prophets. No one will question that in the prophet we see religion at its best. His clearness of vision, his ardor and purity of passion, his sweep, intensity, and self-abandon—these, in our highest moments, we covet with all our souls. Other religious types often become names of disapproval. The priest, the pharisee, the ecclesiast, the puritan, or even the mystic, may at times denote what is defective and unideal. But the prophet has become a synonym of the highest character and clearest faith. The prophet is the religious type that can fully meet the requirements for leadership in the modern world. And

it is one of the great new insights of today that the prophet is a practical ideal for us all. It is of the utmost moment therefore to note the manner in which the prophet's religious experience was attained.

The distinctly prophetic consciousness of God formed itself under the pressure of social injustice. It was the luxury, license, and extortion by which the strong victimized the weak that most aroused their holy resentment. It was the misery, degradation, and oppression which the weak suffered at the hands of the strong that called forth their divinest compassion. Listen to the relentless denunciation of social wrong by Amos: "For they know not to do right, saith Jehovah, who store up violence and robbery in their palaces. I will smite the winter-house with the summer-house; and the houses of ivory shall perish, and the great houses shall have an end, saith Jehovah."³ Or hear the heart-wrung wail of the compassionate Hosea: "There is nought but swearing and breaking faith and killing and stealing and committing adultery."⁴ Isaiah, in his turn, utters his outraged protest against the Jewish princes: "What mean ye that ye crush my people and grind the face of the poor?" And then with pitiless irony he depicts the luxurious women of Jerusalem, who are "haughty, and walk with outstretched necks and wanton eyes, walking and mincing as they go, and making a tinkling with their feet," and enumerates all their apparatus of luxury—"the headtires, and the ankle chains, and the sashes, and the perfume boxes, and the amulets."⁵ And Micah makes the same bitter complaint: "Woe to them that devise iniquity and work evil upon their beds! When the morning is light, they practise it, because it is in the power of their hand. And they covet fields and seize them, and houses and take them away." "The prince asketh, and the judge is ready for a reward; and the

³ Amos 3 10, 15.

⁴ Hos. 4 2.

⁵ Isa. 3 16, 20.

great man, he uttereth the evil desire of his soul. Thus they weave it together. The best of them is as a brier; the most upright is worse than a thorn hedge."⁶

These passionate utterances of the Hebrew prophets reveal the direction in which the mighty currents of their religious life poured themselves out. Every great new form of religious consciousness has some ideal to which the sense of God gives reality and motive power. In some forms of religion the ideal is philosophic and cosmic; it represents predominantly the order of nature and man's harmony with nature. In other forms it is psychological and has to do with reuniting a divided self or curing a sick soul. But the ideal of the prophets was primarily social. It aimed at securing righteous and humane relations among men and reforming the social order. This social ideal is what gave shape to that consciousness of God which we recognize as loftiest and most intense, and as having the most meaning for our day.

But the prophet does not simply make a passive protest against the existing social order. He actively seeks to reform it. Other religious types—the Hindu, the monastic, the quietist—react from social disorder by seeking to withdraw from it and to lead a separate life according to their own ideals. Not so the prophet. His sense of God launches him against social injustice. The symbol of the prophet's religious consciousness is the plumb-line of Amos's vision. By his consciousness of God's righteousness he finds the political and social life of his people out of plumb. Then he remonstrates, pleads, arraigns, condemns, scourges, sparing no class—neither princes nor aristocracy nor men of wealth nor judges nor priests—sparing no institution or practice—neither business nor luxurious living nor courts of justice nor the customs of the sanctuary—pouring out his soul in his effort to make his people know the righteousness of God

⁶ Micah 2 1, 2; 7 3, 4.

as the law between man and man. In brief, the religion of the prophet made the man himself a mighty social force. He knew no life with God which could keep apart from the service of men. The deepest nature of God was expressed in his will for righteousness among men, in his judgment upon social injustice, in his compassion toward the weak and oppressed. The experience of such a God as this was inseparable from the effort to make his will prevail in the social order. If the Hebrew prophet may be taken as embodying the highest type of prophetic religion, then that form of religion is in its deepest nature a social force.

There are, however, social types of religion which are backward-looking. Such most notably is the Confucian religion. This faith, as we know, exalts the social order to the highest place. But the social order thus exalted is that of the remote past. In by-gone ages is to be found fully embodied the ideal to which the present must live up. As for the present social order, it needs to be mended rather than re-formed. It is not to be developed but maintained. Now in contrast to all this the prophetic type of religion, as is shown by the Hebrew prophets, is forward-looking. It aims to re-form, to reconstruct. Its ideal is in the future. This is largely because prophetism is more religious than Confucianism. Since the living, active will of God is a present reality for the Hebrew prophet, the prevailing state of things has to his mind no finality. For the Hebrew prophet the ultimate fact is not an existing social order, but a supreme spiritual power willing a better social order.

Great constructive work resulted from prophetism. The thorough-going reform under Josiah, embodied in Deuteronomy, was such a result. The preservation in the Exile of the nation's faith, and the reconstruction of the Jewish state, taken in the large, are products

of the prophetic spirit. Even in the denunciations of the great pre-exilic prophets the constructive motive was underlying. In the first chapter of Isaiah, known as "the great arraignment," we find this message from the Lord to Jerusalem: "I will turn my hand upon thee, and thoroughly purge away thy dross. . . . Afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness, a faithful town." The prophetic union of denunciation with the constructive motive receives its classical expression in Jeremiah's vision of the two baskets of figs. While Zedekiah and those still in Jerusalem are denounced as being like the basket of very bad figs, "which cannot be eaten, they are so bad," for the captives in Babylonia there is a message of hope. They are the basket of good figs, "like the figs which are first-ripe," and Jehovah will bring them back again to their own land. Thus the prophetic spirit demanded not only the vindication of God's righteousness through judgment, but also its realization through mercy. No sooner was the destruction of the unrighteous order accomplished than the construction of the righteous order was to ensue.

This fundamental constructive purpose of the prophet finds full expression in the great ideal which he gave to the world—the ideal of the kingdom of God. In this ideal are gathered up all the prophetic motives. By it the Christian faith was cradled. Through it the best spirit of our modern time finds expression. But the permanently constructive character of this ideal, as of the prophetic type of religion in all its aspects, was given to it by Jesus. In Jesus we find that climax of Hebrew prophetic religion by which it becomes world-religion, and in him we find eternal expression of the motives for social progress. If then we are to appreciate the full value of prophetic religion as a social force, we must turn to Jesus' thought of the kingdom of God.

Jesus universalized the idea of the kingdom. He made the conditions for entrance into it not political but moral. He described the qualities of its members not as Jewish but as human. He depicted its activities not as violent and retributive, but as spiritual, righteous, and beneficent. In the Roman centurion, in the Syro-phenician woman, in the Samaritan portrayed as acting in a neighborly way to one of his Jewish despisers, in the publican and outcast who were eager for his message he saw more hopeful citizens of the kingdom than in the religious models of his people. Indeed he declared, "Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven; but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast forth."⁷ Like the scientist of today, who everywhere in nature sees forces where we see only inert objects, so Jesus saw universal human values where his fellows saw only caste and custom. In his work of establishing the kingdom he swept away all barriers which stood in the way of the simple claims of human life.

But Jesus did more than this consummating of the prophetic work. He universalized the prophetic consciousness itself; that is, he opened to everyone the same sense of God's nearness and power, the same sense of having an inspiration and a mission direct from God, which the ancient prophets had. He declared that the least in the kingdom of God was greater than John the Baptist. He showed that all who were ready for the life of love were sons of God. He said that everyone who did God's will was most deeply akin to himself—"the same is my brother, and sister, and mother." He found that the deeper truth was hidden from the wise and understanding, and revealed unto babes. By every resource of thought, imagination, and example he sought to bring to his fellow-men, of whatever type, that imme-

⁷ Mt. 8 11, 12.

diat experience of God which is the possession of the prophet.

But this is only one side of the prophetic type of religion, and it is only one side of Jesus' work. We commonly express this side by saying that Jesus made religion personal and inward, that he completed the individualizing of religion. But the other side of prophetic religion, the social side, was no less characteristic of Jesus. And with him the two sides are, if anything, more closely related than with the Old Testament prophets. For the content of his individual religion itself was social. All his central ideas have the most direct social meaning. The thought of God's Fatherhood as that of a loving will working towards universal human good, the thought of man's sonship as a sharing in the work of that loving will, the ideal of the neighbor, of the physician, of greatness through service—all these blend religion and social life most intimately. Hence individual religion for him meant also individualizing social responsibility. In his work of universalizing the religious consciousness of the prophets he kept together their sense of God and their social goal. Infinite sources of truth and power were available for every soul, but only as used to meet social need. The sense of God and the service of men were inseparable.

But the full measure of the union which Jesus effected between the life with God and the service of men is not to be learned simply from his teaching. It can be learned only from his life and deeds. Jesus subordinated himself to the kingdom. He did not put himself first; he put the triumph of God's will among men first. He fought injustice. He launched himself against that form of social wrong with which he was directly confronted—religious caste feeling. He hung the millstone of his wrath about the neck, not of the sinner in general, but of the man who was sinning against the weak. He

died not only to save men from sinning, but to save them from being sinned against. So also he poured out his mercy, his healing power, his message of forgiveness, upon the helpless and hopeless multitudes. With every resource of mind and heart he strove to open the door of the kingdom to those against whom it had been shut by the Pharisees. To banish fear and anxiety from timorous, harrowed minds, to awaken faith in benumbed souls, to unearth the deeper, better self in the worldly and irreligious, to shepherd the mass of common people—for these ends he unreservedly spent his power. Thus he became the embodiment of the ultimate law of the social order; namely, free self-sacrifice by those who possess spiritual values in order to make those values available for others. The cross itself is the symbol of this ultimate social law. It is the emblem of the supreme life given to create life. It stands for the losing of life to impart a gospel and to establish the kingdom of God on earth.

Thus the facts about prophetic religion—that type originating with the Hebrew seers and transformed into a world-religion by Jesus—amply support the position taken at the outset of this discussion. They make strongly for the conclusion that religion is not essentially a conservative tendency, and that it is not individual in such a sense that it may thrive apart from social interests, but that, taken at its best, it is a powerful force for social progress.

But in maintaining this position we need not confine ourselves to the beginnings of our faith. There are important facts in modern religious life which make for the same conclusion. Consider, for example, that movement which must rank as one of the most important characteristics of our religious life in the last hundred years—the development of liberal Christianity. The leaders of this movement have been distinguished

no less for their social spirit than for their liberalizing work. In fact, these two sides of their influence seem to be most intimately related. So that we may say, a powerful force for social progress appears again in modern liberal religion.

Let us note the relation of some of the leaders of liberal religion to social progress. William Ellery Channing must be counted one of the chief originators of the humanitarian and philanthropic movements in our country in the early part of the last century. He was foremost in promoting the causes of anti-slavery, of temperance, of humane treatment of criminals, of diminishing poverty, of promoting peace, and of elevating the laboring classes. An early entry in his journal, where he makes a list of "things to be done in town," reads like the most modern program of social betterment. And into all his strenuous activity in these directions he carried a devout Christian spirit and a truly prophetic consciousness. Speaking of God's call to social reform, he said: "In thus calling us, he imposes on us a burden such as the ancient prophets groaned under. We must 'drink of the cup' and 'be baptized with the baptism' of our Master."⁸ Horace Bushnell, from whom flows so broad a stream of influence for liberal religion, was foremost in civic progress in Hartford, and one who maintained that "politics are under the law of God." Professor Walker writes of him: "As a citizen he was a man of far-reaching vision and inspiring leadership."⁹ Henry Ward Beecher, of whom Lyman Abbott says that "he probably did more than any other man in America" to lead the Puritan churches into a faith both vital and liberal, was foremost in the anti-slavery struggle—making public opinion, counselling with statesmen, and

⁸ Channing's *Life*, centenary memorial edition, by W. H. Channing, pp. 181 and 457.

⁹ *Great Men of the Christian Church*, p. 362.

fighting another Gettysburg for the cause of the Union on the platforms of England.

Or among Englishmen think of Frederick Denison Maurice, one of the chief channels for the liberalizing influence of Coleridge, and at the same time the originator of Christian Socialism and founder of the Workingmen's College in London, the precursor of the university settlements, Toynbee Hall and Oxford Hall, and so of the social settlement movement. Or recall Charles Kingsley, typical of the men who rallied around Maurice, who gave ardent support to social causes both on the platform and by his articles and novels. Or consider Frederick W. Robertson, not so much the initiator of a movement as a preacher of unrivalled power with the working classes, consuming his strength during those brief but wonderful six years at Brighton in organizing a Workingmen's Institute, which against much opposition he carried through successfully.

Finally, bring to mind the group of leaders of the present day in our own country—more impressive because more numerous—who stand for liberal religion and social progress: President Tucker, founder of the Andover House in Boston; Professor Peabody with his pioneer courses in Harvard on Christian social ethics; Washington Gladden, early and valiant champion of the cause of labor; and others now in the full tide of their activity, of whom Graham Taylor, Charles R. Brown, and Walter Rauschenbusch are but shining examples. The direct social service of these men is very great. Their influence as leaders in the churches is still greater. But what we especially should not fail to note is the ardent religious impulse present in their social endeavor. The powerful nature of this impulse may be felt, for example, in these words of Rauschenbusch, from his last book, *Christianizing the Social Order*: "Were you ever converted to God?" he asks. "Do you remember the

change in your attitude to the world? Is not this new life [the movement for social righteousness] which is running through our people, the same great change on a national scale? This is religious energy, rising from the depth of that infinite spiritual life in which we all live and move and have our being. This is God."¹⁰

Not all liberal theology, we must admit, can be counted on to share the social motive. Professor Gerald B. Smith, in his recent and notable book, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, points out as "one of the chief dangers which lies before us in our efforts to reconstruct our theology," that the work be too exclusively scientific and intellectual and too remote from social interests.¹¹ But where real liberal religion is present—that is, religion greater, deeper, fuller than even the best forms of thought and institution can contain—there is abundant evidence that one of its chief characteristics is a progressively social spirit.

But we must turn for a moment to another group of facts closely connected with those just considered. This group of facts is furnished by modern missionary activity. In modern missionary religion we may also see a powerful force for social progress. The entering wedge of missions is often the definitely philanthropic work of the physician and the hospital. Dr. Peter Parker "opened China at the point of the lancet." After many years in China a certain civil engineer, who professed little personal interest in religion but who was most friendly to missionaries, said in my hearing that the work of a single hospital in China would justify all the money spent on missions there. The Moslem understands the ministry of the physician when his mind is closed to every other form of the Christian message. The Boxer rioter who was Dr. Watson's first patient in Shansi learned unmistakably what "love for enemies" means. Philanthropic work is thus a most significant part of the missionary enterprise.

¹⁰ Page 6.

¹¹ Page xviii.

Missionary education, in turn, is unmistakably social in its consequences. The school and college change the social status of women, and give both sexes a new sense of the worth of personality. From these educational influences movements for political liberty have flowed, with the most astonishing results. This appears directly in the securing of Bulgarian liberties a generation ago, and in the recent establishment of the Republic of China, and less directly in the case of other Asiatic countries. Finally comes the effort of missionaries to transform the economic life of the people among whom they labor, by agricultural and industrial schools and the introduction of machinery.

Leading missionaries explicitly adopt the point of view of social progress in propagating Christianity. So Dr. Hume in *Missions from the Modern View* argues for the sociological approach to missions. We find him affirming: "The missionary—whether recent or long in the land—is sure to do some injury to himself and to his work and to his people if he fails to realize the fundamental laws which have always controlled and should control all social and religious progress."¹² Not infrequently missionaries are influential advisers of statesmen, as was Dr. DeForest of Japan. Sometimes they have the shaping of entire policies, as in the case of the new educational system of Turkey. Sometimes they even construct the entire life of a people, as did Mackay in Uganda. But in so vast a field we can only suggest; the present argument has been given monumental expression in Dr. Dennis's *Christian Missions and Social Progress*.

Thus the notions that religion is essentially conservative, and that it is individual in such a sense that it can thrive apart from social progress, have large masses of fact against them.

They are opposed by prophetic religion in its classic embodiment, and by those phases of faith so closely

¹² Page 121.

related to it, modern liberal religion and modern missionary religion. Each of these phases of faith is gaining an increasing hold in our day. A religion inspired by the divine impulse and social passion of the prophets, regulated by the liberal spirit of our scientific age, and resolutely bent upon the universal goal of the modern missionary—that is the religion for the present and the future, the only adequate expression of the mind of Christ. Such a religion calls upon us to abandon those notions so often shared by the social worker and the defender of faith—which at the same time set them at odds—and to think of religion as essentially a progressive and constructive force, and in its innermost meaning as no less social than individual. As an aid to this end let us re-examine some of the reasons by which the notions criticised are commonly sustained.

II.

We may consider first the reason already mentioned—that religion, being a relation between the soul and God, is intrinsically individual in such a sense that it may really thrive without relating itself to social progress.

Now no examination of this reasoning would be helpful which did not at the outset recognize how great is the value of understanding religion in the personal and individual way. “God and the soul! the soul and its God!”—much of the preciousness of religious experience is summed up in those simple terms. No need of human mediation; each personality has direct access to God. That means spiritual independence. No dismay over outward misfortunes. The soul has an inner life with God. Therein is spiritual strength. No morbidness over not gaining one’s own will; one may will what God wills. This is the entrance to life’s deepest joy. The direct, inward, intimate relation of the soul to God is

one of religion's supreme achievements, gained at the cost of great struggles with dogmatic authority, with the deadness of the letter, with formalism in worship and morals; an achievement never again to be lost so long as the Son of Man finds faith upon the earth.

But when this individual experience of religion becomes sufficient unto itself, so that it monopolizes the idea of religion; so that one may say of social relations, "they are good, but they do not, even at their best, constitute an experience of God"; then we must ask ourselves whether the fullest and deepest meaning of religion is not being allowed to slip away. One says to us, "Behind the veil of sense is an ideal world of divine thought which the soul may find," and we respond, "Let us build a tabernacle there." But may not the divine thought be even now moulding things of sense into an expression of itself? If so, our tabernacle will be located outside of God's workshop. Or one says, "Beneath the perplexing turmoil of human affairs is a realm of light and peace where the soul may dwell"; and we answer, "Let us take refuge there." But what if God himself is in the midst of the human turmoil, illuminating it and shaping it into orderly, peaceful action? Then we shall have fled from the daylight of religion into its twilight. Or one says again, "Out beyond the conflicting, unintelligible stream of life and time is an eternal existence where the soul may have repose"; and we are led to give all our thought and effort to preparing for that existence. But what if, into this very stream of life and time, unclear though it be to us, God is pouring the infinite energy of his love? Then by steering out of that stream we shall have abandoned the means of arriving at whatever good the future has in store. In brief, if God himself is actively in the midst of our social relations, then the soul's most direct experience of God cannot be apart from those relations.

How social relations may constitute an experience of God we may best comprehend from the standpoint of the union between the ideas of God's immanence and his Fatherhood. Immanence is the form in which we are required to think of God by the evolutionary view of the universe. The Christian conception of God as Father best satisfies the ethical view of the universe. Hence one who feels bound to unite evolutionary forms of thought with Christian ideas of value will think of God both as an immanent and as a fatherly God. This means however that God should be thought of as the power moving through the developing world-process toward the realization of a vast conscious purpose, and that this purpose is most clearly seen where men are being fashioned into sonship to God and into a brotherly society. God is in the brotherly society somewhat as the spirit of a transcendent genius is in his disciples. Imagine a great laboratory under the guidance of a Pasteur. Everywhere would be active investigating minds, and everywhere would be the dominating ideas and influence of the master. The inspiring genius would both stimulate the originality of individuals and unify their efforts in a common work. And the more harmonious, and at the same time original, the work of the disciples, the more truly would it be the expression of the inspiring genius. In like manner, only in a far profounder and more intimate degree, God is immanent in the brotherly society. The relation between the immanent God and the human mind is both fuller and freer than in God's immanence in nature, because in the case of man the relation is a moral one. But the relation between the immanent God and the man of filial and brotherly mind is the fullest and freest of all, because here, through moral means, the deepest will of God finds expression.

How then, from this point of view, should we seek the deepest experience of God? First we should ask our-

selves, "What is God now doing in his world? To what end is his loving will most intensely going forth?" And then we should ask, "How may I be taken up into this divine working, and most actively participate in it?" Now we already have dwelt upon the Christian answer to these two questions. It is found in sharing in the work of social progress for the realization of the kingdom of God. But in this answer the contrast between individual religion and social experience drops away. As President King, in his *Theology and the Social Consciousness*, has so truly said: "The very meaning of religion is sharing the life of God. . . . God's life, according to Christ's teaching, is the life of constant and perfect self-giving. To share the life of God, therefore, . . . is to come into the life of loving service. The two fall together from the point of view of the social consciousness."¹² Thus when we say that religion is a relation between the soul and God, we should understand ourselves to mean an active relation to the working God in his effort for social ends.

But this emphasis upon activity as being pre-eminent in religious experience requires us to re-examine another opinion which has underlain the semi-unfriendly relation between religious faith and social progress. This is the opinion that religion is essentially conservative for the reason that it consists primarily of meditation, adoration, and other passive moods.

It would be hard indeed to think of a vital religion which was devoid of these more passive moods. Personal religion can scarcely be separated from conscious worship, from self-surrender, from up-wellings of inward inspiration. But even these phases of religious life fail of their best meaning if they are taken in an exclusively passive sense. And along with these we are coming more and more to emphasize distinctly active experiences as of the utmost importance in religion.

¹² Page 98.

The fundamentally active nature of religious experience at its best is made evident by the Christian idea of faith. It is true that faith has its passive meaning, but that is not its supreme meaning. Faith often requires that we relax and rest back upon God, but it never means a relaxed life. It calls for self-surrender, but that surrender is to the working and self-giving God. Christian faith means loyalty to the cause of bringing to pass a brotherly society on earth in the confidence that it is God's own cause. Hence faith is forward-looking and adventurous. It stimulates activity and releases new energy. It is the spirit of enterprise in the moral world. Of the "faith-state," with the beliefs that accompany it, Professor James says: "We are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind."¹⁴ But if this conception of faith be true, it becomes clear how mistaken it is to regard religion as inherently conservative in its social influence.

We are coming, indeed, to recognize that religion, so far from being primarily conservative, is essentially creative in its workings. Professor Hocking, for example, presents religion as "creating men, conferring on them power and freedom to create." He writes: "He who would be creative in any direction would do best to pursue that from which alone creativity can result, a personal knowledge of the Absolute. This is that 'guidance of God' for which men may legitimately pray, and expect an answer. When the holy spirit is come, he shall lead you into all truth; and not otherwise is new truth or new value accessible to mankind."¹⁵ Religion then is to make the soul alert, resourceful, inventive. It is to awaken intuition, to make the mind fertile and the

¹⁴ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 506.

¹⁵ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 478.

will productive. Its purest essence is seen where there is originality and creativeness in the moral and spiritual realm.

Each one may test this thought for himself. Which is the diviner experience—when the soul is spellbound in the presence of a great religious ideal or fact, or when that same ideal or fact is carrying one on, with however much stress of soul, to its concrete embodiment in deed? Must we not say that the latter exceeds the former by as much as life exceeds mere thought or feeling? As Coleridge, rich of imagination but weak of purpose, falls short of Browning, the union of genius and moral vigor, or as the Brook Farm philosopher falls short of the founder or savior of our nation, so the religion that is merely passive and reflective falls below that which sustains the soul in new activity and in creativeness. Jesus' cry, "I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" hushes us with the thought that the eternal will of God was at that moment passing through birth-pangs into deed. And must we not say of every human soul which is straitened until a sense of divine purpose is brought to accomplishment, that in such is being enacted God's highest creative deed?

But now this active and outgoing faith of which we have been speaking, this resourceful, inventive, creative type of living which is religion at its highest—wherein will it find its chief expression? Obviously, in the relation of man to man, in the promotion of social progress. And here we have gained a point of view for revising those opposing judgments: "Save society, and the individual will take care of himself," and "Save the individual, and society will at once be saved." A great part of the perplexities and problems that will confront the minister of the immediate future are comprised in the situations out of which these opposing judgments spring.

With conscientiousness we must ask ourselves what we should do in the midst of such conflicting claims.

Our present generation is discovering that the gospel which aims exclusively at the individual breaks down, because it neglects some of the chief forces by which the individual is shaped. An individual is not something entirely pre-arranged and devised in advance. Not even from the most ideal view of him is this true. An individual is always more or less in the making, and hence susceptible of being played upon by every social force. Now if many of these social forces are themselves unchristian, it is fatuous to leave them unchanged while working for the individual's salvation. If this be done by the ministry and the church, they become like the one or two righteous directors of an unrighteous corporation—powerless to influence the decisive issues. They become unequally yoked together with unbelievers. It is indispensable therefore that religion seek to bring the other social forces into real partnership with itself. Until all the great social forces become Christian in their trend, the work for the salvation of individuals will be fatally weak at critical points. Every wise movement in the cause of social reform and progress is a matter of vital concern to the ministry and the church. The protection of women-laborers, the prevention of child-labor, an adequate standard of living for every wage-earner, the public health, public amusements, an education which shall equip the individual for life, the social settlement and the development of neighborhood life, the moralizing and developing of local self-government, the cause of temperance and the warfare against social vices, the development of rural life by co-operation and by social activities—these and similar causes must have the power of Christianity definitely behind them. Any given minister or church, it is true, may have to do with but few of these movements, perhaps directly with none. But

the Christianity of every community, taken as a whole, should be most directly related to them. Possibly the chief specific work of the ministry and the church will always be the services of worship, religious education, and the culture of family life. Nevertheless, each of these functions should be given a strong social direction and impulse; and ministry and church should be ready to do pioneer social work, inspiring and initiating such work at any point of social need.

The abandoning of the purely individual point of view is all the more necessary, because that point of view misinterprets the very nature of religious forces themselves. Our whole argument goes to show that those forces at their best are social—having a definite social aim and inspiration. Prophetic religion, modern liberal religion, modern missionary religion, are saturated with social passion. If we would bring men into the fellowship of these forms of faith, we must fill their hearts with the same motives, and then focus their efforts upon their own sphere of social influence. To confine the interest of ministry and church to individuals is like pouring hot fluid into thermos bottles. It leaves a vacuum around each soul, which may keep the warmth in for a time, but which prevents both its radiation and its replenishment. An individual is not fully saved until he has the social spirit. He must become part of God's present working for a brotherly society among men, and must bring his own increment of originality and creativeness to that cause, if he is to enter fully into the saved life.

But the effort for social salvation which ignores the individual is also gravely mistaken. The individual furnishes the motive to society, as society affords scope to the individual. A society rationally organized but unconcerned about individuals would be like honeycomb without honey; its richness and sweetness would be

gone. Such a society would gradually lose the values for which it was created. We all know how soulless an institution designed for human welfare may become, how hollow and perfunctory its service, when it ceases to be animated by a warm and direct interest in individual men. The mistake of allowing such interest to evaporate has been too often and egregiously made, and too painfully retrieved, for us to allow our present social movements to make it again. The sense of the preciousness of personality, and of the need of winning each personality into its full development, must remain the only adequate motive for social endeavor.

Moreover, for workers for social progress to ignore the saving of the individual is to confound their own efforts, because the individual embodies the very principle of progress. Speaking from the standpoint of evolution, the individual stands for the element of variation in nature. And the same is true in the moral realm. It is to the individual man who knows salvation for himself that we must look for the swift and sure perception, the prompt and vigorous reaction, by which opportunity is seized and advancement made. In a moral society there must be great numbers of such leaders in larger and smaller spheres, and indeed everyone must be equipped to make his personal and inimitable contribution to the welfare of the whole.

Social progress then needs the service of personal religion. It needs that intensive work in the individual soul which personal religion alone can effect. With the perfecting of our means for securing to all men the values of life there must go a steady renewal and enlargement of those values. Here is a great work for personal religion. With the constant enrichment and complexity of our ideals must go the renewal and the broadening and deepening of our spiritual powers. Here again is a great need for religious faith. And as for social causes

themselves, though they often are dealing with conditions and institutions rather than directly with men, which of them does not gain new meaning from the thought of the infinite worth of the soul, from the sense of the immanent God actively working out his will in this present world, and from the application of Christ's law that only he who loses his life for a great end shall find it?

There is then abundant reason for reversing the opinion that religion is inherently conservative in its influence and mainly individual in its application. For we have seen that while religion is a relation between the soul and God, the God with whom the soul seeks relation is one who is spending the resources of infinite love to bring to pass upon earth a society of brotherly men. Hence a full experience of him means a sharing in that very work. We have seen too that while the soul is to rest back on God in meditation and worship, it also is to become an expression of God's creative will by itself going forward to add its own increment of vital energy and creative originality to the total life of mankind. And we have seen that individual and social salvation must go hand in hand in the thought and effort both of the Christian church and ministry and of the social worker. These conclusions support the one already drawn from the survey of prophetic religion, modern liberal religion, and modern missionary religion. They require us to think of religion as essentially a progressive, constructive, social force. It therefore rests upon us as our privilege and duty to work for the doing away of any unfriendly and divisive spirit between defenders of faith and workers for social progress, and to seek to bring these two great interests into such intimate union that each shall powerfully reinforce the other.

MARK RUTHERFORD

WILLARD LEAROYD SPERRY

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

"We shall read today in the Book of Experience." These words of Bernard of Clairvaux serve well as an adequate preface to the six short novels by "Mark Rutherford," which constitute an important contribution to the intimate religious literature of the last century. For, although cast in the form of fiction, these narratives clearly belong to that comparatively small class of inevitable and significant works which are best described as "confessional." Indeed, neither the form of the books, nor the shelter sought behind his now familiar pseudonym, served long to conceal the identity of the author, or to divert attention from the autobiographical aspects of his works.¹

William Hale White was born in Bedford, England, in 1831 and died in March, 1913. In this Midland stronghold of Dissent his father was a printer and bookseller, and a member in good and regular standing of the Independent Meeting founded by John Bunyan. "The recollections of boyhood, so far as week days go, are very happy. Sunday, however, was not happy." The lad seems to have lived for the six days a healthy, natural life; but the seventh day proved, alas! that he was "not one of God's children, like Samuel, who ministered before

¹ Autobiography of Mark Rutherford, 1881. Mark Rutherford's Deliverance, 1881. The Ethic of Benedict Spinoza, translated by William Hale White, 1883. The Revolution in Tanner's Lane, 1887. Miriam's Schooling, 1890. Catherine Furze, 1893. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione et de Via, Benedict Spinoza, translated by William Hale White, 1895. Clara Hopgood, 1896. A Description of the Wordsworth and Coleridge Manuscripts in the Possession of Mr. T. Norton Longman, 1897. An Examination of a Charge of Apostasy against Wordsworth, 1898. Pages from a Journal and Other Papers, 1901. John Bunyan, 1905.

the Lord girded with a linen ephod." When he was fourteen or fifteen, however, he became entangled in the religious conventions of his time, was "converted," and in due season "admitted" to Bunyan Meeting. "Then came the great event and the great blunder" of his life. He decided to enter the ministry; not because of any prophetic burden or any apostolic woe, but rather because that way lay the path of least resistance. Incidentally this choice was very gratifying to his mother, "who was a little weak in her preference for people who did not stand behind counters." After six years of perfunctory preparation for his calling, Hale White passed through a genuine spiritual awakening. He was at that time a student in New College, St. John's Wood. His new experience led him to seek fresh interpretations of experience, and he soon fell under suspicion for his radical views and independent spirit and was summarily expelled from the College. In this extremity he appealed for moral support to the Reverend John Jukes, pastor of Bunyan Meeting; but the Reverend John being prudently orthodox and quite unwilling to compromise his comfortable position by befriending heretics, refused the desired aid. Hale White then drifted to London, where he obtained temporary work under John Chapman, editor of the *Westminster Review*. It was here, at 142 Strand, that he had his brief memorable fellowship with George Eliot, who reappears in his first book as "Theresa Wollaston." Subsequently he became London correspondent for two provincial papers, and finally obtained a position in the Admiralty, which he held until his retirement, late in life. For those intent upon discerning the precise line between fact and fiction in his books, the few autobiographical notes written in 1909 for his immediate family and since published as *The Early Life of Mark Rutherford*, are an indispensable guide. But, as he himself says in the beginning of this slight volume, most

of its record "has been told before in a semi-transparent disguise"; and it is in his disguises that William Hale White has spoken most directly and most intimately of his religious experience.

The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford appeared in 1881. In its general outline it is the story of the writer's own life up to the time he left the *Westminster Review*. It was written thirty years after the last of the events which it narrates, yet while those events still belonged to the writer's present consciousness. "I have been accused of secrecy and reserve. The real truth is, that nobody more than myself could desire self-revelation." The long interval of silence quickened, almost unnaturally, his powers of introspection and delineation. When finally the book appeared, in unpretentious paper binding, as an inevitable outcome of the imperative need for self-expression, it was, in its sincerity and poignancy, a modern Jeremiad. His early experience "had been shut up in his heart as a burning fire, and he was weary with forbearing and he could not stay." Such then is this record of one born into a world of "rigid Calvinistic Independents," brought up in an atmosphere of spiritual unreality, sent to a theological college to fit himself for the ministry in which he was "to meet the doubts of the nineteenth century; to be the guide of men; to advise them in their perplexities; to suppress their tempestuous lusts; to lead them heavenward." There he listened to countless lectures "as irrelevant as the chattering of sparrows," there he was girded with those weapons of dogma by which he was to achieve "a triumphant refutation of the sceptic and the shallow infidel," weapons which in the thick of the fight he found to be "mere swords of lath." Because, in the face of such a perfunctory process, he attempted to work out his own salvation, it was suspected that he "did not rest in the simplicity of the gospel" and was not content with "a repetition of the old,

old story; of which, Mr. Rutherford, you know we ought never to get weary." Leaving the school under official disfavor, he put through two brief, unhappy pastorates; first over an orthodox congregation where a few prosaic souls mechanically reiterated the five points of Calvinism, and then in a Unitarian chapel, "where a few descendants of the eighteenth century heretics still testified against three Gods in one." One after another the articles of his inherited faith became incredible and were renounced. "Nakeder and nakeder had I become with the passage of the years, and I trembled to anticipate the complete emptiness to which, before long, I should be reduced." His only human fellowship in those dreary days he found with the "Republican, atheist," Mardon, and his daughter Mary. Wearying finally with a message of negations, which he knew to be joyless and unprofitable, he left the ministry and took up literary work in London, only to discover new and unsuspected capacities for failure and to end in utter self-contempt. From such desperate self-loathing he had been in part rescued by Theresa, when he was suddenly summoned to Mardon's death-bed.

"All that night Mary and I watched in that topmost garret looking out over the ocean. It was a night entirely unclouded and the moon was at the full. Towards daybreak her father moaned a little, then became quiet, and just as dawn was changing to sunrise he passed away. . . . I went back to London. Before I had gone twenty miles on my journey the glory of a few hours before had turned into autumn storm. The rain came down in torrents, and the wind rushed across the country in great blasts, stripping the trees and driving over the sky with hurricane speed great masses of continuous cloud, which mingled earth and heaven. I thought of all the ships which were on the sea in the night, sailing under the serene stars which I had seen rise and set; I thought of Mardon, lying dead, and I thought of Mary. The simultaneous passage through great emotions welds souls, and begets the strongest of all forms of love. Those who have sobbed together over a dead friend, who have held one

another's hand in that dread hour, feel a bond of sympathy, pure and sacred, which nothing can dissolve."

Here *The Autobiography* ends. His friend and editor, "Reuben Shapcott," says of him in a postscript that at this time Mark Rutherford passed through a crisis which issued in better things. "Something happened, . . . there was some recoil, some healthy horror of eclipse in this self-created gloom, which drove him out of it. . . . He was content to rest and wait."

In *Mark Rutherford's Deliverance* (1881) the narrative is resumed. We find him as a city correspondent for country journals and as a clerk in the Borough. The trite euphemisms of arm-chair philosophers about the joy of work had no meaning for him, and in his sordid, monotonous tasks he was forced to "arch his back to bear his burden and find some compensation elsewhere." As the earlier book was the record of his spiritual negations, so this second book is the record of his first tentative affirmations. The quest for positive values was not wholly vain. He found a friend, M'Kay, and they two found a few other friends, a coal-porter, a copying clerk, a waiter, obscure souls "whom the world had crushed out of all shape." These all met Sunday afternoons and painfully fashioned their "Drury Lane theology," a very meagre theory of faith and practice with only two or three articles, "not thirty-nine, nor, alas! a third of that number," but yet a creed to live by. They achieved not merely the Stoic power to endure, but even some measure of contentment with their lot. Then came Mark Rutherford's sudden meeting and as sudden marriage with Ellen, whom he had forsaken in the old days, and who like himself now came to the meeting out of great tribulation. *The Deliverance* ends with another of those strangely moving, impressionistic passages by which Mark Rutherford so skilfully conveys

the suggestion of "something far more deeply inter-fused." With Ellen he leaves London for his one holiday in all the year and goes down to the sea-shore.

"We had a wonderful time. . . . We brought our food with us, and sat upon the shore in the shadow of a piece of the cliff. A row of heavy white clouds lay along the horizon almost unchangeable and immovable. . . . The level opaline water differed from a floor by a scarcely perceptible heaving motion, which broke into the faintest ripples at our feet. So still was the great ocean, so quietly did everything lie in it, that the wavelets which licked the beach were as pure and bright as if they were part of the mid-ocean depths. About a mile from us, at one o'clock, a long row of porpoises appeared, showing themselves in graceful curves for an hour or so, till they went out farther to sea off Fairlight. Some fishing boats were becalmed just in front of us. Their shadows slept, or almost slept, upon the water, a gentle quivering alone showing that it was not complete sleep, or if sleep that it was sleep with dreams. The intensity of the sunlight sharpened the outlines of every little piece of rock and of the pebbles, in a manner which seemed supernatural to us Londoners. . . . It was perfect—perfect in its beauty—and perfect because, from the sun in the heavens down to the fly with burnished wings on the hot rock, there was nothing out of harmony. Everything breathed one spirit. Ellen and I sat still, doing nothing. We wanted nothing, we had nothing to achieve. No reminiscences, no anticipations disturbed us; the present was sufficient and occupied us entirely."

"A month later," says the brief editorial footnote, "my friend was dead and buried." The task of self-revelation was ended.

These first two books are unquestionably the most perfect of all. They were fashioned out of the heat of early feeling, made triply intense by long years of self-suppression and silence—a feeling which Mark Rutherford was much too sincere to feign in after-years. And yet the volumes which follow, though less compelling and less beautiful, are in their own way quite as significant. Having satisfied the need for self-expression, Mark Rutherford was able to turn from an intensely

subjective report of his experience to an impersonal, objective criticism of that experience. In his third novel, *The Revolution in Tanner's Lane* (1887), he takes his stand outside himself and his early world and attempts to estimate the values of his inherited faith and practice. The story of Zachariah Coleman, stanch Republican and orthodox Calvinist, gives the author ample opportunity to appraise Calvinism fairly, and to discuss in the terms of a single experience that momentous change in the Christianity of the nineteenth century by which "the man rose up behind the Calvinist." Then follow three other short novels, each of them taking its name from the woman whose spiritual discipline and development it recounts: *Miriam's Schooling* (1890), *Catherine Furze* (1898), and *Clara Hopgood* (1896). While no longer parochial in their problems or theological in their content, these narratives are still predominantly religious. With Calvinism left far behind as an incredible system, Mark Rutherford here undertakes the rehabilitation of old dogmas in new forms. In the interesting stories of these women we find the few needful but sufficient intimations of the larger spiritual affirmations of a mature experience.

The wealth of material and the charm of style of these six books makes any adequate critique difficult. Merely as a writer of English prose, Mark Rutherford has won a place with the masters of that art. His books are short, the best of them scarcely over a hundred pages—a welcome respite from the tediously prolonged meanderings of the contemporary psychological novel. He has a marvellous clarity of style, a simplicity and a directness, which are the fruits of a sincere nature schooled by hard experience to direct speech. His own canons for style are given us in his description of Mary Mardon: "There was no sort of effort or strain in anything she said, no attempt by emphasis to make up for weakness of thought,

and no compliance with that vulgar and most disagreeable habit of using intense language to describe what is not intense in itself." He must have followed all his life the advice which he received from his plain-spoken father: "If you write anything you consider particularly fine, strike it out!" As a stylist, Mark Rutherford is to be judged and justified by the argument from silence. The books which he might have written but did not write, give to the brief books he did write their abiding literary excellence.

It is not as a writer of high prose that Mark Rutherford will live, however, for his themes and not his treatment of those themes give to his work its perennial interest. He is, by his own right, the spokesman for mid-Victorian Independency, a world which without his witness would have been mute and perhaps ultimately forgotten. He has done for the humble Non-conformity of his own Midland counties what Trollope did for the Establishment in sleepy cathedral towns, what George Eliot did for Methodism through the country-side, and what Jane Austen and Miss Mitford did for innocuous gentility at large. "Cowfold" is the "Barchester" of Dissent. "Would that the present historian could bring back one blue summer morning, one afternoon and evening, and reproduce exactly what happened in Cowfold square, in one of the Cowfold shops, in one of the Cowfold parlours, and in one Cowfold heart and brain." The deed fulfilled the wish. Mark Rutherford knew with Emerson that "every man can live all history in his own person," and he set himself seriously to interpret the universal human interest and the deep significance of humble events in obscure places. "The garden of Eden, the murder of Cain, the deluge, the salvation of Noah, the exodus from Egypt, David and Bathsheba, with the murder of Uriah, the Assyrian invasion, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the

Resurrection from the Dead; to say nothing of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the tragedy of Count Cenci, the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, the Inquisition in Spain, and the revolt of the Netherlands, all happened in Cowfold, as well as elsewhere, and were perhaps more interesting there because they could be studied in detail and the records were authentic." He writes like the poet Gray, revealing the universal value and meaning of some particular provincial "village Hampden" or "mute inglorious Milton."

Often he bids us laugh at the quaint contradictions of his world, that world which Kingsley once called, in happy paradox, "Orthodox Dissent." If Bergson be right, that humor springs to birth where free agents act mechanically, then there is a wealth of humor in the lives of these folk of Cowfold—Nonconformists who mechanically conformed to their own self-imposed conventions. What liturgy ever mumbled from a book could be more conventional than the "long prayer . . . which generally began with a confession that we were all sinners, but no individual sins were ever confessed; and then ensued a kind of dialogue with God, very much resembling the speeches which in later years I have heard in the House of Commons from the movers and seconders of addresses to the Crown at the opening of Parliament." When did the ancient Nonconformist liberty of prophesying ever degenerate into such dreary repetition of uninspired theological platitude as in these days of which we read? "The minister invariably began with the fall of man, propounding the scheme of redemption, and ended by depicting in the morning the blessedness of the saints and in the evening the doom of the lost. There was a tradition that in the morning there should be 'experience,' that is to say, comfort for the elect, and that the evening should be appropriated to their less fortunate brethren."

And how the conventions of this lean ecclesiasticism were reflected in the social usages of these communities! Again and again, as one reads, it is to laugh, not with Gargantuan laughter which spends itself in one noisy outbreak, but rather with the quiet smile of the "Comic Muse, grave and sisterly," who, looking upon this world, "compresses her lips." Who but the simpering deacon of Water Lane Chapel, Mr. Snale, would object to the *Book of Martyrs* because, "although Mr. Fox might be a very good man, and was a converted character, yet he did not, you know, Mr. Rutherford, belong to *us*"! What depths of parsimony in the single phrase "potatoes or cabbage," by which the meagre options of the Sunday dinner are presented! What nice caste-systems, more rigid than any of the godless East, are found in these Dissenting towns! Woe to him who overstepped the boundaries of his particular communion, that rare intrepid soul "who preferred tea with some taste in it from a Unitarian, to the insipid wood-flavoured stuff sold by the grocer who believed in the Trinity"!

And then how the genial laughter of comedy becomes occasionally the hard laughter of satire, which Meredith says is like "a blow in the back or the face"! There was the Reverend John Broad, who after his three sermons on Sunday "always professed himself a little 'Mondayish.'" This humor turns bitter and merciless, a scathing criticism of the moral impotence of decaying Calvinism, as we are introduced to Thomas Broad, supposedly "the child of pious parents and of many prayers, who had not been exposed to those assaults of the enemy of souls which beset ordinary young men," but actually "a brazen red-hot idol" of coarse passions, whose cad-dish deeds stand out in ugly relief against his father's efforts "to improve Thomas where he was weakest, that is to say, Systematic Theology, and more particularly in the Doctrine of the Comforter." This was Mark

Rutherford's great criticism of Calvinism, made frankly in his first book: "It is remarkable that the scheme was never of the slightest service to me in repressing one solitary evil inclination." All the bitterness of personal protest against the inconsistencies and insufficiencies of that system as he knew it, are summed up in the superb irony of that unforgettable chapter on Romans 8 7, a passage almost unrivalled in English fiction. We listen to Thomas Broad's first sermon, his sermon upon "the carnal mind." We hear the judgment of a fellow-theologue that "it would be better in the future to be a little simpler and to avoid what may be called the metaphysics of the Redemption." We see Thomas, himself "Mondayish" like his reverend father, calling upon Pauline, and then coarsely tampering with the sanctities of her clean person. We see her mark him with a mark like the brand of Cain. And, then inconveniently bandaged but unabashed, we see him in his pulpit on the following Sunday. "He had struck out the metaphysics and put in a new head—'Neither indeed *can* be.' The Apostle did not merely state a fact that the carnal mind was not subject to the law of God; he said, 'Neither indeed *can* be'! Mark, my brethren, the force of the *neither can*."

Yet both the thoughtful smile of quiet humor and the merciless laughter of cruel satire are merely foils to the serious purpose of these books. Great as is their human and antiquarian interest, valuable as they are already becoming as first-hand documents from an era that has closed, these books are of greater moment as the records of intimate individual experience. Each of them tells of the struggle of some one soul to work out his own salvation. A process of natural selection, therefore, must always determine the readers for whom Mark Rutherford really writes. Those to whom orthodoxy is precious for its own sake will find him disquieting. Those who are dogmatically committed to a religion of healthy-

mindedness will find these narratives depressing, if not unintelligible, for they tell of sick souls. Those who demand a complete and consistent system of thought will find our author disappointing, for he abandoned such a system and never found a substitute. To those who thrive only upon some new thing these books will be stale and unprofitable, for they have only the oldest and most hackneyed philosophy of life, and one can "discover" Mark Rutherford only as he discovers the book of Job, that is, for himself. "The persons who to me have proved attractive," he says, and his readers are determined by these words, "are those who have passed through such a process as that through which I myself passed." These are the persons to whom the riddle of existence is an imperative problem; persons who are compelled alike by temperament and circumstance to wrestle with life until it yields, if not a clear meaning, at least some measure of blessing; persons to whom religion and love more than all other human interests give, if not a final answer to life's problems, at least a valid working hypothesis. To all such persons Mark Rutherford speaks with authority and not as the scribes of nineteenth-century literature.

By his own confession he writes of "commonplace lives." But the word "common" falls from Mark Rutherford's lips, not with the suggestion of worthlessness, but rather with the intimation of those deeper values which Wordsworth gave it when he spoke of "the common heart of man." In his own words, he had found "that what is commonplace is true." These characters of his, he goes on to say, will be "disappointing to persons who prefer men and women of linear magnitude to those of three dimensions." After the manner of the world they live narrow circumscribed lives, utterly devoid of broadening circumstance. There is here no familiarity with the affairs of state or society that the

worldling should enjoy the fellowship of these obscure souls. But the negligible first dimensions of character serve to set in bolder outline the heights and depths of spiritual experience, of which even the most commonplace are capable. Mark Rutherford has deliberately chosen not to confuse the issues or confound the values of his work by introducing the world's standards of greatness. For he tells us, not how men go abroad through the kingdoms of this world, but how they go down into Hell and rise up to Heaven. These are the aspects of the "commonplace" which he portrays. The chapter on "Miss Arbour" is the classical instance of his ever-recurring thesis that beneath the dull surface of obscure lives there are unsuspected heights and depths. "Who would have dreamed that such tragic depths lay behind that serene face, and that her orderly precision was like the grass and flowers upon volcanic soil with Vesuvian fires slumbering below? I was taught, as I have been taught over and over again, that unknown abysses, into which the sun never shines, lie covered with commonplace in men and women, and are revealed only by the rarest opportunity."

Nor are these commonplace persons simple characters, to be easily classified by one or another of our familiar categories. The novels are written by one with a veritable genius for introspection, yet they seldom attempt any analysis of character. Mark Rutherford knows that our whole inward life, with its baffling impulses and contradictory ideas and unresolved aims, makes even the simplest of us a hopelessly involved being. So he says of Catherine, "It is vexatious that a complicated process in her should be represented by a single act which was transacted in a second. It would have been more intelligible if it could have written itself into a dramatic conversation extending over two or three pages; but as the event happened, so it must be recorded." How

refreshingly candid after the tedious and unconvincing character-studies of contemporary fiction!

Indeed Mark Rutherford cannot accept as valid the hard-worked modern categories of sincerity and insincerity, by which our nebulous contemporary theology would distinguish the saved from the lost. This familiar distinction suffered recent rebuke at the hands of Father Tyrrell, who wrote to Canon Lilley in one of his last letters, "As to the question, 'Are we honest?' I reply, indifferent honest. English John Bull speaks as though honesty were the simplest and most elementary of virtues, and not the very last quintessence of a noble character. . . . The honesty question always riles me." Mark Rutherford anticipated Father Tyrrell in his affirmation that sincerity is not an adequate and final substitute for orthodoxy. "I never, hardly, see a pure breed either of goat or sheep. I never see anybody who deserves to go straight to heaven or who deserves to go straight to hell. . . . There is no such thing as a human being simply hypocritical or simply sincere. We are all hypocrites more or less, in every word and every action, and, what is more, in every thought. It is a question simply of degree." Hence Mark Rutherford, like Browning, sees some measure of sincerity in the most patently inconsistent persons. The most despicable of all his characters, Rev. John Broad, was "a big, gross-feeding, heavy person with heavy ox-face and large mouth"; but "he was probably as sincere as his build of body and soul allowed him to be." Mr. Cardew, a refined and sensitive churchman, finds himself suddenly entangled in the meshes of illicit love, and so became one whom the world would call "a canting, hypocritical parson, a type not uncommon, described over and over again in novels, and thoroughly familiar to theatre-goers." Mark Rutherford knows otherwise: "The truth is that he did not cant and was not a hypocrite. . . . The accusation of

hypocrisy, if we mean lofty assertion and occasional and even conspicuous moral failure, may be brought against some of the greatest figures of history. Because David sinned with Bathsheba, and even murdered her husband, we do not discredit the sincerity of the Psalms." Mark Rutherford has no interest in lack-lustre, lukewarm souls, incapable of inconsistencies, but prefers to tell of men and women in the making, complex, passionate, and unresolved, only slowly bringing order out of the spiritual chaos of their human heritage.

The religious history of these commonplace yet intricate characters follows naturally, though not consciously or artificially, the general direction and stages of the "mystic way," which we are now rediscovering. Mark Rutherford himself, Zachariah Coleman, Miriam Tacchi, Catherine Furze, Clara Hopgood, belong to that goodly fellowship of souls who, in Saint Martin's phrase, "all speak the same language and come from the same country." They begin life with certain inherited creeds and institutions. For a time these external traditions of faith and practice suffice; but as the strain and stress of intimate experience increase, these second-hand solutions to first-hand problems no longer suffice. Such was Miriam's plight: "She was now face to face with a great trouble, and she had to encounter it alone, with no weapons and with no armour save that which Nature provides. She was not specially an exile from civilization; churches and philosophers had striven and demonstrated for thousands of years; yet she was no better protected than if Socrates, Epictetus, and all ecclesiastical institutions from the time of Moses had never existed."

All personal religion which is worthy of the name has its origin in some experience through which external tradition is replaced by immediate conviction. This is the time of the "soul's awakening." Coleridge understood the almost casual character of this event: "Awakened by

the cock-crow (a sermon, a calamity, a sick bed, or providential escape) the Christian pilgrim sets out in the morning twilight." Mark Rutherford understood, with Coleridge, that the immediate causes of this initial religious experience may be relatively trivial. Churches, theological colleges, systems of dogma, all had touched Mark Rutherford but had failed to wake him. Then one day, as he was going down his Damascus Road, he "happened to find amongst a parcel of books a volume of poems in paper boards. It was called 'Lyrical Ballads,' and I read first one and then the whole book. It conveyed to me no new doctrine, and yet the change it wrought in me could only be compared with that which is said to have been wrought on Paul himself by the divine apparition. . . . Wordsworth unconsciously did for me what every reformer has done; he recreated my Supreme Divinity." So Mark Rutherford writes of Miriam's new birth in a passage so intimate and so suggestive that a later novelist has built a whole story around its final sentences:

"What had she undergone? A little poverty, a little love-affair, a little sickness. . . . Miriam had a vitality, a susceptibility, or fluidity of character, call it what you will, which did not need great provocation. There are some mortals on this earth to whom nothing more than a summer morning very early, or a certain chance idea in a lane ages ago, or a certain glance from a fellow creature dead for years, has been the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, or the Descent of the Holy Ghost.

"A man now old and nearing his end is known to Miriam's biographer, who one Sunday November afternoon, when he was but twenty years old, met a woman in a London street and looked in her face. Neither he nor she stopped for an instant; he looked in her face, passed on and never saw her again. He married, had children, who now have children; but that woman's face has never left him, and the colours of the portrait which hangs in his soul's oratory are as vivid as ever. A thousand times he has appealed to it; a thousand times it has sat in judgement; and a thousand times has its sacred beauty redeemed him."

Mark Rutherford knows that it is not within our human power to determine the times and the seasons and the ways of the Spirit. The most insignificant happenings of the unanticipated hour may bring the soul to its re-birth, for sensitive souls are moulded by the slightest influences. "Ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. So is every one that is born of the Spirit."

Then after the season of new birth, with its intimations of more abundant life, there follows the hard but inevitable time of readjustment, the period of "purgation." From the pleasure-state of its awakening, the soul swings over to the pains of renunciation. Augustine must loose his hold upon "the baggage of the world." Francis, gay, genial, romantic, must strip himself naked in the streets of Assisi. Antoinette Bourignon must cast away even the last single penny which she took with her that morning she renounced the world. The tale of these drastic denials of the creature is told again in Mark Rutherford's narratives. Miriam, Catherine, Clara, all make the great renunciation; they achieve the power of doing without that which they most desire.

The demands of this period are imperative and remorseless. There can be no temporizing, no compromise. Not that which is indifferently loved, but that which is most loved must be denied. The records of this time have been told fully and once for all in the incomparable *Confessions* of Augustine; yet in Mark Rutherford's account of his renunciation of his mistress, metaphysics, there is deep poignancy. By nature he was open to the seductions of speculation; "by a cruel destiny he was impelled to dabble in matters for which he was totally unfitted. . . . Just in proportion to his lack of penetrative power was his tendency to occupy himself with difficult questions." In passing through

his season of spiritual purging he was forced to turn his back upon this one interest, which above all others fascinated him and snared him. There are those to whom theological negation gives a kind of rude pleasure. In many respects Mark Rutherford's negations were not unlike those which Edmund Gosse has recorded in his *Father and Son*. But, unlike Gosse, Mark Rutherford tells the story with humility and pain and deep feeling for the tragic transition through which his time was passing. He could never be satisfied with Gosse's facile iconoclasm. To him the renunciation of old creeds and the casting off of outworn systems is a painful self-mutilation. Suso's self-appointed bodily mortifications were hardly more grievous than the spiritual discipline which Mark Rutherford accepted as his lot. He falls back again and again upon the familiar mystic symbols of nakedness and poverty when he seeks to describe the issues of this process. One after another he strips off the decent intellectual habiliments of his faith and stands finally naked before the world, overcome with "the feeling of my own worthlessness and the longing for death as the cancellation of the blunder of my existence."

The price of these negations was the greater because it was Mark Rutherford's lot to renounce one of the greatest intellectual systems which the mind of man has ever achieved. There is nothing facile in his denial of Calvinism, but everywhere a full and measured appreciation of its inherent credibility. "This at least must be said for Puritanism, that of all the theologies and philosophies, it is most honest in its recognition of the facts. . . . Even if Calvinism had been carved on tables of stone and handed down from Heaven by the Almighty Hand, it would not have lived if it had not been found to agree more or less with the facts. . . . I object to giving the name of Calvin to a philosophy which is a necessity in all ages. 'Are not two sparrows sold for

a farthing and not one of them shall fall to the ground without your Father.' This is the last word which can be said, and at times it is the only ground which does not shake under our feet."

The great renunciation asked of Mark Rutherford was, therefore, not that of a particular system, but of intellectualism as a whole. He never replaced Calvinism by any other and less consistent system; he simply issued from his period of negation in settled anti-intellectualism. His charge against Calvinism was unique in his own day, yet it anticipated something of the dominant temper of our day. Calvinism collapsed, not because it was unintellectual but because it was over-intellectual. When in later years he looks back upon those early unhappy days, he speaks of metaphysics as other saved men have spoken of the world, the flesh, and the devil. "I shun all those metaphysical speculations of former years as I would a path which leads to madness." He never even aspired to an answer to the riddle of the universe. He is content to place the most contradictory facts in juxtaposition, and to leave the Spirit, in fulfilment of the creative task, brooding over the paradoxical chaos of a pluralistic universe. "No theory of the world is possible. The storm, the rain slowly rotting the harvest, the children sickening in cellars, are obvious; but equally obvious are an evening in June, the delight of men and women in one another, in music, and in the exercise of thought." Mark Rutherford admits that there may be those gifted genuises who can profitably occupy themselves with the effort to achieve an intellectual reconciliation between the contradictions of experience; but he has no fellowship with them. He much prefers the homely company of his own Zachariah and Pauline, lay, private persons, "happily for them committed to nothing, not subsidized by their reputations to defend a system."

The mystic period of negation has its own recompenses. In renouncing Calvinism, Mark Rutherford found Christianity. "The most desperate private experiences cannot go beyond the garden of Gethsemane," and at the very nadir of his world Mark Rutherford met Jesus. "The mere knowing that other people have been tried as we have been tried is a consolation to us. . . . In the worst maladies, the healing effect which is produced by the visit of a friend who can simply say, 'I have endured all that,' is most marked." So it was that Mark Rutherford discovered Jesus, not through a limited atonement or irresistible grace, but in "the fellowship of his sufferings." Jesus is not to him a "young Apollo," busied with glad affirmations of this present world, but the great World-Denier. One or two of his passages upon this central theme are prophetic of the interpretation of the gospel which the modern eschatological school is forcing upon contemporary theology. In one of the darkest hours of his life he sat and listened to Mary Mardon singing from "The Messiah" "He was despised and rejected."

"The song wound itself into the very centre of my existence. I seemed to be listening to the tragedy of all human worth and genius. . . . The song is potent, because with utmost musical tenderness and strength it reveals the secret of the influence of the story of Jesus. Nobody would be bold enough to cry, 'That too is my case'; and yet the poorest and humblest soul has a right to the consolation that Jesus was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. . . .

"The story of Jesus is the story of the poor and the forgotten. He is not the Saviour of the rich and prosperous, for they need no Saviour. The healthy, active, and well-to-do need Him not, and require nothing more than is given by their own health and prosperity. But every one who has walked in sadness because his destiny has not fitted his aspirations; every one who, having no opportunity to lift himself out of his narrow town- or village-circle of acquaintances, has thirsted for something beyond what they could give him; everybody who, with nothing but a daily round of mechanical routine before him, would welcome death if it were martyr-

dom for a cause; every humblest creature, in the obscurity of great cities or remote hamlets, who silently does his or her duty without recognition—all these turn to Jesus, and find themselves in Him."

Having thus come to himself and having found himself at deeper levels, Mark Rutherford passed at once from "The Everlasting Nay" into "The Everlasting Yea." He now sets himself resolutely to the task of affirmation, to the discovery and assertion of positive values in life. This is to be an intimate task; for a man's religion "is not something without any particular connection with him. It is the answer to questions which have been put to him, and not to those which have been put to other people." Moreover it must be a slow task; for "there is no remedy for our troubles which is uniformly and progressively efficacious. All that we have a right to expect from our religion is that gradually, very gradually, it will assist us to a real victory."

His first affirmations, "the compensations for life" he calls them, seem at first sight pitifully disproportionate to the need and sorry substitutes for the dogmatic values he had destroyed. Yet, if these early "compensations" are meagre in content, they are prophetic in spirit. As the moralists tell us that the size of a sin does not alter its inherent wickedness, so Mark Rutherford implies that the mere amount of some recompense for life does not affect its inherent worth. So, like the "Preacher" of old, he does not deprecate even the creature-pleasure of the passing moment. There is no realm of ends contemplated by the ancient injunction to eat one's bread with joy; yet the whole reaction to life implied in that bidding is positive, and warrants Mark Rutherford's exegetical comment that "happiness, if it does no mischief, is better than most spiritual misery." Then beyond the happiness of the moment there are those countless trivial avocations, our hobbies, by which we are

delivered from ourselves. The butterfly-catcher of *The Autobiography* is a spiritually constructive force in Mark Rutherford's world, and leads to the wise reflection that "men should not be too curious in analyzing and condemning any means which nature devises to save them from themselves, whether it be coins, old books, curiosities, butterflies, or fossils." Then, through these saving avocations, one rises to other and fuller recompenses, those wide-spread and readily accessible intimations of the Infinite which will deliver even the most circumscribed life from its slavery to "the petty and personal." Everywhere the world of sordid particulars is pierced by "chinks through which to touch the universal." "The sea was a corrective to the littleness all round me." Even more than the sea the stars became the mediating symbol of the Infinite. How often, in one novel after another, does Mark Rutherford lift his eyes to the heavens at night and repeat the mystic affirmation, "All shall be well and all shall be well." "The provision in nature of infinity ever present to us is a great help. No man can look up to the stars at night and reflect upon them without feeling that the tyranny of sense is loosened, and the tyranny too of the conclusions of his logic. . . . I sought refuge in the idea of God, the God of a starry night with its incomprehensible distances; and I was at peace, content to be the meanest worm of all the millions that crawl on the earth."

So by the way of his "compensations" Mark Rutherford gets home again to God, and attempts his first conscious and deliberate religious affirmation. "I felt as if somehow, after many errors, I had once more gained a road, a religion in fact, and one which essentially was not new but old, the religion of the Reconciliation, the reconciliation of man with God. . . . This surely, under a thousand disguises, has been the meaning of all the forms of worship which we have seen in the world. . . . In my

younger days the aim of theologians was the justification of the ways of God to man. They could not succeed. They succeeded no better than ourselves in satisfying the intellect with a system. Nor does the Christian religion profess any such satisfaction. It teaches rather the great doctrine of a Remedy, of a Mediator; and therein it is profoundly true." Thus far did Mark Rutherford come in the *Deliverance*.

In the last three novels the problems of theology are supplanted by the problems of love, and the men give way to women. Yet in following the experiences of Miriam and Catherine and Clara, Mark Rutherford is still seeking under the guises of this human interest a further development of the religious consciousness. One who was so minded could plot the two curves of theology and love in these six books, and see how the spiritual mean remains constant. Two detached remarks in the earlier novels indicate the line along which the love-interest is to be developed. "Blessed is love; blessed is hate; but thrice accursed is that indifference which is neither one nor the other, the muddy mess which men call friendship." "Passion does not dawdle and compliment. It may devour and burn like a flame; and in a few moments, like flame, may bring down a temple to dust and ashes; but it is earnest as flame, and essentially pure." There are few writers who have drawn as nicely as Mark Rutherford the sharp line between passion which is clean and passion which is unclean. The vivid picture of Pauline Caillaud dancing in her attic tenement before her father and Zachariah, is marvellous alike for its freedom and its restraint. First and last he is an intense nominalist in his treatment of love. Catherine Furze loved Mr. Cardew: "But what is love? There is no such thing. There are loves, and they are all different." Baruch Cohen, a middle-aged widower, finds himself in love with Clara: "But it was

not Clara Hopgood who was before him; it was hair, lips, eyes, just as it was twenty years ago."

It is not with love as a physical experience, however, that Mark Rutherford is concerned, but rather with the struggle of naturally free souls to realize their freedom and find themselves through the human restraints and disappointments of the divine passion. His women all belong to one type. Theresa Wollaston, Pauline Cailaud and her daughter Pauline Coleman after her, Miriam Tacchi, Catherine Furze, and Madge Hopgood, each of them in her particular environment was "like a wild sea-gull in a farm yard of peaceful, clucking, brown-speckled fowls." As the earlier books were studies in theological incompatibility, so the later books are studies in personal incompatibility, efforts to discover in the terms of the most intimate of all human relationships the ever needful "religion of Reconciliation."

In the earlier novels, where the theological interest predominates, the function of the women is clear and simple, they achieve the deliverance of the men from their spiritual bondage. Mark Rutherford begins where Goethe left off: "*Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan.*" Theresa and Pauline each "add one more beatitude to those in the gospels: 'Blessed are they who heal us of our self-despisings.'" In the later novels the immediate spiritual dilemmas of the women become paramount, and Mark Rutherford sets himself seriously to achieve for his heroines the deliverance and reconciliation which he had found for himself. In *Miriam's Schooling* the most untamed of all these women of "wild irregular genius" is reconciled to her plodding husband by the discovery that, although he had no soul for *Romeo and Juliet*, he could understand the movement of the heavenly bodies, which, for all her eager romanticism, she could not understand. With telescope and orrery

she became a novitiate at his feet. In this simple way she learned the first necessary lesson in the school of religious experience, the lesson of Humility. Through her broken and contrite pride, love came to its own.

In *Catherine Furze* the dilemma is yet more serious. Though it was altogether unlikely "in a sleepy midland town knowing nothing but the common respectabilities," the daughter of an ironmonger fell in love with a married clergyman. The trouble grew until one sultry afternoon they stood together by a riverside. "She loved this man; it was a perilous moment; one touch, a hair's breadth of oscillation, and the two would have been one." But in obedience to a something, that inhibition which in the perilous moment always saves Mark Rutherford's men and women, Catherine conquered herself and in so doing gave Cardew the power to conquer himself. He went back to his wife, and "no woman ever had a husband more tender or devoted than hers in those later years." When at last he came and knelt by Catherine's bedside as she was dying, he could only say, "You have saved me," and she whispered in reply, "*You have saved me.*" "By their love for each other they were both saved. The disguises are manifold which the Immortal Son assumes in the work of our Redemption."

And finally in the last novel, *Clara Hopgood*, our dilemma has become veritable tragedy. Outraged respectability deplored this book when it appeared, because it told of Madge Hopgood's fall and her determined refusal of the conventional reprisal, marriage. But outraged respectability missed the whole content of this largest of the novels; for this is the story, not of Madge Hopgood's fall, but of Clara Hopgood's great renunciation, by which finally she transfers to her discredited sister a love that might have been her own, and so saves her sister by her vicarious sacrifice. She goes to Italy with Mazzini and dies there in the service of political

liberty, and one day long after, when her name was mentioned, Baruch said to Madge, "The theologians represent the Crucifixion as the most sublime fact in the world's history. It was sublime, but let us reverence also the Eternal Christ who is forever being crucified for our salvation." By these devious ways Mark Rutherford found again that "orthodoxy" which once he lost awhile. In *Clara Hopgood* "the wheel has come full circle."

Such are the novels of this man for whom, in William James's memorable words, "religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather"; to whom, in his own words, "the love of a woman to the man who is of no account is a true testimony of what God is in his own heart." They are the records of "The Dark Night of the Soul." They are melancholy, not "because it is easy to be melancholy and the times lack strength"—and who that knows Arthur Hugh Clough or Matthew Arnold would disparage the inevitable melancholy of those transition years?—they are melancholy because he who would be one with God must first wander in a far country. The writings of all the mystics seem to issue in anti-climax. The Union to which they bear witness seems but a meagre recompense for their sufferings. What more grievous story has been left the world than that of Suso, and how inadequate the simple conclusion to it all: "And later, when God judged that it was time, He rewarded the poor martyr for all his suffering. And he enjoyed peace of heart, and received in tranquillity and quietness many precious graces." Mark Rutherford's work, likewise, seems to issue in anti-climax, yet in the occasional intimations of a peace which passeth all understanding, we are given to know that this modern Servitor of the Eternal Wisdom came "*ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*." It is not by chance that more than one of these records of the "Dark Night"

ends with a daybreak, a daybreak like that to which Miriam rose very early, on the first morning of her soul's peace.

"It poured with rain during the night. Miriam lay and listened, thinking it would be wet and miserable on the following day. She dropped off to sleep, and at four she rose and went to the window and opened it wide. In streamed the fresh south-west morning air, pure, delicious, scented with all that was sweet from fields and woods, and the bearer inland as far as Cowfold of Atlantic vitality, dissipating fogs, disinfecting poisons—the Life-Giver.

"She put on her clothes silently, went down stairs, and opened the back door. The ever watchful dog, hearing in his deepest slumbers the slightest noise, moved in his kennel, but recognized her at once and was still. She called to him to follow her, and he joyfully obeyed. . . . She paced about for a little while, and then sat down and once more watched the dawn. It was not a clear sky, but barred toward the east with cloud, the rain-cloud of the night. She watched and watched, and thought after her fashion, mostly with incoherence, but with rapidity and intensity. At last came the first flush of scarlet upon the bars, and the dead storm contributed its own share to the growing beauty. The rooks were now astir, and flew, one after another, in an irregular line eastwards black against the sky. Still the colour spread, until at last it began to rise into pure light, and in a moment more the first glowing point of the disc was above the horizon. Miriam fell on her knees against the little seat and sobbed, and the dog, wondering, came and sat by her and licked her face with tender pity."

A PROTESTANT AND SOCIAL VIEW OF THE CHURCH

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The Church is a divine institution, just as all legitimate organizations, like the State, the university, the political party, or the private club, are divine institutions. This is the outcome of any thoroughgoing acceptance of the Protestant position of the essentially divine character of all life, the priesthood of all believers, and the rejection of local divine places. Any special claim the Church can make must be based not on its essential character but upon its purpose and aim, and its special efficiency in pursuit of some end. That some ends in life are higher than others goes without saying. The end of a private club is legitimate and praise-worthy, but it is not in the judgment of thoughtful men on the same level of importance for life as a university. It is true that any scale of importance is finally based upon judgments of value which are in the last analysis extra-rational. The end aimed at by all churches, and among them we must include synagogues, cathedrals, and the lecture-halls of the Ethical Culture Society, is the mediation to men of the unseen and eternal values of religion and ethics. And each particular church bases its claim for recognition upon its assertion that it is attempting to mediate the truest and highest of these values in the most efficient way it knows. We thus see that the Church or churches represent the community, or rather parts of the community, organized for a particular purpose. The older distinction between a visible and invisible church should have lost all meaning for a consistent Protestantism, because

it was fundamentally based on the false assumption that our relationships with God depended upon the mediation of the church, and that outside of the church there was no salvation. Hence to account for certain obvious facts, an invisible church had to be postulated. The logic of Protestantism makes any such assumption needless. Our relationships to God and salvation are not in the keeping of any church.

Nor is it accurate to speak of any separation between Church and State, for as a matter of fact it is the same community organized for two distinct purposes; but the purposes cannot be more than relatively distinct, and the community has always an interest in any organization and its purposes and can never permit entire separation. Nor have we actually either in the United States or in France any such separation. All that has happened is a changed relationship between the community organized for certain political purposes and the community organized for certain ecclesiastical ends. In the United States all ecclesiastical organizations receive a large subsidy, and are communal servants in so far as they accept remission of taxes. Even in France there is no real separation. The community guarantees protection to all ecclesiastical bodies and in a measure regulates their life. There is simply in France a more radical recognition of the real character of all such organizations within the communal limits. The community in its protection of the physical and corporate life of all churches recognizes them as a part of its life. It is a matter of expediency how far it taxes or subsidizes these organizations, just as it is a matter of expediency how far it should subsidize Trades Unions or private educational institutions. The assumption is always that some kind of social service is being rendered to the community.

Genetically, the ecclesiastical organization of the community, like the educational, was coterminous with the

political organization, commonly called the State. With the increasing complexity of human life and great differentiation of human needs, there has arisen a greater differentiation of function. Administrative and defensive organizations have arisen out of the political, and indeed with various degrees of deliberate separation from the political life. In one sense the political organization must always be supreme, because its main purpose is defence, and for that purpose it must control brute force. The maintenance of peace within and without demands physical force, and the community intrusts the control of this force to organizations which have seldom risen adequately to their high responsibility and have often lamentably betrayed their trust. Hence it is a grievous error to identify the State with any organization which temporarily controls the physical force of the community. Often history must decide whether the control of overwhelming physical force was exercised by the State or by a usurper. Only growing social experience and increasing knowledge and independence on the part of the individuals of a community will enable us to determine the adjustments socially most expedient between the various organizations which express various elements in the communal life.

At present the ecclesiastical organization of the community is probably both broader and more effective than any other expression of communal vitality. The only possible rivals are the political and educational interests; and on the educational field the ecclesiastical organizations are so interwoven with various institutions for promoting knowledge that alliance rather than separation is still the note of the relationship. In the political field it is noteworthy that as communal efficiency rises, there come into being administrative bodies which cease to be political and take over large areas of life once dominated by political interests. In the United States the

most exciting political election induces roughly fifteen million men to enter a polling booth once in four years, and spend perhaps an hour's travel in order to vote. On ordinary occasions the vote sinks to less than seventy per cent of this number. Moreover, only about one-sixth of the population are legally entitled to political expression at the polls, while over one-third of the community are avowedly organized ecclesiastically, and over two-thirds are probably more vitally connected with some church than with any political party. The churches, for example, have a seating capacity for nearly seventy per cent of the population, and the seating capacity more than keeps pace with the population, while the nominal membership outstrips it. On any given Sunday there are probably more people in churches of one kind or another than went into the polling booths in November for the Presidential election.

It may be that the churches are "losing ground," but there are no evidences of it on the numerical side. All the various organizations in which the communal life finds expression are relatively defective and inefficient. The political organizations are notoriously wasteful, time-serving, and ineffective. No one who has to do with the educational machinery can rise from the study of what it is as compared with what it might and should be, without sickness of heart. So also the community ecclesiastically considered is most obviously to a great degree badly served by the churches and synagogues. They are divisive, often narrow, selfish, and inefficient. There are however degrees of inefficiency; and just in the measure in which any of the ecclesiastical bodies are successful in mediating the highest unseen values to the communal life, just in that measure are they "true" churches and are doing what the community instinctively demands of them.

In the past the churches have failed in various degrees to mediate the unseen values to the communal life which was advancing in complexity and was possessed of an increasingly intelligent outlook upon life. This has been the fruitful cause of a constant restlessness and dissatisfaction within the organized religious life; and has resulted in the rise of new sects and organizations aiming at better expression of the vast variety of human needs. The various bodies minister to different levels of aesthetic and cultural demands. Nor does it seem likely that with increasing communal heterogeneity the rise of new organizations will cease. Exactly the same forces are at work in political parties, and we see the same stupid inflexibility, and the same waste and confusion. An examination of the historical facts seems to show that the political State and the ecclesiastical bodies have never been more than exceedingly partial and imperfect organs for the communal life, and one main trouble has always been that these bodies in an arrogant way have constantly assumed that they did really incorporate that life. Only the sad awakening of such years as 1517 and 1793 reveal the real facts of serious misrepresentation. No political State and no ecclesiastical body has ever succeeded in expressing the communal life more than very imperfectly. There is a higher citizenship than ever wholly organized a political State, and a nobler religious life than ever became completely embodied in an institution.

On reason however why the ecclesiastical organization counts for more than any other as an expression of the communal life is that in Christianized countries, at least, women and children are given more place. Political states have excluded all that the power-possessing class could safely exclude, and political parties have always had their eye upon gaining power in the political state. Hence the pressure of the ecclesiastically organized com-

munity is steadier, and the life of the churches more nearly representative of the whole community than any group of political parties. For this reason also the churches elicit an unselfish devotion and a steadier self-sacrifice than all other organizations put together, although in recent years the educational interest begins to some extent to rival them. The communal life has many needs and is slowly and often blindly fashioning organs to minister to those needs. The earliest of all such organizations are seldom sharply defined in their functions. The earliest forms of organization seem to have been of a political-military and a religious-educational type. The religious demands are however interwoven with all other demands, and the organs called into being to meet one set of needs must often adapt themselves to meeting an entirely different set of wants. The defensive organs become the organs for the exercise of internal political power. At the same time the danger of institutional life is rather fixity than extreme adaptation; hence both churches and political parties by their very nature tend rather to conserve than to create. Life is forever struggling within the organization for new and more perfect expression, and often it is hampered and crushed instead of conserved by the forms built up to guard it. These conserving forms of the past are often a weight and hindrance, and in a measure become misrepresentative of the real life of the organization. They however continue to have their function as an expression of the continuity of life, and as an abiding confession that the present is a child of the past, and should have a reverence for the parental life. As occasionally however the bark of a tree binds it and kills the tree, so in the ecclesiastical life creedal forms and ritual observances have more than once bound the religious life, and violent disruption or deadly stagnation has always ensued. No one can observe the churches of Spain or Italy with anything like

intelligent sympathy, and not realize that they are ministering to pronounced needs of the social organism; but at the same time it is also perfectly evident that they have long ceased to be the expressions of the total religious life of those communities, and that because of their religious and ethical imperfections many noble religious and ethical enthusiasms are being starved and stunted. And yet on account of the monopoly these churches possess of the organs for religious expression, it is difficult for any spontaneous religious wants to make themselves properly felt. This same thing is measurably true of Protestantism, particularly where the relationship between the political State and some one denomination is of the kind somewhat inaccurately known as "established."

In the United States the Protestant churches with all their evident shortcomings are essential elements in the communal life; at the same time they are no longer representative of the whole religious life even of the non-Roman Catholic population. For one thing, the financial burden of any effective ecclesiastical organization is very heavy. Buildings, rituals, an educated ministry, organs, choirs, are exceedingly costly. At least nine-tenths of the property of the United States is controlled by one-tenth of the population. This one-tenth is largely called upon to pay the bills of a relatively prosperous Protestantism, and "who pays the piper calls the tune." So it easily happens that the churches try to maintain a standard set by the prosperous one-tenth, and nine-tenths are consciously or unconsciously shut out. Or, what is almost worse, it happens that the churches try to minister to the "other half" without really knowing what are their religious wants and habits. We often hear of "today's demand" for this or that, for "ornate" worship or "intellectual" preaching, or "the simple Gospel," when the truth is that the demand is that of a

small and paying minority, while no one knows what would be the demands of the majority were it not so voiceless and uninterested. The real difficulty which faces the Protestant Church is an economic one. Its corporate life is relatively wasteful, and the constituency from which it would naturally draw its strength is economically taxed by the strain on its material resources. We have aped the cathedral-building which was once the open centre for the whole religious life of the community; then we close up the building, save for four or five hours a week. The waste is at once apparent. At the same time this difficulty faces the communal life on its political side. American democracy has as yet neither proper ecclesiastical nor political organs for making its real needs known. Nor have we any adequate machinery for meeting those needs, were they known. The church is simply a part, and a most important part, of the entire question of communal reorganization. In some respects it is both less wasteful and more democratic than the political and educational organizations. It takes in women and children, which the political organization fails to do, and it ministers to adult life as the educational organization has hitherto not done. Some radical political thought, realizing the institutional conservatism that inheres in all external organizations and finding it an obstacle in the way, fondly dreams of its destruction. In point of fact, it would be necessary to destroy all institutions to get rid of conservatism. Universities and schools are in general far more hide-bound in thought and custom than the churches, and for reasons a thoughtful man can easily supply for himself. They are, for one thing, built upon the external authority of a teacher addressing the immature. Nor would the destruction of institutional conservatism necessarily make for progress; because the energies of the communal life would at once be absorbed by the task of constructing new

institutions bound soon to develop their own type of conservatism.

The hope of the Protestant churches must be such a democratic reorganization of the communal life that they may rest upon a broader economic basis for their material life, and thus come into closer touch with great ranges of religious need and aspiration now untouched and undreamed of. The churches are no worse off than the schools and universities, which also now minister to the tastes and needs of a small possessing class, and respond directly to the life of that class, and only indirectly and almost by happy accident to the non-possessing class. The whole matter is one of relative inefficiency. We talk freely of pedagogic reform, and also of reconstruction of the church; but we do not know the needs to which pedagogic reform and reconstruction must minister—and no one knows, least of all the voiceless majority. We who are trying to minister in school and church to the supposed needs of a half-awakened Democracy are guessing in the dark. Our chiefest social service will be awakening the Democracy to demand its own economic, political, and religious self-expression. It may well be that an economically awakened Democracy, with political autonomy and real religious freedom, will give expression to its religious life in forms as different from those of today as a Quaker meeting-house is from a pagan temple. But it is more than likely that it will revert to many of the æsthetic inspirations of a pagan, feudal, and aristocratic past, and evolve out of them a richer and more inspiring symbolism. Indeed it is almost useless to speculate upon the direction the religious life of Democracy will take. The most we can do, we are in part doing, in cultivating a much larger elasticity in our ecclesiastical machinery. The Salvation Army, the Young Men's Christian Associations, the Boy Scouts, the various Settlement Guilds,

and the like, are all individually subject to serious criticism, but they are wholesome expressions of the church's attempt to adapt its life more completely to the whole range of human need. But at almost every point the worker is face to face with the lack of that economic autonomy without which Protestant individualism and spiritual freedom are unable really to find themselves. This disability we should frankly face, and instead of arrogantly identifying the life of the church with the religious life of the community, honestly admit that we do not and cannot comprehend the religious life of the community, and set ourselves to the task of awakening the community to its need of more complete Protestant and Democratic autonomy.

MARTIN LUTHER IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CRITICISM

EPHRAIM EMERTON

The decade just passed has witnessed an unusual activity in the production of books about Martin Luther. This activity has been greatly stimulated by the re-introduction of a method of controversy which reasonable men had been hoping was forever silenced. Until about a generation ago there had been two obvious and hopelessly opposed ways of approach to the subject of Luther's character and work. From the one side he was presented as an angel of light; from the other as the type of a depraved and malicious spirit, moved to activity not through any desire to improve the condition of his people but because, being the malignant thing he was, he could not act otherwise. It need hardly be said to the readers of this *Review* that both of these views of Luther are essentially false. They are perfectly intelligible, one equally with the other. They are the natural precipitation of the bitter controversies that gathered about him in his life, and continued long after his death to complicate the political and economic struggles out of which the new Europe of our day was born. In the light of our modern historical method, both views appear crude and unscientific. They represent a way of looking at historical characters and historical events to which we are apt to apply the crushing word "old-fashioned." And in fact it did seem, up to a very few years ago, that these primitive judgments, which classified men into good and bad, angels and fiends, had become a thing of the past. We flattered ourselves that the canons of historical criticism had become so well fixed in the habits of our

modern thought that we were no longer blind to the intermediate shades of quality and motive that determine human action. We thought we had learned that no man is wholly good or wholly bad; that no historical movement is all along one direct line, but that if we would really understand it, we must follow it in its many windings and disentangle it from the many cross-roads of opposing forces that tend to confuse and to obscure it.

For more than half a century scholars had been occupied in delving deeper and deeper into the original sources of historical knowledge, confident that the more completely these were brought out into the light, the more certainly we should be able to eliminate the false and the uncertain and to fix forever the volume of the certain and the true. That confidence was but another expression of one of the most noticeable tendencies of the modern world—the tendency to believe that, in the words of the poet who more than any other was the prophet of modern optimism, “We needs must love the highest when we see it.” A right method, it was supposed, must inevitably lead to sound results. We forgot that there is another side to this matter. We overlooked the bitter fact that learning, right method, intellectual power, may all be perverted to the service of the false and evil as well as applied to the service of the true and the good. It is only when, behind all the apparatus of sound scholarship and beneath all the force of intellectual capacity, there is honesty of purpose, purity of aim, and a genuine love of the liberty which knows no fear of consequences, that we can hope for the highest results of research.

Now if we apply these rather large generalizations to the special case of the study of Luther, we see that what we have ventured to call the “old-fashioned” crudity of judgment was pretty definitely repudiated more than a generation ago. And it is interesting to note that this abandonment of the extreme partisan attitude begins

on the Protestant side. Not only was it a Protestant, it was a Lutheran writer, Professor Julius Köstlin, who gave to the world the earliest considerable study of Luther from an avowedly strict historical point of view. While maintaining the attitude of reverence for the great achievements and the commanding personality of his hero, Köstlin was not blind to the defects and limitations that at many points seem to dim the lustre of his renown. And so it has been with the host of other Protestant scholars who have followed the way marked out by Köstlin. They also have endeavored to preserve what was valuable in the older tradition, and at the same time not to lose the advantage that comes from treating a great human figure in a human way.

But not only Protestants have felt the influence of the modern emphasis upon a truly historical method. Catholic scholars too, trained in the schools of Protestant Germany, began to approach this subject of the Reformation in a markedly fairer spirit. On this side the lead was taken by two men of vast learning and industry, inspired by common zeal to present their side of the great controversy in such a way as to conciliate the scientific spirit of their day. These two men were Johannes Janssen and Ludwig Pastor. Both chose for their field of work the period of European history following upon that of the Middle Ages proper. It was their cue to admit with admirable frankness the evils of the Church system in that period and to acknowledge the need of reformation. In so far they disarmed criticism from the outset. But then came, of course, the question, how this reformation might and ought to have been accomplished. These authors contended that the means of reformation were all indicated by the very constitution of the Church itself. Though the Church was a divine institution, it was in the hands of fallible men, by no means exempt from the passions and follies of human

kind. In its development there must occur those waves of soundness and unsoundness which mark all human endeavor. In its periods of decline it had only to enforce still more strictly that divinely instituted discipline which had so often rescued it from apparently impending ruin, and it would once more assume its rightful place as the infallible guide of human conduct.

From this point of view it followed that all violent reformation deserved rather the name of revolution, with all its attendant horrors and confusions. Revolution might lead to schism, and schism meant the rending of the seamless garment which symbolized the essential unity of the Christian Church. With the actual process of the Reformation under the lead of Luther, these Catholic scholars could therefore have no sympathy; but they were not quite willing to adopt the traditional view of him and his work as criminal. It was not a question of crime, but of blunder. The Reformation was a mistake, and Luther was the victim of a series of errors arising, not from a vicious nature, but from the extravagance of an over-sensitive conscience preyed upon by solitary brooding and working itself out in a continuous sequence of audacious actions.

In defence of this attractive thesis, Janssen in his *History of the German People* and Pastor in his *History of the Papacy* marshalled their evidence in the form of a vast accumulation of quotation from contemporary writings, especially from the writings of the Reformers themselves, and above all from those of Luther. The success of these undertakings was immediate and enormous. The reader, critical or sympathetic, found himself overwhelmed by this mass of apparently unanswerable testimony. The combination of frankness and learning with good temper and a generally respectful tone appeared to be irresistible. Of course a war of counter-demonstrations ensued. Protestant scholars

rushed to the rescue, and the air became lurid with the flames of the combat. It was easy to show that the frankness of the new Catholic presentation was only apparent; that evidence had been twisted and perverted and combined to accomplish the desired result; that after all, the real issue, the justification of the Reformation, remained essentially untouched.

Still, as the smoke of the encounter lifted, it became apparent that henceforth the treatment of the whole subject would have to be set upon another plane. Protestant scholars acknowledged gladly the many contributions to actual knowledge which their confessional opponents had made. Whatever disposition might still linger to represent Luther as something a little more than human was pretty well counteracted by the weight of evidence to the contrary, and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the old violence of assault could ever again be revived. That was the situation so long as the papacy of that remarkable man, scholar, and gentleman, Leo XIII, continued. Pope Leo died in the year 1903 and was succeeded by the Venetian peasant, Giuseppe Sarto, who under the name of Pius X still occupies the throne of St. Peter. Within a year of his accession appeared the first volume of a book called *Luther and Lutheranism*,¹ by a Dominican friar, Heinrich Denifle, who for more than twenty years had held the position of sub-archivist at the Vatican. The thesis of this book was one especially useful in Catholic exhortation—namely, that no one has ever become a recreant to the true faith unless he had previously become a wicked man. Every departure from the doctrine of the one holy and apostolic Church must be traceable to some mental or moral depravity on the part of the erring person.

¹ *Luther und Lutherthum in der ersten Entwicklung*, von P. Heinrich Denifle, O. P. 1904-1909.

In pursuance of this thesis, Denifle brought together and marshalled into one terrible indictment every suggestion which a mind open to that kind of evidence could extract from contemporary literature, and especially from the utterances of Luther himself, pointing toward a depraved imagination and a diseased moral nature as the mainsprings of his activities and the basis of the seductive influence which he exercised over the minds of his followers. It was a frank return to the attitude of a previous age. As to the great learning and ability of the Dominican scholar there could be no manner of doubt. He had demonstrated these in a long series of critical studies of mediaeval institutions, which had won for him the hearty recognition of all competent authorities. He was on his way to England to receive the highest honors of the English academic world, when he died at Munich, June 10, 1905, a little more than a year after the appearance of the first volume of his assault upon Luther. A second and a third volume, from materials which the author had long been gathering, appeared in rapid succession.

This book of Denifle's is not a biography of Luther. It is not even an attempt at this. "I am no Luther-biographer," the author himself says in his preface to the second edition. It is rather a psychological study, based upon historical method and directed to proving the point from which the author sets out, namely, that Luther was merely the mouthpiece for a type of corruption which for more than a century had been creeping into the Church and threatening its very life. It is worth while to follow for a moment the process which Denifle tells us he followed in approaching the subject of his work. He had occupied himself, he says, for many years with studies especially in regard to the University of Paris and the devastation of churches and monasteries in France during the Hundred Years' War; and

this had led him to the conviction that the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries were an almost continuous period of decadence in the spiritual standards of the Church. Rationalism, individualism, paganism, the lust of the flesh, the delight of the eye, had all been slowly sapping the foundations of the structure which the devoted faith of the true Middle Ages had built up. Especially had the world of nominal Christians turned away from that ideal of the Christian life represented by the monastic system with its manifold reactions upon society in general. All this wide-spread discontent and criticism seemed to our Dominican scholar only so many manifestations of the world against the Church, the flesh against the spirit, the devil against Christ. What appears to others as the spirit of enlightenment, leading with all its dangers through struggle and doubt to ultimate clearness and deliverance, this seems to him the spirit of darkness blinding the eyes of the world and causing it to stumble about in uncertainty, until the one divinely appointed guide shall again be able to command its allegiance.

This process of decadence within the Church he finds then typified and personified in Luther. He grants to him, grudgingly, a certain measure of good intention and a barren kind of capacity; but, aside from these dubious endowments, he is to him only the expression of the general corruption of mind and soul to which the unhappy tendencies of the previous century had been inevitably leading. The key to the nature of this so-called reformer is plainly a gross and irresistible sensuality. It is this germ of corruption which poisons all his being and leads him to the other vices which from an early point determine his action. Especially does it lead him, as sensual indulgence always must, into a fatal disregard for truth. The whole world of law and order and religion becomes hateful to him because it seems to

stand in the way of his own selfish desire. Having the spirit of falsehood within him, he lies to himself. Evil becomes good in his sight. When the man of the fifteenth century sinned, he knew he was sinning. He did not try to deceive himself or others with the fiction of a new morality that confounded right and wrong. And because he knew that he was sinning, he kept open for himself a way of reform. There was always for him and his kind the hope that through this sense of sin they might be brought back once more to the kindly bosom of that Mother Church that was always more ready to forgive than to condemn. But for this Luther and his kind there was no such hope. They sinned, and then made a new law to justify their sin. When Luther, moved by uncontrollable desire, broke the vows he had solemnly taken and united himself with a woman who had been through the same process of apostasy, he had the audacity to call this union a marriage and to declare that it had the approval of the divine command.

One sees the cleverness of this method of attack. It is of no avail that Luther, and his defenders to this day, point out the perversion of the system which had led him and countless others into a relation with the world which their sober and mature judgment condemned as false, and out of which therefore every right instinct of their nature taught them to escape. All this could be interpreted as merely an excuse to justify their own perverse and corrupted action. It would not help, to show that a long series of faithful servants of a true Christianity had for generations been protesting against precisely these fictitious restraints upon everything that was natural and right in the closest of human relations. From the days of Gregory VII such protests had not been lacking. They had come, not from men who were seeking justification for their own private acts, but from devoted adherents of the system they were compelled to

criticise. Such men were grieved and pained by the corruption they saw in the holiest places, and advised an entire change as the only means of escape. They had been silenced by the weight of that centralized power that saw in the existing system the only defence of its own authority. But now such voices would be silenced no longer. It was perfectly true that Luther was giving expression to a feeling of restless impatience with fictitious and hypocritical restraints; but this was done only that a new Christianity in greater harmony with the eternal rightness of the good universe of God might be brought into being.

The reply to this assault was as difficult as the reply to those critics of the English Reformation who represent this event as merely the result of King Henry VIII's obstinate determination to rid himself of a wife who no longer suited him. It is as idle in the one case as in the other to attempt a direct reply. Such movements as the Reformation in Germany and in England are too vast and too complicated to be summed up in any such simple formula. The only way to reach an intelligent comprehension of them is to trace them back through the long and intricate development which brought society at last to such a point that there was no longer the possibility of compromise. It is not the personality of the leader nor the immediate circumstances about him, that are of the highest importance. These are the dramatic elements of the situation, and for that reason they are sure to attract and hold the attention. It would have been better if this violent and insolent attack had been allowed to pass in utter silence. But the undoubted learning and the high official position of the writer seemed a challenge which the Protestant scholars of Germany could not afford to neglect. With one accord they again rushed to the defence of their national and religious hero. A new deluge of pamphlets, each

aiming to place in its proper light some aspect of Luther's personality or some incident in his career, was poured out upon the world of readers. Especially, of course, the teachers of Church History in important universities, men like Harnack, Kawerau, Kolde, Walther, put themselves immediately on record as protesting alike against the spirit and the content of the offending book.

In the interval of barely ten years a whole literature has made its appearance. In general it must be said that the tone of the controversy on the Protestant side has been dignified and worthy of the traditions of the best historical scholarship. It has acknowledged frankly the few contributions which the learned Dominican has made to our actual knowledge. It has repudiated, so far as such repudiation was necessary, the extravagant laudation of the earlier days. But it has left no room for doubt as to its absolute rejection of the point of view and the conclusions of its adversary.

It was natural that Father Denifle, himself a "religious" and a Dominican at that, should have directed his attack with especial venom against Luther's whole relation to the monastic system. It was not merely that Luther had abandoned his monastic profession, broken his vows, and led multitudes of others to do the same. His chief offence was that he had misrepresented the sacred idea of the regular life. Luther's own utterances on the subject would lead us to believe that he had entered the monastery in order that he might secure deliverance from the sense of sin that was oppressing him. He had given it a fair trial. He had not been in the attitude of rebellion against the minuteness of the rule, which had marked the attitude of Erasmus, for example. On the contrary, he had conformed with scrupulous exactness to every requirement, in the vain hope that thus he might acquire the peace of mind he sought. Failing to find this relief, he had passed through a stage bordering on

despair, and out of this stage he had worked himself only through persistent study of the Bible and its interpretation in the light of the theology of Paul and Augustine. In other words, he had found through the process of personal experience his solution of the problem of personal sin and sinfulness. The method of conformity to a system of prescribed practices had failed. He had gone beyond and above all prescriptions to the personal and intimate relation of the sinful soul to the God who made it. Now this is what the dominant Church could not and cannot forgive. If the individual could thus leap over all the bounds of form and ceremony which it had established, then its occupation was gone, and it was quick to perceive this inevitable conclusion. Denifle did not waste his time in dwelling overmuch on the wickedness of breaking vows and seeking the gratification of sensual desire under the excuse of religious scruple. These things he characterizes with vicious side-thrusts which leave no doubt as to his opinion. What he chiefly dwells upon is the false-heartedness of Luther in professing any such idea of the monastic life. Luther ought to have known that the profession of the monk was not primarily a process intended for the deliverance from sin. The whole notion of the monastic vow as a "second baptism," whereby a man was sacramentally renewed in spirit, he declares to be a complete misapprehension. Not as a guarantee of spiritual perfection but only as an aid toward this end, is the regular life truly to be interpreted. All this Luther ought to have known and probably did know; so that he is guilty, not only of an overwrought hysterical motive in entering the monastery, but of deliberate lying about it when it became necessary to defend his apostasy. The answer to this particular charge of Denifle is admirably stated by Karl Benrath in his treatise on *Luther in the Monastery*.² It is made clear that this is only

² *Luther im Kloster (1505-1525)*, von Karl Benrath. 1906.

one of the countless illustrations of Denifle's controversial method. He begins always with the point he desires to make, then seeks for words of Luther which by some perverse ingenuity can be twisted into a self-condemnation, then draws his foregone conclusion, and proceeds to build upon this the foundation for a new indictment. Benrath shows by a perfectly just historical method that Luther was fully justified in the year 1505 in thinking that the monastery life would be the surest way to secure him the peace which his boy's soul craved. It is not necessary to imagine that he expected any miraculous demonstration of such a deliverance. His surrender to the requirements of the house would indicate the contrary. What he probably did expect was that through this surrender he would find himself growing daily in what he would have called the Christian character. When he did not find this, he began the course of questioning and reaction which finally carried him outside the bounds of the monastic relation.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the foul insinuations with which Denifle pursues his victim during the years of struggle with the monastic limitations. Enough that his only material here consists of a series of scattered utterances of Luther himself, largely in personal letters, never specific in their references, and always leaving large room for interpretation, but used here with true Dominican inquisitorial cleverness in the sense most unfavorable to the defendant. Reduced to their lowest terms, they all fall back to the one simple statement that Luther was made a man and not a monk and believed that he was not singular in this respect. His unpardonable offence was that he believed a man was something better than a monk and did not hesitate to say so.

This note of personal abuse is continued throughout the discussion of Luther's early years, and furnishes the foundation upon which the whole judgment of his later

accomplishment is built. It has been the task of his Protestant defenders to show the falsity of the method and to illustrate this by reference to specific points. Denifle has then replied to his critics with sweeping accusations of a character quite in accordance with his assault upon Luther himself. The chief points in this rejoinder are found in the familiar charges of ignorance and falsehood. If we could accept this criticism, we should have to believe that all the vast output of German scholarship in the past two generations had been thrown away. These scholars, the most eminent in their field, are represented first as utterly incapable of understanding even the first principles of historical inquiry. Evidence means nothing to them, because they are constitutionally, or, if you please, confessionally disqualified to weigh and measure it. They cannot read the documents necessary to establish their opinion. They are ignorant of things that every Catholic child knows in its cradle. And then these ornaments of German scholarship, thus incapable of any worthy achievement, are united in a conspiracy to pervert the truth. They are worthy disciples of their master and involved in the same condemnation.

Denifle's book was received with jubilation by the Vatican wing of the papal party. By the more moderate and more decent element it met with distinct reproof for its vicious method, but was accepted as a final judgment upon the man and the movement it had condemned. Denifle himself had disclaimed the character of a Lutherbiographer. His work was, as he himself said, to trace the movement of the Reformation as embodied in the person of its leader back to its origins in a corrupt and decadent clericalism in the century previous. In so doing he set himself, as has been well shown by his critics, in distinct opposition to that other Catholic school of which Janssen and Pastor were the best representatives. They had maintained with a wealth of illustration that the

Church of the fifteenth century was doing very well indeed. Personal corruption and false leadership there were, to be sure, just as there is bound to be in all institutions intrusted to human hands, but the means of reformation were contained in the very constitution of the Church itself, and these agencies would have worked out the redemption of the Church in their own way and time, if only they had been given the chance.

In presenting their view of the case, they were always pointing forward to the time when these forces of regeneration should rally and find expression in the Counter-reformation of the late sixteenth century. Denifle, by throwing his emphasis on the corruptions of the fifteenth century, has only made the more clear to every seeing eye the hopelessness of the notion of a true reform without a shock of revolution. He has demonstrated that the system which had produced the papacy of the Borgias and the Medicis could never have been trusted to cleanse itself of the principle of decay that lay in its very structure.

The last volume of Denifle's book appeared in 1909. Within barely two years the problem of a complete biography of Luther, which he had definitely set aside, was taken up by another Catholic scholar of acknowledged eminence, the Jesuit, Hartmann Grisar, professor at the University of Innsbruck.³ In this monumental work, in three ponderous volumes, Dr. Grisar has undertaken to present from the Roman point of view the life and work of Luther as a process of development. Like Denifle, he has sought for the moving springs of the reformer's action, but he has found them in a somewhat different source. Without specific reference to his predecessor, he frankly repudiates his whole theory of Luther's personal depravity as the origin of his fall from grace. In a few brief sentences he expresses his

³ Luther, von Hartmann Grisar, S. J. 3 Bde. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911.

opinion that the material for a judgment of Luther's early experiences, whether in his own utterances or those of others, is far too meagre to permit of confident conclusions. At the same time Grisar accepts the theory that loss of faith is "not uncommonly" (i, 86) the result of moral corruption; only he is unable to find this connection of fact in Luther's case. So also in his treatment of the charge against Luther that his whole attitude toward the monastic problem was determined by his conviction of the uncontrollable nature of sensual desire, Grisar is honest enough to see that Luther meant this to apply to every kind of temptation of the will toward selfish desire at the cost of others and did not mean to limit it to the single element of physical lust.

Nothing could be fairer than Grisar's statement of the principles he proposes to follow in his work. He declares himself unreservedly to be aiming at historical truth and nothing else. That is of course what all historians have done ever since there was any writing of history, and, as very few of them have been able to live up to their declarations of principle, so we need not charge it as an especial crime against Dr. Grisar that he also has allowed certain modifications to creep into his actual practice. For one thing, he makes it clear that his historical attitude must comprehend also a certain psychological position; and that is always a dangerous venture for the historian. To account for the actions of his subject, he must create for him a psychological condition, and when he has made such a condition satisfactory to himself he must refer everything to that. It is an attractive method. It offers at every turn the clew which the biographer is always seeking; but the honest historian knows that there is nothing more illusive than precisely these alluring clews. They are more than likely to lead him into the very snares which he is trying

to avoid. For, after all, a human genius is too subtle a thing to be formulated under the headings and sub-headings of the psychologist's system.

Another of Grisar's declarations deserves our notice. He explicitly declares his independence of the views of Denifle or of any other authority. He rejects with some little warmth the idea that there is or can be a "Catholic" verdict upon Luther's personal character and experiences. Only in the sense that, as a matter of course, every Catholic must approach the subject with "the doctrines and the essential institutions of the Church as his standard for Luther's opinions and reforms." Denifle's personal opinions, he says, were his own, and he claims for himself the same independence. That has a very fair sound; but notice the caution of this reservation. What are the dogmas, and which are the essential institutions of the Church? That is precisely the question at issue; and because this is the question, the party which is bound to assume as its standards the very things that are in dispute can never stand in a truly historical attitude toward the persons or the institutions which have rejected these standards. The protestations of Dr. Grisar therefore do infinite credit to his good-will, but offer little promise that through his activity any noteworthy progress toward a mutual understanding between the two great wings of western Christendom will be made.

If Dr. Grisar rejects Denifle's principle of moral degeneracy as the explanation of Luther and Lutheranism, what does he substitute for it? Mainly two motives, by which he thinks the downward course of the so-called reformer was determined. The first of these motives is an ever-increasing, uncontrollable self-concern, developing as time went on into a fatal self-assertion, a contempt of all authority except such as he could turn to the support of his own individual conclusions. It was

not that Luther based his opinion or his action upon Augustine or upon Scripture, but that, having through his own perverse activity come to certain conclusions, he then found, or wished others to think he had found, support in these undoubted foundations of Christian tradition. The other motive, upon which Dr. Grisar dwells with great emphasis and prolonged argument, is Luther's sensitiveness to mystical influences. To his mind, already started upon its quest for a new source of spiritual satisfaction, came the subtle suggestions of what our author calls a "false mysticism." By that I understand him to mean a mysticism which over-emphasizes the individual process of reaching religious satisfaction through personal, spiritual communion with the source of all spiritual certainty. Such over-emphasis seems to him—and in this he is undoubtedly right—to underestimate the importance of those other methods of approaching the divine bestower of peace to the soul which the Church has systematized and the key to which it claims to hold. That is a distinction which to the Roman Catholic must always seem decisive. The Church could never afford to question or even to minimize the importance of a profound spiritual attitude of the believer toward the highest problems of the Christian experience. What it could, on the other hand, equally not afford to give up was the claim that such a spiritual attitude should express itself in forms recognized and controlled by the organized system of the Church's administration. Whoever allowed himself to come too directly into personal relation with the God who had made him and to whom he was responsible, must inevitably seem to be setting himself in a certain opposition to the existing system of the Church. It is these two elements taken together, an uncontrollable self-assertiveness and a morbid sensitiveness to imagined spiritual suggestion, that constitute Grisar's Luther-psy-

chology. Starting with these, it is easy to refer to them every individual act of the reform programme.

It is a pleasure to turn from the directly controversial pamphlets written in reply to the Roman assault, and to notice the steady progress of busy scholars in presenting continually new evidence of Luther's actual work and thought. Such a bit of carefully studied evidence is Johannes Ficker's edition of Luther's *Lectures on the Epistle to the Romans*.⁴ Long known and used by scholars in copy, it was reserved to Professor Ficker to utilize the Berlin manuscript in Luther's own hand. We have here, reproduced in a beautiful edition, the Latin text as Luther copied it out, his brief notes marginal and interlinear, and then his commentary, the main substance of the lectures. One sees here the complete process of Luther's thought in the two years (1515-16) immediately before his first great appeal to the world with the Ninety-five Theses of 1517. We can trace his studies in all authorities, ancient and modern. We can see how at a given point he must have received the new Greek Testament of Erasmus, and how from there on he profited at every step by its use. We learn from this illustration how Luther was feeling his way, deeply impressed with the great leading thought of justification by faith, yet feeling always the apparent contradiction between this and the imperative duty to do right, and so seeking to reconcile these two through a complete understanding of Paul's deepest meaning as interpreted by Augustine.

A very useful little contribution is Professor Scheel's collection of documents⁵ selected especially to illustrate Luther's development down to the year 1519. In his preface the author enumerates more than forty books

⁴ Luther's Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, 1515-16. Herausgegeben von Johannes Ficker. 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1908.

⁵ Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung (bis 1519), von D. Otto Scheel. 1911.

and articles which have appeared since 1900 on this subject. The documents here given are arranged by topics, and under these they are grouped as far as possible according to the volumes of Luther's writings. Intended primarily for the use of special students, they form an interesting body of evidence on the much-discussed main question as to Luther's sincere and irresistible progress toward the convictions which from 1519 on were to dominate his action.

One of the most difficult problems of Luther's early career is that of his relation to the established civil powers. The prince under whose immediate authority he lived, the Elector Frederic of Saxony, was well known for his sturdy and orthodox piety and his generally conservative character. How was it possible for Luther to speak and act with such freedom, not to say such reckless boldness, without being checked from the start by this civil control? The answer is at least partially to be found in the personality of Georg Spalatin, the Elector's most trusted counsellor, and at the same time the devoted friend, admirer, and patron of Luther.⁶ Between the two there went on for many years a voluminous correspondence, very much of which has been preserved, and on the basis of which this volume of Dr. Berbig has been written. To one who is willing to follow it carefully it demonstrates anew, and from a quite different side, the same fundamental fact: that Luther's intellectual and spiritual progress was a slow but steady development of a central idea working itself out under the influence at once of continuous study and a rich experience of life. It supplies the evidence which proves at the same time Luther's substantial equipment of worldly wisdom. He recognized from the beginning that it would be idle to protest and proclaim unless he were

⁶ Georg Spalatin und sein Verhältniss zu Martin Luther bis zum Jahre 1525, von Georg Berbig. 1906.

to find support in the temporal powers, and his relations with Spalatin show the consistent application of this principle. As Melancthon was Luther's foil on the theological side, so was Spalatin on the political. It is only regrettable that Luther did not have the orderly habit which led Spalatin to preserve his correspondence. We are in consequence obliged for the most part to reconstruct the contents of the chancellor's letters from Luther's replies; but even so we gain from this publication an inspiring picture of Spalatin's wise and cautious, but at the same time liberal and generous support of Luther's early activity.

The same problem, only in much finer detail, is considered in Kalkoff's study of the early treatment of Luther's case by the Roman tribunal.⁷ Probably few readers can quite realize how delicate the situation was in the year 1518; how slight a change in the balance of forces would have thrown Luther into the hands of Rome, and how little hope there would then have been that he would escape the final penalty of his rashness. To accomplish this result only one little jog at the right point in the mechanism of the papal-imperial-German-nationalistic machinery was needed. If the Elector Frederic of Saxony had yielded for a moment to the pressure brought to bear on him by the clever diplomacy of the Curia acting through Cardinal Cajetan, and had let Luther slip out from under his protection, the cause of German reform would probably have been indefinitely postponed.

Kalkoff's investigations in Italian archives have made it possible for every student to see for himself all there is to see in the way of original documentary evidence for this complicated bit of diplomacy. The volume is made up partly of narrative and partly of registers of documents arranged in chronological order and accom-

⁷ *Forschungen zu Luthers Römischem Process*, von Paul Kalkoff. Rom, 1906.

panied by a running commentary. The documentary chapters are the most instructive and are hardly less readable than the narrative; which is a model of everything that a literary style—even a German literary style—ought not to be. Even so, however, the effort to understand it is well worth making, if only to gain one more convincing proof of the quality, both active and passive, of the steadfast Elector.

American scholars also have been making their worthy contribution to this work of the past decade. *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, by Dr. L. H. Waring,⁸ is a study of the reformer's relation to the many practical questions involving governmental control over the action of the individual which were forced upon him by the immediate demands of the time. In this, as in every other field of his activities, Luther was an opportunist rather than an abstract theorist. He met the several crises of his career with such practical suggestions as each seemed to require, and then defended his advice by reference to general principles. Inevitably he was led into declarations that were more or less self-contradictory. Dr. Waring has collected these various utterances and so put them together as to show the varying attitude of their author at different times, but also to illustrate his well-balanced conception of the nature, the functions, and the rights of civil government in dealing with subjects who themselves had rights equally original and inalienable, or, to use Luther's own phraseology, equally divine. The chapter on the Right of Reform and Revolution is especially instructive in this respect. It shows the reformer in the sternest conflict of principles; on the one hand, his instinctive love of liberty and sympathy with the oppressed; on the other, his profound conviction of the importance of civil order as the indis-

⁸ *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, by Luther Hess Waring. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.

pensable foundation of a true liberty and an effective justice.

A monument of industry and patience in the least attractive field of Lutheran studies is *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church*,⁹ by the late Professor Richard of the Gettysburg Theological Seminary. After a brief but comprehensive review of the political, social, and dogmatic conditions of the first twelve years of the Lutheran movement, there follow some two hundred pages, about one-third of the volume, on the inception, the completion, presentation, and confutation of the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Although the author's point of view is, of course, the conservative Lutheran, he presents all the aspects of the amazingly difficult problem with singular fairness. We are made to see and to feel the critical moments when a false step or a timid policy might have endangered the whole cause of religious freedom for Germany and so for the world. The final formula of the Augsburg Confession was a monumental testimony to the spirit of compromise where compromise was possible, and of unshakable firmness when further yielding would have sacrificed fundamental principles and the great practical results already attained. The figure of Luther as the motive force, the beloved and revered teacher, and yet as obviously not the man to be intrusted with so delicate a mission, is brought out into clear relief. Already the current of events was sweeping on more rapidly than he or any other man could have foreseen and was carrying him along with it to results he would certainly not have welcomed.

The remainder of the volume is devoted chiefly to the working out of the several lines of dogmatic speculation started by the Lutheran revolt. On the one hand, we have the principle of liberty, once set in motion never

⁹ *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church*, by James W. Richard. Published for the author by the Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1909.

again to be completely checked. On the other, we see the demand for uniformity, localized in the several principalities, and, happily, having no central organ of expression. The conflict of these two ideas is reflected in the long series of doctrinal formulations which are the subject of the present volume. Dr. Richard was not blind to the outward pettiness and evil temper of these discussions, but he has succeeded in maintaining throughout an objective, judicial attitude which gives to the non-Lutheran reader an almost sympathetic understanding of the real historic value of this apparently hopeless period. It shows itself as a stage of transition from the first generous enthusiasm of Luther's day to the fresh and vigorous impulse of modern German rational thought.

The two biographies of Luther by Professor McGiffert¹⁰ and Dr. Preserved Smith,¹¹ both published in 1911, were noticed in this *Review* (April, 1912). They are both written for the general reader; the former as the natural overflow of the ripe learning and long experience of the mature scholar and the inspiring teacher, the latter as the first-fruits of a well-trained student showing thorough familiarity with the material and a gift of lucid presentation.

The promise of the latter work has since been well maintained by the first volume of Dr. Smith's translations from Luther's correspondence,¹² which appeared in 1913 and was noticed in this *Review* (October, 1913).

What now is to be our conclusion from this array of testimony on the one side and the other, as to the true Luther? I cannot see that the judgment of sound, reasonable, historically minded Protestant writers, begin-

¹⁰ Martin Luther, the Man and his Work, by A. C. McGiffert. The Century Co., 1911.

¹¹ The Life and Letters of Martin Luther, by Preserved Smith. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.

¹² Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters, translated and edited by Preserved Smith. Vol. 1 (1507-1521). Philadelphia, The Lutheran Publication Society, 1913.

ning with Julius Köstlin and continuing down to the present day, needs any serious modification. The essential basis for a calm and rational verdict was laid as soon as the extravagant laudation of strict confessional advocacy was abandoned. Luther has shared in the general clearing of the historical vision that has been one of the most marked phenomena of the age of science. To understand him even half thoroughly we must indeed look at him in his historical setting and in the light of his psychological make-up. The charge that he was an individual rather than a type is true. What concerns us today is not whether a man has an aggressive, self-assertive personality, but rather, supposing he has, what use he makes of it. In itself, the demonic obsession with world-moving ideas, such as Luther charges upon himself, is not a ground of suspicion to the modern world. On the contrary, it is precisely to such inspired leaders that we look as the real motive powers in all the great world-movements. When we find such a character, we do not expect to see him moving in the ruts of tradition or employing the gentle methods of the trained diplomatist. Rather we look to see him carried on and sometimes out of himself by the very greatness of his mission.

It is not the impetuous rush of his words in assault or the passionate inconsistencies of detail in his defence that offend us or cause us to lose confidence in his integrity. We are not repelled by seeming contradictions either in his utterance or in his action. What we admire and cling to is the thread of consistent devotion to some one guiding principle, pointing to some far-away hope or some shining ideal of the future. The enthusiasts who cannot claim our sympathy are those whose fire burns out in idle effort, or turns and consumes them because they are not made of the stuff that can bear the fierce heat of the conflict they have aroused. But Luther is not one of these. His was indeed an aggressive personality; but

it was so because of the passionate devotion with which he threw himself into the cause, which he believed to be the cause of God and God's truth. By nature he does not seem to have been of the typical reforming temper. On the contrary, every bit of evidence points to him as being in his youth rather of the shrinking, sensitive quality, that seeks its support in the institutions amid which his lot is cast. He was a good son, a docile and obedient scholar, zealous, probably over-zealous in the punctilious performance of his cloister-routine. He was a trusted official of his order, sent at the age of twenty-seven to Rome as its representative in important affairs, continuing, through the seven years that followed, in all the detail of his several functions as university professor, as parish priest, and as member of his order, without resistance within or criticism from without. He was thirty-four years old before he found himself driven by an irresistible inner impulse to say what had long been shaping itself in his thought about the obvious evils of the Church.

Surely that is not the radical temper. And yet the same steadfastness of purpose which had held him true to his obligations up to the last moment, now worked with equal intensity to hold him faithful to the new obligations into which his new position led him. When on that eve of All Saints he sent out into the world his challenge of the Propositions on Indulgence and Grace, he committed himself to an attitude which admitted of no compromise. Either he must abandon his position or he must go forward. To have gone back would be, as John Huss had said a hundred years before at Constance, to desert all those faithful souls who were now looking to him for leadership. In going on, he was launching out upon an unknown sea. It was impossible to foretell whether the winds that seemed most favorable would not drive him upon the rocks, or fail and leave

him to drift upon the sands. That was to be the most cruel test of his quality, and it is precisely there that hostile criticism finds its welcome opportunity.

It must be admitted that Luther's policy—if indeed we can think of him as having any fixed policy at all—was a policy of opportunism. What the factors were going to be that at any moment would determine his action could not even vaguely be predicted. The opposition of Rome could, of course, be counted upon; but that was the least of his concerns. On that point his mind was made up. What really pressed upon him with at times almost crushing weight was that sense of responsibility to those who now, quite without his previous knowledge and contrary to his expectation, were hailing him as the spokesman of their own deepest convictions and the herald of their most exalted hopes. I do not hesitate to say that now, after criticism has done its worst, the dominant impression of Luther is that of an eminently conservative and constructive genius. His conservative quality was shown as soon as the more radical elements of the revolt against Rome began to make themselves felt and to claim kinship with him. From his Patmos on the Wartburg he watched the gathering of these forces of destruction, then descended upon them and scattered them once for all out of the territory where his own chief constructive work was to be done. In the fury of the peasant outbreak, after a first attempt at reconciliation, he threw himself with all the ardor of his glowing temperament upon the side of social order and reconstruction. No sooner had he in the dramatic scene outside the gate of Wittenberg thrown the ancient law-book of the Church into the flames, than he began to work out with infinite pains and difficulty the plan of a new church-law based upon a harmonious working of the civil powers and the newly organized clergy. On the doctrinal side, recognizing

the spiritual value of the traditional sacramental scheme, he fought to the bitter end the battle of what he considered the crucial element in that scheme—the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Eucharistic ceremony. Finally, in that extraordinary document, the Augsburg Confession of 1530, we see the culmination of this conservative and constructive work. In its dignity, its moderation, and its firmness we read, not indeed the hand, but most truly the heart and soul of Luther.

It is obvious that a character of this type lends itself with peculiar readiness to hostile criticism. The worst as well as the best that has ever been said of him can be supported by reference to his own utterances. His was eminently an expansive nature. What he felt strongly at a given moment he must share with whoever would listen. He was subject to great and violent changes of mood. In his moments of exaltation no words were too strong to express his confidence in the truth of his position. In the depths of his depression he was overwhelmed at times with his own boldness. It was to be expected that under the influence of these changing moods he would say many a thing that seemed absolutely to contradict his former declarations. It is the easiest possible kind of criticism to pick out these separate utterances and weave them into an apparently unanswerable charge of mere opportunist policy leading to the more serious one of deliberate falsehood. Such a method, however, is as false as it is cruel. It is a violation of the first principle of historical judgment—that a man must be measured, not by individual words or deeds, but by the whole completed record of his accomplishment, and by the dominant motive of his life.

Criticism of Luther merges naturally into a criticism of Lutheranism and thus of Protestantism in general. We are told that the work of Luther set back the wheels of progress for at least a century. We are pointed to the

pitiful divisions among Christians, due to the emphasizing of petty points of difference, to sectarian intolerance, to the fanaticisms that from time to time have disgraced and endangered the name of Christianity itself. We are asked to contrast the splendors of art and the glories of literature which belong to the noble record of triumphant Catholicism, with the poverty of the worship and the sordidness of discipline that have often marked the Protestant communities; and then we are expected to imagine that if it had not been for Luther and his work, the world would have gone right on under the mild sway of Leo the Medicean and his successors, developing all that seems to us now attractive and correcting or suppressing all that was repellent. Is there anything in the situation of European affairs in the year 1517, or in the story of Roman Catholicism through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which can make us strike the balance so as to appear more favorable to that side of the account?

Certainly, to the open-minded student the answer cannot be doubtful. We can ask nothing better for this great spiritual leader than to have all the light possible thrown upon him from every source. And if in the fierce illumination of hostile controversy some dark spots seem to grow even darker than before, there will be ample compensation in the clearer judgment of the man as a whole. Let us be grateful for every contribution to this judgment, no matter from what source it may come; but let us not for a moment lose out of sight that one foundation-principle of Protestantism—that no earthly power shall stand between a man and his God, and that there are many roads leading to the Kingdom of Heaven.

A CRISIS IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

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The construction and working of ecclesiastical machinery has always been allowed to be the special function of High Churchmen of every description. For there are High Churchmen not only in the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in America, but in every church. The division of churchmen into High, Low, and Broad is founded on the different attitudes of the human mind—legal, emotional, intellectual. All Christians reverence the Church, the Bible, and the conscience. But in presence of a problem one man will ask what is the teaching of the Church? Another will turn to consider what the Bible has to say about it. A third will endeavor to trace it to its basis in the necessities of thought and life. Religion is, for the High Churchman, devotion to an institution; for the Low Churchman, to a person; for the Broad Churchman, to abstract truth. Such sturdy guardians of the different important ways by which the soul approaches God are fortunately found in every church. And so the man who stands pre-eminently for the special tenets of the fathers, whether Calvin, Wesley, Swedenborg, or Channing, is as truly a High Churchman as he whose fathers are Ante- or Post-Nicene. And if the faith is regarded as having been delivered to the saints once and for all, the construction of machinery for its preservation will be not only the duty but the delight of the loyal ecclesiast. The High Churchman therefore has ever been strong in organization, while his Low or Broad Church brother has been intent on other things, and then has been sur-

prised to find that church conventions and ecclesiastical offices have not gone his way.

But movements in the Church of England in the last year or two have indicated that other parties in her are awaking to the importance of organized action. Two books have just appeared which show that the Broad Churchmen and the Evangelicals are each endeavoring to define their position, with a view of attracting adherents and arranging an order of battle.¹ It has been sometimes said that Evangelicalism is dead. According to Rev. Mr. Herklots, it is not only not dead but very much alive, and holding the key to the reconciliation in the future of all sides of the Church of England and of all Christendom. He points to its origin as a child of the Wesleyan Awakening, and to the beneficent results it accomplished—the popularization of hymns and of singing, of Bible-reading, social reforms and the abolition of the slave trade, the utilization of women in the work of the church, home and foreign missions; above all, its interest in spiritual rather than ecclesiastical problems, and its insistence on bringing each individual soul face to face with God. His theological platform he states as follows: “The Holy Scriptures are to us the inspired and authoritative record of Divine revelation. The deity of the Son of God, His miraculous birth, His authoritative teaching, His atoning death, His glorious resurrection and ascension, His second advent in person, and meanwhile His presence with and in His Church universal—these truths are as dear to us as to them [our predecessors]. Like them, we make bold to ‘enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus.’ Like them, we teach and preach a living Saviour, a full salvation from sin’s penalty and power, and the need for personal contact with Christ the Lord through simple faith, and that grace

¹ The Future of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England. B. Herklots. Elliot Stock. 1913. Pp. viii, 198. 3s. 6d.

Broad Church. J. E. Symes. Methuen & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 116.

and faith are alike the gift of God. Like them, we do not for one moment underestimate and undervalue the two great Sacraments of the Gospel."² This we may take as a statement of the Evangelical platform.

These principles have, in the opinion of the author, been so successful that by the end of the nineteenth century a quarter of the clergy of the Church of England, so he maintains, were of this party. He criticises his party. "Parties, like houses, need spring-cleaning. In process of time all sorts of worn-out, superfluous, antiquated, and undesirable things accumulate within the party walls. An ecclesiastical rummage-sale might be beneficial."³ He criticises the intellectual poverty of the Evangelical movement, its narrowness not only of outlook but of spirit, its neglect of art and culture and of services enriched by them; especially—its worst feature—"its spirit of suspicion and disunion, the occupation of heresy-hunting."⁴ To distinguish the kind of ritual which is desirable from that which is undesirable, he gives the following test: "Is it an exhibition to man, or is it an offering to God? Does the nature and amount of the ritual observed obsess the mind, excite the senses, and preoccupy the spirit, so as to positively hinder and obstruct the undistracted worship of the Deity; or does it so act upon the tripartite personality of man as to conduce to deep and heartfelt confession, prayer, and praise? In short, does the ritual dominate the worship, or does the worship dominate the ritual? Is the worship the mere vehicle and occasion for the display of the ritual, or is the ritual the mere handmaid and assistant of the worship? If the former, it is ritualism. If the latter, it is its rival and antithesis."⁵ This is not a satisfactory test; for no Ritualist would allow that his ritual was a mere exhibition to man, and the worship only its vehicle and occasion. A more logical and satisfactory test

² Page 81.³ Page 38.⁴ Page 43.⁵ Page 94.

would ask whether the ritual was the necessary and readily apprehended expression of doctrines held. Thus there is a clear line between ritual which is expressive of sacramentarian doctrine—a belief in the corporeal presence of deity on the altar or at the font—and that which is aesthetic only. One may like or dislike a vested choir, but there is no sacramentarianism in it. It is almost wholly a matter of taste; or—since all taste has the shadow of a principle behind it—a question of expressing function by dress. On the other hand, one will not be likely to bow before the altar unless he feels a localization of deity there. Mr. Herklots' principle of discrimination does not discriminate. Moreover, one may doubt whether the Evangelical party will accomplish the victory the author glowingly sees before it until, in addition to that enrichment of its services for which he so justly pleads, it modifies its reliance on the letter of Scripture, arising from its limited view of inspiration, and modifies also its legal and substitutional view of the Atonement, and its insistence on conversion as the sole entrance into the kingdom of God.

Mr. Symes' statement of Broad Church doctrine may make some of his friends hesitant about appearing in his company. For attempts to formulate Broad Churchism have too often been in a minimizing direction, endeavoring to allure inquirers by assuring them that there is nothing so very much after all in these dogma-things which theologians have insisted on. To those who find in Broad Churchism a more profound answer to the problems of life than is found elsewhere and a deeper source of comfort, this is not an attraction, and therefore not an advertisement of their benefactor which they are glad to see set forth. Any treatment of the creeds of the ages which does not regard them as precious algebraic formulae of truths which are eternal, they must deprecate. Any intelligent exposition of these formulae, any attempt

to translate them afresh into living terms of the day, they welcome.

Mr. Symes, it is fair to say, is not directly one of these minimizers; yet his book has an apologetic appearance. His dedication has a noble endeavor: "Dedicated to Unbelievers who have the will to believe." But the impression of the succeeding pages is of an attempt to make the Broad Church pill easier to swallow by diminishing its size. There is not the unfolding of the exultant faith of one who has a grasp on profound and wealthy truth. His judicial aim perhaps deliberately confines him to brief and therefore often apparently superficial statement. In regard to relations between members of the Church of England and Nonconformists, for example, he advocates no course, but says: "It is against the purpose of this book, which aims simply at expounding Broad Church views, to take a side when Broad Churchmen differ from one another."⁶ The book gives a brief chapter to each of the main doctrines of the Christian faith and to significant points of religious thought, such as miracles, heathendom, religious education, socialism, as Mr. Symes considers these are held by Broad Churchmen. It is more than a catechism and less than a treatise.

The indignation among Broad Churchmen at the reception given some two years ago by the High Church authorities to Dr. J. M. Thompson's book, *Miracles in the New Testament*, has led to a movement for the abandonment of inactivity and the distinct organization of a Broad Church party. This has given rise to "The Churchmen's Union," which has its members all over England, and has established a monthly magazine—*The Modern Churchman*. Its President is Sir C. Thomas Dyke-Acland; among its Vice-Presidents are Dean Henson of Durham, Canon Rashdall of Hereford, Pro-

⁶ Page 102.

fessor Gardner of Oxford, and Professor Henslow; and on its Executive Board are Archdeacon Lilley of Ludlow and Professor Lake of Leyden. Broad Churchmen have hitherto been content with diffusing an atmosphere throughout the community; they are now discovering that they must fight for their lives, and therefore organize.

The fight has been precipitated by an event in Africa. Last June a conference was held at Kikuyu, East Africa, of all the Protestant missionary bodies in the region, for the purpose of establishing among them a working union. The opening service was held in the place of worship of the Kirk of Scotland, and the bishops of Mombasa and Uganda administered the communion to Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, as well as to members of their own church. At once the bishop of Zanzibar petitioned for the impeachment of his brother bishops who had arranged the meeting and admitted to the communion those who were not members of the Church of England. As a consequence, a controversy has been roused which is now going on throughout the entire English Church. Lord Halifax, president of the Church Union, speaks for the High Churchmen in declaring that the event "threatens a schism which will rend the Church of England in two." The bishop of Oxford, Dr. Gore, says it is impossible to continue in a fellowship which threatens anything so totally subversive of catholic order and doctrine. He doubts if the cohesion of the Church of England were ever more seriously threatened. Another High Churchman asserts that any attempt to establish open communion must result "in far worse than secession. The Church of England and the churches in communion would first be thrown into two violently opposing camps, and then be split from top to bottom and broken into pieces." On the other hand, the bishop of Durham, Dr. Moule,

says that if the bishops of Uganda and Mombasa are arraigned for heresy, he stands beside them; and Dr. Sanday, Professor of Divinity at Oxford, declares, "The Church of England, nay, of Christendom, needs us all. We cannot afford to spend our time in squabbling." The *London Times*, conservative as it is, insists that something must soon be done to "gather up the scattered forces of the Christian cause against a degraded and disintegrated heathenism, and against the resolute and united army of Islam, which will otherwise enter in and possess, while we are composing our petty differences of administration. The natural means by which to prevent this is to work for, to lay far-seeing plans for, the ultimate creation of one united native Christian Church in the British East Africa Protectorate. It is the head and front of the two offending bishops that they have realized this."

To us at this distance the turmoil may seem strange, almost incomprehensible. Yet we may remember a similar disturbance, though but a murmur in comparison with this uproar, when, at a service in Trinity Church, Boston, on the tenth anniversary of the death of Phillips Brooks, Dr. Edward Everett Hale received the communion at the hands of Bishop Codman of Maine. With all its comprehensiveness, the Episcopal Church has at times been as narrow as the most rigid close-communication Baptist in insisting on admitting to its communion none but its own members. Yet this unfraternal custom is now held by most liturgical scholars to be owing to a historical blunder. It is based on the rubric at the end of the Confirmation Office in the English and American Prayer Books, which is as follows: "And there shall none be admitted to the Holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed." This at first seems plain; yet this is not a canon, and there is a distinction between rubrics and canons.

The latter are laws passed by the governing body of the church, and are binding upon all its members. But the former are directions for the orderly conduct of the services, and are therefore counsels rather than ordinances. They may be compared to stage-directions, generally to be followed, but by no means prohibitive. This is shown by the recognition in the rubrics themselves of the needs of the occasion. Thus in the second rubric in the Office of Baptism it is provided that for every male child there shall be two god-fathers and one god-mother, "when they can be had." And in the fourth rubric in the Office for the Communion of the Sick it is said, "If a man, either by reason of extremity of sickness, or for want of warning in due time to the Minister, or for lack of company to receive with him, or by any other just impediment, do not receive the Sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood, the Minister shall instruct him, that if he do truly repent him of his sins . . . he doth eat and drink the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the Sacrament with his mouth." To the rubrics in the Prayer Book there is therefore to be added what has been called the rubric of common sense.

But even supposing the rubric of common sense is not called upon in interpreting the rubric of the confirmation service; the historical sense of the latter is violated when it is made to refer to those who are not members of the Episcopal Church. For this is a pre-Reformation rubric, which first appears in the Constitutions of Archbishop Peckham in 1281. There were then no other religious bodies in view than the one Catholic Church; Nonconformists had not come into existence. And that the rubric was not intended to exclude from communion all but Christians of one kind is evident from its practical aim, which is stated in the context. "Many neglect the sacrament of confirmation for want of watchful

advisers; so that there are many, innumerable many, who want the grace of confirmation, though grown old in evil days. To cure this damnable neglect, we ordain that none be admitted to the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood that is not confirmed, except at the point of death, unless he have a reasonable impediment."⁷ The confirmation rubric consequently—so most scholars are now agreed—is designed for members of the Episcopal Church, and has nothing to say in regard to members of other churches. It was intended, on the one hand, to prevent the Roman practice of admitting children to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; and, on the other, to insure that participation in this sacrament, which was regarded not only as essential to Christianity but also to citizenship and qualification for office, should be preceded by due instruction and preparation. It aimed primarily therefore to secure not exclusion but fitness. But a rigid ecclesiasticism has joined this rubric with a narrow view of the historic episcopate, and brandished them before all comers. Here again the *London Times* gives to the authorities of the English Church a needed warning: "They will look, we venture to trust, even at the historic episcopate itself, and ask whether, not the institution but our conception of it, may not be capable of reconsideration. Amid the fitful glimpses that we have had of its origin it is possible to discern that the episcopate arose as a means towards unity. Ought it ever to have developed into a pretext for perpetual dissidence abroad and at home?"

Even the conservative *Spectator*, the organ of English respectability, utters a similar warning (Jan. 3, 1914):

"Let us however face the worst. Let us suppose that we are wrong, and that Bishop Gore and his followers

⁷ "Statuimus quod nullus ad sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Domini admittatur extra articulum mortis, nisi fuerit confirmatus, vel nisi receptione confirmationis rationabiliter fuerit impeditus." A Collection of the Laws and Canons of the Church of England, by John Johnson, vol. ii, p. 277. (Lib. of Anglo-Cath. Theology.)

will leave the Church, not because they are themselves asked to give Communion to Nonconformists, but because other bishops and clergy who believed it was their right—nay, their duty—to do so, practised such open Communion and mean to continue such acts of religious loving-kindness. We say that even if this deplorable mistake were to occur, no disruption in the true sense would take place. . . . Secession on the grounds foreshadowed by the bishop of Oxford would secure, we will not say no followers, but followers so few in proportion to the total strength of the members of the Establishment as to be unimportant. . . . The vast majority of the English laity, and even of the English laity who hold High Church doctrines and are in strong sympathy with ritualistic practice, are at heart inspired with the true spirit of the Church of England—the spirit of comprehension. . . . They know that if the Church were to be narrowed to an episcopal sect, and were to become a body inspired by Roman exclusiveness and by the doctrine of *nulla salus*, even though it were not in communion with the Roman Church, it could not last a day.”

The Modern Churchman, the Broad Church review (Jan., 1914, p. 517), considers that the almost national discussion of the subject will be of great benefit, and that the existence of it is already a valuable revelation to many who have regarded the Church of England as dominated by the extreme Anglo-Catholics.

It is interesting to note that the leading paper of the Episcopal Church in the United States takes a similar view (*The Churchman*, Jan. 31, 1914):

“In England and in this country there is an important and influential school of earnest and devout Churchmen who think the bishop of Mombasa did wrong. . . . Their objection is based in part upon the familiar rubric at the end of the Order of Confirmation. . . . Does this apply to those who do not conform to the discipline of the

Anglican Churches? There has been in the Church of England and in this country a persistent opinion that this rubric was intended as a disciplinary measure for the children of the Church, to guard them, on the one hand, against premature admission to the Holy Communion, and, on the other hand, to guard the Sacrament against disparagement through the levity of communicants unprepared to receive it. . . . The arguments that support this view of the confirmation rubric are beyond the limits of the present article. They appear to us to be valid. They are corroborated by a traditional practice in all parts of the Anglican Communion. The rubric bears upon children of the Church, for whom alone the Church undertakes to legislate, and not upon those who do not habitually conform to her authority. . . . The Communion at Kikuyu is an impressive spectacle. Men of various denominational connections, all bent on one task—the salvation of the native races through the name of Jesus; all engaged in preaching His gospel; all ready to give their lives in testimony of their faith—some, no doubt, bound to die in the service; all assembled to discuss matters of common concern in the cause of Christ; filled with a holy love for Him and for their fellow-servants; thus they resort to the bishop's altar to receive from him the Sacrament of our Lord's appointment. To us, such an incident indicates that the Holy Spirit is moving His people to compose their divisions and to return to the unity of One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church."

It may be doubted whether this African incident will result, as the High Church prophets gloomily foretell, in the disruption of the Church of England. There are intelligent critics of ecclesiastical affairs who maintain that it would be vastly better if the different parties in the Episcopal Church, and in other churches as well, should frankly recognize their wide differences and

separate. If differences are fundamental, doubtless this is not only necessary but wise. Yet this precludes the beneficial influence of one party upon another, and condemns them to undisturbed isolation and self-content. As long as there is even a nominal bond binding them together, the friction is likely to prove remedial of idiosyncrasies and wholesome; while if the High Churchmen constituted a separate body from the Low Churchmen, neither would affect the other, more than the Methodist now affects the Unitarian. The warring between different divisions in the Roman Catholic Church is quite as great as in Protestantism, though the Roman authorities endeavor to conceal it; but because each is compelled to recognize the others as belonging to its own body, the result has been less divisive than in Protestantism.

Yet even if disruption should not result in England, this incident may bring disestablishment nearer; in which case—so it would seem from a transatlantic point of view—it would prove a great blessing. For the Church of England is so entangled with a special class in society that it has not the chance to have its excellences known to others nor its faults to itself. In order to come to its true self it needs to stand on its own feet. We in America are so accustomed to the separation of Church and State that we can hardly comprehend the gloomy forebodings of English Churchmen at the prospect of disestablishment. We cannot but think that, after the Church's recovery from the shock of that operation, she would experience a new vitality. However that may be, the probability is that this incident will increase for a time the animosities of the different parties, and that the Broad Churchmen and Evangelicals (who object to being called Low Churchmen) will unite against the High Churchmen. As these two African dioceses are independent, it is not probable that any attempt will be made to coerce them

by an official judgment. The custom which the bishops of Mombasa and Uganda have inaugurated will probably be continued in these dioceses and will spread here and there in other missionary jurisdictions. Gradually it may affect the more conservative Church at home, as missionary children have so often done. And then it is possible that the English Church may take a leaf from the practice of the Church of Rome; which has always at first opposed innovations but when she has found she could not fight them, has adopted them, moulded them, and then professed that she had included them all along.

There is rising throughout the world among all Christian bodies a wave of demand for union. By this the High Churchmen of every church understand uniformity. Taking Jerome's mistranslation, which Rome enforced, they insist that there must be one fold as well as one shepherd. Union to them therefore means, "Forsake your ways, all you others, and come and join us." Rome has extended this invitation for several centuries, and it has had little success except when supplemented by a conviction of the intrinsic worth of her position. But there are many who reject uniformity who are working for what is called organic unity: by which is meant some institutional connection, more or less close, among the different Christian bodies, in government, creed, or worship. The nature of this connection is not yet clearly seen by those who are reaching towards it. Whether it is feasible, and if so, under what conditions, is still a problem. But it is becoming every day plainer that, whatever may be the case with uniformity and unity, we have already more union on hand than we have ecclesiastical room for. Young Men's Christian Associations and Students' Volunteer Movements, summer Union churches, undenominational Divinity Schools, and Organized Charities have brought together Christians of all names, not only in common work but in common wor-

ship, and made it difficult for them to shore up their denominational walls. This drawing together means that all are feeling the presence of one and the same spirit. Since spirit shapes body to its own ends, we may perhaps look to the establishment ultimately of some form of organic unity. But it will come not by ecclesiastical conventions imposing ways upon the indwelling spirit, but by the spirit dictating ways to the conventions. It will be with the various ecclesiastical machineries as it was in Ezekiel's vision. "Whithersoever the spirit was to go, they went. When those went, these went; and when those stood, these stood; and when those were lifted up from the earth, the wheels were lifted up over against them; for the spirit of the living creature was in the wheels." The incident in Africa was a result of the greater apprehension of the spirit of Christ, and it will do much to extend the understanding and apprehension of that spirit.⁸

⁸ Since this article was written the archbishop of Canterbury has called a Council to meet in July to give advice in the Kikuyu case.

RECENT TRANSLATIONS OF BUDDHIST WRITINGS¹

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS

PHILADELPHIA

In these volumes, Mrs. Rhys Davids has added to the debt which all students of Buddhist literature are under to herself and her husband. The two volumes of *Psalm*s are canonical, while the *Compendium of Philosophy* is an interesting and esteemed epitome of that third section of the Buddhist canon, the Abhidharma, about which the sects differed so much.

As the present reviewer is not qualified to deal with a metaphysical work, especially one that is edited by a professional philosopher, he will dispose of this first. In her preface the editor says: "It is my conviction that if the way in which the tradition of the Theravādins—it is often called Southern Buddhism—has philosophized, and still philosophizes, on these fundamental questions, could be adequately expounded so as to be intelligible to Western philosophy, tendencies in the former might become apparent which were not a little sympathetic with much in certain notable departures now showing themselves in France, America, and England."

As metaphysicians, both the Burmese translator and his English editor spare no pains in discussing the best equivalent in our tongue for Pali technical terms. Thus,

¹*Psalm*s of the Brethren (Thera-Gāthā). Translated from the Pali by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1913.

*Psalm*s of the Sisters (Theri-Gāthā). Translated from the Pali by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1909.

Compendium of Philosophy. Translated from the Pali of the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha, by Shwe Zan Aung, B.A. Edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1910.

(All three published by the Pali Text Society.)

an editorial note informs us: "*Itthattam* is exactly the 'this thusness' of Artemus Ward, and it is regrettable that so good a word should as yet be outside the pale of serious English." But it is just such scholars as Mrs. Rhys Davids who finally succeed in re-establishing such words. A Japanese scholar, in 1900, already set the example with "suchness," and there is no reason why "thusness" also should not become a respectable philosophical term.

Both translator and editor freely discuss the terms used by Kant and other Europeans, and the fitness or unfitness of such words to represent similar terms in Pali. Thus the editor observes: "I have spent many hours over *javana*, and am content to throw 'apperception' overboard for a better term, or for *javana*, untranslated and as easy to pronounce as our own 'javelin.' It suffices to remember that it is the mental aspect or parallel of that moment in nerve-process, when central function is about to become efferent activity or 'innervation.' Teachers in Ceylon associate it with the word 'dynamic.' And its dominant interest for European psychologists is *the fusion of intellect and will in Buddhist psychology*, to which I adverted under *cetanā*."

Italics ours, with the hope that such a sentence will whet the appetite of the psychologist for more.

Now for the *Psalms*. These books are most important, for they contain not only ancient poetry but stories. In the Pali canon they are placed in the Fifth, or Short, Collection of Sūtras, originally an appendix of utterances by disciples, but in its present form containing very ancient utterances ascribed to Buddha. This Collection, like the Abhidharma, was another section of the canon, about which the sects differed. Thus the pre-Christian sect of the Dharmaguptas, whose recension of the canon has been lost in the Hindu, but partially preserved in Chinese translations of fifteen hundred years

ago, had a book in this Fifth Collection called *Verses of the Elect* (*Ārya-Gāthā*). As the sect also mentions other poetical books agreeing in titles with those of the Pali recension of the canon (which belongs to the sect of the Elders), it is reasonable to suppose that these Elect Ones' verses were our present *Psalms of the Brethren* and probably also those of the *Sisters*. And in Catholic Buddhism we cannot consider a book fully canonical unless it have been transmitted by more than one sect. Even those thus transmitted betray unmistakable traces of sectarian manipulation. Thus the great Middling Collection (so named, not from its position in the canon, which varied, but from the medium length of its dialogues) contains in the Pali a hundred and fifty-two discourses, but two hundred and twenty-two in the Chinese of another sect, whose Hindu original has been lost. We can only be certain of the genuineness of those discourses wherein both recensions agree (including some found in the Numerical Collection, between which and the Middling there was a constant interchange). Until therefore we can be certain that the Elect Stanzas of the Dharmaguptas were our present *Psalms*, or until we find these in another sectarian canon, we must suspend our judgment. Of course we can fall back upon higher criticism, and argue from language, style, ancient quotations, and the like, that the *Psalms* are very early; but they cannot have the same standing as the Sutras of the Four Collections common to the two sectarian recensions in Pali and Chinese. Higher criticism has already pointed out that the *Psalms* have been added to, and that the Brethren who uttered them lived over a period of two or three centuries at least, from the lifetime of Buddha, 500 B.C., to the age of Asoka, 250 B.C. If we had a Chinese version before us, as we have of a companion book in the Short Collection, the Logia-Book, we could then, as in this case, bring in the lower criticism in con-

firmation. For in the two recensions the Logia-Book differs, as does the Middling Collection.

To the exhaustive study by Professor Anesaki, now at Harvard University, we owe the knowledge of these fundamental facts about Buddhist criticism. Before that we were free to imagine that the canon of the Elders in Pali was the only one that ever was, though the catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka published by Nanjio in 1883 had already shown us a different recension of the Long Collection and even of the Middling.

We know from the Book of Discipline that it was a habit of the early Buddhists, as of other Orientals, to summarize their doctrines in pithy verses. These verses have a concentrated quality and often a superb music, both of which defy translation. Mrs. Rhys Davids has chosen blank verse as her medium, but sometimes employs hexameters. While the present reviewer prefers rhythmical prose, arranged in lines, like the Revised Version of Job and the Psalms, yet he is so thankful to get another solid fraction of the immortal books in English that he will not press so small a point. The difference between the one kind of rendering and the other, as also the difficulty of translating metaphysical terms, may be seen in the following verses which are found also in the *Hymns of the Faith* (*Dhammapada*). The two sets of verses are identical in the Pali:

*Psalms of the Brethren.*¹

676. When he by wisdom doth discern and see:
 "IMPERMANENT IS EVERYTHING IN LIFE,"
 Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
 Lo! herein lies the way to purity.
677. When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
 That "EVERYTHING IN LIFE IS BOUND TO ILL,"
 Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
 Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

¹ London, 1913.

678. When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That "EVERYTHING IN LIFE IS VOID OF SOUL,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

Hymns of the Faith.³

277. Impermanent all compounds of existence!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.
278. Painful are all the compounds of existence!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.
279. Impersonal all mental states!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.

The stories that accompany the poems were compiled by a commentator of the fifth century who lived at Conjevaram, in the south of India, a town to be made famous long afterwards by a forgotten battle of the American Revolution. Now, owing to the late date of the commentator, the stories are reckoned uncanonical. But this regards only their present form. The commentator expressly says that he built upon older commentaries now lost, as well as on the Dhammapada commentary, still extant.⁴ The practice of writing stories to illustrate the pithy Sūtras and verses of the early Buddhists was itself early. *And when one of these commentaries was made in primitive times, it was canonized.* This was the case with the explanatory stories to the verses of the *Book of Enunciations*, another poetical section of the Fifth Collection. A story, therefore, in that famous book is canonical, whereas a precisely similar story in the com-

³ Chicago, 1902.

⁴ Brethren, pp. 180, 266, and xxiv.

mentary upon our Psalms is uncanonical. This fact seems to have escaped our learned translator.⁵ Thus she calls the story of the Twin Miracle "post-canonical." According to this legend, Buddha sent fire and water from his person to confound unbelievers.⁶ Now that this Twin Miracle story was once part of the canonical interpretative legends is not only clear from the methods of higher criticism, arguing from Pali works alone, but has lately been demonstrated by the surer facts of lower criticism. For the profound researches of Sylvain Lévi into Catholic Buddhism have proven that the text of the story in the Sanskrit of the *Book of Legends* (*Divyāvadāna*) is the canonical text of the Book of Discipline of the sect of the Realists. The Chinese version of the latter proves it. Mrs. Rhys Davids makes a similar slip (page 415) when she calls the Buddhist analogue to the Wandering Jew a "Chinese Buddhist legend." It is a Hindu Buddhist legend, occurring in the same *Book of Legends*, and reappearing in the canonical Chinese of the Classified Collection, translated from a lost Sanskrit original, fragments of which have been found in Central Asia. As to the Twin Miracle, that story, with others from the Pali Canon, was graven upon the Great Tope in Ceylon in the second century before Christ. We cannot therefore make a clean sweep of everything as uncanonical because it no longer stands in the extant recension of the canon of the Elders transmitted in Pali.

Apart from these fascinating literary questions, the Buddhist *Psalms* have a still more fascinating human interest. One of the things that strikes a Christian is the prevalence of sudden conversion. Mrs. Rhys Davids leaves the word *aññā* untranslated, though she calls it "gnosis, or intuitive enlightenment, constituting the

⁵ *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 36, note.

⁶ See *Buddhist Texts in John*, John 7 38; 12 24.

guarantee of Arahantship.”⁷ “Sudden conversion” would not be a bad translation. Every student of the Pitakas knows the phenomenon. Thus in our present *Psalms of the Brethren* (page 175), a monk sees a pretty dancing-girl in the main street of his town, and the sight, by reaction, kindles the Buddhist reflection that *all is fleeting*. Instantly he realizes his sudden conversion, and testifies thereto in a psalm.

In her introduction Mrs. Rhys Davids draws a charming picture of child converts. They are all ordained at the age of seven, and their artless verses are sufficiently childish to represent the little fellows, even if these did not compose them themselves. The reviewer, for one, is pious enough to believe that they did.

Very instructive too are the editorial statistics of external and internal experience. Among the *Psalms of the Monks*, 141 out of 264 relate to internal experiences, whereas among those of the *Nuns*, 42 out of 73 relate to external experiences. It is fortunate that a psychologist and a woman was at hand to tell us this. Very external, indeed, were some of the Sisters’ experiences, as when a nun was persistently tempted by a libertine and plucked out her eye. “There!” she exclaimed, “take your eye,” and gave it to him. One cannot help being haunted by the suspicion that this story became as famous as other Buddhist legends which we now know to have been translated into the vernaculars of the Parthian Empire, the buffer state between Palestine and India. Why should not the story have been familiar to him who said: “If thine eye cause thee to offend, pluck it out!”

In the *Psalms of the Sisters* we meet with converted harlots (pages 52, 121). One is the famous Ambapāli of the Sūtras.

The commentary on the Monkish *Hymns* tells us that one brother “dwelt in the infirmary” (page 78). We need

⁷ So Mrs. Rhys Davids and her husband now write this word.

not be sceptical about this and cry, "Oh, fifth century!" for Asoka in the third century before Christ established hospitals for men and animals under the immediate inspiration of Buddhism. Anesaki has told us that in Japan a hospital and an asylum were attached to a temple in 593 A.D., soon after the great religion was introduced into that land.

So too in the matter of writing. A monk, says the commentary (page 107), wrote to a distant friend "on the excellence of the Buddha, and sent him a copy of the system." The Ceylon Chronicles relate that the Pali canon was first committed to writing in Ceylon in the first century B.C., but Chinese sources inform us that it was already in writing in continental India.

On page 172 there is some typical eschatology. A monk sums up his past existences: He has been in hell, of course, and often in the Preta-world, where they are all so hungry, with very big bellies and very little mouths; oft has he transmigrated into beasts, mighty glad to be born at last a man! Occasionally he went to heaven. But now the long drear round of births lies before his converted vision, and he sickens of the whole business, heaven and all! It is void of true worth,

"Born of preceding conditions, unstable and constantly drifting."

And so he comes unto the final Peace.

This summary of Buddhist eschatology is echoed in a famous verse of the *Hymns of the Faith*:

126. Some to a womb are born again;
Wrong-doers unto hell;
To Paradise the pious go;
The sinless to Nirvana.

The reviewer has pointed out elsewhere that the verb *parinibbāti*, in the last line, can only mean an eschatological Nirvana. True, as Rhys Davids and his wife have often observed, the word also means "to be at

peace, to enter into rest," etc., and is frequently used of Nirvana here and now. But it also means what it does in this authoritative Dhammapada verse. In an apparently exhaustive note on the word, in his *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii, 132, Rhys Davids quotes another verse from the same Hymns, but unfortunately omits the one here given, which exhibits the eschatological connotation. His wife (page 283) translates the word "wholly pass away," but says in a note (page 417) that it "need not necessarily refer to the *death* of the righteous." She then goes on to quote an explanation from the commentary, but overlooks the fact that the explanation is a pointed quotation of a famous passage in the Logia-Book which declares that there are two kinds of Nirvana: first, wherein one still feels pleasure and pain; second, where one's feelings have become cold.

Now these states are important in this life, but the Nirvana thus attained derives its supreme importance in Hindu eyes from the fact that it is a guarantee against further transmigration. Indeed, on the first page of the Buddhist Logia-Book, the Buddha himself declares, "I am your guarantee that you shall not transmigrate!"

In order to secure both the present and the eschatological connotations of *parinibbāti* therefore, we must neither say "is at peace" nor "passes away," but simply "attains or enters Nirvana." Mrs. Rhys Davids very aptly renders the past participle *nibbuto*, "extinct," by "dwells in Nirvana."⁶ The exact words are:

"Cool and serene, I in Nibbana dwell," where the Pali form for Nirvana is used instead of the now naturalized English word. It is therefore appropriate to say "enters Nirvana" in such passages as those which so often recur.

The propriety of this rendering is still further manifest from the fact that there is a little pious snobbery about the word. Like other Orientals, the Hindus are very

⁶ *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. 130.

particular not to use the same verb for the death of a man as for that of a beast, nor the same word for the death of a Buddha as for that of an ordinary man. A beast is "dead," a man has "finished his time," while an Arahant or a Buddha has "entered Nirvana." It is well understood that he can enter it here and now. *Parinibbuto* is also used of a horse in the Middling Collection, in the sense of quieted, pacified by the horse-breaker. But, if that pacified horse had died, no sacred writer would ever use the lofty verb *parinibbāti*. Only those whose germs of renewed existence are extinct can die like this, which is only possible after the human form has been attained. Thus then is *parinibbāti* simply the most aristocratic of all the verbs "to die." The nicety of Hindu usage was recently pointed out by Dr. Eugene Watson Burlingame, in his Pali class at the University of Pennsylvania. "*Viharanto*," said he, "does not mean 'dwelling'; it could never be used of an animal. It means that the monk was *in residence*, as we say of a Christian Canon. Many of these Pali terms are highly technical." As to the verb *parinibbāti*, it is not a subtlety of philology that is at stake, but the treatment by a great religion of the life after death. Why should we allow a nineteenth-century agnosticism to color our translations? Why should we shrink from admitting that the early Buddhists believed in a future life? Their whole thoughts were centred in a future life or lives; their whole religion was a scheme to escape the consequences of such. One hears people say: "Buddhism has no god and no soul!" The statement is very misleading. By turns the Buddha and his Dharma were the gods. True, they had not created crocodiles and sharks and pronounced them very good; that business had been done by sterner forces than the Supreme Ideal, which is God. As to the soul, the Buddhists metaphysically deny it, but practically affirm it. Five hundred

Jātaka stories end: "The hero was I myself." The non-ego doctrine of Buddhism has a Christian counterpart in Swedenborg's statement that the Lord is the only man, that the exterior sight is merely the window for a more interior one, and that in the last analysis, it is the Lord alone who sees. Both Swedenborg and Myers—two names which will go sailing down the centuries when a thousand lesser ones that fill our mouths today are forgotten—both these supreme geniuses agree that as the spirit ascends, the egoism falls off; a whole society appears as a single angel, says Swedenborg. Orthodox Christianity ties us up so terribly in its narrow heaven of Tom Smiths spun out to eternity that we need these daring rebels to unite us with the thoughts of the other side of the planet, where the Buddha declared the bliss of personal life in the highest heaven to become finally tedious; man cannot live forever this separate truncated existence.

Nor is Nirvana nothingness. It is only nothingness for anger, lust, and folly. It is the larger life whereinto we may enter and abide right here. But to enter it here is so rare that the phrase is generally retained for the death of an Arahāt. A few generations after Buddha arahatship ceased. (Here we have the Savior idea.) The Beloved Disciple was backward in his development, and was refused admittance to the First Council of the Order after Buddha's Nirvana. But he suddenly attained it and was admitted. This had already been predicted by the Master, who had said, "Even in this present life will Ananda enter Nirvana"—our verb again. To translate "In this present life will Ananda find peace," would miss the point. It is the peace of Nirvana, which for most of us belongs to a far future state, that Ananda was to attain even here.

On page 10 we have an account of Dabbo the Mallian (a race of wrestlers). His psalm (page 11) is a single

stanza, and he too is "perfected" (*parinibbuto*, again). This Dabbo was so spiritual that, according to the canonical commentary on the *Book of Enunciations*, he entered Nirvana by fire. Like Elijah, he ascended into the air, but unlike him he fixed his mind upon the idea of flame, and meditated thereupon so intensely that his body took fire, and he passed away before the astonished monks, so that "neither ashes nor soot remained"! And so did he finally enter Nirvana.

Noteworthy renderings by Mrs. Rhys Davids are "superman" for *Mahāpuriso* (page 311), and "silent Buddha" for *Paccekabuddho* (page 58). This is much better than Warren's "private Buddha," which somehow provokes risibility. "Gospel," for *Saddhammo*,⁹ is also very satisfactory. But we cannot congratulate the translator on her rendition of *Dhammo* by "norm." It is doubtless good metaphysics, but rather grates upon one in poetry. To those of us who have been reading her husband's translations since the '70's, "doctrine" is good enough still for this untranslatable word. On page 71 of the *Psalms of the Sisters* there is a rather serious mistranslation where *mā cintayī* is rendered "Think not," instead of "Be not disturbed." Buddha is telling a famous nun that she has come into the presence of the only one who can be her refuge, but the present translation reverses the meaning. Little slips like the following indicate how the forms of the first and second persons of verbs are passing away in English (especially the second person):

"Sooth am I one who *doth* not seek to be."¹⁰

So, too:¹¹

"Dhīrā, brave Sister! who *hath* valiantly
Thy faculties in noblest culture trained."

We must not omit the allusion to baptism (page 197), where a disciple tells how that, before he became a

⁹ *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. 86.

¹⁰ P. 110.

¹¹ *Sisters*, p. 14.

Buddhist, he bathed three times a day to wash away his sins, but now he has found a higher Baptism:

"For I have plunged into the Eightfold Stream."

An oft-repeated formula of conversion is, "Then was my heart set free"; or, to use the exact metre of the Pali: "Straightway my heart her freedom found."

A good example of the conciseness of the Pali compared with the diffuseness of the English is the line,¹²

"Him saw I sitting there, Light of the World."

In the original this line consists of two words, or at the most three, for the second is a compound:

"*Divedna lokapajjotam*":

"Having-seen world-lamp."

On page 336 is a poetical rendering of a famous prediction of Buddha's about the last times of the church. Indeed, it is one of the scriptural selections fixed upon by imperial authority, 250 B.C., and graven on the rock at Bhābrā. This prophecy was first translated into English in *The Open Court* for 1902, and reprinted in Asia, America, and Europe, in a well-known work.

On page 251 we read, in the Brethren commentary, of a Greek Elder named "Truth-guarded the Great." He lived in the third century B.C., and converted one of the princes. According to the Great Chronicle of Ceylon he also converted the Panjāb, while an Elder with a similar name converted the Bactrian Greeks. Another account adds that he converted them by means of a scripture (still extant) on the Buddha's omniscience. Let us hope that Truth-guarded translated it into Greek, and that Aurel Stein will dig it up in Afghanistan. It would help us to understand so much! Certain it is that so early as B.C. 2 the Buddhist Sūtras were trans-

¹² *Sistera*, p. 85.

lated into a vernacular.¹⁸ This vernacular was not Chinese, for the Annals declare that the religion, though known in China then, was not believed in. Moreover, the vernacular translation was presented to a Chinese official by an ambassador from the great Yue-chi, that people whose coins have come down to us with Greek on one side and Pali on the other. Was the vernacular Greek itself? Probably not. More likely it was Tokharish or Sogdian, known to have been used by that people. Specimens of Buddhist books in both these tongues have been found in Central Asia. And both were current in portions of the great Parthian empire. Such being the case, we need not be astonished if Luke and John had heard of two towering characters in these *Psalms of the Monks*, viz., the Penitent Thief and the Beloved Disciple. Yes, here they both are, as large as life. Indeed, their absence would raise doubts as to the antiquity and genuineness of the Psalms, so prominent are these characters in the oldest books and sculptures. Quite the reverse would be the case with the Gospels. Were we to find a recension of Luke without the Penitent Thief, we should say at once, "That looks like an earlier edition." And why? Because Luke has to do violence to the text of his master Mark to get the story into the Gospel at all. Compare the synoptic narratives:

MARK	MATTHEW	LUKE
And they that were crucified with him reproached him. (15 22)	And the robbers also that were crucified with him cast upon him the same reproach. (27 44)	And one of the malefactors which were hanged railed on him. . . . But the other answered and rebuking him said. . . . (23 39-40).

¹⁸ The Wei Annals of China, according to Franke, in *The Indian Antiquary*, 1906.

Why is Luke so anxious to introduce this character at variance with the older tradition? The answer is that the Antiochene physician was a student of religion, and in the Syrian metropolis, which was the terminus of the Chinese silk-trade, he had seen Kanishka's coins, which even now are found from India to Sweden. Upon these coins he had seen the name of Buddha in Greek letters: BOΔΔO.

He had inquired who this Buddha was, and had found that he was the founder of a missionary religion of love and forgiveness, whose Scriptures were being translated into Sogdian and Tokharish, two vernaculars of the neighboring Parthian empire. Scenes from these Scriptures were being carved on temple gates in that empire, which ancient geography shows us was studded with a long line of hotels from Luke's own city to the Hindu frontier. He could not escape this knowledge in that great international metropolis. As a poet and an evangelist, he made it his business to adapt the new Christian religion to the Gentile world. The Fathers of the Church are unanimous about this, as we all know. Now among the sculptured figures which he had probably seen himself in his travels as a student of medicine to one of the greatest seats of ancient medical learning, India, were the Beloved Disciple and the Penitent Thief. Even if Luke had not seen them himself, he could easily have heard of them.

That the author of the Fourth Gospel should have introduced, under similar influence, a Beloved Disciple where the Synoptists know of none, I will not assert; he may have been influenced by other motives. Still it is suspicious. But in the case of Luke I feel considerable confidence.

The Buddhist story of the Penitent Thief first appeared in English from the Pali of the Middling Collection in *The Open Court* for October, 1900. Since then it has

been reprinted with Chinese notes by Professor Anesaki, and lately translated into Italian. A better translation than this pioneer one has now been made by Doctor Eugene Watson Burlingame, of the University of Pennsylvania, and will appear in his forthcoming *Dhammapada Commentary*.

It is a Buddhist custom to end an important section of Scripture with a kind of stichometry, giving the names and order of the Sūtras and even the number of the stanzas. This latter item is given in the Brethren's book, though omitted by the translatress. Curiously enough, the Sisters agree with her, and give us no such guarantee of textual integrity:

"With her two-finger consciousness,
That is no woman competent to gain!"¹⁴

The commentary explains:

"For women, from the age of seven or eight, boiling rice at all times, know not the moment when the rice is cooked, but must take some grains in a spoon and press it with two fingers; hence the expression 'two-finger sense.'" Mrs. Rhys Davids points out that the Italians have the same phrase to this day.

Well, the old redactor of the *Psalms of the Brethren*, when he comes to the final stichometry, after giving us the dry statistics, turns, in the twinkling of an eye, into a poet, and his stichometry takes fire:

"Sons of the Buddha, taintless, passionless,
With lion-voices ye have roared and gone,
Gone to the goal of calm, gone out, great fires!"

Blank verse is perhaps the best we can do for it, but the music of the Pali (in the words of Ruskin) "smites like the sound of the sea upon men's hearts for ever:"

Agikkhandhā va nibbutā!

Thus endeth the Book of the *Psalms of the Brethren*.

¹⁴ *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. 45.

BOOK REVIEWS

PÄDAGOGIUM, BAND I: DIE PSYCHOANALYTISCHE METHODE,¹ von Dr. OSCAR PFISTER, Pfarrer und Seminarlehrer in Zürich; mit einem Geleitwort von Prof. Dr. S. FREUD. Verlag von Julius Klinkhardt, Leipzig u. Berlin. Pp. 490.

This book is noteworthy, not alone because of the nature of the subject and the interesting manner in which it is handled, but also because the author is at once a clergyman, an educator, and an expert psychoanalyst, and has found useful, in each of these capacities, the method and the principles which the book describes. The introduction by Professor Freud, the able founder of the psychoanalytic method, calls attention to these facts in suitable terms, and forms a valuable addition to the remaining portion.

It may be known to the readers of this journal that the term psychoanalysis is applied to a method elaborated many years ago by Professor Freud of Vienna² for a strictly therapeutic purpose—namely, as a means of relieving a class of patients presenting such symptoms as morbid fears, distressing obsessions, and compulsive acts and thoughts, for which no adequate or systematic mode of treatment had been found available. It soon became clear, however, that the method thus indicated meant a good deal more than a step in therapeutic progress. It meant also an advance along the whole line of studies through which it is sought to gain a more intimate knowledge of human nature and human motives, and has laid the foundations for a very considerable revision of our beliefs respecting psychology and the history of childhood and of folklore, besides proving of great assistance in determining the underlying influences which have prompted men to devote themselves to religion, philosophy, and art. The essence of the matter lay in the demonstration that it is possible, through a sharpening of the memory, through the legitimate use of reasoning by inference, and through the study of one's dreams (which, when properly analyzed,

¹To appear in English later.

²The first impulse in this direction (not to speak of the work of Charcot or the important pioneer work of Janet) was given by Dr. Jos. Breuer of Vienna.

are found to reveal one's deeper motives to a remarkable extent), to gain a kind of first-hand evidence with regard to the history of one's inner, largely unconscious, life, such as had never previously been furnished in a convincing, thorough-going, and scientific form, and cannot be obtained in any other manner.

It is one of the merits of Dr. Pfister's exposition that he emphasizes—what has been overlooked by many of the critics of this movement—that Freud's generalizations were arrived at as a result of the patient accumulation, through many years of painstaking research, of a vast number of important facts. Whatever theorizing he has done has been on the basis of these facts. As new students took up the same task with him and by the same method, these facts were usually verified afresh, one by one, and to the astonishment of each investigator in turn. The mode of interpretation of the observations and the theories of origin of the various disorders above noted have been modified both by Freud himself and by others who have worked in the same field, so much so that of late years considerable divergence of opinion on certain points has become evident; but the accuracy of the large series of observations which formed the basis of the earlier statements has been but rarely called in question, except by outspoken opponents of the whole movement. As time went on, it became evident, on the one hand, that these psychopathic disorders did not stand alone but passed over by insensible degrees into the far more numerous, in general anti-social, peculiarities of persons classified as normal; and, on the other hand, that in making a study of this whole group of peculiarities and symptoms, one necessarily comes up against the exceedingly important and engrossing problem of the psychology of childhood, as representing a period of vast significance, in certain respects, for the establishment of character and temperament.

One should say "in certain respects," because, while it is true that the habits formed in childhood determine those of later life far more than is commonly believed, it is evident also that the ability to work with conscious volition for the best outcome of our evolution does not reach its climax until a later period.

Many thoughtful persons had indeed become aware that the intense and never-ending struggle variously described as the contest of the carnal, or the animal nature against the spiritual nature, of the immature tendencies against the maturer tendencies, of pleasure against duty, of a partial self-expression against a completer self-expression, in fine, of the assertion of one's self as an a-social individual against the assertion of one's self as a "*Glied-*

games," to use Froebel's term, begins during childhood in good earnest. Previous to the investigations of Freud, however, it was impossible that the full significance of this beginning should have been known, because the history of childhood itself (whether of the man or of the race) had been understood only to a very inadequate extent. The writer of this review has recently heard an eminent psychologist declare that in presenting the subject of emotion to his classes, he has learned to distinguish sharply between pre-Freudian and post-Freudian periods of knowledge of what emotion practically means.

Many children, of course, contain in themselves at the outset the "promise and potency" of progress to such a degree that everything which they experience and everything which they do seems to point onward to something better. And this desirable situation is sufficiently well marked with even the great majority of children for their parents and teachers to accept them as conforming to "normal" types, even when an accurate statement would not bear out this estimate. On the other hand, there is now much evidence to show that every child is wooed by temptations to dwell on the sense-elements of his experiences, not as pointing to a future spiritual meaning, but rather in and for themselves alone (that is, as affording materials for self-indulgence), and that many children do this to such a degree that they can never afterwards succeed in shaking themselves free from this tendency. In this fashion specific cravings of one or another sort become established, which may be so strong that their presence, even though unperceived, may check, to a notable degree, the further development of the spiritual life. Sometimes the child seems to protest and to react strongly against these early tendencies, with such vehemence as to form habits of an opposite sort; but in spite of this, his protest may amount only to a yielding to the same temptation in another form. Thus, to offer one illustration out of many that could be given, it becomes clear that such qualities as self-abnegation, self-reproach, over-conscientiousness, and the like, in spite of the fact that they may contain elements of real sublimation and may have owed their existence to a reaction against real faults, often constitute a new means of perpetuating egotistic self-admiration or self-indulgence.

More important still is the discovery—and here again one should distinguish between the sufficiently familiar general principle and that detailed knowledge which alone gives us the information that we need in practice—that the child very quickly learns to crowd out of sight ("repress") great numbers of sensuous or self-seeking

tendencies which his own feeling for better things and the influence of society have taught him to reprobate and avoid, and yet at the same time to retain them as a hidden source of illicit pleasures and undying cravings, without realizing that he is doing this. The reactions just mentioned might be used also in illustration of this point. Then begins that long course of self-deceit by which, in greater or less measure, perhaps every human being finds his value as member and representative of an ideal community more or less impaired. We all lead, in a sense, double lives, and the hidden life of the *alter ego*, to the thorough exploitation of which these researches have been dedicated, makes itself felt by keeping alive a series of hidden impulses and desires—often innocent enough if rightly understood and properly utilized—from which we would fain think ourselves free, and which show themselves externally as fears and doubts. Thus fear is often the disguise under which desire masquerades, and, in analogous fashion, the doubt about some apparently external problem conceals a far more real doubt which has some personal craving as its actual cause and is thus a doubt about one's ability to resist this or that temptation. This instinctive attempt to keep alive in some new form the cravings which it had been sought to get rid of in their original form, often colors and modifies the most serious efforts of adult life.

It has been a notable service on the part of Dr. Pfister that he has studied carefully, from the standpoints here outlined, and others equally important, a number of the religious movements of earlier days and the personal history of their exponents, and has thus supplemented the descriptive histories of religion in significant respects.

In similar manner he and others have sought to make clear the kind of aid which this mode of studying human motives can bring to the cause of moral reform. Many of the bad habits into which children often fall, such as habits of lying and stealing (which may take on a compulsive form), can be shown to be substitutes for passionate cravings of a self-indulgent, usually sexual, nature, or of a craving for some sort of egotistic self-assertion, and the thorough-going recognition of this fact, on the part of the child, has often been followed by excellent results. The same statement may be made of the dipsomanias and other compulsive tendencies of the adult.

It must not be thought that these efforts at reform can be undertaken lightly on the part of either patient or educator or physician. To attempt such a task often means an attempt to revise one's character and temperament, a revision to be carried out by means of a sort of living over again of one's past life, and rebuilding it,

as it were, on the basis of a wider knowledge and a broader vision of one's possibilities and purposes.

It is true, of course, that strong influences, whether of a personal nature or as provided by work or by religion or by both, may enable a person not only to repress but effectually to suppress, the unfavorable elements of his past life. But this result cannot be counted on, and even if it could be it would still remain true that if such a person has the opportunity, in addition to this, to revise the misunderstood conflicts with unlucky outcome to which he may have been exposed, he would usually do well to avail himself of this chance. In so doing he would only be assuming a responsibility which is of a wholly natural sort. For the external problems which each individual is called upon to meet are foreshadowed in his internal problems. A man's religion and conduct are likely to be freer from hampering mistakes if he has learned to subject the past decisions which he has made to a critical and scientific scrutiny, carried on with the aid of some one who has studied the psychological questions involved, in the light of the experience, not of one person alone but of many persons. The temptations inherent in his own nature, his own "original sin" (if one wishes to adopt the old term), are the problems which present themselves most naturally and most cogently to every one as problems for his study, in preparation for "taking the cities" against which he must march. It is not morbid introspection but a rational study of one's self (a process which is the very enemy of morbid introspection and its antidote) that is here at stake. Can any one believe that Dante's progress into Paradise would have counted for what it did to him, had it not been preceded by his journey through the Inferno of his own temptations and the Purgatory of his convalescence? It is difficult to fight against an unseen enemy, and the attempt to place one's self wholly before one's self is like the attempt to make visible an unseen foe, and thus to avoid such disasters as befell Braddock's gallant army in its vain battle against the Indians in the wilderness of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Pfister deals with these important questions, and many others not here touched upon, in a thoroughly scientific spirit, and yet from the standpoint of the practical and moral educator and the religious teacher. The book is divided into two parts. The first of these deals at length with the modifications of psychological theory which these new investigations have made necessary, and shows how by the aid of this newer mode of looking at the subject it is possible to explain physical and mental symptoms of the psy-

choneurotic illnesses better than they have ever been explained before.

In this part also a variety of important traits are dealt with such as show themselves among persons not to be classified as patients.

Dr. Pfister's views expressed in this theoretical portion are for the most part in accordance with those of Freud and other prominent psychoanalysts, although important divergences of judgment appear which he does not hesitate to state clearly. He has done some valuable original work bearing on some of the problems here discussed. The researches with regard to *kryptographia* and *kryptotalia* deserve especial mention, the more so that these phenomena have figured in religious history. It has long been one of the general theses of the leaders of this school that events do not occur without causes in the sphere of mental manifestations any more than in the sphere of material phenomena, and that when people seem to talk gibberish or nonsense, as under the conditions just referred to, or when their conduct seems irrelevant, emotional causes for these apparently causeless happenings are to be found if any one is willing to make diligent search for them. Dr. Pfister has shown, for example, that one may challenge a person to invent a long gibberish word or sentence, and then may discover, through adequate analysis, that a meaning or a series of meanings, often of an important sort, have underlain it. The criticism has often been made in regard to just such claims as this that psychoanalysts go very often much too far. It is quite possible that from time to time they may have done so, and that in this or that particular instance occult meanings may have been read into what was really nonsense. Nevertheless, the important point is that sense does unquestionably often lie concealed behind apparent nonsense, and that deep emotions of important sorts for the welfare of the person who has to deal with them may lie behind disguises which the physician and the teacher can and should learn to strip off. The motives of most men are mixed and the motives which are the most cogent are of a different sort from those which lie upon the surface. For this reason, to acquire the power of getting at the truth, for better or for worse, beneath its outward cloak, is important enough to justify the risk of sometimes going wrong. Many pieces of rock, of doubtful value, may be gathered in on the chance that they may prove ore-bearing. After all, it is the patient, or the person whoever he may be that desires to learn to know himself at closer range, to whom the final judgment in all cases should be left. This is a cardinal point

in psychoanalytic doctrine. Interpretations should never be forced upon unwilling recipients, hardly even offered to them; but they should be led to recognize, what is obviously true, that in dealing with their own unconscious selves they are dealing with a very subtle quantity—often a subtle adversary, one might say—and yet that within they have their own consciousness as a touchstone which can enable them to judge as to the truth or falsity of the conclusions at which, with the aid of the physician or the teacher, they arrive. Every one knows that the anatomy and physiology of the brain are complex matters. But it is not so often realized that what one might call the anatomy and the physiology of the mind are far more complex still.

The second part of the book is taken up with the details of method and the conditions necessary on the part of the patient and physician before a successful treatment should be attempted.

Then comes a summary of fifty pages, dealing with the practical outcome of this method, whether applied as a means of treatment in illness or as a help to the teacher, and with a number of practical and theoretical questions, such as the relation of the child to its parents, the proper attitude of the teacher, the relative value of authority and freedom, asceticism, confession, punishment, and various problems relating to sexual, moral, and religious instruction.

Whatever criticism this or that person might be inclined to offer, here or there, the final judgment of every reader who is sympathetic with the important movement described and who looks for well-defined, fearless, and honest statements presented in a straightforward and unvarnished manner, will not be disappointed in the perusal of this volume.

In conclusion I would offer a somewhat free translation of a few lines which occur on page 481 of Part II. An apology is perhaps due the author for the liberty taken in inverting two sentences. This seemed desirable on account of the absence of the context with which they occur in the original. The sentiments here expressed have reference to the theory of which much is made in the course of the work, and which has at least considerable value as a working hypothesis. This theory is that we may look upon the formation of the character, temperament, and conduct of every human being as determined in considerable part by the fact that he starts life with what, for convenience' sake, may be called a reservoir, or, potentially, a stream of living energy (*libido*), the function of which is, primarily, to enable him to play his part as

perpetuator of his race, but which may be converted into a means for making him a useful member of society in any sense. It would take us too far afield to discuss the philosophical merits of this theory, which, as the author might agree, could perhaps be rendered more intelligible if made subservient to the general doctrine of "self-activity," which has played so large a part in philosophical thought. However this may be, the important point remains that when the whole matter is looked at in a purely practical way, every individual does find himself possessing or possessed by a great stream of energy which may enable him to expend upon his fellow-men love and devotion, which may be sensual, or may be disinterested, or which, again, may enable him to follow the highest aims of the religious life. If this stream of energy does not find suitable outlets in the direction of disinterested well-doing and of active work, it is likely to lend itself to the cultivation of personal egotism and personal self-indulgence.

The paragraphs referred to run about as follows:

"Evidence has been offered in the foregoing pages to support the view that one of the most important tasks which presents itself to the young child, is that of finding, at an early age, suitable objects on which to expend his interest and love. If he does not find such outlets, his interest and love are likely to turn inward upon himself, and thus to lead to the formation of habits of introspection, debilitating day-dreams, apprehension, a hostile sense of terror, a suicidal weariness of life; or, to serious disorders of the nervous functions. This being so, it may be said that human happiness and human power are largely dependent, first on the relationships which are early formed between the child and those about him, especially the father and mother and such persons as in a psychological sense come to occupy their places; next, upon the capacity which the child may be led to display for turning the energy first exhibited in his earliest instincts upon the higher, and eventually the highest, means of promoting the welfare of the community as a whole."³

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

Boston.

³ Important as the matter of this book is, it should not be assumed that the reading of it is a light task. The author's style, though precise, is not fluent, and the reader, if unfamiliar with the subject, must be prepared to find much that is strange and even for a time repellent.

MEMORY. *Lectures on the Specific Energies of the Nervous System.* By Professor EWALD HERING. Fourth Edition, enlarged. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 70. \$1.00.

The first chapter of this book is a lecture on Memory as a general function of organized matter, delivered by Professor Hering at Vienna in 1870. In it the author attempts to correlate physiology and psychology. While the title of the lecture would seem to imply materialistic assumptions, Professor Hering denies such implications. He is quite willing to admit that "the material processes of the cerebral substance also appear to be functions of the phenomena of consciousness."

As a psychologist having strong interest in physiological processes, Professor Hering has undertaken to explore the nebulous realm of relation between the physiological and the psychological. While his conclusion that there are brain changes accompanying the phenomena of memory may be accepted without controversy, there appears to be little profit in speculating about the chemical aspects of the processes involved. Professor Hering in his logical wanderings seems to have left behind the realm of possible verification through experiment. His conjectures have been scientifically unproductive in the forty odd years since the lecture was delivered. Few biologists to-day will give much credence to his deduction that "the substance of a germ is able to reproduce what the parental organism has acquired during its individual life." Since this conjecture was made, we have accumulated too much evidence to the contrary, and have learned that the acquisitions of the parent, beneficial or injurious, are not transmitted to the offspring. At least this form of organic memory, which is so strongly emphasized in Dr. Hering's lecture, seems disproved.

The other essays—upon "The Specific Energies of the Nervous System" and "The Theory of Nerve Activity"—are more specifically discussions in the domain of nerve physiology. Dr. Hering appears to have good grounds for the supposition that the impulses along nerves differ qualitatively, but experimental demonstration of the fact is still wanting. It has only recently (1913) been proven that the transmission of impulses along a nerve involves a chemical change. Dr. Hering thinks that he is able to demonstrate on logical grounds that "the path taken by an excitation is coincidentally determined by the quality of that excitation," and is led to infer an unconscious organic memory of past nervous experiences. It would seem that other terms than psychological ones might be used

to express the physiological processes under discussion. Even if the psychologist finds it advantageous to use the question-begging phrase of "unconscious memory," physiological students may properly object to its introduction into a treatise on nerve physiology. Possibly, however, in the case of a theoretical thinker like Professor Hering, who has made important contribution to the theory of color vision and other aspects of physiological-psychology, considerable license may be permitted.

THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION. SAMUEL CHRISTIAN SCHMUCKER, Ph.D.
The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 298. \$1.50.

"How beautiful!" exclaimed a college student, as for the first time he saw a living cell under the microscope. "Never mind the beauty," said his instructor, "we are not concerned with beauty in this course." Technically the pedagogue was correct, although the student might have suggested that in a complete interpretation of life beauty may not be disregarded.

It is refreshing to read a book like Professor Schmucker's in which evolution is studied from more than a single aspect and is interpreted in other terms than those of morphology alone. The interests of the writer are broad, and in this book he brings his science into relation with his philosophy and his theology. He seems to have no difficulty in reconciling a mechanistic with a teleological view of the universe. While his interpretation of nature is naturalistic and thoroughly scientific it is also idealistic and reverent. To Professor Schmucker evolution is God's mode of creation. Nature reveals the Infinite Presence. With an increasing number of biologists the writer of this book appreciates the bankruptcy of materialism.

The book is persuasively written, full of interesting observations of which many are original, and is evidently the product of mature thought. The scientific layman will find the terminology comprehensible and the style lucid. The writer has given us a book which is readable as well as scientifically trustworthy. The sentimentality of the foreword is amply atoned for in the subsequent chapters.

For excellent reasons Professor Schmucker emphasizes the distinction between evolution and Darwinism, and shows that the acceptance of evolution as a fact does not depend upon the Darwinian hypothesis. He is tolerant of Lamarckism—as might be expected of a pupil of Cope—and thinks that the inheritance of acquired characteristics may have been a factor in organic evolu-

tion. Yet he does not fail to recognize that Darwinian factors may explain all that the Lamarckian factors will—and more. Very properly—in a book intended for lay readers—he does not enter into a discussion of the controverted points of recent advances in the study of heredity.

The spontaneous generation of living substance inspires in the writer no theological fears nor suggests materialistic assumptions. After speaking of the origin of life he sketches with considerable vividness the ascent of life toward man. Eugenics receives rational treatment. The volume ends with a chapter upon "Science and the Book" which would not disturb progressive churchmen.

The book may be highly recommended to those who still cling to the notion that evolution is subversive of religion—that is to say, of theology.

THE MECHANISTIC PRINCIPLE AND THE NON-MECHANICAL. Dr. PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 135. \$1.00.

The title of this most recent book from the prolific pen of Dr. Carus is taken from the opening essay by the author, in which he attempts to reconcile a mechanistic with a teleological view of the universe. The shortcomings of philosophical materialism and the myopia of the thinker who attempts to reduce all phenomena to the laws of motion, seem convincingly demonstrated. In the opinion of Dr. Carus motion cannot be translated into emotion. He takes up the perennial problem of freedom, to which he gives an affirmative answer after an interesting discussion. He also inquires into the nature of the categories of time, space, and causality, and in the end is led to the conviction of the divinity of both mechanical law and man.

The second essay is a summary of Mark Twain's posthumous work, *What is Man?* Dr. Carus finds in Mr. Clemens's grounds for a pessimistic view of man—which he holds to be identical with the reasons for a mechanistic view of the universe—the very best of reasons for optimism.

The essay on La Mettrie's *L'Homme machine* tends to show this much-abused Frenchman to be a pioneer in defence of the mechanistic interpretation of nature and of life.

The extracts from Dr. W. B. Smith's article in the January *Monist*, which form the next chapter in the book, constitute a further defence of the thesis that there is no antagonism between the belief in mechanical causation and purposiveness in nature.

The book closes with a review of Dr. James T. Bixby's book, *The Open Secret*, in which the materialistic conceptions of science are found wanting and a philosophical dualism defended. With the latter view Dr. Carus does not find himself in accord.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION. F. STUART CHAPIN, A.M., Ph.D. The Century Co. Pp. xxii, 306.

An introduction to the study of society, readable and popular in style, intended for college classes primarily. The book covers a long tract of time, and many controversial matters, and consequently it is too summary for the advanced student; but it should prove useful in its way.

RELIGION IN SOCIAL ACTION. GRAHAM TAYLOR. Dodd, Mead, and Co. Pp. xxxviii, 279. \$1.25.

This is hardly a serious study of either religion or society. It is, rather, a rhetorical call to action, doubtless effective in the assemblies where the substance was used for addresses, but not satisfying to the serious student, or even to the general reader who likes clear thinking. The work is the outcome of generous emotion and an unselfish life; but it gives the impression of being the labor of one who is too immersed in the local struggle to speak convincingly of its meaning.

GEORGE T. SMART.

NEWTON HIGHLANDS.

THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL REFORM. Professor JAMES R. HOWERTON. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 127. 75 cents.

This book contains three lectures. In the first lecture the author treats of the church and the revolutions of the past, and shows that the church has always played some part in them. In the second lecture he deals with the causes of the present social crisis; which he finds in the increasing solidarity of social life and in a growing moral sensitiveness. In the third lecture he discusses the church and the social reforms of today, and demands social interest on the part of the church in obedience to the ethical principles of the gospel and the needs of the world. There is much outspoken criticism of social conditions and a warning against being silenced by alliance with the money-powers.

DANIEL EVANS.

CAMBRIDGE.

SOCIAL PROGRAMMES IN THE WEST. Professor C. R. HENDERSON. Chicago University Press. 1913. Pp. xxviii, 184. \$1.25.

We have sent missionaries to the Far East to preach the Christian Gospel, to establish hospitals, and to introduce new industrial appliances and scientific methods of agriculture. The Barrows Lectureship has made it possible to send some thinkers to interpret to the learned classes the significance and value of the Christian religion. It was a happy thought to select and send Professor Henderson to make known to the leaders in this same Far East the leading social policies of our Western world. The economic and social problems of the West are making their appearance in the East and are destined shortly to become acute. The experience of the West should be of great value to the leaders of the East; but our mistakes should be avoided and only our successes imitated. To secure these desirable ends by sharing our experience with them, Professor Henderson discusses the social programmes of the West in matters of economics, private and public relief, the warfare against anti-social forces, preventive and constructive policies in public health and education, and the movements which seek to improve the conditions and life of the working people. He then points out the way of social progress. He lays stress on the worth of the common man and justifies unusual efforts on his behalf. In like manner, he places a high estimate on woman, and tests our own and other civilizations by the treatment of women. The book gives full proof of the social results of the Christian religion. It is a social apologetic. It has value for men in the West as well as in the East, and it suggests the thought that the better our social programmes, the more valuable and commendable will our religion be for others and the more conscientiously can we offer it to them.

DANIEL EVANS.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. JAMES Y. SIMPSON, D.Sc., F.R.S.E. Hodder & Stoughton. 1912. Pp. xvi, 383.

A large part of this book is occupied with a task which needs to be performed at frequent intervals, that of presenting a plain summary of the present state of biological knowledge so far as it bears on problems of philosophy and religion. In his chapters on The Principles of Biology, Evolution, Natural Selection, Variation, Heredity, Environment, the author, who is professor of Natural Science in

New College, Edinburgh, is everywhere competent and informing, and nearly everywhere clear. The intention and value of these expository chapters is largely independent of those in which Professor Simpson records and defends his own interpretation of the living world—The Directive Factor in Evolution, Evolution and Creation, Science and Miracle, Evolution and Immortality, and others.

This interpretation is in the first place anti-mechanical. The points in which living things differ, or appear to differ, from machines are described with much skill and with much detail: the organism changes itself, adjusts itself, regenerates itself, repairs itself, reproduces itself, and often emerges complete from one of its fragments, as inorganic arrangements cannot do. Here mechanical explanations fail; but it is especially in the facts of growth and of development from species to species that we are obliged to assume for purposes of explanation not only a free conscious impulse, such as Bergson appeals to, but an intelligent directive purpose as well. The author insists that the appeal to teleology as an explanatory factor is not a resort of ignorance; he regards it rather as a matter of positive evidence (pp. 131, 141). Yet the items of this positive evidence, so far as he offers it, resolve into simple assertions that mechanical theory fails to explain the phenomena. Somewhat uncritically, we feel, he accepts a cumulative account of the difficulties of one type of theory as sufficient evidence for another type. Hence the faith which provides his interpretation of nature, though based on a better perception of the life of things than that of Butler or of Paley, leaves with us the impression of subjectivity. It is analogic rather than metaphysical.

The author takes full advantage of the corollaries of his anti-mechanistic biology. If a purposive direction is the supreme fact in nature, and law a subordinate fact, miracle in a literal sense is possible. Accordingly we find here a plea for openness of mind in regard to miracle, in particular the miracle of the Resurrection, "belief in which must ever be easier than unbelief" (p. 360). The interpretation of nature which results is thus not only a spiritual one; it is a theistic, a Christian, perhaps we should say a Trinitarian interpretation.

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

CONSTRUCTIVE NATURAL THEOLOGY. NEWMAN SMYTH. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii, 123. \$1.00.

Dr. Smyth is preparing for future publication, as he tells us in the preface, a volume on that ultimate problem toward which the natural sciences and our spiritual faiths alike lead up—the problem of personality as a fact in nature. The chapters which compose this present volume are a by-product of that larger study, and were given as a course of lectures upon the Taylor Foundation of the Yale School of Religion. If the forthcoming and larger volume is as suggestive and stimulating as this smaller one, we may well eagerly await it.

In the first chapter the author shows in several aptly chosen illustrations the vast fields of knowledge that science is opening up as material for interpretation in the construction of a new natural theology. The watchword for that new theology is that it must be constructive. It must grip known facts, see them in their straight lines and right relations, discern their true proportion and perspective, but its final problem is one of values and meaning.

Dr. Smyth next deals with the problems which confront one in this arduous quest and the method to be pursued. Taking his stand on the "electron," that "last jumping-off place of physics into the unknown and inconceivable," he pushes fearlessly on that he may lead us to see the light and "interpret the spiritual expression that is on the very countenance of true science."

It is admitted to be a venturesome attempt to approach the person of Christ from the nature side, and to read the meaning of human life in the personal consciousness of Jesus. Yet "nature itself leads to the consummate Man, and the inner consciousness of the perfect man throws back its light on all that has been before him." Both the man of science and the man of faith have a right to stand on holy ground. When Moses saw the burning bush, he was a natural scientist when he said, "I will turn aside now, and see why the bush is not burnt." Moses was a religious man when from out the midst of the bush he heard God calling him, and he hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God. In that presence he quickly forgot his question, "Why?" We may the more readily discern the revelation if we recognize how naturally from the midst of the material world the unconsuming flame shines out.

EMERY L. BRADFORD.

BOSTON, MASS.

WHAT DOES CHRISTIANITY MEAN? W. H. P. FAUNCE. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1912. Pp. 246. \$1.25.

In this volume, containing the Cole Lectures delivered before Vanderbilt University in 1912, President Faunce places himself squarely on the side of Voluntarism, finding in Purpose the essential nature of God, of Christianity, and the righteous life, as well as the basis of Christian fellowship and the goal of education. Christianity is defined as "the revelation through Jesus of Nazareth of the eternal unchanging purpose of God, and the developing of that same purpose in the lives and institutions of men" (p. 40); and in this definition all the issues of the book are implicit. God is regarded as the subject of a progressive experience, in whose becoming the permanence of being consists in abiding purpose. Righteousness is not conformity with a code but loyalty to an ideal purpose, as indeed the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith plainly teaches. The modern representative of the eschatological doctrine of early Christianity is the hope of the fulfilment of this comprehensive purpose in the perfected kingdom of God. Dr. Faunce has made a genuine contribution by this course of lectures; for he has put in popular form, with much richness and pungency of phrase, ideas which are destined to play an important part in theology. The concept of purpose as interpreting the unity, the being, and the righteousness of God will be established only after much more thorough examination and discussion than Dr. Faunce gives it, for there are difficulties and implications in the idea which he does not consider; but it is of extraordinary service to have it put in enlivening rhetoric with the skill and force of a popular preacher of the best and noblest sort.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ASSURANCE OF IMMORTALITY. H. E. FOSDICK. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. 141. \$1.00.

INTIMATIONS OF IMMORTALITY IN THE SONNETS OF SHAKSPERE. The Ingersoll Lecture, 1912. GEORGE H. PALMER, LL.D. Houghton Mifflin Co. Pp. 57. 85 cents.

Nothing could better illustrate the change which has come over theological thinking than the fact that a Baptist clergyman, in a book dedicated to the congregation which he serves, discusses the idea of immortality absolutely without reference to revelation, the

resurrection of Jesus, or even the authority of Jesus save as he is numbered among the spiritual seers of our race. The principal argument is that personality is so significant both in itself and as fruit of the prolonged evolutionary process that no one who believes in a rationally and morally significant universe can doubt its continuance. As the author acknowledges, the book makes no original contribution to our thought on the subject, but it marshals familiar arguments with unusual effectiveness.

In explaining his reasons for making his Ingersoll Lecture a literary rather than a philosophical study, Professor Palmer refers to *The Christian Hope* by Professor Brown of Union Theological Seminary as "a little masterpiece, making superfluous for the present any other vindication of the claims of immortality." This is high and deserved praise, and we are glad that Professor Palmer felt himself free for the subject which he has treated with characteristic insight and suavity of style. Dividing the Sonnets into three groups, he finds in the successive groups corresponding ideas of immortality—natural, ideal, and spiritual; the last and highest of which was "born out of the experience of monstrous and degrading sin which lies behind the second group of the Sonnets." "Did Shakspeare plan anything of the sort? Did he mean to announce a theological doctrine with three stages of successively larger hope? No, he certainly never meant that, but nevertheless it meant him."

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

PROTESTANTISM AND PROGRESS. A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE RELATION OF PROTESTANTISM TO THE MODERN WORLD. ERNST TROELTSCH.
Translated by W. Montgomery. The Crown Theological Library.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. 210.

Professor Troeltsch, in a preface to this translation, states concisely his aim. He sets himself to inquire what are the elements in modern civilization which have proved their value, in distinction from those which lead nowhere. He holds that these possibilities of progress are to be found in Protestantism, and he examines the modern spirit to determine how much it owes to Protestantism and how much to other sources. The main difference between the religious outlook before the Reformation and since, he finds to be that the former was based on submission to authority as such and the latter on personal conviction. Yet he avoids the mistake which sees in the Lutheran movement a revolt against the principles of

Catholicism. Luther retained unchanged the assumptions of Catholicism, but endeavored to draw from them different conclusions. In regard to ecclesiastical authority, for example, both Lutheranism and Calvinism continued the practice of Catholicism in maintaining orthodox doctrine by compulsion and prosecuting heresy. The freedom of thought and action which now exists comes not directly from these Confessions but from those movements which they opposed—that of the Anabaptists and Mysticism. This parenthood of religious liberty on their part constitutes a belated compensation for the suffering these outcasts had to endure at the hands of all the Confessions of the sixteenth century.

Professor Troeltsch in summing up characterizes the agency which must be relied on to preserve the civilization of the future as “the religious metaphysic of freedom and of a faith based on personal conviction; which has established freedom upon a foundation which an all-too-human humanism cannot destroy, upon faith in God as the power whence freedom and personality come to us—namely, Protestantism.”

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

DIE SCHRIFTEN DES NEUEN TESTAMENTS IN IHRER ÄLTESTEN ERREICHBAREN TEXTGESTALT HERGESTELLT AUF GRUND IHRER TEXTGESCHICHTE. HERMANN FREIHERR VON SODEN. I. Teil, Berlin, 1902-1910; II. Teil, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1913. Pp. xvi, 2203; xxviii, 908.

GRIECHISCHES NEUES TESTAMENT; Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe). HERMANN FREIHERR VON SODEN. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1913. Pp. xxviii, 436.

Professor von Soden's tragic death in January of the present year by a railway accident in Berlin gives a touch of solemnity to the deep respect with which these massive volumes must be viewed—the great monument, as they are, of the life-work of a brilliant and industrious man, distinguished as scholar and university professor, as pastor of a great city parish, and as public-spirited citizen of a great capital, intimately concerned in the varied forms of its higher activities.

A trustworthy text of the New Testament is the foundation of all critical knowledge of the origins of Christianity. Since the critical editions of Tischendorf and Tregelles forty years ago and of Westcott and Hort in 1881, not only has knowledge grown through

discovery and research but it has become increasingly apparent that the solution of the problem required an examination of all the later Greek manuscripts, sometimes called "cursives," more than three thousand in number. The most essential part of this has now been done, thanks to a subvention (which must have amounted to many tens of thousands of dollars) from a generous German lady. Her grant made it possible for Professor von Soden to organize the work of younger scholars (forty-five in all were engaged on the task) in travel and various kinds of research for more than sixteen years. Substantially all Greek manuscripts offering a continuous text were examined, and a large number collated.

The result lies before us, in a huge body of introductory discussions and lists of readings, and a volume of text with apparatus. The successful completion at last was due to the liberality of the ancient firm of theological publishers at Göttingen, Messrs. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, whose service to learning and the church will never be repaid in money and ought to be mentioned in the same connection as that of the patron and the scholars with whom they have collaborated.

Von Soden's textual theory, to which he has come with greater knowledge of facts than any one ever had before, has several new and striking elements. First, he thinks (in opposition to Westcott and Hort) that the earliest period of textual history was one of relatively careful copying, and that the great divergences which admittedly arose before the end of the second century were due not to scribal carelessness and freedom but to certain specific causes of corruption. The chief of these was, for the gospels the Diatessaron of Tatian, for Luke and the epistles of Paul the modified text of Marcion, for Acts and the epistles a corrected edition, perhaps also the work of Tatian, of which the "Western Text" has left clear evidence. In addition, much influence is ascribed to the reaction on the Greek text from Latin, Syriac, and Coptic translations. Against these sources of corruption the text of Origen and of Tertullian bears its mute protest.

Secondly, von Soden classifies the whole body of manuscripts in three great groups,—*I*(erusalem), *H*(esychius), *K*(oine), representing three independent recensions all made about the year 300. *I* was the text of the New Testament sent out in such numbers from Caesarea by Eusebius; *H* became the established text of Alexandria; *K* is Lucian's Antiochian recension. The later history of the text is mainly the process of mutual contamination between *I* and *K*, out of which arose the subordinate later groups.

Thirdly, under this view the procedure of textual criticism is to find the authentic text of each of the three recensions, and then (subject to some qualifications) to adopt those readings in which any two of the three concur. It is gratifying to find that the resulting text corresponds on the whole, though with many differences in detail, to Westcott and Hort's and other modern critical texts. Whether it is better than they, and whether these theories and their application really give new and conclusive grounds for confidence in it, can be told only after the work of many years yet to come. In any case, the actual classification of the minuscule manuscripts (however the relation of the groups may have to be interpreted) may be confidently declared a permanent achievement.

The second Part of the great edition, containing the text, is sold separately, and will be needed by every critical student of the New Testament. The *Handausgabe* will also, it is hoped, be widely used. It gives the same text, with an abridged apparatus, and is sold at a very low price.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE NEW TESTAMENT PERIOD AND ITS LEADERS. How Christianity was prepared for, inaugurated, emancipated from Judaism, and became universal. FRANK T. LEE. Sherman, French, & Co. 1913. Pp. 358. \$1.35.

Dr. Lee has written a skilful popular sketch, with grace and urbanity of style, in which a brief outline of the Gospels is followed by the material of the Book of Acts distributed among studies of the life and character of the several leaders of the apostolic church. The point of view is that of a full acceptance of the New Testament narratives, such that for it the problems of the critical historians do not exist. To this is prefixed an account of Jewish life and religion in the time of Christ. The relative fulness of this section is significant of the importance which such information has gained in the last twenty years. The dark and hard picture, however, which has become conventional and for which Talmudic statements furnish convenient evidence, surely rests in large measure on lack of historical sympathy combined with undue generalization from the frankly polemic attacks found in our Gospels. Polemic and satire have their rightful place and use; but the historian may not treat them as if they preserved due proportion of emphasis. Both later Jewish literature and the documents and history of early Christianity are very

hard to understand if the amount of spiritual religion in Judaism was so small as is often represented even by the most learned and in other respects trustworthy writers.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE LIFE OF JESUS IN THE LIGHT OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM. ALFRED W. MARTIN. D. Appleton & Co. 1913. Pp. x, 280. \$1.50.

These eight lectures by the Associate Leader of the Society for Ethical Culture, New York City, are honest, well-meant, and reverent, but utterly inadequate in scholarship. That the abundant errors and ill-informed discussions often relate to matters which are of no possible consequence to the readers for whom the book is intended, will not diminish regret (even on the part of those who share many of the positions taken in the book) that the writer yielded to a request for publication from "several hundred" of the hearers who had been interested by such a glimpse into New Testament themes, and who may well have been helped by the lecturer's personal attitude.

CHRIST THE CREATIVE IDEAL: Studies in Colossians and Ephesians. W. L. WALKER. T. & T. Clark. 1913. Pp. vi, 236.

Mr. Walker is already well known as the author of several books in which he has sought to reconcile the doctrines of Christianity with the results of modern science. He keeps the same general object before him in the present work. The book is primarily an exposition of the theological teaching of the twin Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians; but in the light of this exposition he seeks to present a view of Christianity which will bring it into full accord with the intellectual movement of our own time. Briefly stated, his conclusions are these: The true life of man was revealed in Christ; and the Christ who appeared as Redeemer existed eternally in the thought and purpose of God. The Incarnation is not to be regarded as a sudden interposition of God in the natural order. It was involved in the very act of creation, and was realized in due time through the evolutionary process. Throughout the world's history the divine ideal was unfolding itself more and more fully, until it found absolute expression in Christ. "The creative thought and power that formed the world became manifest in him in human form. Therefore the apostle can say truly, 'It pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell.'" Mr. Walker expounds from

different points of view this conception of Christ as the Ideal involved in the whole purpose of creation, and endeavors to show how it provides an answer to the perplexing questions forced upon us by the conclusions of science. The book is able and suggestive, and deals boldly with problems which are too often shirked or overlooked. Its treatment of the teaching of the Epistles is at times illuminating, although it suffers from the continual effort to read a modern philosophy into Pauline ideas. Likewise the attempt to maintain the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation while construing it along the lines of evolutionary theory, is more ingenious than successful. We are afraid that those honest doubters whom Mr. Walker is anxious to win back to the faith will only find their difficulties increased by his explanations. The book serves to remind us (and this perhaps is its chief value) that the need for reconciling Christian doctrine with the cosmic order was already felt by the earliest thinkers of the church. Mr. Walker has done well to confront us once more with the ancient problem; but he has rather re-stated it for us in modern terms than helped us towards its solution.

E. F. SCOTT.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, CANADA.

THE COUNTRY CHURCH. C. O. GILL and GIFFORD PINCHOT. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 222. \$1.25.

One of the really serious problems which confront the religious forces of our eastern States today is the declining effectiveness of the country church. She is altogether too much left out of the reckoning in the discussions of our Associations and Conventions and Conferences. The fact is that the country church lies close to the heart of civilization. The country is the great feeder of the vital forces of all our great urban populations, and no one has a better right than its church to all the enthusiasm and devotion, the resource and ability, of the best Christian thought and enterprise. This study is a serious attempt to get at the facts in the case, and to suggest some remedies.

The volume presents the results of a careful study of the facts as to the gains and losses, over a period of twenty years, in attendance, expenditure, and membership, first in Windsor County, Vermont, where every Protestant Church was covered, and next in Tompkins County, New York, where every Protestant Church outside the city of Ithaca was included. These two counties were chosen because of their representative character. The results are gathered in an

admirable series of diagrams and tables, separate for each county. The tables are well arranged, clear, cogent.

The findings of the investigation are summed up in these words: "They show that in these counties the country church has suffered a decline which proves beyond question that it is losing its hold on the community."

But the recognition of the facts is only the first and necessary step in the pathway of betterment. The facts here presented are sobering, but the book is by no means a wail of despair. Its constructive section, though brief, is wise, suggestive, courageous. The book should deeply interest all who have the problem of the country church on their hearts and are seeking its solution.

EMERY L. BRADFORD.

BOXFORD, MASS.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE. M. V. B. KNOX. Sherman, French, & Co. 1913. Pp. iii, 536. \$2.00.

The title of this book arouses expectations which its contents do not fulfil. Perhaps this was inevitable, for to describe adequately the religious life of a comparatively homogeneous community, indeed even of a single individual, calls for the finest and rarest insight, and when the subject is the Anglo-Saxon race in its various homes—Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States—considered, moreover, through some thirteen centuries, almost encyclopedic knowledge must be added to penetrating insight. That the author attempted so stupendous an undertaking is creditable to his courage; that he has failed is not surprising. Unfortunately, the book, although pleasantly written, has many errors, some of which in the judgment of charity may be deemed typographical.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. A. L. SMITH.

Under this somewhat misleading title Mr. A. L. Smith, the well-known history tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, publishes six lectures given by him on the Ford foundation eight years ago. The title is misleading because it seems to announce some wide and general treatment of a vast and highly interesting subject, whereas in fact the real topic is: "The good and evil of the connection of England

with Rome, especially in the middle of the thirteenth century." Mr. Smith's thesis is that down to the time of Pope Innocent IV England stood in a loyal and appreciative attitude toward the papal government. He illustrates this throughout his first three lectures by reference to specific cases of recognition. He thinks that the common sense of Englishmen was showing them that if any reasonable standards of religious life were to be maintained in their country, there must be an effective appeal to some powerful central authority superior to all others and both willing and able to keep the balance among them. As things were, the only power that could possibly meet this requirement was Rome, and Mr. Smith thinks that, down to the time he indicates, the demand was adequately met.

In support of his view he gives several illustrations from contemporary documents, partly English and partly Roman, especially from the papal registers. The complaints of English critics against clerical abuses he finds substantiated by actual provisions of the papal legislation. An entire lecture is given to a sympathetic survey of the church laws regarding marriage, which Mr. Smith believes were, on the whole, conducive to the higher welfare of a society nominally Christian but in fact just emerging out of barbarism. In passing, the author disposes of the supposed hostility of Bishop Grosseteste to the Roman system, a false impression which he ascribes to the anti-papalist tendency of Matthew Paris. So far, England and the Papacy appear in a relation of mutual support and confidence; but then begins the fatal policy of temporal aggrandizement in Italy, which finds its chief expression in the deadly conflict with the emperor Frederic II, the ultimate defeat of the Hohenstaufen scheme of empire, and the introduction of French control in southern Italy.

The reaction of this struggle upon England is shown in the political bargainings with Henry III and the continually increasing tension of the papal financial system, until a profound change in the attitude of England toward Rome is produced. The volume closes with an examination of the personal character and methods of Innocent IV as the decisive factor in this change. It is obvious that Mr. Smith's own conception of his subject is clear and orderly; but it is to be regretted that he did not see fit to throw his lectures into the melting-pot and bring them out again in a unified and readable narrative form. As they now appear, in spite of all their luxury of type and marginal notes, their effect is rather to confuse than to clarify. They are filled with unexplained references to persons and things with which the average intelligent reader can

hardly be expected to be familiar. There are frequent quotations from classic authors, many side-thrusts at modern institutions, and occasional gibes at things British; but of style, in the best sense, there is little trace.

ITALY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK. 2 vols. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912.

It is always interesting to see an impossible task confidently assailed. To depict a century as a unity is almost impossible, for this demands the insight and mastery of an epic poet. Failing this, the account is liable to become a dictionary of periods and movements. The author of this book has faced his task cheerily, and has but partially accomplished it. It is a glittering pageant that is unrolled before us of different sides of the life of the thirteenth century; but they are not exhibited as the onward march of a single vital force. Of the three great movements of the century, the development of the Franciscan Order is treated but scantily. Knowledge of it is assumed, while its kinsman and rival, Dominicanism, is almost wholly passed by. The contest between Guelfs and Ghibellines which resulted in the banishment from Italy of the Hohenstaufens, is more extensively and adequately treated. The account of the rise of art and literature, in its mention of this and that painter and poet, does not escape sketchiness. In a style, readily readable though without charm, the author has done for his subject all that could be done without the epic outlook. Carlyle's histories needed the touch of fact. This history needs a touch of Carlyle.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY. The Macmillan Company. Each volume, \$1.50.

THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. English translation by KIRSOPP LAKE. Vol. I, 1912. Vol. II, 1913.

PHILOSTRATUS, THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA; THE EPISTLES OF PHILOSTRATUS; THE TREATISE OF EUSEBIUS. English translation by F. C. CONYBEARE. Vol. I, 1912. Vol. II, 1913.

THE WORKS OF THE EMPEROR JULIAN. English translation by WILMER CAVE WRIGHT. 3 volumes. Vol. I, 1913.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS. 2 volumes, 1912. English translation by WILLIAM WATTS (1631).

These volumes, containing texts and translations of authors whom even the proficient classical scholar too often neglects, are part of the fulfilment of Mr. James Loeb's generous promise, in founding the Series, to "include all that is of value and interest in Greek and Latin literature from the time of Homer to the Fall of Constantinople." In the careful editing of the original texts, in the grace and general accuracy of the versions, it would seem that the aim of the editors should be realized, namely to "appeal not only to scholars who care for a uniform series of the best texts, and the college graduates who wish to renew and enlarge their knowledge with the help of text and translation, but also to those who know neither Greek nor Latin, and yet desire to reap the fruits of ancient genius and wisdom."

In the *Apostolic Fathers* Professor Lake offers a new and admirable rendering of Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp, Barnabas, the Didaché, the Shepherd of Hermas, Polycarp's Martyrdom, and the Epistle to Diognetus. The plan of the Series does not contemplate extended annotation, but a brief critical apparatus accompanies the text, and excellent notes, of amazing compactness, are appended to the translation.

Professor Conybeare's translation of the Life of Apollonius is most timely, for in conjunction with Harmon's Lucian it enables the student to realize vividly the pagan environment of early Christianity.

Only the first volume of Mrs. Wright's *Julian* has appeared as yet. For this work, which requires thorough mastery of the earlier and classical literature, she has already proved her competence, notably in her *Julian's Relation to Neo-Platonism and the New Sophistic*. A translator might well be pardoned for yielding to the temptation to display his learning, but the notes, while they are adequate, are judiciously brief.

For Augustine's *Confessions*, William Watts's translation of 1631 is here reprinted with introduction and Scriptural references by Mr. Rouse, one of the general editors. In view of Harnack's remark that the diction and phraseology of modern Christianity, in prayer and hymn and discourse, are directly traceable to Augustine, it was probably wise to select this version, contemporary with the King James Bible, out of the four or five that exist in English. But the editor might have exercised his discretion in correcting more errors, and even making considerable alterations in the interest of a clearer modern idiom. Thus, when Augustine describes his mother's devotion he says (Book ix, chapter iv): "*Matre adhaerente nobis, muliebri habitu, virili fide, anili securitate, materna caritate, Christiana pietate.*" The English of Watts—"and with my mother likewise inseparably sticking unto us, in a woman's habit verily, but with a masculine faith, void of worldly care as a woman in her years should be, yet employing a matronly charity and a Christian piety"—is not only too diffuse when compared with the terse original, but lacks its dignity and climactic power.

Future editions should correct many misprints, especially in the Greek, and German commas before restrictive relative clauses in the original texts, Greek and Latin, might be removed to advantage.

CHARLES BURTON GULICK.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

LUTHER'S CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY LETTERS. Translated and edited by PRESERVED SMITH, Ph.D. Vol. I, 1507-1521. The Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia. 1913.

Dr. Smith follows up his *Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (1911) with this first volume of a translation of letters written by and to the Reformer, adding also such other contemporary epistles as serve to illustrate important episodes in his life. The translation is accompanied but not overburdened by useful notes giving information as to persons and conditions. It is mainly Dr. Smith's own work, but includes also a number of letters already done into English elsewhere. The volume should prove a welcome addition to the working material of Luther students and is at the same time adapted to the needs of the general reader.

HISTORY OF ENGLISH NONCONFORMITY FROM WICLIF TO THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. HENRY W. CLARK. Chapman & Hall, London. 2 vols., 1911, 1913. Pp. xvii, 439; xx, 458.

These two sturdy volumes are from the pen of an English Congregational minister, now devoting himself principally to literature and history. They will repay reading. While the story of English Nonconformity is told with no little fulness, and many of its leaders are characterized with much clearness, it is by no means a history of the ordinary pattern. Mr. Clark's work is primarily an interpretation of English religious life in the light of his fundamental definition of Nonconformity. "The Nonconformist spirit is, in succinct summary, the spirit which exalts life above organization. More than that, it is the spirit which holds that life should *make* organization, and that organization is at least greatly reduced in value (sometimes even valueless, sometimes even actually harmful) unless it be thus the direct product of life." This principle constitutes the touchstone by which the author would test all English religious organization. Democracy in church administration; freedom from any particular form of ecclesiastical control, especially if that freedom implies submission to another form; even the attempt to reproduce some supposedly Biblical pattern of the Church—all these are misreadings of the real Nonconformist spirit.

Of that true Nonconformist spirit Mr. Clark finds Wiclif the brightest illustration. In him it showed itself in a purity and power since scarcely equalled in English religious life. Its fundamental character was, however, soon obscured. Naturally the author finds little of it in the story of the Reformation. Nor do the earlier English Presbyterians, with their belief in a *jure divino* model of the Church, seem to him much better exemplars. "When Presbyterianism, through the voices or the pens of Cartwright, Travers, and their colleagues, contended for the establishment of the Genevan system as the one thing—or at least the first thing—demanded by the interests of religion, we are not within sound of a call to make organization secondary to, and the product of, life; the call is still for the establishment of an organization on which life is supposed to depend; and it is not the Nonconformist spirit that can be credited with the authorship of a call like this." With Puritanism the case is somewhat better. "The Puritans assuredly embodied the Nonconformist protest in some degree." Yet Puritanism lost its clerical leadership largely through the policy of Laud, which settled New England, "with the consequence that Puritanism, being lay and undirected, and allying itself with Presbyterianism

for ends of political reform, became merged in Presbyterianism and virtually ceased to exist." Independency was in scarcely more satisfactory situation, for it "fell into that falseness to its own principles shown in the ecclesiastical settlement of Cromwell's time." Quakerism, indeed, "was a new protest of the Nonconformist spirit"; but it too, free as it was in its beginnings, had organization imposed upon it, rather than spontaneously growing out of it, before the death of its founder.

With the Restoration the Nonconformist ideal, in the author's understanding of it, largely faded. The first struggle of Dissent was for the right to live. Toleration, won in 1689, was followed by spiritual decline, which brought the Nonconforming communions to their lowest ebb, till their current was changed by the effects of the work of Wesley and Whitefield, in which Mr. Clark sees "the resurrection of Puritanism within the Established Church." Since then the progress has been upward, first through a revived religious zeal, and then through increasing freedom from outward shackles; but the real meaning of the Nonconformist spirit is far from being grasped in its fulness by the Nonconformist churches even yet. Of modern men, Dale of Birmingham most fully comprehended it. "It is no extravagance to say that if one sets one's hand imaginatively upon Wiclif's head, and then brings the hand down the years along the ranks of those by whom the Nonconformist principle has been expounded, it is only when the hand comes to Dale that it rests again upon a head quite as high."

The author is specially critical of the conception that Congregationalism finds its value chiefly as an expression of democracy in the Church. Its primal vision was of "the Church as a body of Christian men and women through whose united minds and wills the mind and will of the living Head of the Church were revealed, through whose united voices the voice of the living Head of the Church was heard, through whose united hearts the very life of the living Head of the Church was beating." Oppression led, however, to emphasis on "toleration" and "freedom." "That Congregationalism represents 'self-government,' the settlement of Church affairs by a sort of process of parliamentary debate and division, has been assumed by practically all historians who have touched the theme; and worse still, it has to be confessed that many Congregationalists themselves have accepted and still accept the reading as correct." To the author's thinking such a definition of Congregationalism "is really an intrusion of the Conformist spirit."

This is a suggestive work. The author's thesis is vigorously maintained. But at the risk of being classed as a "Conformist," the reviewer is constrained to feel that we have here, as so often in English Dissenting literature, a point of view which, developed under the dominance of an ever-present Establishment, emphasizes the ideal and the theoretical at the expense of the practical. Christian organization has always been the product of life—that is, of life in some period and some part of the Christian community. The question of the extent to which the institutions produced by the life of a by-gone age should serve to express the life of the present, or of one land those of another, is undoubtedly most difficult. But at least equally difficult is it to see just how, as a practical matter, the life of any given period can "make organization" that will not of necessity include much of inherited form and method which may not be the immediate outgrowth of the life of the particular age. Doubtless a compromise will always be made between the principles which the author styles "Conformity" and "Nonconformity"; and such compromise has been the actual history of English Nonconformity.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HIGH COMMISSION. ROLAND G. USHER. Clarendon Press. 1913. Pp. 380. 15s.

The recent dictum of one of our most distinguished scholars, that for "very very much history there is more importance in the ancient error than in the new-found truth," is significantly illustrated in the apparent ineradicability of the old idea that the Star Chamber and Court of High Commission were originally and always instruments of tyranny and oppression. The bitter hostility of their many opponents during the last decade of their existence, when they were the tools of a monarch as unpopular and inefficient as his Tudor predecessors had been the reverse, has blinded posterity to the indubitable fact, that during the vastly preponderant portion of their lifetime, they were both regarded as useful and beneficent institutions. But the efforts of modern historians to secure any general recognition of this truth, outside the pale of the specialists, have met with singularly little success. Hitherto the Star Chamber has been the beneficiary of the larger number of attempted rehabilitations; but now the sister institution has evoked a doughty champion in the person of Professor Usher; to whose diligent labors in

the Tudor and Stuart vineyards the enormous number of references to his own previous writings in the foot-notes of the present volume bears eloquent testimony. He has certainly produced an excellent piece of work. Abundantly furnished, as always, with original material, he has organized and digested it far more thoroughly than in any of his previous books; best of all, he has learned to write simply, clearly, and unpretentiously. The result is a volume which reflects great credit on the author, and which will prove an indispensable guide to all who are interested in the constitutional and ecclesiastical history of the period with which it deals.


Three features of the present work deserve special notice. In the first place, Professor Usher has done good service in emphasizing the continuity of the development of the institution which he describes, from the commission issued to Thomas Cromwell in 1535, to its emergence as a permanent ecclesiastical court about 1580. The view taken by Coke and the later assailants of the Commission, that it owed its legal existence to the Act of Supremacy of 1559, ignored the earlier phases of its growth; and, from the point of view of the historian, is entirely misleading. Secondly, the author has done much to elucidate the jurisdiction, actual working, and procedure of the body, as constituted between 1580 and 1641. It could reach crimes with which the ordinary ecclesiastical court was powerless to deal, and could render a final decision. Its procedure was swift and effective (the court often transacted business in a hundred suits on a single day), and much was left to the discretion of the Commissioners. Those who continue to regard the Commission as an instrument of tyranny and oppression will probably be amazed to learn that during the last thirty years of its existence only about five per cent of the cases that came before it were instituted by the Commissioners themselves, while at least eighty per cent were suits between party and party; in other words, it was resorted to voluntarily, and the notion that it was the chief work of the Commission to ferret out cases must be discarded.

Lastly, Professor Usher deals at length with the growth of the opposition to the Commission. In that growth he distinguishes three phases. During the first (1584-1592) and during the last (1611-1642) the assaults emanated for the most part from isolated Puritans, who had felt, directly or indirectly, the weight of the Commission's authority. The majority of these assaults, at least during the latest phase, were delivered from the floor of the House of Commons, where the Puritan opposition was assured of a sympathetic audience. In the intervening stage, from 1592 to 1611, the attack was far more

systematic, and was directed by the judges of the common law under the leadership of the irascible Coke, whose sturdy championship of the legal system which he represented caused him to regard with bitter hostility any institution which did not recognize its supremacy. Royal intervention, the penal promotion, and finally the removal of the Lord Chief Justice ended this phase of the assault; and the common-law judges were forced jealously to acquiesce in a jurisdiction which they found it impossible to overthrow. Professor Usher's treatment of this phase of his subject, especially his discussion of the relative merits of the legal arguments, is admirable. His efforts to reconcile the virulence of the opposition to the Commission in the last ten years of its existence with the "overwhelming evidence" in favor of its popularity, are perhaps somewhat less convincing; but the problem is scarcely susceptible of entirely satisfactory explanation. Certainly it was the whole system which the Commission represented, rather than the Commission itself, which was at fault. Personal considerations probably had much to do with it. That the first systematic attack on the Commission followed so closely on the substitution of the stern Whitgift for the gentle Grindal, is highly significant. The story of the man who, fifty years later, threw a long stick with a prohibition nailed to the end of it, into the room where the Commission was sitting, to show that he would not touch the Archbishop with a ten-foot pole, indicates that much may be explained by the unpopularity of Laud.

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THE LORD'S PRAYER

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The Lord's Prayer has of late received renewed study, and fresh material has been brought together for determining its form and meaning. The problems have not been fully solved, but the discussion has reached a point at which a general survey of its present state and results is interesting and profitable.¹

I

If anything could deter Christians from superstitious belief in the mechanical inspiration and magical transmission of the Bible, it would seem to be the fact that even the Lord's Prayer has not come down to us in a uniform text.

The text in Matthew, to be sure, is substantially sound. The few variant readings are mostly of little consequence. The most important one relates to the closing doxology, which is found in the Textus Receptus, and hence in Luther's Bible and the King James Bible, but is absent from most of the ancient authorities, among them the Vulgate, and therefore from German versions before

¹ Cf. G. Hoennicke, "Neuere Forschungen zum Vaterunser," *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, xvii, 1906; and the articles "Lord's Prayer" in *Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible*, and in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

Luther, as well as the New Testaments of Wycliffe, Tyn-dale, Coverdale, and some other translators.²

Quite different is the case with the text in Luke. In the Textus Receptus, indeed, and the versions which are based upon it, the difference from the text of Matthew is slight. There is one variation in the fourth petition: 'day by day' (τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν) instead of 'this day' (σήμερον); two in the fifth: 'sins' instead of 'debts,' and 'everyone that is indebted to us' instead of 'our debtors.' That is all. The doxology is missing in all authorities, ancient and modern. But when we turn to the critical texts or to the translations based upon them, as, for instance, the Revised Version of 1881, we note great differences: here in the address Luke has nothing but 'Father,' while the third and seventh petitions are lacking altogether. It is interesting to observe that in these points too the Vulgate has kept the original form and transmitted it to the late Middle Ages, so that Wycliffe, Coverdale in his Latin-English edition of 1538, the Rheims-Douai Bible, and others, represent the true text against the Authorized Version.

Nearly all the quotations outside the New Testament represent the Matthaean form, or some form akin to it. Thus Didache 8 2³ follows Matthew; except that in the fifth petition it has 'indebtedness' (δφελήν), instead of 'debts' (δφειλήματα), and the present tense 'we forgive' (ἀφίμεν, compare the late uncials and Textus Receptus) instead of the aorist, 'we forgave' (ἀφήκαμεν); in the doxology 'kingdom' is omitted, as it is also in some Egyptian texts. The interesting inscribed potsherd found at Megara and published by R. Knopf in 1900⁴

² These, however, have an Amen at the end of the prayer.

³ This paragraph is lacking in the Ethiopic version discovered by E. von der Goltz, Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1906.

⁴ Mittheilungen des kaiserl. deutschen archaeologischen Instituts, Athenische Abtheilung, xxv, 1900, pp. 313-324. A Coptic amulet was published by U. Wilcken in 1902.

has, together with the mis-spellings which betray an illiterate writer, the present tense in the fifth petition (*ἀφίμεν*, cf. *DELAN*); and at the end the place of the doxology is taken by an acclamation, 'O Lord Christ,' which is at variance with the invocation, 'Our Father.' The liturgical use, as attested in the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions and other rituals of the church, is entirely in agreement with Matthew. In one remarkable form occurring in the Acts of Thomas, § 144, the fourth petition is lacking.⁵

II

There is, however, one variant reading in the Lukan text which, after being long neglected, has in recent times become the subject of much debate. It is the petition for the Holy Spirit, which is found in some ancient authorities. Not more than two or three Greek manuscripts, and these late and relatively unimportant, give it; but it is attested in the fourth century by the Cappadocian fathers and in the second by Marcion. It runs as follows: 'Let thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us;' the words 'upon us' varying in position and in some authorities being absent. Further, Codex Bezae (D) appends the words, 'upon us' to the first petition of the prayer, and in some German forms *zu uns* begins the second. This may be taken as a remainder from the petition for the Holy Spirit; but the explanation may also be given that that petition has developed out of the words 'upon us.' The most curious fact is that in Marcion's Gospel this sentence took the place of the first petition, whereas in all the other witnesses it is substituted for the second. It is difficult to account for this variation.

⁵ This, however, is attested only by one Greek manuscript (U in Max Bonnet's edition, *Acta apostolorum apocrypha*, ii, 2, p. 250) and by the Syriac (ed. Wright, p. 279; Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, ii, pp. 105 f., 268 f.).

Bishop Chase, in his book, *The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church* (1891), was the first to call attention to this variant reading; he regarded it as a liturgical development of the second petition made to fit the Lord's Prayer for use in the baptismal service. In 1904 Harnack⁶ insisted upon the importance of this very old reading and drew radical critical conclusions from it. Spitta, writing in the same year,⁷ affirmed its genuineness; while von Soden⁸ suggested that it originated in a baptismal prayer of John the Baptist.

The facts may be presented in the following scheme:

<i>Matthew</i> address	<i>Luke</i> address	<i>Marcion</i> address	<i>Others</i> address
1. name	1. name	1. spirit	1. name
2. kingdom	2. kingdom	2. kingdom	2. spirit
3. will			
4. bread	3. bread	3. bread	3. bread
5. forgiveness	4. forgiveness	4. forgiveness	4. forgiveness
6. temptation	5. temptation	5. temptation	5. temptation
7. deliverance (doxology)			

Now Harnack argued, as in the *Textus Receptus* Luke's form was assimilated to the Matthaean standard by adding the third and the seventh petitions, so the canonical form in Luke and the other two forms are all attempts to complete an original Lukan text from Matthaean material. One form added to Luke the name (Matthew's first petition), another added the kingdom (Matthew's second); in the canonical form the two enlarged forms were combined and the primitive Lukan petition for the Spirit dropped. It thus appears that originally instead of the first three petitions of Matthew

⁶ *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1904, pp. 195 ff.

⁷ *Die älteste Form des Vaterunsers*, *Monatschrift für Gottesdienst und Kirchliche Kunst*, 1904, pp. 333-345.

⁸ "Die ursprüngliche Gestalt des Vaterunsers," in *Christliche Welt*, 1904, pp. 218 ff.

Luke had only one, that for the Spirit; and, comparing this result with Matthew's form, Harnack finds that they cannot both be genuine, in fact that they exclude one another.

	address	
1. name	}	
2. kingdom		
3. will		spirit
4.		bread
5.		forgiveness
6.		temptation
7. deliverance		

Thus the original prayer would have consisted only of the address and the three petitions (4-6 in Matthew) relating to daily needs; Matthew's first three petitions and, equally, the petition for the Spirit in Luke being later liturgical additions.

Spitta, on the other hand, thinks that the form which includes a petition for the Spirit, and which is attested by Gregory of Nyssa and two Greek manuscripts, represents not merely the original Lukan text but actually the primitive form of the Lord's Prayer. But Harnack seems to me to have given ample proof, and von Soden has still further strengthened his arguments, that a petition like this does not correspond with Jesus' mode of thought.

In Luke's Gospel, to be sure, a petition for the Holy Spirit seems admirably to suit Luke's fondness for referring to the Holy Spirit. It is not necessary to adduce the instances from Acts, for they are well known; but we may note the fact that Luke 11 is the chapter of the Holy Spirit, where he is mentioned oftener than in any chapter of the Synoptic Gospels. In Lk. 11 13 for 'give good things' the evangelist glosses, 'give the Holy Spirit'; in 11 20 in a passage from Q, where Matthew has, 'If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons,' Luke, prob-

ably following an exorcistic tradition, changes this into 'by the finger of God'; in 12 12 he gives the comforting assurance that 'the Holy Spirit will teach you in that hour what you must say.' It is obvious that the petition for the Spirit fits in well here; but the argument can be turned in the opposite direction, for it may be said that the very fact that the Holy Spirit is so often mentioned in these chapters led someone to introduce this petition here. Besides, the petition as a whole does not agree with the Lukan style of diction and of thought. In its form with two verbs it corresponds neither to the first nor to the third (Lukan) petition. Luke uses 'cleanse' only for outward levitical cleanness (4 27, 17 14, 17, of leprosy; 11 39, Acts 10 15, 11 9, of vessels and food)—except in Acts 15 9, where the word is used in a figurative sense of hearts cleansed by faith; while in this petition the idea is neither purely levitical nor figurative, but sacramental. Moreover, and this is the main point, Luke never thinks of the Spirit as cleansing; the Spirit is a divine energy, imparting the gift of tongues and other miraculous endowments, never the cleansing power. That conception belongs to the sacramental view, seen in the mysteries, which became common among later Christian theologians and is already found in the thought of the gnostics.

Having thus proved that this petition does not originally belong to Luke's Gospel, we need not concern ourselves with the possibility of its coming from Jesus him-self. It would be a strange chance that a genuine saying of Jesus should find its way into a later form of Luke's Gospel. And in any case it does not agree with Jesus' teaching. In the few instances in which Jesus mentions the Holy Spirit, he implies that he himself and his disciples already possess it, so that there would be no need of praying for it; and the idea of the Spirit as a cleansing power is not germane to the teaching of Jesus.

It is difficult to refute the theory that this petition came from the Baptist. One textual critic has tried to prove that the additions and variations in the Western Text were borrowed from Q, the document used by Luke himself, which he supposes to have been consulted again by a later editor; in somewhat similar fashion von Soden assumes that a saying of the Baptist came into the Gospel of Luke as an additional note. But the burden of proof lies on him who maintains such a thesis.

III

If then the canonical text of both Matthew and Luke can be accepted as authentic, the question as to the original form of the prayer itself becomes much simpler. We have merely to ask whether there has been a shortening or an expansion, for it is evident that the longer form of the address, the third petition, and the seventh petition all belong together. I purposely avoid suggesting that it was Matthew who expanded or Luke who shortened. The evangelists would not have ventured of their own motion to alter what had been transmitted to them; they simply repeated the form used by the churches to which they belonged. The alteration, whatever it was, must have come in at a very early date and without attracting attention.

The Lord's Prayer need not have been drawn by either of the two evangelists from a written source, such as Q; one or both might have taken it from oral tradition. We have, however, one piece of evidence for a common Greek source in the unusual Greek word used to render the adjective qualifying 'bread.' *Epiousios* is not found elsewhere in extant Greek literature, and our limited knowledge is supplemented by the statement of an ancient scholar of the highest rank, Origen, who expressly says that *epiousios* here seemed to be a new word coined

on the analogy of *periousios*. In view of the variation in other words (such as 'debts' and 'sins') the agreement in this unique term is only to be explained, so far as I can see, by the use of a common Greek source, and hence we may infer that the Lord's Prayer stood in Q, or in some other Greek source used both by Matthew and Luke,⁹ but that the text of the prayer was reproduced by one of the evangelists in a form changed so as to accord with the form to which he was accustomed and which was current in the church to which he belonged. This local form may have been a late and altered one, but it is equally conceivable that we have in it the original form, restored in the Gospel against the authority of Q. As to this literary criticism gives no help; we are confined to internal evidence.

Now it is a general observation founded on experience that the shorter form is usually the more original. This rule admits of exceptions, but in our case it leads to the best solution. No reason can be given why the address should have been shortened and the third and seventh petitions dropped altogether, whereas the enlarged form of the address corresponds to the liturgical fashion and the third and seventh petitions are mere repetitions of the second and sixth. Nothing is missed when they are lacking, while they give a certain coloring to the second and sixth petitions which, as we shall see later on, was not originally intended. And the very fact that the longer, Matthaean form was adopted for all liturgical purposes speaks for the genuineness of the shorter, Lukan form. A deviation from the commonly used form would be inexplicable if not caused by a very good tradition.

⁹ It is not the place here to enter upon the Synoptic problem. I am convinced that not all the materials common to Matthew and Luke are taken from Q; for example, with Matt. 11 12-14 compare Luke 16 16 and with Luke 7 29, 30, compare Matt. 21 32. Only where the wording or the order is identical is it probable that Q is used.

There is still the possibility that both forms go back to Jesus himself. Harmonists like Osiander supposed that Jesus gave this prayer once in the Sermon on the Mount and a second time on the occasion when his disciples asked him to teach them how to pray, and modern apologists insist upon the probability that Jesus would have repeated so important a lesson. To me the repetition does not seem in itself probable, especially as the introductory request of the disciples in Luke 11:1 loses all reasonableness if Jesus had already told them how to pray. One would expect that in his answer he would at least remind them of this fact. In trying by this theory of repetition to get rid of the difficulty of a double tradition more improbabilities are created than are dispelled.

IV

Before discussing the prayer itself, a word must be said about the occasion on which Jesus gave it.

In Matthew 6 the prayer is found in the Sermon on the Mount, which according to this Gospel is addressed to the disciples, who are surrounded by the people. It is introduced with no special occasion, in a series of sayings about prayer; in opposition to the hypocritical practice of Jewish rabbis and to the loquacity of gentile prayers, Jesus says, 'After this manner therefore pray ye.' But it is not difficult to see that this is not the original place of the prayer. The verses 7-8, 9-13, 14-15, are insertions by the evangelist which destroy the harmonious structure of the passage with its three examples of good works,—almsgiving, praying, fasting,—as given in 6:1, 2-4, 5-6, 16-18. That these verses form an original unity, only partly obscured by the insertions, is obvious to anyone who has a feeling for symmetry. It is the catechetical method of Matthew which makes him gather at the same point everything belong-

ing to one topic. So we conclude that Matthew did not find the Lord's Prayer in its present surroundings, but himself gave it its position in the Sermon on the Mount.

This conclusion seems to be in favor of Luke's introduction. But it is by no means necessary that either Matthew or Luke should have preserved the original position of the prayer. Luke 11 belongs to the so-called "longer insertion," in which Luke brings together most of his non-Markan materials. He is not following a single source but is combining several; and more than once we can see that he has himself provided a fitting situation. That the instructions given, according to Luke, to the seventy disciples were in the source addressed to the twelve, is evident from the allusion in Luke 22 35; Luke has introduced the seventy in order to distinguish these instructions in chapter 10 from the similar ones given in 9 1-6, where he followed Mark 6 7-13. It is therefore entirely possible that the introductory verse 1 in chapter 11 is likewise the free composition of Luke. He is fond of representing Jesus in the act of praying (cf. 3 21; 6 12; 9 28; only 5 16 has a parallel in Mark 1 35), and is particularly interested in the disciples of the Baptist (cf. Acts 19 1-7). Thus all the elements of this introduction are easy to explain.

But whatever view be taken as to the situation given by Luke, it is obvious that Luke's introduction gives to the Lord's Prayer a wholly different character from that which it wears in Matthew. According to Luke the prayer is a model given to the disciples at their request; in Matthew it appears as the prayer which a Christian is bound to say whenever he prays. It is only a short step from the formula, 'After this manner therefore pray ye,' to the instruction of the Didache, 'Three times a day ye shall pray.'

V

The address is the shortest possible: 'Father.' Much has been said about the "communicative" value of 'our,' and about the importance of reminding oneself that this father is not an earthly one but is so high that he inspires at once awe and trust—awe for his holiness and trust in his power. That is well; but a later addition interests us less, and we may well fear any interpretation which turns the Lord's Prayer into a sermon on religious and moral topics. It is a prayer, a normal prayer, and in no wise a lesson. We are allowed to say, 'Father,' and are not thereby in any way reminded of other beliefs or duties.

'Father' is the most simple and natural address for a child in asking for something from his human father (cf. Luke 15 21); the whole attitude of the child towards the one who is able to give and willing to help him to his best, finds expression in this word. Is it so natural for men in speaking to God to call him 'father'? It is noteworthy that in all religions the idea of fatherhood is present in some way or other. It may be called a common notion of mankind. And yet there is a great difference. When the Assyrians speak of their god Sin as 'father,' it is the father of the gods whom they have in mind; they ask Nebo to intercede as son with Marduk his father. So Zeus is the father of gods and of men; the Latin Jupiter expresses this in the name itself. The Romans in their prayers call Mars and Romulus *pater* because the nation is said to be derived from them: it is a national and mythological connection which finds expression in the address. So Israel calls God 'father' because he has created the nation, or, according to another figure, has selected it from among the nations. In this case the connection is again national, but is not mythological. In Israel monotheism does not recog-

nize any physical relation between God and man, God and his people; the relation is purely moral, but it is national. Not the individual, as individual, but the nation is son of God; the individual has this relation only as a member of the nation; for instance, the king as the national representative. It is remarkable that in the Old Testament more is said about men as sons of God than about God as their father. Judaism shrank from bringing God into too close relation to humanity. Nevertheless the development of piety, encouraged by the influence of Greek philosophy, individualized the thought of this nation also. In the Alexandrian book of Wisdom the individual pious man is said to boast of God as his father—possibly only in addressing him in prayer, but more probably in speaking about him in general. There is a great difference between pondering upon the fatherhood of God and realizing it in prayer, for only in prayer does the relation become vital and important.

Now this is what we find in Jesus; he not only refers to God as 'the father,' but addresses him as 'father' in his prayers. With Jesus what was in former times exceptional becomes the rule. For Jesus himself it is the expression of the natural relation to God in which he feels himself to stand: God is his father, he himself God's beloved son, who is sure that nothing can happen to him which is not in his father's will and therefore good; who on his part is sure of his loyalty to his father's will, and is prepared to fulfil it by every means. This relation of father and son as it existed between God and Jesus is, however, unique. Jesus wishes men to enter into the same relation, but he is aware that their position is different; he never speaks of God as 'our (common) father.' He says 'my father' and he says 'your father.' John 20 17, if not a genuine saying of Jesus, surely gives a just interpretation of his thought. "I ascend unto

my father and your father, and my God and your God." Being himself the Son of God, he could make men to be God's sons and to feel as such and to behave as such. When Paul uses the term 'adoption,' he brings in a strange legal touch, but the underlying idea is true: sonship to God is not for men what it was for Jesus; it is not inherited as a right but is given them by Jesus.

These remarks may seem out of place here, where we are discussing the Lord's Prayer; but I wish to make it clear that this intimate address, 'father,' short and full of trust, is not an obvious form of speech. When used in Jewish prayers, the term is almost buried under solemn additions, 'God our father and our king,' and the like, due to the same tendency which made Christians add 'our (father) which art in heaven.' Jesus, when he prays, addresses God simply by the word 'father'; cf. Mark 14 36, where the sound of the original Aramaic word is preserved in 'abba, father.' In Matt. 11 25 'father' is enlarged to 'father, lord of heaven and earth,' but the address returns to 'father' in verse 26; again we have 'father' in Luke 23, 34, 46, as well as in John 12 28, 17, 1, 5, 21, 24. We do not find it used by anyone else in the gospels; even Jesus himself, when describing the prayer of others, does not use it; cf. Luke 18 11, 13 where both the Pharisee and the publican say 'God.' On the other hand, the Christians used it from the beginning. This is attested by Paul in Rom. 8 15, Gal. 4 6, where the Aramaic 'abba, father,' is kept, as it was in Mark 14 36. It was through Jesus that the Christians learned to address God as their father; it is probably by the Lord's Prayer that they became accustomed to do so. This seems a reasonable explanation, whereas the suggestion that Paul, in the two passages adduced, had the Lord's Prayer in mind, quoting it by its first word, can hardly be accepted.

VI

The Lord's Prayer itself is divided into two parts. The first two (or three) petitions bear a character quite different from the following three (or four); they are exactly parallel and solemnly asyndetic.

Hallowed be *thy* name;
 come *thy* kingdom;
 [done be *thy* will . . .].

'Thy' is here the prominent pronoun, whereas the following petitions have 'our' and 'us'; in these latter, moreover, the structure varies and there are connecting particles.

Our bread, the *epiousion*, give *us* today;
 and forgive *us* *our* debts . . . ;
 and do not bring *us* into temptation
 (but deliver *us* from the evil one).

We need to observe this general structure before entering into details. The difference is remarkable, but it does not prove that the first part did not originally belong to this prayer. The change in tone is, I think, intentional.

Now what is the meaning of the first series of petitions? They seem to be prayers not to God but on his behalf. This sounds strange, and therefore interpreters have tried to turn these first two (or three) petitions into something like a vow—for that is the substance of nearly all the interpretations, differing though they do in form of statement. "We would hallow thy name—do thou help us to do so; we would bring in, or spread, thy kingdom—do thou work with us; we promise to do thy will as it is done by the angels—enable us to fulfil this promise." In particular, the first petition is usually spoken of as representing a kind of doxology,¹⁰ and many interpreters

¹⁰Non tam petentium quam adorantium (Wetstein).

refer to a rabbinical statement, quoted by J. Lightfoot and J. J. Wetstein from *Berachoth*, p. 40 b, that a prayer without a doxology is not to be counted as a prayer. I venture to think that this way of putting it would rather tend to support Harnack's view that the first series of petitions is a later addition springing from liturgical motives (ecclesiastical feeling often coincides with rabbinical views); the same motives leading to the addition of the regular doxology at the end. But who can explain this strange form for a doxology? Why not 'we hallow,' or better 'we praise'? We have no right to construe the words 'hallowed be' in any other sense than the word 'come,' and the latter surely expresses a petition. Likewise 'be done' must be taken as a real petition, not as a concealed form of promise or vow.

Zahn is right in insisting upon the aorist tense of these two (or three) imperatives. For the Greek understanding, whatever the corresponding Aramaic form may have been, the aorist imperative means some demand which is to be fulfilled by an instantaneous, or at least a single, act. How can the name of God be hallowed in a single act? It cannot, if it is to be hallowed by men. But Jesus is not thinking here of men; nor will the Christian think of their agency, if he understands the prayer as a real prayer; rather is he asking God to hallow His own name. What does this mean?

The name, important with us in private and public life (a name often carries with it a great mass of associations; without the name a document is worthless), was still more important for the Semite.¹¹ It is full of meaning; to change one's name means a substantial change in his position. One can take neither man nor spirit without knowing his name. The name is not the man; but the man is nothing without his name. To calumni-

¹¹ We ask, 'What is your name?' or 'How are you called?' The Semite asks, 'How is your name called?' Gen. 32 28.

ate another is to give him a bad name, to bless him is to make his name great (Gen. 12 2). The name represents the man to others, and also to posterity.¹² The names of the twelve tribes on the high-priest's breast-plate represent the tribes themselves before God. So likewise the name of God, revealed by himself to his prophet (Ex. 3 15, 6 3), represents God himself; one can praise God or praise his name, one can curse God or curse his name, but the name always implies reputation in the sight of others or of mankind. The angels decline to answer when asked for their name (Gen. 32 29, Jud. 13 18), but God says of his angel (Ex. 23 21) that his (God's) name is in him; therefore he can be God's representative. The common phrase, 'to cause his name to dwell there' (Deut. 12 11 and often) may be derived from an old fashion of inscribing the name of the god on the walls of his temple (compare 'to put his name there,' Deut. 12 5), but in Israel it is meant figuratively: the name represents the gracious presence of God himself, and contains a power (compare the benediction Num. 6 24-26). Often the name may stand for the person represented by it (compare Ex. 34 16); sometimes it may mean 'fame'; it usually implies the notion of a spoken word (compare 2 Sam. 7 26).

The combination 'hallow the name' is as uncommon in the Old Testament as the other combinations 'make the name great' and 'praise the name' are common. In Is. 29 23 (perhaps a late addition) it is said: 'They shall sanctify my name; yea, they shall sanctify the Holy One of Israel, and shall stand in awe of the God of Israel.' Here the sense is 'praise.' In the same way it is used as an equivalent for 'praise' and 'glorify' in Enoch 61 12, and often by the Rabbis (*kiddush hashem*, *hillul hashem*).

¹² Cf. Gen. 21 23 (LXX), 48 16, the law relating to marrying a brother's wife in order to keep up his name: Deut. 25 6-10, Ruth 4 5 ff., 2 Sam. 14 7, 18 18. The persistence, not being personal, is bound to the name; therefore to drop the name (from inscriptions, etc.) is to destroy existence; Deut. 9 14, 29 20, Josh. 7 9.

But in Ez. 36 23 it is said of God himself: 'I will sanctify my great name, which hath been profaned among the nations, which ye have profaned in the midst of them; and the nations shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes.' Here the meaning is clear: it is God himself who sanctifies his name by restoring his people to glory and holiness. When God allows his people to be defeated and scattered through the nations, he causes his name to be profaned; again, when he brings his people back to their former position, he sanctifies (hallows) his name. All this shows the path to the right understanding of the first petition in the Lord's Prayer. God is asked to sanctify his name by some wonderful mighty deed, in a word by nothing less than the establishment of his kingdom.

The second petition is merely the interpretation of the first. Here again a sound interpretation has to start from an historical analysis of the idea of 'kingdom.' *Malchuth* properly designates not 'realm' but 'dominion,' not the place of rule but the act of rule, the government. Now in the Old Testament two conceptions run side by side. One takes the dominion of God as something present: he rules the world, the sidereal as well as the spiritual; he governs the nations; he is king and lord over the gods. More important, however, is the other, which, starting from a pessimistic view of the present, sees the dominion of God made real only in the future. At present, worldly powers, the party of the impious, Satan himself and his evil spirits, exercise their dominion, but the time will come when God shall suddenly break this tyranny and establish his own dominion, and thereby bring in the reign of bliss. It is in this future sense that the kingdom of God is spoken of in later Jewish literature, and Jesus himself shared this view of his time. The kingdom (or dominion) of God is not something empiri-

cally in existence; it has to be brought about, and therefore the disciples may ask for it in their prayer. It is not to be established by men; God sends it, or establishes it, by his own wonderful power. The novel feature in Jesus' gospel is that he thinks of God's intervention as independent of the behavior of men. God brings about his kingdom, even if men do not care for it; they do not hinder its coming, they only deprive themselves of its blessings (compare Luke 10 9, 11). To be sure, Jesus says much of the conditions for the individual's entrance into the kingdom, but the coming of the kingdom is not conditioned by the attitude which the individual, or even the people, takes in regard to it. It comes of itself, sent by God; it has in some sense already come in Jesus, and it will come in glory with Jesus at the parousia.

Here again the combination, 'thy kingdom come,' is remarkable. We are more used to such phrases as 'enter' the kingdom, 'see' the kingdom, 'inherit' the kingdom, 'share in' the kingdom. This group of verbs, which in the Old Testament designate the possession of the land of promise,¹³ convey the notion of a topographically circumscribed and located kingdom, or realm. The kingdom is there; the question is whether one can enter it or not. But another set of verbs is frequently used in connection with kingdom which embody a different conception: the kingdom 'is at hand,' 'comes'; this involves the notion of something movable, pertaining to a temporal not to a local scheme. Doubtless, the Jews of that time conceived of heaven and earth as capable of motion; Paul expects the "building from God," the "house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens" to be moved thence to earth because it is the new body with which he longs to be clothed upon. Nevertheless, the idea of coming, of being at hand, suggests

¹³ So in Matt. 5 5, 'they shall inherit the earth' (better, 'the land') is equivalent to 'theirs is the kingdom of heaven.'

rather future time than distant position. And in fact the notion of the kingdom of God is a temporal one: it is the future reign of bliss, a dominion to be made real by God when his good time shall arrive.

But the more important aspect is that Jesus does not teach his disciples to pray that they may enter the kingdom, that God may grant them to share the blessings of his realm, that they may be able so to act as to bring about, establish, or spread his dominion. On the contrary, he makes them pray directly for the coming of the kingdom. Here we grasp the very meaning of the idea. It is not individual happiness; that is expressed elsewhere by the equivalent, 'live.'¹⁴ Jesus is looking for a general change of all conditions, which will bring bliss to mankind. So this petition, taught to his disciples, does not interfere with his claim that in his company they already enjoy the blessings of the kingdom. They do already enjoy them personally; but there still remains the desire that these blessings may become universal, that everything which is opposed to true happiness may be removed. And this can be done only by God himself, by some supernatural act of his almighty power.¹⁵

By bringing about the kingdom in this full sense of the word God will hallow his name, that is, will cause it to be praised by all creatures. The same thing is prayed for in both these petitions; only it is first viewed with relation to God—he has honor from it; then with relation to mankind—through it men are blessed.

The third petition is an addition which does not quite fit here. It might be interpreted as meaning that God is asked finally to fulfil his will, that is, to bring to effect

¹⁴ Observe that the same group of verbs which we found connected with 'kingdom' is used in combination with 'life'; 'enter,' Mark 9 43, 45, Matt. 18 8, 9, 19 17; 'inherit,' Mark 10 17, Matt. 19 29, Luke 10 25, 18 18.

¹⁵ See the discussion of individual and collective salvation in my book, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, London, 1910.

what he has planned and promised. 'Will' can have this meaning, *Heilsratschluss*, the intention to save mankind; in Matt. 26 42 'will' means God's decree, to which man has to submit.¹⁶ But it is much more common in the sense of 'will to be obeyed,' that is, law, commandments.¹⁷ This petition seems therefore to be a moralizing interpretation of the former ones: the kingdom, or dominion, of God is established when the will of God is done by all creatures, on earth as well as in heaven.

This last clause, 'as in heaven so also on earth,' cannot be taken as belonging to all three petitions, as is held by Westcott and Hort,¹⁸ for it is connected in tradition exclusively with the third one. The introductory particle 'as' indicates that heaven and earth are not taken as the two parts of the universe on an entire equality (compare Gen. 1 1, Matt. 5 18, etc.), but are contrasted; the heaven, God's residence, being the model of perfection, where the will of God is done always without reluctance, the earth on the contrary being the scene of rebellion against God (compare Is. 55 9, Deut. 30 12, Ps. 2 7). The petition thus asks God to cause his will to be done by men as it is regularly done by the angels; perhaps one may include the idea that the wild beasts and other brute creatures on earth shall submit to God's law as fully as do his heavenly creatures, the stars.

¹⁶ This passage, however, seems to be modelled after the Lord's Prayer; there is nothing similar in Mark 14 36, 39, Matt. 26 39. Luke 22 42 again comes nearer to the Lord's Prayer, but is not identical with the third petition, as is Matt. 26 42. Submission to God's irresistible will is implied in Acts 21 14.

¹⁷ 'To do the will of God' is the common phrase in Judaism as well as in the gospels, cf. Mark 3 35, Matt. 7 21 (Luke 11 28), John 7 17, 9 31, Acts 13 22; in Rom. 2 13 'will' stands for the totality of the Law. It is remarkable that the Old Syriac, which usually translates 'do the will,' here gives the plural, 'thy wills (wishes) be (done).'

¹⁸ It is maintained already by Origen, the Arian author of the *Opus imperf.* in Matt., and the *Catechismus Romanus*; it has been supported recently by Nestle, in *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, vi, p. 190.

In Luke a few Latin manuscripts have the third petition without this addition. This reading was supported by Lachmann.

This would enrich the notion of God's dominion, which in fact is never a purely moral one, but almost always includes the idea of a realm of peace, a restored paradise. This would fit into Jesus' conceptions; but as we have here a later addition, I do not feel sure that it is right to go beyond the moral meaning.

Thus the first part of the Lord's Prayer may be summed up in the one idea that God is entreated to fulfil the desire of his faithful people and bring about his dominion, the realm of bliss. That this one idea is expressed in two (or perhaps three) petitions is exactly what would be expected in view of Jesus' custom of illustrating his points with two or three examples.¹⁹ This does not run counter to his own warning to avoid vain repetitions (Matt. 6 7); he himself prayed insistently and with repetition of the same words (Mark 14 39). The repetition here is not vain; the one idea is expressed on two sides and so receives its due emphasis.

VII

The second part of the prayer is markedly different. It begins with the petition for daily bread. We shall not attempt to solve the riddle contained in *epiousios*.²⁰ The phrase 'bread of tomorrow' (*mahar*) in the Gospel according to the Hebrews does not signify, since this Gospel is probably a retranslation from the Greek, not the original Aramaic. Jerome's translation *supersubstantialem*, which reappears in Wycliffe's 'bread over other substance' (compare also Coverdale, 1538, and

¹⁹ Cf. my paper on Doublets and Triplets, in *Neutestamentliche Studien* Georg Heinrici zu seinem 70 Geburtstag dargebracht, Leipzig, 1914, pp. 92-100.

²⁰ It has been discussed recently by A. Debrunner, *Glotta*, iv, 1912, pp. 249-253, and A. Deissmann, *Neutestamentliche Studien* Georg Heinrici dargebracht, 1914, pp. 115-119. The former proposes to take the adjective, or what the grammarians call hypostatic, form for *ἐν τῇ οὐσάν* (*scil. ἡμέραν*) 'for the day just being,' whereas the latter still maintains the derivation from *ἡ ἐτιοῦσα* (*scil. ἡμέρα*) 'the next day.'

'supersubstantial' in the Rheims-Douai Bible) spoils the very best in this petition, which is not spiritual, nor sacramental, but natural and human, man's answer to God's call for trust in him (Matt. 6 25 ff.). To omit *epiousion* as being a gloss on the word 'today' meaning 'every day' is too easy a solution. My own opinion is that the word indicates that men are to ask for what they need, what is appropriate for them, but not for more. The difference between Matthew's 'give us today,' with its aorist tense (δός), and Luke's 'give us day by day,' with its present (δίδου)—it is remarkable how accurately the tenses are used in this popular Greek—may be explained by the purpose of the prayer for use in the evening, just as the translation 'tomorrow' seems to be governed by liturgical motives.²¹ Matthew's version is here supported by symmetry as well as by internal evidence.

The next petition is akin to the one just considered. Forgiveness of sin is the daily bread of the soul, and it is significant that Jesus puts it in this way. This was not the attitude of later Judaism. Consciousness of guilt and longing to be rid of it was, indeed, not lacking—one need only remember the Psalms—but it is usually on account of a special fault, under the pressure of a special penalty, that the Jew asked for forgiveness. We are not told that the publican's sigh, 'God be merciful to me a sinner!' was his daily prayer. The formulated confessions of sin which we find in the Mishna are meant for special days, like the day of atonement. On the other hand, we find the prayer for forgiveness constant in Christianity from the beginning. In spite of its enthusiasm and excitement, Christianity was fully aware that man has every day to struggle with sin and that his struggle is often unsuccessful. I do not refer

²¹ Cf. F. H. Chase, *The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church* (Texts and Studies, i, 3), 1891, pp. 42-53.

here to the seventh chapter of Romans, but to 1 Thess. 5 14, 1 Cor. 3 12 ff., and to all the exhortations of Paul's letters. Following Jesus' utterance about sins which can and sins which cannot be forgiven (Mark 3 28 ff., Luke 12 10, Matt. 12 31 ff.) primitive Christianity for the most part distinguishes between sins of weakness and ignorance and mortal sins—the former to be forgiven through the intercession of the heavenly Lord (Rom. 8 34, Heb. 2 18, 4 15, 7 25, 1 John 2 1), the latter irreparable (Heb. 6 4 ff., 10 26 ff., 1 John 5 16). Jesus does not assume that such sins have been committed by his disciples, but he thinks it necessary for them every day to ask forgiveness.

The question has recently been much discussed whether or not Jesus offered the prayer in his own behalf, and so accepted a share in this petition for forgiveness. The tradition does not give the Lord's Prayer as meant for himself; it does not introduce it by 'Let us pray,' but by 'When ye pray, say'; and in view of what has been pointed out above regarding Jesus' attitude of distinguishing himself from his disciples in his relation to God, I think it highly improbable that he meant here to include himself among penitent sinners.

In this petition, likewise, the wording of Matthew seems to come nearer to the original than that of Luke; 'remit debts' is a familiar figure with Jesus for the forgiveness of sins (compare Matt. 18 23). Luke likes to explain²², and therefore says 'sins' instead of 'debts,' keeping, however, 'debtors' in the second part of the petition. The genuineness of this second part has been doubted²³, because it is said to make the structure unsymmetrical and to have a moralizing tendency unfit for a prayer. Here again there is a slight difference between Matthew and Luke. Luke's form expressed

²² Compare Luke 11 13 with Matt. 7 11.

²³ Eduard von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der Ältesten Christenheit*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 51.

rather the willingness on the part of the person praying to forgive if anybody is 'owing' him, that is, has offended him; with Matthew the man insists that he has forgiven, and that now it is God's turn to forgive him. Both ways, we are sometimes told, are alien to Jesus' mind, and unfit for a real prayer; therefore this must be a later addition, suggested by the parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Matt. 18 23-35) and other sayings of Jesus (compare Mark 11 25, 26, Matt. 18 21 f., Luke 17 3 f., Matt. 5 23 f.). I am not prepared to agree with this criticism. First, the tradition is against it: Luke proves that this is an old part of the prayer, not an enlargement added when this was connected with Matt. 6 14 f. On the contrary, it attached to itself this other saying. Secondly, Jesus is here teaching; a certain amount of pedagogical matter would not therefore be surprising. It is true that prayer ought not to be abused for purposes of teaching and preaching; prayer is addressed to God, not to a congregation, and Jesus knew this better than anyone else. But is it necessary to assume that by adding this sentence Jesus wished to intimate to his disciples the duty of forgiving? He makes them speak to God and declare their willingness to forgive (for here Luke's form seems preferable to Matthew's, which was probably influenced by the parallels in 5 23 f., 18 23 ff.: first forgive, then ask for forgiveness). It is a natural expression of right sentiment and only incidentally a reminder of one's own duty.

The next petition is closely connected with this: forgiveness does not help, if sin is done again; therefore shield us from new temptation. It is a self-created difficulty which has led to the Old Latin rendering: 'Do not suffer us to be brought into temptation.' Theological reflections like those expressed in James 1 13 ff. are far from Jesus. His undisturbed religious sense traces everything immediately back to God. While

later Jewish narrowness and timidity introduced Satan instead of the anger of the Lord (1 Chron. 21 1), and so corrected the old Biblical view that God tempted David (2 Sam. 24 1 ff.), Jesus goes back to the primitive conception.

It is therefore unfit for his prayer and evidently again a later addition when Matthew adds here, 'but deliver us from the evil one.' A careful study of the phraseology convinces me that the word 'evil' cannot be understood in the sense of *Übel*, evil inflicted upon a man, so that the petition becomes a prayer for deliverance from death, illness, or other distress; it bears a moral character, and is either neuter—the evil which one does, or masculine—the evil one. This latter meaning not only is attested by the interpretation of the fathers but is required by the context, for it is needed to meet the difficulty contained in the reflection that God tempts not directly but through Satan (cf. Job 1). The sixth petition was supplemented by this seventh, which however is less comprehensive, excluding only one line of temptation (the devil, not the world or the flesh).

The second part of the Lord's Prayer thus shows greater variety than the first; it comprises three different petitions, all, however, closely related to one another.

Neither the doxology nor the 'Amen' belonged originally to the Lord's Prayer. Both attest its early liturgical use.

VIII

Having thus analyzed the Lord's Prayer in detail, let us now sum up its contents. We find that, except for the short address, it contains nothing but petitions. That is remarkable. A rabbinical rule says that no prayer is complete without praise, and it is this feeling which has caused the enlargement of the address and the addition of the doxology at the end. The same

feeling has induced many interpreters to explain the first petition as a kind of praise rather than prayer. To us it seems fitting that thanksgiving should be included in every prayer (compare 1 Thess. 5 18, Col. 3 17, Eph. 5 20, 2 Cor. 1 11, etc.), but for Jesus to pray means to ask for something (compare Matt. 7 7-11). Many a theory about prayer will have to be revised, if we take Jesus as our example in praying and adopt the prayer he taught his disciples as a model.

And for what does he bid his disciples ask? A German proverb says, *Not lehrt beten*, necessity teaches to pray. This is often censured: one ought to pray without being urged by necessity. But, like all proverbs, it has truth in it, and Jesus supports it; it is necessity which makes his disciples pray. Rather, two necessities lead them to ask God for relief. First comes the one great urgent necessity that all the conditions of life be changed. In this present world with all its distress and woe man needs a general change which shall bring happiness and peace. This is the kingdom of God for which the Christian looks; and he calls upon God to bring it about, beseeching him to hallow his own name, exposed to blasphemy if God do not exhibit his power and justice. Secondly, there are the minor necessities of the intervening present. As long as this world with its existing conditions remains, man wants bread to eat, and he needs daily restoration through the forgiveness of sin and the averting of temptation; body and soul both need support. Jesus puts this in the plainest form. He does not enter into detail as to the needs of bodily life; daily bread expresses it all. He does not use many words about feeding the soul with spiritual food, supporting it by divine communion, and so on. That our sins may be forgiven and that we be not led into temptation, that is all that he tells us to ask for. But he plainly and insistently wishes his disciples to ask for these things.

Here is no making of words; it is prayer, real prayer.³⁴ Instead of moralizing upon the Lord's Prayer we had better observe the Lord's attitude as it is expressed in this model prayer, and then learn from him what he values, what he thinks worth while to pray for, what he does not mention at all, and why he puts things in this order; what is his valuation of the several objects he is setting before his disciples' minds, and how plain and simple it all is. The whole prayer is, so to speak, only one great petition: deliver us from our burden, universal and individual.

Jesus begins with the common, and in his view the most urgent, necessity in order to put emphasis upon it, and he expresses it in two parallel petitions. Then he goes on to speak of the needs of the individual in the present time, and here three short sentences cover the whole ground.

It is important to notice that Jesus starts from the evil situation in general. It shows how strongly he himself feels the depressing state of the present world, how deeply he is impressed by the misery of his people, or rather of mankind in general (for he is a Jew, but without the narrow limits of nationality); it shows how social his mind is and how much he values the common benefits and deplores the common evils. However individualistic he may be, he cares for mankind as a whole, nay even more, for the world universal, including all being, and he is not satisfied until the universe shall be changed from a place where Satan exerts his influence into a dominion of God.

It is remarkable that Jesus ascribes so much importance to the daily needs of human life. Nothing human

³⁴ That is very appropriate which Isidore of Seville, *De officiis ecclesiasticis*, i. 15 3 f., says: that in the first three petitions *aeterna poscuntur*, and in the following four *temporalia petuntur*. It has no value to compare the Lord's Prayer with the Decalogue: twice three petitions corresponding to twice five commandments; the first part dealing with piety, the second with charity. Calvin, otherwise the best interpreter, is here misled by a bad tradition.

is alien to him; he is not one of those exalted spiritualists who are above the need of eating, nor does he share the dualistic view that the material body has no claim for support because it is the creature of an inferior God. No, Jesus well knows what hunger means to man, and he puts into the world-prayer a petition for daily bread, thereby securing to the bodily life its proper right for all time to come. But at the same time he by no means confines himself to this domain; there is something else in man which has equal claim to attention. If the body is tormented by hunger, so is the soul by the interruption of communion with God, which is what sin means. Therefore sin must be removed and not allowed again to enter. Whenever this is done by God's forgiving sin and averting temptation, then man is safe and happy. There is no need to add a special petition for bliss and joy; these are here;²⁵ but since they are merely individual, the first two petitions are necessary.

The prayer thus reflects the gospel of Jesus. The gospel is not a new law, not a new kind of morals. It is a message of grace from God our Father announcing his readiness to bring about his kingdom, that is to fulfil all his promises regarding the future realm of bliss; it is at the same time a declaration on the part of God that he is willing to act as the Father of each individual man, supporting, forgiving, defending. Nothing is said in this prayer about Jesus. Christianity from time to time missed something and tried additions having regard to John 16 23. But it is exactly Jesus' attitude. He announces the kingdom and he preaches God's fatherly love without saying much about himself; and yet he is the king of this kingdom and it is but through him that we are sure of God's fatherly love. So it is

²⁵ Alcuin is reported to have prayed daily: 'O Lord, grant me to acknowledge my sins, to confess them sincerely, to make satisfaction for them justly; and so grant me forgiveness of my sins'; to which prayer Benedict of Aniane wished to add, 'and after this make me blessed (grant me salvation).' Was this addition necessary?

Jesus who teaches his disciples this prayer; they never would dare to pray in this way were it not for him. To be sure, the single petitions have parallels in the Old Testament and the Jewish literature.²⁶ But one looks in vain for anything like this prayer. It is unique as to its composition, and original as to the religious spirit revealed in it. It is the Lord's Prayer, in the sense that it expresses the new relation into which God and mankind have been brought by Jesus.²⁷

²⁶ J. J. Wetstein: *Tota haec oratio ex formalis hebraeorum concinnata est*. See the materials in E. von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit*, 1901, pp. 40-41, and G. Heinrich, *Die Bergpredigt*, 1905, pp. 66-67.

²⁷ C. C. Torrey, "A Possible Metrical Original of the Lord's Prayer," in *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, vol. xxviii, 1913, pp. 312-317, gives a retranslation of the Lukan form of the Lord's Prayer into Aramaic in "six perfectly metrical lines of seven syllables each," which deserves careful consideration. Torrey's article, "The Translations made from the Original Aramaic Gospels," in *Studies in the History of Religions* presented to C. H. Toy, New York, 1912, pp. 269-317, also contains discussion of some of the problems of the Lord's Prayer.

MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

ANNA GARLIN SPENCER

The Nineteenth Century was ushered in with trumpet-calls to self-assertion and social freedom. A vague but long-cherished hope of the elect of humanity that the masses, each and all, might yet become persons, crystallized during the eighteenth century into a popular assertion of "equality of rights" in the body politic as "the first of rights" and essential to the process of universal individuation. Thus was born the democratic State. The Church in Christian civilization had long before recognized the independent personality of all, even of slaves and of women, in its spiritual Magna Charta, which secured to every human being the right to own his own soul and laid upon each the burden of saving it. The Protestant Reformation added to this the duty of understanding "the plan of salvation," and hence reinforced, and in many instances initiated, the demand of the State for an intelligent electorate. Thus Church and State worked together to call into being the free, tax-supported school, and to make compulsory some minimum of formal education. The democratic State and the democratic school have worked together to create slowly legalized freedom of association for manual laborers. Labor reform organizations, springing up at once as soon as legal restrictions upon such associations were removed, have initiated the collective struggle for common industrial betterment. Of the five basic institutions of society, therefore—the family, the Church, the State, the school, and the industrial order—four are already well on their way toward thorough-going democratization. It is necessary to remind

ourselves of these familiar facts in order to escape the common error of treating some one institution of society as a detached social structure, the problems concerning which are to be solved independently of other human relationship. The first, the most vital, the most intimate, and the most universal of social institutions, that of marriage and the family, has longest resisted re-adjustment to the new ethics involved in the now accepted principle of equality of human rights.

This was natural, since conservatism toughens in fibre in proportion to the sentiment involved in the preservation of an inherited social mechanism, and the word "home" symbolizes the acme of sentiment. Long after the Church had emancipated women from the family bond of ethnic faiths and had taught them to approach the altar singly and alone, it gave its sanction to laws and customs which deprived women of all control of their persons or estates and hence reinforced the aristocratic order of the family. Long after the State had written its bills of rights to secure government of the people, by the people, and for the people, its political systems ignored women as people; and its statutes gave the married woman no more contract power than her minor child possessed, and hence incapacitated her for legal guardianship of that minor child; and denied her right to choose her own residence or national allegiance, or to secure redress for any form of oppression by her husband short of personal violence or extreme deprivation of food or shelter, proved dangerous to life. Hence the democratic State for generations buttressed the autocracy of the ancient family order. Long after the democratic school offered to all boys the chance to know and to do to the uttermost, girls were not counted as among those whose trained intelligence was a necessity to the State. Hence not until the middle of the nineteenth century did human beings of the mother-sex share the

advantages of that education which is the basis of the larger life.

At last, rising to popular view on the crest of a wave of passionate protest against African slavery in the United States, what was at first called the "Woman's Rights Movement" was born. Not until such a movement was definitely initiated could the family order respond radically to the world currents of democratic influence. It was inevitable that such a movement should at last appear. The Church had begun to affirm with Emerson: "Every soul has private access to the Divine." The State had already declared, as President Wilson once phrased it, that "human quality is the basis of political equality." The school had announced in the words of Channing: "Every soul is sacred, and therefore every child has a right to the best development society can afford." The industrial order was beginning to thunder with Carlyle: "Work is great, and there is no other greatness, and Labor must yet ascend its throne." It could not be otherwise than that women should at last apply to themselves and to their own condition the ideals thus made conscious and determinate throughout the social structure.

What is now called the Feminist Movement has naturally specialized in several lines of struggle and endeavor. One section has been busy with echoing the eighteenth century claim to political rights, and a lively contingent of its propagandists is still at work on that belated task, which should long ago have been accomplished and taken out of the way of even more vital concerns. Another section, seeking higher education and professional and business training and practice, has been obliged to segregate itself sharply for this achievement of personal power. This section of the Feminist Movement has been largely recruited from, and is now most efficiently sustained by, an increasing

class of unmarried women who can meet men on their own ground of specialized vocational work in the most effective and uninterrupted manner. Still another, by far the largest and the most socially important section, has been at work with the best and wisest men to make over family and social life, bit by bit, in its legal, ethical, and domestic aspects, in the interest of "two heads in counsel, two beside the hearth, and two in the tangled business of the world." The industrial order has, however, contributed an unsought and unexpected but stupendous acceleration of the movement toward the individuation of women. The invention of power-driven machinery, with its subsequent transformation of domestic industry into the factory system, has obviously and greatly changed the life of working-men, but it has completely revolutionized the life and work of women. Schiller says: "While philosophers are disputing about the government of the world, Hunger and Love are performing the task." In the same manner, while new ethics have been pressing toward the conscious readjustment of the family along the lines of democratic tendency already established in the other basic institutions of society, the old economic need and the new economic system have conspired to change rudely and completely that environmental pressure by which all human relationships are most radically affected. The social requirement that girls and women should labor at useful employment between the days of their schooling, whether those days be long or short, and the days of their marriage, is as old as peaceful industry itself. Except for an almost negligible minority of the privileged classes, unmarried girls and married women have never been allowed to "idle." They have had less time for recreation allowed them than boys and men have secured for themselves. They have never had a chance to go a-fishing in house-cleaning time nor to limit their labor

to an eight-hour day. Moreover, their work-capacity has always been counted as a part of the family treasury. The economic value of the unmarried girl and woman has been recognized through the ages as an asset of the family into which she was born, and has been legally attested by the price paid in service or in money by would-be husbands to fathers, who would lose the labor of daughters on their marriage and should therefore receive just compensation for the loss. And when, in some new tenderness of fatherly solicitude, or some dawning recognition of the daughter's right to personal recompense for her labor, the marriage price became the "dowry," secured to the wife in principal if not in income for her economic protection in the case of the death of the husband, this dowry still recorded a clear understanding of the work-value of the unmarried girl and the married woman to the family economy. This ancient dedication of womanhood to constant labor has today taken on change for the mass of average life in but four particulars, namely: girls and women now leave the home for the factory and the shop in order to secure the same work they used to do in the household; they do a specialized section of the task instead, as of old, of undertaking complete processes of labor; they receive through this highly specialized labor of modern industry a training away from rather than, as of old, directly towards the manifold activities of the house-mother's task; and they receive a definite wage for their work outside the home instead of being paid within the family, as of old, by a share in household provision. These are weighty differences, and they each and all affect the conditions of marriage and the family as no previous economic experience of the race has done.

Without some understanding of the political, educational, and economic elements which enter into the instability of the modern family, the true significance of

the problems of marriage and divorce cannot be discerned. Well-known facts prove that this instability of the modern family is serious in extent and has in it grave social dangers, and shows deplorable effects especially in relation to child-life. So true is this that many churchmen and many ethical teachers are seriously alarmed and, even at times, moved to the pessimistic belief that the foundations of social order are breaking up and the family is in process of destruction. In no attempted analysis of social change, however, is evidenced more dense ignorance of what is really happening in institutional structure; and in none is the cowardice and dogmatism of the ultra-conservative more clearly shown. What is really happening in the family is that women have become too free and too strong longer to accept bad conditions which once their weakness and ignorance forced them to endure. What is really happening is that men themselves are not longer content, as of old they were, to have one sex-relationship for upper-servant help in the household and another for enjoyment outside the home, but demand in one chosen wife an honorable and equal comradeship in mutual work and in common pleasures. What is really happening is that the marriage ideal is becoming more and more exacting in the consciousness of both men and women; and that more and more freedom of choice, both in taking on and in giving up marriage ties, is operating to forbid content with less than the most satisfying relationship between men and women. What is really happening is that the best interests of children are understood as never before, and that those best interests are now seen to demand not merely the outward form but the inner substance of a united and a loving parenthood. The tragedy of a ruined home is no longer expressed solely in terms of separation of the married pair; the mistake and failure are now seen to be themselves the tragedy,

whether or not separation occur to publish the fact. Nay more, what is really happening is that the idea of "eternal punishment" for mistakes and failures, as respects both this life and the next, is passing out of the human mind, and men and women will not longer consent to sit forever among the ashes of desolation if life seems to offer the chance to recover from such mistake and failure in a new and happier venture. It is these realities of changed and changing ideals of life that are at work to make divorce possible, and re-marriage of divorced persons no longer, in and of itself, a cause for moral condemnation. In the face of these realities of changed and changing ideals it is as futile as it is childish for church synods and convocations—composed, be it noted, exclusively of men—to ordain a return to the older type of family autonomy. The fact that men as well as women are seeking legal release from hated marriage bonds, and often, as well, the readjustment of family relations in a new effort toward domestic satisfaction, is not, as many suppose, significant of man's ethical back-sliding but rather of his moral advance. For, be it remembered, men have always found ways to relieve themselves from domestic companionship proved obnoxious or even tiresome; often by legal repudiation of their wives, when wives had no escape from unhappy marriage conditions; but oftenest, by illicit sex-relationship while preserving the outward semblance of family unity. The statistics of illegitimate births, and the known prevalence of marital infidelity among men, in those countries which allow no legal divorce, furnish unimpeachable testimony to an element of moral progress in the ideal generally held by men of today, that sex-relationship is limited in honor to legal marriage even if the legal bond be made more flexible thereby. The majority of applications for divorce and of legal separation are, however, made to our courts by women, and this is the most significant fact in the

problems affecting the stability of the modern family. It proves beyond question that the relations of the sexes in marriage must undergo profound changes in order to fit the family structure to the new democratic order of society. It gives this conclusive proof of needed change because it shows that the innermost centre of social relationship is responding consciously to the ethics of equality of rights. Political democracy has taught women to feel themselves of too much worth as human beings to be appraised wholly by sex-relationship, and has therefore made them unwilling to "obey" a husband any more than a king. They have begun to interpret constitutions and bills of rights as giving them an inalienable right to choose for themselves in marriage and to escape from intolerable, even from disappointing, results of a wrong choice. This sense of an inalienable right once engendered cannot be destroyed by inherited church doctrines or conventional ethics. Its most positive expression is shown where women refuse to endure enforced union with vicious men whose touch is contagion and whose heritage to their children is disease and misery. In a world newly awakened to the prevalence of diseases due to vice, and newly made aware of the dire consequences of these diseases in respect to marriage, family life, and the welfare of offspring, dare any enlightened person oppose or regret this revolt of women against the invasion of the home by the worst of social evils? This revolt is only a reassertion of woman's ancient right and duty of sex-discrimination in the interest of race preservation. It is a vicarious sacrifice offered to secure strength and purity in the blood of the nation. It is high time that so much of eugenic wisdom as is represented by the breaking of marriage ties so mistakenly assumed, for causes of mental defectiveness, degenerative diseases, and moral insanity, in either party to the union, should be socially approved and not condemned.

The influence of the school, now opened freely to girls from kindergarten to university, gives an added and quite different tendency, both in entering, in refusing to enter, and in leaving the marriage bond. Educated women have become conscious of personal tastes, capacities, and ambitions, which make many unwilling to "give all for love." This leads to some nice calculations of give and take on the "souls' Rialto," whose "merchandise" creates difficult transactions for any but the intellectual and moral élite. Men find it difficult to realize that household arts and domestic tastes do not come, like Dogberry's "reading and writing, by nature," to all women. Pride in a gifted wife's achievement in some special line is often quite consistent in their minds with demands upon her for equal facility in the all-round usefulness of the old-fashioned housewife. At best, the circumstances of ordinary family life make necessary sharp and often painful decisions between the special taste and capacity of a wife and mother and the general demands of family well-being. If those demands are tempered by understanding, on the part of all concerned, that her personal development has some claim upon the family indulgence as well as the family large claim upon her time and strength, all will go well, and the difficulties may but perfect the moral discipline of the domestic order in the higher grades of social life. If, on the contrary, all concerned look upon the service of the woman-head of the family as rightfully shared with everyone but her own personality, there must be trouble. It is impossible to send girls to schools in which specialized achievement is the motive power and guiding attraction, and not develop in them desires and qualities that demand play and opportunity within, as well as without, the family relationship; and that play and opportunity require a more flexible construction of woman's obligation to the family than most persons yet perceive.

Many men, however, surprisingly many for the short time they have had in which to acquire the graces of concession to equals in the marriage bond, have already adjusted themselves to household conditions of a quite new type. Yet the majority of men are still confused by, if not intolerant toward, the claim for re-adjustment of family life which higher education has made inevitable in the case of many women. Moreover, the masses of women have not yet ethically adjusted their own technique of living to the new principles of life. They often claim all that the old type of woman claimed even when specially privileged, while claiming at the same time all that the "new woman" can or should demand. Such take advantage of the full measure of freedom in work and in social opportunity which the new time has made possible, and yet may sue for "breach of promise" for disappointment in marriage, or claim support in idle luxury from hard-working husbands, and even demand "alimony" after selfish and hasty repudiation of marriage obligations. In spite, however, of some selfishness and of more shallow and inconsistent assertion of their new freedom, educated women have, for the most part, kept their poise during the transitional period and walk the dizzy heights of the bridge between the old and new conditions with admirable agility and still more admirable conscientiousness. With few exceptions the leading womanhood of our time, aided by the leading manhood, is bravely attacking and loyally achieving the difficult task of creating a new family order. Already the centres of higher education are themselves definitely engaging in the task of fitting into working efficiency the school and the feminine ideal in terms of mingled personal development and family service. In nearly one hundred and fifty institutions of higher learning in the United States, courses in household economics and home-making are already established,

courses in which the relation of the most highly-developed womanhood is directed toward both a finer and wiser service in the home and a broader civic house-keeping. Meanwhile, the most varied and ingenious experimentation is going on within the family in the higher intellectual and ethical areas, by which to demonstrate in terms of successful experience the possibility and social advantage of true democracy in the home.

It cannot be denied, however, that there are serious pathological conditions in the lower strata of the family life due to the maladjustment of the old economic need and the new economic system in the life and work of women. To train the average girl away from domestic arts in her school life and during her usually brief experience in a "gainful occupation," while leaving the demands upon the average house-mother so largely the same as in the past, is to make common wifehood and motherhood more difficult. To give such a girl the new and delightful experience of receiving a pay envelope into her own hand while, as is the case in many even of the poorer families, relieving her from responsibility for her share of the family expenditure, is to make the sacrifice of "pin-money" exacted by marriage distasteful to many. To give woman's work a definite market value while destroying much that used to give the home its economic standing in the world of industry, is to create a conscious antagonism between the condition of the earners and of the spenders among women, which leads to confusion of choice between personal desire and domestic duty. A well-known sociologist has said that many couples seek separation or divorce because "John, who earns ten dollars a week, has married Mary, who used to earn six dollars a week, and now they are trying to live on John's ten dollars alone and bring up a family of children besides." That makes John discouraged and Mary dissatisfied with her meagre share of the tiny in-

come, and may lead John to desert his family and force Mary to return to her earning and leave to philanthropy such burdens of child-care as Mary cannot assume. Sometimes, however, and increasingly is it true, Mary does not try to live on John's ten dollars but keeps on, after marriage, her own paid work outside the home. Then it happens often that children are not sought, or, coming, are not carefully nurtured, and thus the bond of common love for offspring, so far in the history of the race the strongest tie in marriage, loses its power. Or it often happens that John, aware of the dangers and privations of a "lowered standard of living," postpones marriage until he can secure better wages, and in the lonely bachelor days contracts habits which make him unsuccessful in family relationships. Or Mary is coolly prudent and fears to dare poverty with John and turns away from his love with a chilling effect upon his ambition and his idealism, which bodes ill for his future and the woman he may later marry. These economic difficulties are not limited to the range of ten dollar and six dollar a week incomes. They act and react upon the lives of those whose earning capacity is much larger and whose intelligence superior to the average. The economic difficulties inhering in modern marriage are not solved by any "paper plans" by which the entire work of women is to be made as highly specialized as that of men, so that home-making and motherhood shall interfere scarcely more with women's economic opportunities and achievements than with those of men. Most of these paper plans are made by exceptionally clever women whose own work has the relative freedom as to hours and conditions of all expressions of high-grade personality. They have no vital significance for the majority of women, who can earn money only subject to the exactions and the rigidities of man-made systems of labor. Nor have we as yet any data of en-

couragement toward diminishing to such a degree as is indicated by these paper plans, the demand upon the strength and time of the house-mother for that home-making which is the earliest socializing influence in human society. Nor is it women alone who pay a heavy price for the recompense of parental affection. The average man gives hostage to fortune with the birth of offspring, and must do what will give the family economic security rather than what will most please his own desire in labor. Neither fathers nor mothers are "economically independent," but both are bound with chains of service to their children's welfare.

One social fact, as yet hardly perceived by the general mind in its bearings upon family stability, presses for clearer statement and fuller application. This is the fact that the *laissez-faire* theory has been applied to all the basic institutions of society, including the family, in their first transition from aristocratic to democratic forms; and in all has proved itself socially incompetent. It was once thought that freedom in religion would liberate and give adequate expression to a universal passion for excellence. It is now understood that the freer the form of religious organization, the more vital the need for great personal leadership. It was once thought that freedom and class despotism would allow all men to rise immediately to political efficiency, and that when "fishers and choppers and ploughmen should constitute a state" it would be at once demonstrated that the voice of the people is the voice of God. We have learned by costly experience that public welfare demands in democracy, as in aristocracy, the rule of the best; and that the demos must learn to pick and choose its servant-leaders by far more ingenious political mechanism than despots require. It was once thought that to open the school-house door to the masses would guarantee intelligence and virtue in the common life.

We have learned that social control is imperatively needed to make education compulsory, to forbid the industrial exploitation of childhood, and to secure the right kind of training for all sorts and conditions of children. We once believed that if labor could have a fair field and no favor the clash of opposing interests would work out a balanced industrial order and would secure economic well-being to all. We have learned that social control must check the greed and cunning of the masterful, must protect the weaker and younger and less competent from exploitation, must secure the public against the evils of labor wars, and institute clever devices to democratize industry truly. In the same manner, in this latest application of democratic idealism to the institution of marriage and the family, we are learning that freedom and equality of rights are not enough to secure success in this vital relationship of life. Too much weight of unguided choice has been pressed upon ignorant and careless youth; too little safeguarding from the effects of moral weakness has been furnished the individualistic family; too dangerously optimistic trust to mere good intent has left undisciplined the average parent. We are gradually reintroducing in modern social forms the control and direction which the old patriarchal or collective family once applied to each married couple and their children. The modern state is beginning to forbid the mating of the unfit; it is beginning to prevent the breeding of defectives. The modern state is studying the great producing causes of race degeneracy and seeking to prevent them by abolishing pathological conditions in the family itself. The modern state is introducing Domestic Relations Courts, which are already realizing their aim to hold back the thoughtless and foolish, the selfish and wayward from premature and preventable separation and divorce; and these new Courts are already placing the child in the midst of all efforts for

family stability as the central object of care and protection. Not that these Courts always do or always will work to keep two people together who desire or think they desire to be free from marriage bonds; but where there are children, to whom the divorce of parents is always a tragedy even if that divorce may be necessary or right, these Courts, established in the interest of family rehabilitation, will not allow fathers and mothers to ignore the rights of their children. Sometimes the wise judge will see that the claim of the man or the woman or both to freedom, must in justice take precedence of all other considerations. Sometimes the wise judge will find the conditions of family life so abnormal that even for the sake of the children themselves the home should be broken up. The Domestic Relations Courts, however, have already shown that in the majority of cases an external conscience and an external wisdom may tide over difficulties and keep fathers and mothers and children together for a more earnest effort toward loyalty and faithfulness. Especially are these new agencies for the strengthening of the family bond stiffening to higher faithfulness the weak wills, and supporting to greater efficiency the feeble economic capacity, of "truant husbands." Manhood has had a much shorter discipline than womanhood in family devotion and child care; and hence, when the personal fibre is defective or undeveloped the modern individualistic family makes too heavy a claim upon the character and efficiency of husbands and fathers. Bewildered by the multiplicity of cares, realizing the new earning power of their wives and the accessibility of charitable relief, desertion seems easy for them, and not so craven an act or so cruel to wives and children as once it seemed. To put such men back in harness, and by probational discipline hold them to their assumed responsibility, is in itself an invaluable social service. The same Courts which thus hold hus-

bands and fathers, wives and mothers, to their tasks, will yet become the legal guardian of all children deprived of united parenthood by the breaking-up of a home, in order to secure to such unfortunate children the parental feeling of society-at-large, expressed through a chosen agency. The socially enlightened are coming to see that no power but the State can fitly and fully represent the public conscience and the common intelligence in granting permission to marry, in legalizing the bond, in determining its conditions and responsibilities, in giving emergency-help in its difficulties, in the application of social therapeutics to its curable diseases, or surgical treatment in its more serious disorders.

These are homely items of consideration, often ranked below the level of philosophic theory. The whole sociological approach by way of study of the common life to puzzling social problems seems to many too close to the noise and dust of the world's daily task. Today, however, religious idealism itself is becoming socialized; and not what glorifies saints, but what elevates the mass of mankind, is now most keenly desired. The science of human society, touched with this idealistic faith in the upreach and perfectability of common human life, is becoming the theology of a socialized religion. In the love and sacrifice of plain and unknown fathers who toil for their loved ones, in the patient endurance of simple-hearted mothers who give their lives in ready service, in the frolic joy and eager activity of ordinary children, in "these who make up the fabric of the world," is the fruit and promise of the human, in these the sure testimony and revelation of the divine. Yet is this fabric of the world shot over with golden patterns of prophetic beauty, woven by the tears and joy, the aspiration and the service of those who live today in the spirit of tomorrow. These are showing in a new way of life what marriage was meant to be. These are realizing the new

love between man and woman, already celestial in its demands of each upon the other for a perfect life to perfect that love. These are already showing the type and pattern of a new parenthood that calls children from the storehouse of the universal life, not in response to careless passion but in the solemn joy of creative purpose. These are already making clear and shining the pathway of that new comradeship of men and women which shall yet build from the heart's centre a righteous State, a wise school, a just industry, and a pure worship of the Ideal.

BAHAISM—A STUDY OF A CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENT

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More and more there is being brought to our attention the news of a great spiritual awakening in Southwestern Asia, that home of the prophets and birthplace of religions. At first it was called Babism, and centered around the brilliant youth, Mirza Ali Mohammed, the Bab, who after six years of teaching was martyred at Tabriz, Persia, in 1850. Later, most of his followers accepted the leadership of Mirza Husain Ali, generally known today as Baha'u'llah, and following his more universal teaching called themselves Bahais. Baha'u'llah after forty years of heroic teaching in exile and imprisonment closed his earthly existence at Acca, Syria, in 1892. The present leader of the movement, Abdul Baha (Abbas Effendi), under whose guidance the Bahai gospel has spread with remarkable rapidity into many countries, has recently spent more than a year in Europe and America, making its principles known, and through his great kindness, his words of wisdom, his sweet persuasiveness, has reflected its pure spiritual light. Apparently, it is not so much an organization as a spiritual attitude, not so much a new religion as religion renewed. Its followers are found in all sorts of ecclesiastical organizations. To be a Bahai a man need not sever his previous religious affiliations; he may remain a Buddhist, or Hindoo Braman, a Parsee, a Mohammedan, or a Christian. He becomes one of the Bahai Movement when he catches the Bahai spirit.

This is part of a world-wide movement, for without doubt we stand at the dawn of a great spiritual renaissance. New religions are appearing and sweeping through the world with a vigor that makes the religious awakening of our age, as William James has said, "analogous in many respects to the spread of early Christianity, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism."¹ William James referred merely to America. But clearly this is a more universal revival, a spiritual spring-time, as the Bahais call it, when the formalism and dogmatism of the ecclesiastical winter give way to the flowers, the joy, and the gentle breezes of true and spiritual religion. For the reason that the flood of spiritual warmth and sunlight which appears in such an awakening is so great, established institutions, even though they be revived and enlarged, are unable to contain it all. Hence it clothes itself in scores and hundreds of new sciences, philanthropies, and reforms. It is an old truth that the newest and most active wine must often be put into brand-new bottles.

Here is a fascinating opportunity for the study of the psychology of religion, when that mysterious force appears, as now, in its innate freshness, vigor, and conquering power. In fact, it is difficult to see how we can comprehend religious history in the past without the study of contemporary experience. It is easy enough to pronounce the heroes of ancient days illustrious when the world has with unanimous vote put them among the company of immortals, but the task of passing judgment on contemporary men, reforms, and visions, though harder and more adventurous, is far more interesting.

What is the secret of the growth of this Bahai gospel? What makes such a religion, in the face of the most terrible persecution, spread like wild-fire until in a little more than fifty years it counts its followers by the mill-

¹ *Memories and Studies*; Longmans, Green, & Co., p. 259.

ions? What inspires 20,000 men, women, and children to become willing martyrs in its path? These are questions of universal interest, because they get at the heart of vital religion wherever it may appear.

The Bahai Movement clearly supplies some rather universal need. Otherwise it could not win men of all classes, in all countries. This need is in part intellectual. The Bahai teaching presents a clear and beautifully ordered interpretation of the universe. But this is of course not a universal need. A few intellectually cultivated men crave philosophical consistency. To the mass of men it is a secondary concern. They want not so much new and clear ideas as new life. They are worried and confused; they cry for peace. They are unhappy; they long for joy. They are dissatisfied with mere material pleasures; they pray for something that is satisfying. They feel the chains of self-centered living; they long for release. Their inner self is a prison; they would exchange it for a palace. To the multitude of mankind, as to our new philosophers, knowledge is primarily an instrument for the production of life. This truth is written all over the history of the world. Men value religious truth just so far as it gives them this life. In short, that religion grows and persists which gives to men regeneration. We have come to distrust this word "regeneration," because in the past it has been defined so largely in unethical terms. But seen in its true light the longing for redemption is simply the deep urge of an evolving universe, which, pressing through the minds of men, constrains them to climb from a merely physical existence to one that is spiritual. All men at a certain level of development feel this divine urge upward. The religion which helps them in that climb they greet with gladness.

Many movements are popular today because they offer, with the spiritual, the more material redemption—

release from sickness and poverty. The Bahai Movement offers no physical prizes. On the contrary, it declares the supreme height of spiritual attainment is revealed when man is enabled to meet sickness, poverty, and death with unclouded brow, "radiant acquiescence," perfect joy. The appeal is a purely spiritual one. It bids men come and "drink of the pure Wine which has no likeness, from the Chalice of everlasting Glory"²—the wine of union with God.

The Bahai teaching also differs from various spiritual movements of the day in its exaltation of social redemption. The body of humanity is sick; it must be healed. "These fruitless strifes, these ruinous wars, shall pass away and the 'Most Great Peace' shall come."³ Inequality of opportunity must give way to justice, equality of the sexes be established, and the fiction of "inferior races" melt before the dawning light of universal brotherhood. It takes for granted that the social consciousness is part of man's native endowment, that every man at his best wants not only individual regeneration but the redemption of the world.⁴

The Bahai Movement then makes its appeal to the high human instincts for spiritual, social, universal redemption. It promises only the reward of spiritual joy for the individual and social welfare of the nations. It spreads with surprising rapidity because to such a large degree it is fulfilling these exalted promises. Its converts will often tell you of the power of the spirit they have won in this new teaching, how it opens the doors of inspiration within them while they speak, how

² *Hidden Words of Baha'u'llah*, p. 18; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago. All references to the words of Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha are English translations of the Persian and Arabic originals.

³ Baha'u'llah quoted in *A Traveller's Narrative*, by Edward G. Browne, p. xxxviii; Cambridge, 1892.

⁴ The social gospel of the Bahai Movement is finely presented in *The Modern Social Religion*, by Horace Holley; Sidgwick & Jackson, London and Toronto, 1913.

it strengthens them to endure suffering, how it makes the rewards of the material world look like tinsel and ashes and sets them afire with the love of the wealth which is spiritual.

Among the oriental Bahais the spiritual results are said to be the most remarkable. Mr. Charles M. Remey in his *Observations of a Bahai Traveller*⁵ describes the universal spirit of hospitality and brotherly love which prevails in the Bahai communities of Persia and Southern Russia. Bahais he had never met would travel a day's journey to see him on the train. Mr. Sydney Sprague tells us of the beautiful spirit of comradeship which prevails among the Bahais of India and Burmah.⁶ They are gathered from half a dozen religions which formerly shunned each other as some dreadful poison. Professor Edward G. Browne describes the remarkable and unforgettable spiritual atmosphere at Acca.⁷ Mr. Myron Phelps, after his visit to Palestine and the neighboring regions, dwells on the "pure and gentle spirit of the Bahais—of them all, so far as I have seen them." He declares there is a spiritual exaltation and certainty about them which makes it impossible to question the reality of the unseen in their presence. He tells how their devotion to each other is so perfect that if an officer seeking men for martyrdom takes the wrong Bahai, that Bahai will often not declare the mistake but gladly die in his friend's stead.⁸

In fact, nowhere does the spiritual dynamic in the movement appear more vividly than in its martyrdoms. A man of eighty when assaulted cried out, "'We are from God, and to Him we are returning,' and in the very moment of his expiration he called out in a loud

⁵ Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago.

⁶ *A Year with the Bahais in India and Burmah*; Priory Press, London.

⁷ *A Traveller's Narrative*, p. xxxix.

⁸ Abbas Effendi [Abdul Baha], *His Life and Teachings*; Putnam's, 1902; pp. 110, 140.

voice with great joy and exultation, 'You have done us no harm! You are only transmitting us to our Lord!'"⁹ A child of eleven is tortured to death by his fanatical school-mates and teacher. They afterwards said: "When we were stabbing him he only cried out, 'Oh Most Glorious God! oh my Supreme Beloved!' never wavering for an instant, but with greatest joy and delight he yielded up his life to his Beloved One."¹⁰ A youth named Badi was present when Baha'u'llah asked for a volunteer to take a letter to the Shah of Persia on the chance that it would allay the horror of the martyrdoms, though it would mean practically certain death for the bearer of the letter. Badi offered himself; and the bystanders declared that as he was granted the commission his face was transfigured.¹¹ He walked hundreds of miles, delivered his message in person to the Shah, was rewarded by being slowly burned to death during a period of three days, but every moment preserved radiant joy. We need only imagine ourselves in such a position to realize that something has happened within the martyr's mind. A death like that requires a spiritual reinforcement most of us have not yet learned to rely upon.

Abdul Baha gives a beautiful summary of the effects of this new teaching on the people of Persia, where it is said one person in every three is a Bahai, showing how already the movement is achieving its ideal of social redemption. In speaking to Miss Laura Clifford Barney, the author of *Some Answered Questions*,¹² who had spent a number of years studying the Bahai Movement, he

⁹ Bahai Martyrdoms in Persia, by Mirza Husain Ali, p. 12; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago, 1904.

¹⁰ Bahai Martyrdoms in Persia, p. 9.

¹¹ Flowers from the Rose Garden of Acca, p. 31; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago.

¹² Some Answered Questions, pp. 343-344; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., London, 1908.

turns to her with the exclamation, "Praise be to God, you have been to Persia, and you have seen how the Persians, through the holy breezes of Baha'u'llah, have become benevolent toward humanity. Formerly, if they met any one of another race, they tormented him, and were filled with the utmost enmity, hatred, and malevolence; they went so far as to throw dirt at him. They burned the Gospel and the Old Testament, and if their hands were polluted by touching these books, they washed them. Today the greater number of them recite and chant, as is suitable, the contents of these two books in their reunions and assemblies, and they expound their teaching. They show hospitality to their enemies. These sanguinary wolves have become as gentle as gazelles in the plains of the love of God. You have seen their customs and habits, and you have heard them speak of the manners of former Persians. This transformation of morals, this improvement of conduct and of words, are they possible otherwise than through the love of God? No, in the name of God! If, by the help of science and knowledge, we wished to introduce these morals and customs, truly it would take a thousand years, and then they would not be spread throughout the masses. Today, thanks to the love of God, they are arrived at with the greatest facility."

Here then is a religion which is succeeding in the undertaking to which all religion is committed, of educating men out of the image of the earthly into that of the heavenly. It is demonstrating its power by entering what are perhaps the darkest countries of the Orient and lifting their people toward the light. What is the secret? What is the method by which it accomplishes these transformations?

It is all summed up in one word—education. Of course in outlining the way to the new social order, to the salvation of the nations, the Bahai teachers suggest

certain laws, especially for the regulation of excessive fortunes, the prevention of poverty. In a hundred years, Abdul Baha believes, poverty will have disappeared from the civilized world. International laws will be necessary for the settling of international disputes. Laws should be framed to accomplish everything within the power of law to accomplish. But this power is limited. We cannot bring in the Kingdom of God by legislation alone. Furthermore, it requires education of the social conscience of men to pass the law and to enforce it. Hence the first and the last word in the regeneration of the world must always be—education.

Abdul Baha distinguishes between education which is material and that which is spiritual. Both are needful. Material education builds up the body of our material civilization. Spiritual education, however, is the only power which can bring to birth that divine civilization which is its light and soul. Upon this heavenly education must the religious teachers concentrate, for therein lies the hope of humanity.

Spiritual education is the proclamation of spiritual truth. Of contemporary thinkers none glorify Truth more than Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha. To them, as to all liberals, it is the only power under heaven which can set men free. "The Sun of Truth is the word of God, upon which depends the training of the people in the country of thought. It is the Spirit of Reality and the Water of Life." It is "the Fire of God which, glowing in the hearts of people, burns away all things that are not of God."¹³

Religion in all lands and all ages sets men's spirits free in so far as it keeps pure this eternal Word of Truth. The great prophets have given it to men in all its pristine purity, dressed of course in garments fitted to their age and time. Their followers continually imprison it

¹³ Hidden Words, pp. 58, 59.

in the husks of barren and materialistic creed and ritual. Dogmatic imitations of celestial Truth always destroy its effectiveness in spiritual regeneration. Behold the history of Buddhism or Mohammedanism or Christianity.

The truth therefore must be rediscovered and restated with each new age. The eternal in the message of the prophets must be dissevered from the merely material provisions and ordinances. This is possible only to those who are free from prejudice and possessed by a passion for Reality.¹⁴ Today it is first necessary to recognize the value of reason and scientific method. "Weigh carefully in the balance of Reason and Science everything that is presented to you as religion. If it passes this test, then accept it, for it is truth. If, however, it does not so conform, reject it, for it is ignorance." For "it is impossible for religion to be contrary to science even though some intellects are too weak or too immature to understand truth."¹⁵ "Religion and science are the two wings upon which man's intelligence can soar into the heights, with which the human soul can progress. It is not possible to fly with one wing alone. Should a man try to fly with the wing of religion alone he would quickly fall into the quagmire of superstition, whilst on the other hand with the wing of science, he would make no progress but fall into the despairing slough of materialism."¹⁶

Religious truth, however, comes primarily through spiritual insight. It is conformable to reason. It also transcends the measuring rod of our mere rationalistic processes and rests ultimately upon spiritual intuition. The Bahai teachers declare further that the validity of a man's intuition depends upon the purity of his heart. We may hear within us not the voice of the spirit but of the satanic ego. It is only in the spotless mirror of a

¹⁴ Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 184.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 143.

pure heart that the rays of the Sun of Truth are reflected with unbroken clearness and splendor. The purest and most perfect of men, therefore, attain the highest degree of certainty in intuitive knowledge. These by the common testimony of mankind are the great prophets. To them we turn for the knowledge of Reality. The true seeker studies their utterances without prejudice, remembering that "light is good in whatever lamp it is burning. A rose is beautiful in whatever garden it may bloom. A star has the same radiance if it shines from the east or the west."¹⁷ The words of the most illumined prophets, however, are often imperfectly reported and always need interpretation. Therefore traditional scripture alone will not suffice as a criterion for truth. In fact, no one of the four accepted standards of truth—the sensory, the rationalistic, the intuitive, or the traditional—is in itself sufficient. When, however, all are combined and all agree, we may count their deliverance the truth. This is at least the nearest approach that the seeker possesses until, after long spiritual discipline, the voice of the assurance of the Holy Spirit speaks from the serene depths of his own pure and God-illumined heart.¹⁸

What then are the spiritual truths which, passing this test, stand forth as enduring certainty? Or, to narrow our quest, what are the truths by the teaching of which the Bahai Movement is effecting the transformation of its followers' lives? They are very few; in fact they can all be gathered under one supreme concept—the inherent unity of the universe. Written on almost every page of the writings of Baha'u'llah and Abdul Baha are the words, oneness, unity. Their supreme aim is to bring men to "the Tent of Unity," the "presence of singleness," the "ocean of oneness." And "oneness, in its true significance, means that God alone should be real-

¹⁷ Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 136.

¹⁸ See Phelps' Abbas Effendi, p. 149; also Some Answered Questions, p. 336.

ized as the One Power which animates and dominates all things, which are but manifestations of Its energy.”¹⁹ All nature is one and reveals to the seeker the splendor of the “Ideal King.” All the prophets speak one truth, declare one religion, manifest one God. The individual man is the potential manifestation of this one God. The immanence of God in the “servants” is taught with persistent intensity. Hence men of all classes and races are the “drops of one sea and leaves of one tree.” Many a mystic has beheld God in his own soul. The Bahai teaching invites men to advance to the more universal view and behold His light in all humanity. Abdul Baha was asked, “Why do the guests that visit you come away with shining countenances?” He answered, “I cannot tell you, but in all those upon whom I look I see only my Father’s face.” By the inculcation of these few but sublime truths would this new gospel not only regenerate the individual but heal the disease of war, annul the blight of racial, creedal, and class antagonisms, and bring in the “Most Great Peace.”

There are however many liberal thinkers in different parts of the world who are announcing these same truths of universal religion and universal brotherhood. The Bahais are part of a great world-movement. Their significance lies in the effectiveness of their teaching. Some teachers present these ideas, and their hearers say, “How true, how beautiful!” The Bahais proclaim the same truths, and often those who listen rise as from the dead, possessed by a new heart, aflame with the love which moves the world. There must be some dynamic in their method of presentation.

What is it? Truth regenerates men when they really believe it. Belief is something far more vital than mere intellectual assent. We may in a vague way surround a truth with the light of our intellect; but if that is all,

¹⁹ Hidden Words, p. 61.

it has little effect upon us. The power comes when the truth surrounds us, grasps our will, kindles our heart, possesses our thought day and night, conquers and subdues our desires, our ambitions, our hopes, and our loves. When the truth shines through the horizon of our mind with such conquering brilliance that we cry, "Woe be to me if I do not do its bidding!" then we really believe. Such belief, as Abdul Baha says, invariably regenerates a man. "If his reality is dark, he will become enlightened; if he is heedless, he will become conscious; if he is sleeping, he will be awakened; if he is earthly, he will become heavenly; if he is satanic, he will become divine. This is the meaning of true belief."

A teacher brings his hearers to this pitch of belief only when he in like manner believes the truth he is proclaiming. Belief is contagious. He who has it not can never transmit it. The Bahais succeed as teachers because of the intensity of their belief. To them, at their best, it is all in all—life for the world, the hope of the ages, the will of God. They die rejoicing, if their service to that Truth requires it.

The fact of their absolute belief in what they teach is made apparent by what they have sacrificed to do its bidding. This is especially clear in the lives of their three great teachers—the Bab, Baha'u'llah, and Abdul Baha. These teachers say that material things count for nothing, are so much "water and clay." The whole material universe is to the spiritual man of no more consequence, says Abdul Baha, than an insect's wing. They show they believe it by giving up all physical comforts. Abdul Baha and Baha'u'llah lost all their property, lived in prisons most of their lives, endured privations and tortures, often in underground dungeons the horrors of which, to Western ears, are almost beyond belief. Yet every day, as Abdul Baha has declared, was a day of joy. They slept of their own choice on the

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floor that the poor might have their beds, ate the scantiest food that the hungry might share their meals, refused to flee from their imprisonment when the gate was open. Therefore when they declare the life of physical comfort, of self-centered ease, is nothing, the life of spiritual love is the one glory of existence, their hearers, beholding their life, believe them and toss away their fortunes, their homes, their lives, with the same perfect joy. Their teachers had put their gospel to the severest test and had lived it without wavering. Hence, when the followers heard their prophet proclaiming the word of God, "If My Will thou seekest, regard not thine own, that thou mayest die in Me, and I live in thee,"²⁰ they knew he had proved it true in his own experience and were constrained to offer "what they had for the hope of what [God] had."²¹ Baha'u'llah puts this law of spiritual education thus: "The effect of the word spoken by the teacher depends upon his purity of purpose and his severance."²² "Guidance hath ever been by words, but at this time it is by deeds."²³ "The truth of words is tested by deeds and dependent upon life. Deeds reveal the station of the man."²⁴ "He whose words exceed his acts, know verily that his non-being is better than his being and death better than his life."²⁵ In short, they had power as teachers because they lived the truth they taught. "The spiritual teacher shows his belief in his own teaching by himself *being* what he recommends to others." He is the Truth.

Here is one of the supreme laws in spiritual pedagogy. Religious truth is a life. It manifests itself in man as pure love, wisdom, joy, sublime vitality, peace, far-reaching service. This divine life in man is but an image, a reflection of the life of God, which is Reality. The divine life, therefore, whether in man or God is the same.

²⁰ Hidden Words, p. 5.

²¹ Ibid., p. 69.

²² Ibid., p. 62.

²³ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 62.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

Now we may describe this life in essay or treatise. That is a word-picture or photograph of Reality; but it is quite different from the Life itself. The motive power in spiritual advancement is love. And we are so made that we love not abstractions but realities, not cold principles but the life incarnate. For that reason philosophic religions are always a failure. No mere "system of philosophy has ever been able to change the manners and customs of a people for the better." That is the reason all the greatest religions of the world gather around some noble personality—a Moses, a Confucius, a Buddha, a Zoroaster, a Jesus—who lives the creed he proclaims. The effect of the prophet in exalting the lives of the people lies in the degree in which he can say, "I am the Way, the Truth, the Life." True Buddhism is the life that was in Buddha; Christianity, the spirit which was in the Christ. Until he sees the "splendor of the life" incarnate in a human friend, not one man in a thousand is able to appreciate its glory and take the hard steps which lead to the summit of its transfiguration.

Furthermore, this life seems actually to pass from teacher to listener. This experience has been recorded in all ages. It is the secret of every inspiring teacher. His inward glory breaks away and through his words, his face, his deeds, and enters the minds of those who hear or see him. In this experience it seems as though reality were transmissible, as if the divine light could pass from mind to mind awakening the slumbering divinity in the hearts of men by the warmth and brilliance of its shining. "The unusual intellects, for instance, of Plato, Aristotle, Pliny, and Socrates, have not influenced men so greatly that they have been anxious to sacrifice their lives for their teachings; whilst some simple men [have] so moved humanity that thousands of men have become willing martyrs to uphold their words."²⁶ A

²⁶ Paris Addresses of Abdul Baha, p. 167.

carpenter, Jesus, was able to light the Roman world with a veritable spiritual conflagration. When the fire of the love of God and men blazed forth in his heart it needs must kindle the hearts of millions, for it is the nature of such fire that it spreads, and burns from the minds it touches all that is not of God. Only "such Fire of Love will assemble all the different peoples into one court."²⁷ Only by the transmission of this holy fire from man to man will the Kingdom of God appear on earth.

Its penetrative and re-creative power lies in this: it is the light of God by which all things have come into being. It is creator of the world. It is an easy matter, therefore, for it to re-create man. This divine life in the good man is God. "He who desires to associate with God, let him associate with His beloved; and he who desires to hear the word of God, let him hear the words of His chosen ones."²⁸ God is incarnate in these "chosen ones" in the degree of their spiritual perfection. The sun shines on the stone and the polished mirror. But only the polished mirror reflects its real splendor. The Sun of Reality, which is God, shines on the hearts of all men, but only those which are pure, burnished by the spirit, reflect its Divine Glory. For instance: "Christ was the mirror; God was the Sun. The Sun appeared with all its effulgence and splendor in the mirror; that is, the virtues, the perfections, and the characteristics of God appeared in Christ. That is what is meant where it is written in the Bible that 'We have created man in our own image.' The perfect man is the visage and image of God, just as the mirror reflects the sun. We cannot say the sun has come down from heaven and taken a place in the mirror. The sun is eternal, living in

²⁷ Tablet of the World, from *Tarazat* and other Tablets, by Baha'u'llah, p. 27; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago, 1913.

²⁸ *Hidden Words*, p. 72.

its own station. It has no ascent or descent; but the rays and the heat of the sun have become fully reflected in the clear mirror."²⁹ The sun is in the mirror; God is in Christ. Therefore he that hath seen Christ hath seen the Father.

The Bahais also emphasize an often forgotten truth. This Light, the Spirit, may be put into a book, clothed with the transparent garment of words. Some books contain ideas; others, ideas wrapped and drenched in the living spirit of Reality. These latter books awaken life, transmit the fire of love, usher one into God's very presence, as did their author when he met men in the flesh. Jesus was incarnate not only in the body of the carpenter. He was incarnate also in the words of the Gospels. Reading their pages with pure and receptive heart, we may behold him rising from them in glory. The Bibles of the world have this power: they preserve as a living presence the spirit of their author for future generations. They grasp men's hearts, stir their hopes, strengthen their wills, as did the prophet himself. They move the world. A few pages of the Gospels turned the course of history.

The Bahais, who make a practice of reading as far as possible the sacred books of all religions, declare the words of the Bab, of Baha'u'llah, and Abdul Baha, possess this same re-creative power. They illumine, exalt them, reveal to them the presence of God, and set them aflame with His love. They shake their soul awake with the divine thirst for the "immortal, everlasting chalice" of union with God. And that is the first aim of spiritual education in every land, every age. Inertia is the wall which blocks the pathway of men's spiritual advancement. They are asleep, they must be awakened; spiritually dead, they must be called forth from the tombs. The teacher who can through deeds, through spoken or

²⁹ Abdul Baha in *Star of the West*, vol. III, no. 6, p. 8.

written words, awaken that love of the divine life will save men. The first step in the Bahai method of spiritual education is that of reading inspired words or meeting exalted teachers, until one is able for a moment "to taste of the honey of union with [God]. If we drink of this cup we shall forget the whole world."³⁰

After this arousing from without, man must take the process into his own hands. His active co-operation is imperative. God puts great responsibilities upon our will. When once "the world-illuminating sun of longing dawns forth, and the fire of love becomes ablaze," we must quickly sever ourselves from all lower ambitions, from "aught else save God," turn our "face from the faces of all created beings unto the Holy Face of [His] Oneness,"³¹ and pray. Few religious teachers give to prayer a more central place than the Bahais. The good Bahais rise, if possible, at dawn with a prayer of awakening, turn to God in adoration as they dress, spend a half hour or so in earnest supplication and praise before breakfast, pray as they leave the house for the daily business, pray in the stillness of the evening, and drop away to sleep committing their bodies and spirits into the hands of God's care and protection. Prayer, they declare, is one of the chiefest pillars of all religion. Without it the highest human life is impossible. To them prayer is "giving up the outward eye and opening the inward eye." It is the concentrating of the whole mind upon that "central radiance" of the universe which is God. Above all, it is cleansing our motives by absorption in the thought of God. "A pure heart is like unto a mirror. Purify it by the polish of Love and Severance from all else save God, until the Ideal Sun may reflect therein and the Eternal Morn may dawn."³² As such

³⁰ *Seven Valleys*, by Baha'u'llah, p. 10; Bahai Publishing Society, Chicago. A little treatise describing man's journey to union with God.

³¹ *Hidden Words*, p. 72.

³² *Seven Valleys*, p. 28.

prayer grows perfect, he who is traversing the valleys towards the "sea of nearness and union" attains a wonderful knowledge of God. "In an ocean he will see a drop, and in a drop he will detect the mysteries of an ocean." "The core of whatever mote thou mayest split, therein thou wilt find a sun." "He beholds the beauty of the Friend in everything. In fire he sees the face of the Beloved; in unreality he perceives the sign of the Reality."³³ He discerns the "goodness at the heart of things evil." "He finds life in death and glory in shame." His character is therefore transfigured. "If he experiences any oppression, he will endure it with patience, and if he sees any wrath, he will show forth affection."³⁴ He passes on and on in the divine journey until the self-centered self vanishes as a shadow. He has "abandoned the drop of life and reached the Ocean of the Beloved One." Nay more, he has "plunged into the seas of Grandeur." He is of those who "swim in the sea of Spirit and roam in the sacred atmosphere of Light."³⁵ "The Beauty of the Face unveils itself from the Orient of the Eternal World and the meaning of 'Everything is mortal save the Face of God' becomes manifest."

Such is the height to which Baha'u'llah would lead his spiritual students through contact with inspired prophets and the intensive practice of prayer. But there is nothing approaching other-worldliness about this exalted state. He who sees God in everything will behold Him first of all in the neighbor who needs his service, in the great causes which make for the upbuilding of spiritual civilization. Abdul Baha declares that today the supreme confirmations of the Holy Spirit come to those who rise to serve the "Most Great Cause" of universal religion and universal brotherhood.³⁶ Immersion in the "sea of union" is the final preparation for the service of such a

³³ Seven Valleys, p. 40.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

³⁶ Tablets of Abdul Baha, *passim*.

divine cause. It brings that baptism of fire which makes him in whom it is burning a light to illumine all those who hear his word or see his face. "The minds of the lovers are ever aflame with this fire."³⁷ It transforms character, destroys ignorance, quickens civilization. It made a few illiterate fishermen of Galilee the leaders of the Western world. It is at once the mightiest and the most contagious force known to man. The Bahai Movement is but a new statement and a new demonstration of the power of the Holy Spirit in the education of humanity.

³⁷ Hidden Words, p. 59.

THE JESUITS AS PORTRAYED BY NON-CATHOLIC HISTORIANS

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From the days of Ignatius Loyola until now the Society of Jesus has bulked large in the imagination of the English-speaking races. The Elizabethan certainty that Jesuits were concerned in plots against the sovereign led with remorseless logic to hangings and quarterings at Tyburn. The Puritan prejudice, common especially in the seventeenth century, that the Pope was Antichrist, made his Jesuit emissaries appear dangerous and almost uncanny. The Enlightenment of the age of Voltaire saw in them a band of obscurantists of darkest dye, whose sinister influence over education and politics properly led the Bourbon courts to expel them from the chief Catholic countries of Europe, and to secure in 1773 from a hesitating Pope their utter and perpetual abolition. In the Brief of suppression¹ the Pope himself enumerated their weaknesses and faults, and declared that these were so great as to outweigh their manifest and signal services; therefore the repudiation.

The nineteenth century saw the dead rise; and the twentieth sees it at the right hand of power in the Church of Rome. If in the judgment of some historians the outstanding political event of the last hundred years in Europe is the creation, out of dry bones, of a United Italy, the outstanding political fact in the history of the Catholic Church is the Risorgimento of the Jesuits.

¹ Reprinted by C. Mirbt: *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums und des römischen Katholizismus*; 3d ed., Tübingen, 1911, No. 457.

Called back precisely a century ago, on the seventh of August, 1814,² they have worked their way to such influence that in the game of ecclesiastical politics as played under Pius IX and Pius X it has been lightly asserted that Jesuits are trumps. Certainly the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, the Syllabus of 1864, the definition of papal infallibility and absolute sovereignty in 1870, the condemnation of Modernism in 1907, and at this very moment the codification of the canon law by the centralized authority of a papal autocracy based on divine right³—these are monuments to the victory of principles for which the Jesuits have contended, milestones on their march to power. However highly we may appraise the personal initiative of the reigning Pope, we have no grounds to suppose that there is any serious conflict of opinion between him and the Society of Jesus.

Inevitably the Jesuits are a problem to the historian. If with Freeman he conceives history as past politics, he finds in many a tangled skein of diplomacy the black thread that runs back to the Gesù at Rome. If with the Hegelians he holds that history is fundamentally a battle of ideas, he emphasizes the early nineteenth century reaction from the Enlightenment to Romanticism, from Rationalism to authority, a process which found its classic completion in the Vatican decrees which recognized the bishop of Rome as the mouthpiece of the Almighty. If the historian believes that institutions are of primary significance, moulding and dominating the individual, he neglects under peril of superficiality the development of the international empire of the Vatican, which claims every validly baptized Christian as a sub-

² Mirbt, No. 471.

³ Ibid., Nos. 499, 504, 508, 509, 558, 559. On the codification see Nos. 555, 561; N. Hilling, *Die Reformen des Papstes Pius X. auf dem Gebiete der kirchenrechtlichen Gesetzgebung*; Bonn, 1909; E. Herzog, *Der papstliche Absolutismus unter Pius X* (*Internationale kirchliche Zeitschrift*; Band I., Hefte 1 & 2); Bern, 1911.

ject of the Pope, and is even now, through the codification of the canon law, engaged in binding all Roman Catholics closer than ever to the footstool of the Vicar of Christ. Modified as these tendencies may be in practice by what Mr. McCabe has called "the decay of the Church of Rome," the victory of the ideas of papal infallibility and papal autocracy is due, more than to any other promoters, to the tenacious followers of Loyola.

If the modern historian desires anything, it is to be fair. He must seek to mortify within himself the seeds of partisanship. He must abdicate even the traditional dignity of judge of the past, lest he be false to the rigorous demands of a science which asks not, Were the Jesuits right or wrong? but, What were they, and how did they come to be just that? Can a Protestant ever qualify for that task? Can he divest himself of feeling, so as neither to attack, nor yet to desire to defend the objects of his researches? Can he succeed in the far more difficult task of comprehending Roman Catholicism, so manifold in its appeal, yet in its dogmas so consistently one? Has he with the eyes of a child watched the star-like candles on the altar? Has he harkened to the silver Sanctus bell, and to the mysterious murmur of the priest as he creates and sacrifices the Body and Blood of our Lord? Has the thought of hell made him shiver, and the consecrated wafer made him thrill? He who cannot imagine these experiences does not know the A B C of Catholicism, in the mastery whereof lies the deepest secret of the power of the Jesuits; for their ascendancy is rooted in their hold on the fears and aspirations of Catholic piety as directed in the confessional and in the Spiritual Exercises.

Granted that understanding of the psychology of Catholicism which is a prerequisite to scientific objectivity, there remains a still greater difficulty than an

adequate psychology—the problem of the possibility of knowledge. Can an outsider really know the past of the Jesuits? Are the sources so abundant, frank, and trustworthy that we may gain from them a true picture?

An official history of the Society of Jesus began to appear three centuries ago.⁴ Though it was composed in the form of annals, then the form preferred by the great Vatican historian Baronius, it found readers and still finds them today, but its importance has been lessened by the publication of certain older sources on which its statements were based. It deserves more attention than does the self-laudatory *Imago primi saeculi societatis Jesu* (1640), or the one-sided reports from the mission fields, the celebrated *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites par quelques missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Paris, 1702, and often, with varying contents).⁵ The interests of their editors and compilers led them to select the edifying rather than the typical, as one may readily see by comparing the account of the Canadian missions given in the *Lettres édifiantes* with the other copious materials edited by the late Professor Reuben Gold Thwaites. Less respected, because more pretentious, is the *Histoire religieuse, politique, et littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, by Jacques Crétineau-Joly (Paris, 1844–1846). Though “written under the auspices of the Society,”⁶ this patently apologetic history has been charged with the suppression or distortion of important facts, and has therefore failed to command the respect of scholars. It is to be understood as the product of those tense days when the Society was the object of the bitter and often unjustifiable attacks which preceded its temporary expulsion from France.

⁴ *Historia Societatis Jesu*, Rome, 1614–1758, begins with Loyola and continues to 1633. It was edited successively by Orlandini, Sacchini, Possinus, Jouvancy, and Cordara (Catholic Encyclopedia, 11, 317).

⁵ Catholic Encyclopedia, 14, 96.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4, 488.

After the revolution of 1848 various European governments opened sections of their archives to investigators; and early in his reign Leo XIII made large portions of the Archives of the Vatican accessible to the researches even of Protestants.⁷ The flood of new material thus inundating the dry and well-trodden lowland paths of political and ecclesiastical historians, compelled them to abandon many old positions; large sections of modern history have had to be rewritten. Perceiving the new situation, Father Luis Martin, twenty-eighth general of the Society of Jesus, arranged for the compilation of a new series of official historical works, to utilize the newly found materials and to answer questions which had lain outside the sphere of interest of the seventeenth century annalists. There is a set of published sources, *Monumenta historica societatis Jesu*, of which over thirty volumes have appeared at Madrid since 1894; and there is a series of histories of the Order in the various countries which have been the scenes of its labors. Differing greatly from one another in merit, these books of Duhr, Fouqueray, and others⁸ represent a distinct advance in Jesuit historiography, and can be neglected by no serious writer on their respective fields. Unfortunately they have begun to appear so recently that they have exercised practically no influence on the non-Catholic authors that we shall now consider.

⁷ See the comprehensive article by Paul Maria Baumgarten, "Institutes, Roman Historical" (Catholic Encyclopedia, 8, 61-65).

⁸ Duhr treats Austria, Germany, and Switzerland; Fouqueray, France; Astrain, Spain; Venturi, Italy; Kroess, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; Thomas Hughes, North America; and Pastells, Paraguay. They are written in German, French, Spanish, Italian, or English. Exact titles may be found in the Catholic Encyclopedia, 14, 94, and 96. On the scrupulous fairness of Duhr as over against the unbending partisanship of Fouqueray, see G. L. Burr, in the American Historical Review, Oct., 1913, pp. 143-145. An earlier work deserves mention also: Foley, Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus. In addition there should be noted the inspired rebuttals of slanders and legends concerning the Order, such as Duhr, *Jesuiten-Fabeln* (4th ed., 1904, pp. xii, 975); Brou, *Les Jésuites de la légende* (1907, 2 vols.). Other Catholic works include E. L. Taunton, *History of the Jesuits in England, 1580-1773* (1901), and Father Taunton's much discussed article "Jesuits" in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1911).

In spite of the inherent fascination of the subject, no English-speaking Protestant has ever written a really good history of the Society of Jesus. Portions of the vast field have, to be sure, received dignified and even distinguished treatment by Americans; it suffices to mention Francis Parkman's *Jesuits in Canada* (1867), and the huge source-collection describing the travels and explorations of the French Jesuit missionaries among the Indians, edited by the late Reuben Gold Thwaites under the title of *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (1896-1901). For the neglect of the larger field various causes may be surmised: the numerical insignificance of the Roman Catholics in Great Britain, leading their opponents to underrate the importance of the task; the former predilection of the great universities for the classics, to the preterition of the study of modern history; the difficulty of doing good work without employing materials which until recently have been secreted in continental archives; and possibly a surmise that only a donkey could browse upon the Jesuit thistle without learning the truth of the motto *Nemo me impune lacessit*. Whether from blindness, caution, cowardice, or caprice, Anglo-Saxon Protestants have usually chosen to leave the Jesuits outside the sphere of their investigations.

Naturally enough the dramatic potentialities of the subject did not escape the eye of Macaulay. In his *History of England* he devotes to it eight famous pages, in which the balancing of vices and virtues, of accusation and rebuttal, issues rather in a series of spectacular contrasts than a judicial estimate of a much-abused Order.⁹ Nor did the lay theologian, Isaac Taylor, who was immune against that itching for antithesis which infected Macaulay, rise to Parnassian heights in his treatment of *Loyola and Jesuitism* (1849). More con-

⁹ T. B. Macaulay, *History of England from the accession of James II*; New York, 1849, vol. 2, 49-56; see also his essay on Ranke's *History of the Popes*, originally published in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1840.

scientiously documented and not altogether to be despised at the present day is the hastily written *History of the Jesuits* by Andrew Steinmetz (1848), who had been for nine months a Jesuit novice; but in spite of his drawing on Ranke and Cr  tineau-Joly, his two volumes are hopelessly antiquated.

The works just mentioned were all published before 1850. As regards books for the English reader of Jesuit history, the second half of the nineteenth century was almost a blank.¹⁰ Griesinger's *Jesuits* (New York, 1883) is the translation of a German work which reflects the hostilities of the Kulturkampf; and W. C. Cartwright's *Jesuits* (London, 1876) is the careful but amateurish production of a learned member of Parliament. The opening years of the twentieth century have witnessed the publication of more works dominated by the polemical interest. Here belongs Neatby's *Programme of the Jesuits*, which concludes with the dark suggestion that "the best equipped battalions that have ever marched under the banner of Antichrist" may be potent factors in that "culmination of the mystery of iniquity" which "is still future, as Holy Scripture seems plainly to indicate."¹¹ If Neatby, historian of the Plymouth Brethren though he may be, is negligible when he comes to write on ultramontane topics, one cannot assert the same of the fiery Walter Walsh, author of several books, including *The Secret History of the Oxford Movement*. His *Jesuits in Great Britain* (1903), takes up from a different angle some problems treated two years previously by Father Ethelred Taunton in his *Jesuits in England*. Walsh gives a carefully documented indictment of the activities of the Order in Britain down to the accession of James

¹⁰ Two German works deserve mention: J. Huber, *Der Jesuiten-Orden nach seiner Verfassung und Doctrin, Wirksamkeit, und Geschichte*, 1873, and E. Gothein, *Ignatius von Loyola und die Gegenreformation*, 1895. The latter is a solid contribution, based on work in various archives.

¹¹ W. Blair Neatby, *The Programme of the Jesuits*; 1903, p. 191.

II. He is chiefly concerned with the plots of what he is pleased to call "that notorious Order."¹²

In the past decade six really notable books on the Jesuits have been published by writers who cannot be classified as Catholics. One of these, by Stoeckius, is a technical study of the organization of the daily life of the Order in the sixteenth century, and should be of special interest to historians of education.¹³ Another, *Der Jesuitismus*, by Pilatus (Dr. Viktor Naumann) is an enlarged and corrected reprint of articles which appeared in the *Augsburger Postzeitung*, dealing especially with the history and reliability of anti-Jesuit polemic.¹⁴ In this work Pilate does not confine himself to the question, What is truth? but renders partisan judgment on many matters, nearly always in favor of the Jesuits. As much of the older polemic, which Naumann has hauled out of the cobwebbed recesses in which it was peacefully rusting, is honeycombed with legends and corroded with lies, it defiles the hands of him who touches it. Pilate may wash his hands of it, but he is still incapable of doing justice, for he lacks impartiality.

Of the remaining four books two are elaborate autobiographies of former Jesuits—Count Hoensbroech, and Father Tyrrell; and two are professedly histories of the Order; one of them by the former Franciscan, Joseph McCabe, the other by a conservative Lutheran, Heinrich Boehmer, now professor of ecclesiastical history at the University of Marburg. Of all the histories of the Jesuits

¹² Walter Walsh, *The Jesuits in Great Britain: a historical inquiry into their Political Influence*, 1903, p. 337. Another work of the same temper is Michael F. J. McCarthy's *Jesuits and the British Press* (1910).

¹³ H. Stoeckius, *Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16 Jahrhundert: I., Ordensangehörige und Externe; II., Das gesellschaftliche Leben im Ordenshause*, 1910 f.

¹⁴ Pilatus (Dr. Viktor Naumann), *Der Jesuitismus. Eine kritische Würdigung der Grundsätze, Verfassung, und geistigen Entwicklung der Gesellschaft Jesu, mit besonderer Beziehung auf die wissenschaftlichen Kämpfe und auf die Darstellung von antijesuitischer Seite. Nebst einem literarhistorischen Anhang: Die antijesuitische Literatur von der Gründung des Ordens bis auf unsere Zeit*; Regensburg, 1905.

by non-Catholic writers the little book of Boehmer is the most satisfactory.¹⁵ It should be read not in the original German form in which it appeared in 1904, but in the French translation, with a long and valuable introduction by the late Gabriel Monod.¹⁶ Its careful bibliographies, given chapter by chapter, in some measure compensate for the paucity of footnotes. The distinctive merit of Boehmer is the independent treatment of mooted questions, together with a sympathetic appreciation of the aims and spirit of Loyola and his Order.

In his *Candid History of the Jesuits*¹⁷ Mr. Joseph McCabe traces the Society of Jesus from its origin to the present day. In treating the first hundred years he proceeds from generalate to generalate; from then on, he traces the development down to the Suppression of 1773 province by province. The concluding chapters are The Restoration, The New Jesuits, The Last Phase. The book is an excellent example of history as it used to be written in the eighteenth century. It was characteristic of the age of Voltaire to draw no clear-cut distinction between original and secondary sources, trusting to the power of the acute intellect to discern truth regardless of its pedigree. Mr. McCabe's recent program of a volume a year has not left him time to trace the ramifying and often subterranean sources of Jesuit history. He has left the work of exploration to others; he prefers to exploit their results. Had he tested his materials as he went along, he would have given his readers a sense of greater security. Though he does not eschew footnotes altogether, he leaves most of his

¹⁵ H. Boehmer, *Les Jésuites*. Ouvrage traduit de l'allemand avec une Introduction et des Notes par Gabriel Monod, Membre de l'Institut; Paris, 1910.

¹⁶ Monod supplements Boehmer especially on three points: the Chinese and the Malabar rites, the casuistry and ethics of the Jesuits, the policy of the Jesuits (including the *Monita Secreta*).

¹⁷ McCabe, *A Candid History of the Jesuits*; G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1913.

assertions hanging in the air. He would base them, no doubt, on the numerous secondary authorities which he casually names in the text, but nowhere arranges in a systematic bibliography. Orlandini and his continuators he usually sets aside as partisan, or uses them chiefly when they make damaging admissions; Crétineau-Joly he cites chiefly in order to expose; but the official *Monumenta* and the provincial histories by Fouqueray and others he seems scarcely to have employed at all. As for Duhr's *Jesuitenfabeln*, with its attempted refutation of seventy-eight varieties of slanders, he errs when he treats it as quite negligible.

If Mr. McCabe has not used the most recent sources and literature, his motivation of events is also distinctly old-fashioned. The narrative is dominated by politics conceived as the game of priests and potentates; in the antechamber or in the confessional one diverts the current of events, without much reference to the logic of ideas, the clash of the classes, or the struggle for the food supply. Thrilling tales of successful priestcraft or of judicial blindness entertain oftener than they convince; like most court memoirs and much else that passes for inside history, they exaggerate the importance of the individual actors to the neglect of the dull but adamant background of economic and physical law. Exaggerating the influence of secret intrigues tends to make the Jesuits appear more formidable than they really were. Just as mediaeval housewives used to suspect Satan rather than bacteria when the cheese refused to act as expected, so certain modern writers, rather than analyze the complicated causes actually at work, flee to the dogma of the omnipresence of the Jesuits. Needless to say, their superstitions about the secretive followers of the Black Pope, as the Jesuit general is called, tend to increase the prestige of these as potent factors in history; but the legends also cause

men to hold them responsible for many a hostile act in which they really bore little or no part.

In pronouncing judgment on controverted questions Mr. McCabe has usually shown a sagacious restraint. Not having time to dig up by the roots the difficulties which are embedded in the original documents, he usually bases his case on damaging admissions by his opponents rather than on a study of the conflicting testimony. Therefore, in spite of his conscious endeavor to be fair, he is really interested chiefly in the sins and errors of the Jesuits. Like a celebrated letter of Abelard, which he knows very well, the present volume might have been entitled *Historia Calamitatum*. To be sure, he enumerates sundry successes, and gives due credit to Jesuit foresight, vigor, and perseverance; but who could deny the foresight of Loyola, the vigor of Xavier, or the perseverance of Jogues? These qualities were not refused to Satan himself by the candid Milton. Mr. McCabe, however, considers most Jesuit successes dazzling but hollow; whether conjured up by corpse-like obedience or by a wave of the Pompadour's fan, they were destined to vanish when Man turned against Magic and Priestcraft.

In view of these facts, is this history of the Jesuits properly entitled "candid"? In the word there lurks ambiguity: it may mean free from disguise or reserve; it may mean free from partiality or bias. The book is quite without reserve, even gossipy at times, though rarely spicy. The bias is, however, unmistakable. Out of his own experience the author published *Twelve Years in a Monastery*. In his Franciscan days he may possibly have soliloquized about the Jesuits as if from a Spanish cloister; now from the governing board of the *Rationalist Press Review* he adds to the old disapprobation bitter intellectual disgust. To the keenness of observation characteristic of the member of a rival

monastic Order he joins the slashing quality which has marked him as a critic of "the Decay of the Church of Rome." Therefore his vigorous *History of the Jesuits* is excellent reading, though it stresses one side of the story.

Turning with regret from the stimulating though inadequate books of Boehmer and McCabe, let us examine those palpitating autobiographies of the two ex-Jesuits, Hoensbroech and Tyrrell.

Count Paul von Hoensbroech was born in 1852 of one of the most ancient and highly respected families of Rhenish Prussia. Educated by the Jesuits at Feldkirch just across the Swiss frontier, he studied law at Bonn and Göttingen, and became a "Referendar." At the age of twenty-six he yielded to an impulse he had long resisted, and entered the Jesuit novitiate. It was then 1878, and Germany, in the feverish excitement of the Kulturkampf, had expelled the Jesuits; consequently he had to pass through the novitiate and the scholasticate in Jesuit schools in Holland and in England. Of their obscurantism and relatively antiquated and inefficient character he gives striking evidence, which, though partisan, cannot be neglected by historians of education. After a varied experience in Jesuit colleges he was sent up to Berlin to study at the university. He was to prepare himself to defend Roman dogma against Protestant attack; and to that end he heard Harnack in the history of dogma, and Paulsen in the history of modern philosophy. Neither Harnack nor Paulsen influenced him. He thought Paulsen an honest old bookworm, and considered Harnack learned and usually accurate in detail, but after all surprisingly ignorant of many aspects of Catholicism. He believed him also—and this throws a side-light on the dogmatic and polemical nature of Hoensbroech's own mind—too clever, too prone to resolve contradictions into a higher unity.

So little understanding had Hoensbroech for the professional many-sidedness of the church historian.

Not Harnack nor Paulsen, but Schleiermacher, Rothe, and Biedermann were the liberators of his theology; and the greatest liberator of all was Immanuel Kant. Says Hoensbroech: "Through Kant I attained to a recognition of the autonomy of reason, and its right to self-direction. Kant confirmed me infallibly in the consciousness, which had been long but timidly dawning within me, of the right and duty of conducting research, free and independent of faith in authority, of being not a mere child in leading strings, but a thinking human being, even in the face of the things of the other world. What miserable superficialities my Jesuit philosophy professors had repeated to me about Kant's 'unemployable' because 'illogical' *Critique of Reason*.'" ¹⁸

Hoensbroech's breach with Rome was in essence the assertion of reason against authority; and after a while he went so far along the road to rationalism that he broke with that comprehensive but on the whole conservative organization known as the Evangelical League, and found a place of refuge on the extreme left wing of German theologians, in the *Protestantenverein*. It is not, however, as a dogmatician or as a philosopher that Hoensbroech interests us, but as a historian. At the time of his leaving the Order in 1892 he found great comfort in Ranke and in Gregorovius, who taught him to study the papacy not as a "divine institution" but as a historical phenomenon, and showed him that its social influence had been not civilizing and beneficent only; like all long-lived institutions, the papacy had helped to perpetuate obsolete and inhumane prejudices and superstitions. These reactionary aspects of the development of Roman Catholicism Hoensbroech diligently exploited after his flight from the Order, and he pub-

¹⁸ II, 405 f.

lished his researches in several books.¹⁹ Apart from the side-lights thrown by these works, his chief contributions to the characterization of the Order from which he fled are recorded in *Fourteen Years a Jesuit: a Record of Personal Experience and a Criticism*.²⁰ Hostile and lacking in psychological insight as this presentation occasionally is, it comes from a man who has been on the inside and knows what he is describing. In addition to the fascinating autobiographical portions, Hoensbroech gives a systematic and elaborately documented criticism of the piety and the ascetic discipline of the Order, of its inner constitution, its doctrine of obedience, its use of the confessional, and its influence on court life, politics, and education. The German original has also chapters omitted in the translation, on "Abuses in the Jesuit Order," and on the "Suppression of the Order."

Of all biographies of English Roman Catholics probably the most charming and the most significant since Newman's *Apologia* is the *Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell* (1912).²¹ The sensitive Irish Protestant boy, literary to the tips of his fingers, passed through unbelief and High Churchmanship to the Jesuit novitiate at the age of eighteen. Except for a brief period in Malta, his career in the Society of Jesus kept him employed in England; he taught at Stonyhurst and elsewhere. Interested in philosophy rather than history, he was led, by his zeal for the dissolving of doubts and for the reconciliation of the doubter to Mother Church, to stretch the limits of Catholic liberty beyond measure. Opposition and disillusionment followed, and culminated in excom-

¹⁹ Das Papetum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit, 4th ed. (1902), 2 vols.; Moderner Staat und römische Kirche (1906); Rom und das Centrum (1907).

²⁰ 1909 f.; translation, 1911.

²¹ Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, arranged with supplements by M. D. Petre; Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912, 2 vols. Reviewed in this periodical, Jan. 1914, p. 123 f., by the Reverend William Sullivan.

munication. When he died in 1909 he still yearned for the Catholic unity in which he had been nurtured, which the logic of his ideas would have rent remorselessly.

In closing let us summarize under four heads what these recent publications would tell us about the real nature and activities of the Company of Jesus.

I. The relations of the Jesuits to the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The members of the Company of Jesus are popularly supposed to be the militia of the Pope. Their innermost circle, "the professed of four vows," swear to go whithersoever he sends them. Obedience to his commands, transmitted through their General, is military; "theirs not to question why"; and bones bleaching on African sands or beneath Canadian snows bear witness to the undaunted loyalty of the individual. The Jesuit Order as a whole has nevertheless repeatedly disobeyed the Pope, when they thought disobedience would redound (in the words of their favorite motto) "*ad maiorem Dei gloriam*." They trust themselves as the unwaveringly consistent representatives of papalism; therefore they are reputed to be more papal than the Pope.

If the Jesuits have been in occasional conflicts with popes, they have waged many a bitter war with bishops. Exempt from episcopal jurisdiction, they have entered diocese after diocese, and before long have endeavored to have things their own way. Jesuit churches and Jesuit schools have often competed with parish churches and schools instead of coöperating with them; and the Jesuits have often diverted to themselves the homage and gifts of the laity, in particular of the upper classes. Like the Mendicant Orders before them, the Jesuits have often crossed the plans of priest, of bishop, and even (though rarely) of the Supreme Pontiff.

The rivalry of the Jesuits with certain other religious Orders has usually been intense. From the start they had to cope with the hostility of the Dominicans, a battle

which was keenest under Pope Benedict XIV (1740–1758), who prohibited those curious compromises with Confucianism and Hinduism known respectively as the Chinese and the Malabar rites. The prohibitions practically put a quietus on Jesuit missions in China and India, which wilted as soon as the subterranean stream of Jesuit accommodation was diverted.

II. If the Jesuits did not always live at peace with their Catholic neighbors, what can we say of their relations to Protestants? Founded primarily for missions in Mohammedan lands, the Jesuits were by the force of the political situation speedily compelled to turn to the home field. Here they confronted sin, unbelief, and especially heresy. Even if we grant the thesis of Duhr,²² that the Jesuits were not founded to extirpate Protestantism, it is undeniable that a large portion of their work has been directed to that end. It was the Jesuits who educated great Catholic princes of the Counter-Reformation, notably Emperor Ferdinand II, and then incited them to crush Protestantism in their dominions by ruthless force. Let those who think the control of religious education a thing of little moment read the history of the suppression of Protestantism in the Tyrol or in Bohemia and Moravia, and they will not regard with indifference any attempt to indoctrinate youthful rulers, whether under sixteenth-century absolutism or under a twentieth-century democracy.

In the control of religious education lies the key to the future. The appeal to force in matters of religion seems to us not merely antiquated but abhorrent; and it is to be supposed that the Roman Catholics of America share this point of view. Smile cynically as one may at the appeal for toleration made by James II at the very time when the Grand Monarch just across the Channel was revoking Protestant liberties and harrying the Huguenots,

²² Duhr, *Jesuitenfabeln*, 4th ed., 1–32.

the American Catholics from the days of Lord Baltimore to the present year of grace have been in a minority, and have consistently pleaded for liberty to worship God in their own way. Granted freedom, the fight will be to dominate education; and this end the Jesuits hope to secure through increased influence on school boards, and ultimately through the division of school funds. This they will be able to secure only on condition that they play politics successfully.

The political activities of the Jesuits have often resulted in failure. This is perhaps the universal experience of all who engage in such fascinating pursuits as politics; but in the nineteenth century they have suffered many a heavy defeat. They lost in opposing the union of Italy;²³ they lost on Napoleon III, and again on General Boulanger;²⁴ and their friend, Cardinal Merry del Val, the Secretary of State to the reigning Pope, probably lost when he sacrificed the *modus vivendi* offered by the French government and accepted by a majority of the French episcopate in 1906, through fear that if the separation of church and state worked too well in France it would straightway be tried in Spain.

In view of these facts, who can deny that the Jesuit actually has entered and does enter politics? Whatever their official Constitutions may say to the contrary, whatever novice-masters may tell their novices,²⁵ the leaders of the Order know very well what they want. Said a shrewd Italian observer seventy years ago: "There are three sorts of Jesuits. There are learned members of Loyola's Order who do not know much about its policy, and pious Jesuits who are fully persuaded that their Order is innocent. By the help of the first kind of Jesuits an impression is made on those who are intellec-

²³ W. R. Thayer, *Life and Times of Cavour*, 1911.

²⁴ Hoensbroech, II, 133 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 164.

tually well educated; by the second kind on pious souls. But behind these two stands the real Jesuitism, which is now more eager than ever before, and which aims at the old object of Jesuitism—a counter-revolution and a theocracy.”²⁶ Boehmer, Tyrrell, and more plainly Hoensbroech and McCabe, give case after case where the Jesuits have interfered in politics, often to their discomfiture. The secrecy which is popularly supposed to hedge them about, as doth majesty a king, gives them a prestige beyond their deserts; but it also causes men to suspect them of much mischief which may not properly be laid at their door. They have sown secrecy, and have too often reaped suspicion and hatred; not merely among Protestants, to many of whom a live Jesuit would be as much a curiosity as a great auk, but among the Catholic laity as well. Country after country has expelled them from its borders, not merely in the era of Bourbon ascendancy in the eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth;²⁷ and today their colleges are forbidden in France and Germany. Frequently as the Jesuits have been the victims of greed or blind hostility, one suspects that where there has been so much smoke there must have been some fire—not necessarily the fire of martyrdom.

III. The ethical influence of the Jesuits. Of all themes for lovers of good detective stories, what can surpass the doings of the confessor to princes? Here is secrecy, here is power, here may lie great achievement; here also may be concealed chicanery and the toleration of sin for the glory, shall we say? of God. Let us judge charitably that *tertium quid* which too often passes for a Protestant court preacher; but let us also demand an

²⁶ Quoted in F. Nielsen, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century* (1906), II, 91.

²⁷ W. Bornemann lists twenty-six times that various governments have officially expelled the Jesuits (*Sind die Jesuitengegner "Lügner" und "Verleumder"?* 1903, p. 39 f.).

account of the uttermost farthing from the priest who for the sake of peace makes a pact with hell. Skilled as some confessors may have been in ethical acrobatics, in due time their feet did slide; and frequent falls have made casuistry a by-word.²⁸ The root of the evil is the fact that the father-confessor is put into the position of a judge who must give the accused the benefit of the doubt, and thus lower the standard which should be held consistently high. No wonder that a decisive factor in the conversion of Hoensbroech was the appeal of Kant for the moral autonomy of the individual.

IV. Finally, let us consider the Jesuit as a factor in the history of education. After having turned from Mohammedan to home missions, Loyola specialized in education. For the first century of their existence the Jesuit colleges were probably superior to anything that the Protestants had to offer; therefore the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1585 is a pedagogical document of prime importance. On the side of discipline, the Society appealed not to the birch so much as to emulation. On the side of subject matter, it subordinated everything, including mathematics and the vernacular, to the mastery of Latin. When, however, Latin ceased to be the language of learning and of diplomacy, the educational ideal was out of date; yet with a conservatism worthy of a better cause, the Jesuits kept instruction essentially on the basis of the *Ratio Studiorum* from 1585 to 1832. They fell to the rear of the pedagogical procession. In spite of certain reforms in the nineteenth century, they are today important educational factors in but two modern countries—in Spain and in the United States.²⁹

In education, ethics, politics, and in the Roman Church, the Jesuits are a power; yet in most countries their influence is on the decline. Their numbers and wealth

²⁸ Döllinger and Reusch, *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeit in der römisch-katholischen Kirche*; 2 vols. (1899).

²⁹ Boehmer, p. 293.

are constantly increasing; the Order counts nearly as many members today as in the palmy days before the Suppression. Typical as the Jesuits may seem to be of the plots or of the missionary heroism of the romantic past, they are destined to play a prominent part in the near American future. We must seek to understand them; and this we can do now better than ever before, thanks to their own learned publications, and to the far from infallible books of Boehmer, Tyrrell, Hoensbroech, and McCabe.

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGION

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In the present essay I propose to compare certain typical religious philosophies, with a view to discovering what degree of religious hope they justify; or what, in view of the nature of reality, they make of religious ideals. Philosophy, viewing experience roundly, taking into account both the uttermost that man wants and the evidence of reality, has reached different conclusions as to the relation between the two, or as to the consequent status of religious values in the light of critical reflection. There seem to me to be four typical philosophical verdicts of this sort: *first*, that the ideals of religion are illusory and vain; *second*, that its ideals are self-sufficient, and independent of reality; *third*, that its ideals define, or coincide with, reality; *fourth*, that its ideals are progressively efficacious, or may be realized. These four philosophies of religion may conveniently be termed: *disillusionism*, *symbolism*, *idealism*, and *progressivism*.

1. By "disillusionism" I mean the view that utterly discredits the religious ideals. This view may be reached by an examination of reality, and the discovery that reality neither corresponds nor responds to ideals. Cosmic reality may reveal itself as inherently hostile or malicious, and so justify only pessimistic dread and loathing. Or it may assume an aspect of indifference, to which man must accommodate himself by preoccupation with secular affairs, or by a purely intellectual contemplation of its necessity. A similar view may be reached by an examination of the desiderative consciousness itself, and

the discovery that ideals are only instruments of torture, such that the effort to realize them only serves to re-instate them with their accompanying sense of suspense, deficiency, and failure. The only remedy is to cease from hope altogether and achieve entire renunciation. I do not think it necessary to estimate this type of philosophy from the standpoint of religious values, inasmuch as it defines its place at the lower end of the scale. It confines itself to the denial of positive values, or to the assertion of the negative value of relief from misery. It imputes no specific hopefulness whatsoever either to the cosmic reality or to the works of the religious imagination. The remaining types of philosophy of religion differ from this first in that they encourage hope. These three remaining types may be illustrated from contemporary thought by three books—Höfding's *Philosophy of Religion*, Hocking's *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose*.¹

2. I am using the term "symbolism" somewhat loosely to mean that philosophy which proposes to confine religious value to the free creations of the religious imagination. Such a philosophy may agree with the first type in finding reality uncongenial to man's hopes, or it may find the facts doubtful; but in either case it invites man not to renounce his ideals, but to cultivate, cherish, and take refuge in them.

The chief significance of Höfding's *Philosophy of Religion* lies in its divorce of religion and metaphysics. The author professes himself to be idealistic in faith, and he even employs certain of the characteristic fallacies of idealism.² But he devotes the earlier part of his book to showing the theoretical invalidity of the distinctively religious ideas. These ideas give "no explanation of

¹ I do not mean to assert that any of these books is to be identified exclusively with that theory which I have chosen it to represent, but only that the theory in question is peculiarly characteristic of it.

² Op. cit., pp. 72-74.

special events," "are not capable of affording a conclusion for scientific thought," and "exhibit the character of figures rather than of concepts." "If," he proceeds, "the religious ideas are to have any significance at all, therefore, it can only be in serving as symbolical expressions for the feeling, the aspirations, and the wishes of men in their struggle for existence."³ The feeling which is peculiar to religion is "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values."⁴ Religion springs from the hope or assumption "that value will be preserved."⁵ In expressing this hope, the imagination draws upon actual relations "between value and reality as experienced by us."⁶ But it attaches to this relation a general or cosmic significance. "In all symbolisation, ideas taken from narrow although more intuitable relations are used as expressions for relations which, on account of their exaltedness and ideality, cannot be directly expressed. . . . A particular element of existence is promoted to be the most characteristic mark of the whole of existence; it is treated as though it entirely summed up the relation between value and reality given in experience."⁷ And similarly myth, legend, and dogma involve the transference to relations and events of the external world of ideas strictly applicable only to inward or human relations.⁸ In this extension they have only a poetical significance.⁹ The function of religion lies in this faculty of forming symbols. The religious consciousness must entertain "no mistrust of the instinctive formation of re-

³ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 93. Owing to our scientific ignorance of those ultimate matters to which our religious ideas refer, Höffding refers to his view as "Critical Monism." He objects to the term "agnosticism," so it appears, only because this view "is inclined to assert that 'the Unknowable' is entirely different from everything that appears in experience." Cf. pp. 88, 89.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 208.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-203.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 207. Poetry is the only means of access to the "highest," and may be "a more perfect expression of the highest than any scientific concept could ever be" (p. 376). Were Höffding to claim to know what he here only ventures to suggest as possible, his philosophy of religion would pass over to the idealistic type.

ligious ideas," and must break down the present "barriers of creed and dogma" in order to be "free and positive" in its production.¹⁰

In judging this type of religious philosophy it is important, first of all, to recognize that religious ideals are avowedly regarded as expressions of human needs.¹¹ They signify not the most we know concerning existence at large, but what we like to think, the most hopeful cosmic notion that we can form. They are the cosmic analogies not of the necessary, typical, or most probable experiences of relation between value and existence, but of those selected experiences in which value is "conserved." Now if this were all, this type of philosophy would at worst be guilty of belittling religion by confining its values to the values of fancy or fiction. Religious ideals would possess value in so far as pretty, congenial, quieting, or stimulating. Man is surely entitled to avail himself of such values. But it is clear that they are values of small magnitude. They attach only to fleeting images, and they satisfy only momentarily, or in the last extremity. They are comparable to the purely sensuous aesthetic values, or to the medicinal tonics. There can be no objection to fiddling while Rome is burning, or telling Boccaccio-tales while the plague is raging, provided the fire and plague cannot be extinguished. The mirage is the greatest possible good to the man who is dying in the desert, provided no water is in reach; and there are doubtless situations which justify the ostrich in hiding his head in the sand. Such values are values of last resort, a consolation when all is lost. And provided such be indeed the human situation, a religion of deliberate picture-building stands justified.

But there is a second consideration that alters the aspect of such a philosophy of religion. The ideals of religion, its myths, legends, symbols, and dogmas, not

¹⁰ *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 208-209. Cf. p. 350.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

only spring from human needs, but *they are believed*. To this fact Höffding does not attach sufficient importance. He does not sufficiently emphasize the difference between the augur who sees the imaginative origin of these ideals and the layman who accepts them in good faith as an account of reality. Viewed in this light religious ideals become illusions—and as illusions they conflict with cognition; as when the ostrich for hiding his head in the sand fails to perceive and avail himself of means of escape. "What would make the preaching of the Gospel utterly impossible," says Santayana, "would be the admission that it had no authority to proclaim what has happened or what is going to happen, either in this world or in another. . . . Even the pagan poets, when they devised a myth, half believed in it for a fact."¹² In stating this undeniable truth Santayana has in mind the proposal of certain modernists to rid Christian dogma altogether of cognitive import. A dogma, according to LeRoy, remains the same, provided the conduct and feeling it inspires are the same. The dogma of transubstantiation is a means of stimulating a form of ritual or a kind of mystical experience.¹³ But the fact is that dogmatic formulas not only refer to facts and events, but *mean* facts and events, together with all their implications. They generate plans and expectations consistent with their real meaning, and could not be varied in this objective reference without modifying the attitude of the believer. Suppose that a man plans with joy to go to New York to meet his sweetheart upon her arrival from Europe. The dogma in this case is the proposition that a real sweetheart is in fact arriving on a real steamer at a specific time and place. Suppose now that we substitute another formula. A rich uncle has died in New York and left the man a considerable fortune which is to be put into his hands by the executors. The plan and

¹² *Kinds of Doctrine*, pp. 32-33.

¹³ Cf. Santayana: *op. cit.*, p. 45, note.

the emotion are the same. He still leaves with great joy for New York, and perhaps by the same train. These two propositions then are dogmatically the same, or constitute the same dogma. But it is clear that their emotional and practical implications only very partially coincide. They will *not* in the long run lead to the same response. Nor could any two formulas be thus identical so long as they remained two in their reference to facts and events. Such identity could be obtained only by altering the dogma to read: "Good news from New York. Come at once. Imagine, if necessary, that your sweetheart has arrived from Europe or that a rich uncle has left you a fortune." But in this case the dogma consists in the first statement, which the man is asked to take literally. And note that if he were simply asked to imagine that there was good news from New York, he might play with the idea if he had nothing better to do; but he would do nothing about it, unless indeed he were unfortunate enough to succumb to its suggestive power and pass from conscious fancy to misleading and dangerous illusion.

In other words, religious ideals are ordinarily believed. As beliefs they determine action uniquely. And in that case the profitableness of the action depends on the truth and not on the hopefulness of the belief. Furthermore, the hopefulness of the belief is a positive danger in that it tends to lead to the acceptance of false belief, and so both to the loss of truth and the misdirection of action. If, on the other hand, religious ideals were universally regarded as the work of fancy, they would cease altogether to play the important rôle which they have filled in historical religions. The average worshipper would say with Bishop Butler: "Religion is true or it is not. If it be not, there is no reason for any concern about it."¹⁴

¹⁴ From the Sermon on Self Deceit, quoted by Arnold, *St. Paul and Protestantism*, p. 239.

The fundamental objection to a religious philosophy of the type represented by Höfding lies in its obscuring the trivial amount of the values of the religious imagination, consciously recognized as such, when compared with the values of true belief, or of the cosmic reality which true belief may reveal. The risk of error far outweighs the advantage of subjective taste, peace, or buoyancy. At best these values should be regarded as supplementary or as compensatory, when the possibilities of truth and reality have been exhausted. Both the types of religious philosophy which remain recognize this principle. They look for religious values in the nature of things rather than in the content of ideals as such. They differ in that idealism regards ideals as determinative of reality or as possessing metaphysical validity, whereas realism or progressivism regards ideals as efficacious or capable of realizing themselves in time. Let us turn next to idealism.

3. Under the label of "idealism" I have here loosely grouped not only tendencies that are ordinarily so termed, but also tendencies that would usually be labelled pragmatism, mysticism, or absolutism. The common ground among these tendencies is the ontological status of the religious ideal. There is an important difference of method and argument between the version which would assert that "the ideal is the real" and the version which would assert that "the real is the ideal." The exponents of the former version would contend that ideals have ontological validity in proportion to the degree of satisfaction they afford. The very fact that an idea does express desire, aspiration, or hope would be taken as giving it a certain guarantee of truth. The exponents of the latter version would propose rather to render the ideal consonant with reality in its ultimate metaphysical aspect, or would find the ideal and the real in one deeper experience of the ideal-real. Thus Professor Hocking

would mean by reality "that which first is, and afterward is in accord with our purposes," by which he means, if I mistake him not, that reality prescribes our purposes. For reality to be independent of man means that man is dependent on reality.¹⁵ Although I shall be dealing immediately with this latter version, I shall have in mind the fundamental contention common to both versions—the contention, namely, that the supreme reality and the supreme ideal are one and the same thing.

Professor Hocking thus records his acceptance of reality as the proper locus of religious values: "I believe, with McTaggart, that men have no right to the satisfactions which their religion affords them except as they earn that right by successful metaphysical thought. We cannot pass at once from our needs to the satisfaction thereof, without considering what that reality is from which we must obtain satisfaction. 'What people want,' says McTaggart, 'is a religion they can believe to be true'; than which nothing could be better said. . . . God can be of any worth to man only in so far as he is a *known* God."¹⁶

In what sense then is God known? Hocking's fundamental argument runs somewhat as follows: To know at all is to know socially. In knowing nature I share the content of other minds, and am acquainted with other minds as fellow-knowers. As our author expresses it, "we look at nature through the eyes of a social world." "This present world of nature is known by me as being, in just this sense, a common world: it seems to me, indeed, that it is *not otherwise known*—that is, that a knowledge of Other Knower is an integral part of the simplest knowledge of Nature itself."¹⁷ God, I take it, appears upon the scene at the point at which Other Mind

¹⁵ *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 161, 572.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 280, 288, 290.

is capitalized; which is the point at which cognitive companionship is correlated with the permanent and orderly system of nature.¹⁸

But to be God in the religious sense this absolute and unfailing Other Mind must reconcile me unqualifiedly to my world. It must enable me to find perfection in things as they are, to find the most real also the most good. "We must find some worth in God," says Hocking, "that we cannot find in the forward look of evolution. . . . We must be free to open ourselves, wholly, in imagination and in fact, if need be, to the *whole* of human experience."¹⁹ In short, though we know all that there is to be known, we must have no regrets. But how does the existence of a Knower of the cosmic order make this possible? There is only one clear answer that I can gather from our text. "The presence of a companion Mind, standing outside the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good and evil, may be found in experience to transmute evil into good."²⁰ "That pain which is taken in common, like effort which is carried on in common, is found through the association to lose its hardness."²¹ In other words, whatever be the misery of existence or the tragedy of the spectacle it affords, God and I can endure it together. Like bereaved parents, we may extract a last consolation from the fact that we have each other.

In addition to this bare presence, gratifying to my social instincts, God is said to possess a certain moral value or "justice" in his impartiality, "a justice which so strongly resembles an indifferent treatment of the righteous and the unrighteous."²² How this detach-

¹⁸ I do not wish here to examine the validity of this argument, except so far as to say that it appears to me to illustrate the characteristic idealistic fallacy of identifying objects of knowledge with their cognitive rôle, and then inventing a type of cognition that shall sustain them during the lapses of finite cognition. I am here concerned not with the constructive arguments but with the religious import of the conclusion.

¹⁹ Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 218.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 331.

ment and impartiality is distinguished from the indifference of fate or mechanism is not clear. Even granting the author's doubtful claim that the essential morality of man is "that he make himself universal," one does not see that man is brought to this escape from his "self-enclosedness" any more effectually by the idea of a being that contemplates "the contrasts of good and evil" from above, than by such an idea of these contrasts as might be afforded by any secular generalization. And here, except for those who are privileged to enter into the mystical consciousness, the account of religious values ends. God is "an Other Mind," "an individual Subject, wholly active," "the Eternal Substance . . . known as such," "the Eternal Order of things," "that which does whatever substance is found to do."²³ The net advantage which accrues to man from the existence or knowledge of such a being, is, apart from the immediate cognitive value itself, the moralizing value of detachment and the social value of a companion in misery. For the rest, one is left to acquire a taste for things as they are, or a poise of mind that shall enable one to face the facts without flinching. Except for the social value itself, these values are simply the values which man may manage to earn *whatever be the specific nature of the world*. And the social nature, as here defined, guarantees nothing whatsoever except a social relation as such. Its value would be great only in case of great extremity, or in case love could be so exclusively bestowed upon this abstract object as to make all other losses negligible.

We are told, however, that God has "a responsiveness of his own," a superlative loveliness, I take it, in which all values are somehow caught up and preserved, and that "herein lies the immediate experience of the personality of God."²⁴ But here again we are doomed to disappointment, as I fear must always be the case when

²³ *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 332, 336.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

we look to the report of the mystical consciousness. "I shall always be more certain *that* God is, than *what* he is." "Man knows well that he is not alone; he does not know so well in what companionship he is." "May it be that the mystic is more sure *that* he is sure than of *what* he is sure—except that he is sure of God and of his own relation to God?"²⁵ I gather from the balance of the text as well as from these admissions, that the mystical experience is essentially an experience of conviction. For some reason our author holds that "in these matters, the *that* actually precedes the *what*, both in time and in importance."²⁶ Why there should be any importance whatsoever in intensity of conviction so long as there is doubt as to its object, is difficult to see, unless indeed one falls back upon the hygienic value of the state itself. In any case, the mere existence of a peculiarly intense state of conviction which may attach itself to different objects cannot be regarded as evidence for any of these objects, and irresistibly suggests a subjective explanation.

There is the best of authority, as well as of evidence, for regarding mysticism as a type of emotionality, a subjective form of conviction, in which any content may be presented or any object judged. Mysticism may, as James has pointed out, be ascetic or self-indulgent, dualistic or monistic, personal or impersonal, naturalistic as with Walt Whitman, or supernaturalistic as with Saint Augustine or Bunyan. "The fact is," concludes James, "that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliance with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional

²⁵ *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 296, 317, 453-454.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

mood.”²⁷ The ideas precipitated by mystical experiences re-echo the normal experiences or thoughts of the time. Their importance or truth may be realized for the first time, but they are not original. “Generally speaking,” says Höffding, “they have their source in the circle of traditional ideas with which the subject was already familiar, but which he had previously disregarded.”²⁸ Thus Bunyan says of his Christian inspiration: “This made a strange seizure on my spirit; it brought light with it, and commanded a silence in my heart of all those tumultuous thoughts that before did use, like masterless hell-hounds, to roar and bellow and make a hideous noise within me. It showed me that Jesus Christ had not quite forsaken and cast off my soul.”²⁹ Can one doubt that Bunyan in another age and environment and with another dogmatic tradition, would have interpreted the same experience in other terms?

The conviction itself is more simply accounted for than by the reality of the object which it reports. Is there any one who has not had an inspirational or ecstatic dream, from which he has alas! awakened; or a flash of insight that has felt profound only to turn stale or commonplace upon reflection? And can any one distinguish such illusory experiences from veridical insight except by the rationalizing consciousness? If the mystical experience is to be regarded as cognitive, it must be tested in sober moments of observation and analysis. Taken in its immediacy, it is equivocal and variable. That religious beliefs should assume a mystical intensity and vividness is well, *provided they be true*. There is a bathos in clearness and articulation, but there is no other purge from the confusion and error to which moods of inspiration are otherwise liable. The objection

²⁷ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 425, 426.

²⁸ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 102.

²⁹ Quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 186.

to an appeal to the mystical experience lies not only in the doubtfulness or emptiness of its report but in its discrediting of the critical consciousness, so hardly won and so incomparably important.

In leaving this type of religious philosophy, let me restate in a word what seems to me to be its characteristic defect. We are to identify the consummation of hope with the totality of things as they are. But to accomplish this unnatural union, it proves necessary either to cultivate an acquiescence in things as they are, an acquiescence that may be tinged with a sort of sublimated love, provided reality be conceived as content of a universal mind; or to abandon the ordinary canons and tests of thought and acquire a mood of ecstatic conviction to which one imputes the maximum both of truth and value. In the first case, one adjusts hope to reality, which is always possible theoretically and even psychologically in the worst of worlds. Such an equilibrium is gained by the abandonment of all values save one's personal peace of mind. In the second case, one loses sight both of reality and of values, or at least of all values save the sensuous value of the ecstatic state itself. This type of religious philosophy, no less than the last, is a counsel of desperation, a last resort. I will not say that it is unjustifiable, but only that it is to be held in reserve until another possibility has been canvassed. This other possibility is the responsiveness of the cosmic reality to our concrete empirical preferences. I say "responsiveness" because I take it to be self-evident that our empirical interests are not already realized in the existing nature of things. But is there ground for believing that cosmic reality will eventually let us have our way; or that our interests may be efficacious and in the long run triumphant? Whatever be the answer, of one thing I feel certain, namely, that a favorable answer would be the best news that philosophy could report.

4. By "progressivism," then, I mean a philosophy of religion that justifies the naïve and daily practical hope that we may some day have those particular things which we want, such as wisdom, power, harmony, long life, virtue, friends, universal happiness, together with the removal of fear, pain, sin, death, and all the innumerable miseries that now beset us. If it could be shown that some hope of this empirical and differential kind is well founded, there would be so much the less need of the consolations of religion, or these consolations could be reserved to offset the residual misgivings that would abundantly remain.

Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose* is an inspiring example of patient philosophical research. Some twenty-six years ago, dissatisfied with what he took to be the theoretically premature and morally confusing spiritual philosophy of the Anglo-Hegelians, the author set to work to study the actual course of natural evolution, with special reference to the development of mind in animals and man, and the development of the human mind and will as exhibited in the history of society. The results of these investigations he published in two works: *Mind in Evolution* (1901), and *Morals in Evolution* (1906). In 1896 he had already published the result of his examination of fundamental concepts (*Theory of Knowledge*), especially as to the nature of mechanical causation and organism. He now gives us the larger generalizations which he believes the results of his previous special studies to justify. He presents his conclusion, he says, "not as something which is to satisfy all emotional cravings or end all intellectual doubts, not because it is artistically complete or even because it is proved with demonstrative certainty, but merely on the humble and prosaic ground that, on a complete and impartial review of a vast mass of evidence, it is shown to be probably true."³⁰

³⁰ *Development and Purpose*, p. 372.

The conclusion falls into two parts, that based more strictly on "a comprehensive review of experience," and that attained by the analysis of the conception of causality. The review of experience establishes, in the author's judgment, the central place of self-conscious mind in natural evolution. The first stage is the development of mind, and the second the development by mind. Blind struggle and natural selection may have been the chief factors in bringing about the existence of man, but once established and enabled to function in its own characteristic manner, the human mind has introduced a new principle of correlation and harmony. The guarantee of the permanence of achievements of this type lies in the mind's power to assimilate and regulate those very forces which would otherwise disintegrate and annul it. "Only if mind should once reach the point at which it could control all the conditions of its life, could this danger be permanently averted. Now it seemed to me that it is precisely on this line that modern civilization has made its chief advance, that through science it is beginning to control the physical conditions of life, and that on the side of ethics and religion it is forming those ideas of the unity of the race, and of the subordination of law, morals, and social constitutions generally to the needs of human development, which are the conditions of the control that is required."³¹

The transition from this empirical generalization of history to the more fundamental or metaphysical view is made by an analysis of the conception of mechanism and teleology. An examination of the action of the organism reveals a determination of part by whole, and of present by future. In life, action is determined not merely *a tergo* and indifferently, but by its tendency to produce specific effects upon co-ordinate processes. We thus reach the definition of a purpose as "a cause conditioned in its operation by its own tendency," and of an

³¹ Development and Purpose, pp. xxii-xxiii.

organic unity as a group of such causes governed by "the tendency of their combination towards a certain result."³² This same *modus operandi* is characteristic of mind and of society. Is it also characteristic of the cosmic process as a whole? Hobhouse concludes that the larger synthetic operations of nature cannot otherwise be explained. I cannot here enter into the merits of the argument. He concludes that "the evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control."³³ Both the empirical and the analytical arguments lead us "to conceive the world-process as a development of organic harmony through the extension of control by Mind operating under mechanical conditions which it comes by degrees to master."³⁴ As in the case of the previous types of religious philosophy, I shall not attempt to argue the strictly philosophical questions. Let me say only that a more careful, well-reasoned, and convincing examination of the question of purposiveness and progress it would be difficult to find. But what shall be said of the religious value of this type of philosophy?

First, as to its results. It attributes to the cosmic reality an actual working tendency in a forward direction coincident with man's hopes of first intent. It promises the fulfilment, through the complicity of the cosmic order, of those ends for which men are actually exerting themselves. It does not promise something else, or offer consolation for inevitable failure, or teach renunciation, but encourages the belief that the enterprise of civilization in which men are actually engaged, civilization with its concrete and specific values, will *succeed* in that historical future towards which its efforts are directed. It not only defines reality as friendly to man, but as friendly to man's actual interests. Furthermore, it endows man

³² Development and Purpose, pp. 318, 319.

³³ Ibid., p. xxvi.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 372.

himself with power to make his way. Instead of teaching man's dependence on a power to whom he should be grateful for small favors, whom he should love as the dog licks the hand of the master that beats him, it teaches that the masterful will moves in him, giving assurance to his hopes and strength to his hands.

And this philosophy confirms not only the hopes of man, but also his moral judgment. Man is not asked to adjust his ideals to reality, but to persist in his ideals. He is encouraged to pursue with better heart and with a broader cosmic outlook the same end that moves him to earn his living, support his family, make much of himself, and exert himself to improve the state of mankind. These secular motives are taken up into what Chesterton calls "the oldest and the best of all causes, the cause of creation against destruction, the cause of yes against no, the cause of the seed against the stony earth, and the star against the abyss."³⁵ The religion which here finds justification is that religion of *service* which received its classic formulation a generation ago in the essays of John Stuart Mill. "A virtuous human being," he said, "assumes in this theory the exalted character of a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife; contributing his little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that ascendancy and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil."³⁶

A word, finally, as to the method of religious philosophy which is represented by this work of Hobhouse. Its great merit, quite apart from the correctness of its results, lies in its clear recognition of comparative values. The values of reality itself, as these bear upon the actual human interest at stake, are of first and most momentous importance. And second in importance is correct knowl-

³⁵ Chesterton's *Bernard Shaw*, pp. 102-103.

³⁶ *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 116.

edge of this reality, in order that man may guide his action aright. The subjective and imaginative values must not be allowed to obscure the importance of the values of reality and true belief. Not that I would for a moment wish to discredit the values of fancy and subjectivity, or, for that matter, rob man of any atom of comfort which his faculties may enable him to extract from his lot. But it would be fatuous to seek consolation so long as, or wherever, it is possible to remove the need for it. If the spectacle of existence and destiny be unendurable, by all means let the lights be turned low; but man should see things in a *dim* religious light only, if need be, after he has seen them clearly. He should be satisfied to regard life as a predicament only after he is sure that it is not an opportunity. It is possible both to seek the best and be prepared for the worst. Discipline is justified because total success is impossible. Compensation is justified when failure is inevitable. If sober and vigorous thought does not justify hope, then man may well fall back upon his imagination, and nourish illusions that shall be flattering in proportion to their unreality. But this will take care of itself. The optimistic bias of the imagination is the one religious source that will never fail. It should be the part of a philosophy of religion to scan the cosmic horizon for signs that shall be as hopeful as possible but that shall first of all be trustworthy; so that if there be any chance of *really reaching the haven originally desired*, it shall not be lost from a too hasty resignation or abandonment to soothing distraction. A philosophy of religion, in short, should devote itself to the construction, not of the most hopeful belief, but of the most credible hope.

THE CHURCHES OF FRANCE AND THEIR SEPARATION FROM THE STATE

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It is a matter of common knowledge that during the last ten years the Churches of all denominations in France have been passing through a profound crisis. Such convulsions are not inevitably the death-agony of religion. Only the world's contempt or the world's forgetfulness could kill the Christian faith; but it is apt to be quickened rather than deadened by struggles for its life. Yet religion has a more subtle danger to encounter than the opposition of public authorities however violent. It is not impossible for the Church to be unconsciously seduced into imitation of her adversaries. She may come to make use of their methods. She may gradually slip downwards to the level of their spirit. So that, while prophesying among men as if she were the voice of God, her actions may be indistinguishable from those of a godless world. That is the danger. It is threatening the Church at this moment, and is more or less a menace to religion, everywhere and always.

PART FIRST: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Strange as it is, and unremarked as the fact may have been, the years which followed the disastrous war of 1870 saw the Catholics becoming or remaining masters of France. From the President of the Republic to the humblest functionary of the State, from the top to the bottom of all officialdom, military as well as civil, Cath-

olics held the ground, and Catholicism was deferred to. How is it that in the few years which have elapsed since, they have fallen so low and are now reduced to short commons? To begin with, one cannot help seeing that during their more prosperous period Catholics were malcontents. Religious enthusiasm was wanting. Had this been otherwise, if as a body they could have risen to the spiritual nobility of a de Mun, whose heart drew an uplift and a baptism from the terrible defeat he witnessed on the field of battle, so as to hear in it but a summons to a splendid moral resistance, how glorious had been the prospect to Catholic ambitions! But alas! let there but arise to agitate France a self-seeking, mischief-making, and bungling General Boulanger, and forthwith the whole Catholic body wheels after him, and follows his blundering lead. Or again, let a new and grave crisis arrive, as was the Dreyfus affair, pushing home to the individual conscience problems on whose just settlement the very foundations of society rested, then what happened? This happened: The Catholics ranged themselves on the side of order, it is true; but at the same time identified their party foolishly with the side of moral confusion. Nevertheless, when in 1901 Waldeck-Rousseau, then the President of the Council, carried a law through the Assembly against the teaching and trading Congregations, it is not necessary to believe that he did so with the idea of retaliation. He was shocked at the wide gulf between the Catholic and lay mind. He desired that the State should be in a position to exercise permanent regular control over the instruction given to young Catholics. Standing up against the Congregations encroachment has been carried on in France many times in its past history. Royalty has from time to time set an example of resistance. The secular clergy themselves have often been among the foremost to call a halt. But under Waldeck-Rousseau the temper of the times was

changed, so that what had been hitherto on the side of the laity nothing more than a defensive wall against the encroachment of the Congregations was converted into a policy of aggressive attack. Combes, a former Seminarist, having succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau as President of the Council, took advantage of the covenant of lay resistance against the Church power which had put his predecessor in the chair, and proceeded to open battle not only with Catholicism, but against the very idea of religion. His manner of dealing with the issue was more than coarse. No citizen with any feeling for liberty and justice could approve such conduct unreservedly. No man of religious ideals could fail to be disgusted at the outrageous harshness and frequent displays of passionate hostility which marked the administration's methods. While all this is true, however, there must be an explanation for the success of the government's vigorous policy, for the majority which steadily sustained it, and for the futile barrenness of the opposition it has met with. The explanation in a word is this. The bulk of the French nation were frightened. They were frightened both by the Catholics' openly defiant reactionary temper, and even more by their supposed plottings and conspiracies. They were eager to be delivered from it all. The explanations of the clericals are often shallow. Their favorite phrase is "the influence of Jewish gold." But, thank God, great events in human history are derived from deeper causes. As is the case in the strifes of nations, so has it been here. The French Church and the French State went to war with one another simply because one, or rather both, of the parties desired there should be war. At first the government wanted it. After a while, the civil authorities, out of breath, were more anxious to compromise than not. By this time however, Rome had become exasperated, and was unwilling to give way. Combes picked a quarrel with the

Pope, because his Holiness protested against the visit of the French President, M. Loubet, to the Italian Court, and added fuel to the fire by mixing himself up at the same time with the ecclesiastical relations of certain bishops, Monsignors Geay and le Nordez, who at that particular moment were on bad terms both with the inhabitants of their respective dioceses and also with the Pope himself. What the rights of the bishops' case were, it is not important for us to know. One thing is certain, the French government in June, 1904, took advantage of the opportunity to break off diplomatic relations with the Vatican and recall its ambassador. It is hinted in some quarters that a movement is beginning to show itself just now to resume official relations. So far, however, France continues, as it has been for the past nine years, without an ambassador at the Vatican. The separation of the Churches from the State was definitely voted by the Chambers in the following year. And thus, though not without some opposition, was at last accomplished a reform, which had had a place upon the programme of advanced republicans for more than half a century. A number of different bills had been offered upon the subject, only to be immediately thrown out, as being frankly hostile to religion itself as well as to the Catholic Church. The measure brought in by M. Briand, however, a member of the Cabinet, met a better fate. The bill he introduced was not benevolent to the Churches, since it ruled out from State remuneration all religious officials alike. But under the new name of "worship associations" he permitted the Church organizations to continue, and even to progress morally, under strict financial limitations. Needless to say, a law which was so novel an experiment, and which affected the interests of the people so deeply, would need to be retouched at many points, according as experience of its results should gradually point out. With a little tact and patience the

Catholics might have parried direct injury to religion and have prepared to adapt themselves to the new situation. But Rome does not believe in evolution nor officially, in adaptation. Strange as it may seem, at the time when the bill was introduced no one expected that it would pass. Surely something out of the ordinary would happen to prevent it. The most amazed man, when the law was actually voted, was the head of the Department of Religion, M. Dumay (Ministry of Home Affairs), against whom it has since been proved that he actually conspired with the Clericals to prevent the bill's passage. Instead of clinging to a system which was tottering to its downfall, the Catholics might, as we said, have made prudent preparations for the new order. Such a policy however would have required some active co-operation, however discreet, with the French government; and this, the Vatican—I do not say the Catholics—repeatedly and absolutely refused to allow.

The question arises, what might have been the effect of the new law upon the life of the Catholic Church? From the moral point of view, the papal authority was strengthened. Formerly two powers, the Roman hierarchy and the French government, co-operated together in directing the affairs of the Churches. Now there is but one administrator. The government's administration is effaced. Rome, appointing her bishops without an intermediary, no longer needs to have any understanding as to the matter with the State. So much the better then for the Pope; he has recovered his old exclusive rights, and is delivered from State interference.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church loses a large amount of money. The suppressed religious budget is some thirty-five millions of francs. Even here, however, it might have got some advantage. The effect upon the people of being compelled to raise so large a sum for the

very subsistence of religion may have had some influence in attaching them to their Churches. What is more serious is the loss of the free use of their vicarages, of the archbishop's palaces, and of the seminary buildings. It was provided that they should belong to the State or to the Commune after some few years. The time of grace originally allowed was too short; but the refusal to accept the law reduced it to a single year. The law, moreover, was too harsh in its manner of dealing with the compensation of the clergy. Only those who were forty-five years old and had been recipients of State remuneration for not less than twenty years, could receive a life-pension. Others who could not come up to these conditions—men in active duty—saw their emoluments gradually fall to nothing in the course of four years. Surely there ought to have been shown some degree of respectful and moderate treatment while the law was taking these men's living from them, instead of the sudden harshness which was actually employed. One of the bishops saw himself brought in a year's time nearly to the point of actual starvation.

While it cannot be denied that the material losses, and by natural consequence the injury to its moral influence, which the Church in France has sustained, have been very great, on the other hand it must likewise be recognized that if she had submitted to the law she would have succeeded in preserving for herself no small measure of her enormous wealth. The truth deserves to be openly proclaimed that the government had no intention of seizing the Church's patrimony. This amounted to three hundred and fifty-one millions of francs, the property of the parishes, of the Cathedrals, of the archdioceses, or to speak more strictly, of the religious edifices, and their "chapters" or trustees. The law in its fourth Article contemplated the transference of the respective endowments to the new religious "Associations"; while the

eighth Article made the Council of State responsible for the equitable carrying out of this arrangement. While there was thus needed some delicacy of administration, yet the law itself was not impossible; neither was it of such a nature as to diminish popular respect for religion or its institutions. Why then has the Church become so transformed as it now is? Why is it that at the present time her aspect is one of such disorganization and disorder as to justify a member of the government in declaring, from the Senatorial Tribune, in the year 1908, that the French Republic had no interest in and did not concern itself with the present anarchical condition of the Catholic religion? "*Le gouvernement de la République n'avait pas intérêt à cet état anarchique de la religion Catholique.*" We propose to find the answer to this question by examining the events with some care, in the order of their sequence.

Once the law of Separation was passed, to their amazement, in December, 1905, there was but one thing for the Catholics to do, namely to await the Pope's official mandate. During the following February this appeared in the Encyclical, "*Vehementer nos.*" It condemned severely the new order of things, especially on these two grounds: first, the danger of the predominance of the laity; secondly, the impossibility of trusting the Council of State (the Supreme Court) with the solution, or with the right to arbitrate the differences which would possibly arise. This condemnation of the principle underlying the law was no surprise. The Pope could not but pronounce condemnation upon any Civil law presuming to affect the Church. He further gave notice in his mandate that what were called "practical" instructions were to follow. These would direct the conduct of the clergy in their new circumstances, which they could not avoid examining attentively. Three days later, Mgr. Merry del Val communicated to the Archbishop

of Paris a list of the questions which the assembled bishops were to examine at their meeting in the month of May. About the same time Mgr. Fulbert-Petit, of Besançon, made the remark that such an assembly of bishops was a favorable sign; compliance with the law might not be an impossibility.

The Commission on preparations for the meeting consisted of five archbishops, and two of the most distinguished bishops, men who welcomed the idea of making an experiment of the law's practical operation. The business transacted at the Plenary Assembly was at first kept secret. The following details, however, came out later. Each of the bishops on coming to his seat in the House found in front of him, in his place, the Fulbert-Petit proposal, as to the possibility of organizing new "Associations." He had also before him a confidential memorandum by Mgr. Fuzet, of Rouen, discussing the subject of worship Associations in Germany. An additional argument on that side of the question was a recent article by the archbishop of Paris loyally approving the new system of things contemplated by the law. Three subjects were voted on in the meeting: first, a complimentary address to the Pope (obviously *de rigueur* in the circumstances), which was passed with only two dissenting votes; secondly, it was decided by forty-eight against twenty-eight that it was expedient to try some *modus vivendi*; thirdly, fifty-six against eighteen adopted favorably the scheme of the archbishop of Besançon as to the possible organization of new "Associations." Notice too that in March of that same year the petition to the bishops had already appeared, called the Petition of the "Green Cardinals" (an allusion to the fact that several of the most distinguished signers were members of the *Institut de France*, whose official dress includes a coat with green embroidery), expressing a fear that civil war would ensue if the "Associations" were not

accepted. And still further, the public press, newspapers of the highest standing (like the *Journal des Débats* and the *Temps*) published some articles insisting that a representative lay element ought to be included, and take part in the administration of the Churches.

Put together the facts above named, and the conclusion is inevitable that at the time referred to, the entire body of enlightened pious and active Catholics were cordially in favor of endeavoring to comply with the new law, in spite of its imperfections. Especially is it noticeable that the great majority of the clergy were disposed to accept the new "Associations." But while the country was once more waiting in expectation of light from Rome, there came instead, in August of the same year, 1906, a thunderbolt, in the shape of the Encyclical "*Gravissimo*," which stunned even the foremost champions of the altar. This rejected the law, root and branch. It would accept no compromise whatever. It cut every cable, as it were, which connected "The Ship of Our Lady" with the now accursed shore of the French Republic. This document from Rome contained an extraordinary and almost inexplicable intimation that not only had the Vatican rejected the new law absolutely, but that the recently held Episcopal Assembly had done the same thing. Now what is the explanation of this strange piece of news? What was it that actually took place? The fact has come to public knowledge that the bishop of Orléans, Mgr. Touchet, one of the minority who voted against any compromise with the Government, had caused a statement to be sent to the Pope, to the effect that his own antagonism to the bill, however it might not be the attitude of the majority, was nevertheless the view which was actually held by the most influential bishops in France. It is also known that at that very time, Mgr. Fuzet, the author of the scheme which the bishops had approved, was denounced to His Holiness as a "moderate" by the Vice-Nuncio

Montagnini; and moreover, it is also known that at this juncture the dominant French influence at Rome was in the hands, not of the French Cardinals or French Clergy, but of a small group of mere politicians, of whom two among three were atheists, and who insisted on having the new law rejected. The thoughtful reader will ask himself, however, how do we know all this? What is the use of mixing up history with a lot of uncorroborated gossip? Our reply is: We have documentary proof in the papers which were seized at the Nuncio's quarters, when Montagnini was put out of office. These papers expose clearly this person's conversations and correspondence with the clerical leaders, and show us therefore the Catholic hierarchy checked and checkmated by the active interference of a set of people, who, with no papal warrant, assume the position of established masters of the bishops and other dignitaries of the Church, and boldly denounce them accordingly. We who are outside cannot comprehend how "the successor of Jesus Christ" could allow such men and such proceedings to be used in the interest of his cause. We believe this fact to be a weak point in the Catholic Church. A Jesuit Father frankly admitted, on the day after the Encyclical, the distrust, terror, and dismay of Catholic circles. If the Roman Curia desired to test the loyalty of the French clergy, certainly it has succeeded. Without protest, without a murmur, they have bowed the head to the gale, which has burst upon them. What is in their hearts, what are the secret thoughts of these accused bishops, as they find themselves doomed to be ignored for the future by the French government, while they are ruled by their own chief with a rod of iron, who shall say? Think of that poor Bishop Lecamus, formerly bearing to the second Plenary Episcopal Assembly, in September, 1906, the papal sanction of his proposal on the subject of diocesan administration, and then receiv-

ing, like a blow in the face, a telegraphic message sent from Rome, and read to him by the notorious Montagnini, cancelling that sanction. The blow struck home to the bishop's heart; he withdrew from the place and died. A certain Breton Cardinal received something like three thousand abusive letters, because he had ventured to make the remark that compromise with the law was not impossible.

During that same year, 1906, the public mind was excited to disorder and resistance almost everywhere, by the government's proceeding to make inventories of the properties of the Church. The agitation arose, not unnaturally, in this way: since the Churches were to revert to the State, and since the State for this reason had to make an exact statement of every detail which the sacred edifices contained, it was unavoidable that the civil power should set its detested foot even within the limits of the sanctuaries. This act, harmless in itself, but in the eyes of the more militant Catholics a symbol of worse to follow, was moreover just the kind of offense which would make an easy pretext for exciting unreasoning anger, and for instigating the people to defy the law. It is proved by the Montagnini papers that Merry del Val himself, understanding the situation, availed himself of the opportunity to spread public disorder. The doors of the Churches were barricaded. A few State officers, who of course were in no position to defend themselves, were drenched with water or otherwise treated roughly. Yet in all this there was nothing very tragic or even serious, any more than there could be said to be anything of real religion. The outside look of things, however, was sufficient to spread in Rome the idea that the French people was holding itself ready for mortal combat; whereas, on the contrary, at that very time it was desiring nothing more than what it always does desire, namely, peace. In several localities the

inventory proceedings brought to light a curious condition of mind among what we have to call the Catholics "*du nouveau style*." These people were more zealous than their curé, whose commands indeed they expressly disobeyed. The best known, though not the only example, was the Church of St. Clothilde in Paris. The parish priest protested in the most explicit manner: "If the curé is no longer master in his own Church, if the bishop is no longer master in his own diocese, if the Pope is no longer master in the Church Universal, there is an end to all respect for the hierarchy, there is an end to the principle of authority, which is the soul of the hierarchy, there is an end of Catholicism. If there exist a new species of Catholics who claim they have the right to overturn the traditional order, their extraordinary claim cannot be fought too strongly." How many bishops and parish priests have *thought* the same thing without being ready to say so!

In December, 1906, the Church not having accepted the new law, nothing remained but that the Episcopal palaces and ecclesiastical seminaries had to be evacuated, and temporary provision, however poor, made for the accommodation of the inmates. One eager effort after another was made first by the bishops, and later by members of the Parliament, to find a scheme of compromise. The second of the Bishops' Plenary Assemblies appointed three of its members to negotiate secretly with the government as to the possibility of creating "Associations" which should be both canonical and legal. Here and there, in spite of the Pope's prohibition, religious Associations actually arose. Well-disposed members of the laity took the initiative. Success, however, could not be reasonably expected. It was waste labor to work against the Pope; it was equally so to work without him. The movement too had a certain smell of schism about it, and naturally enough its attempts were followed by the condemnation of Rome.

In this melancholy year a humorous note was struck at Bordeaux by Cardinal Lecot, and by an Association which he had founded in that diocese. This Society had received the Pope's toleration. One fine day during a debate in the Chamber, the Minister, M. Briand, replied to a question of Jaurès, that Mgr. Lecot's Association was "in conformity both with the law of France and with the law of religion." This was doing an ill turn to the poor Cardinal, inasmuch as Rome had distinctly prohibited the creation of these institutions. Shocked and startled out of his wits, the good man sent a categorical denial. All the same, however, he had actually been guilty of forming, without knowing it, a "worship Association." On the strength of the toleration which the Pope had granted to Lecot, the bishop of Tarentaise solicited Rome's permission to set up in his Alpine diocese an Association like it, and received in reply an unqualified refusal.

There was a time when the Catholics feared that at the expiration of the term fixed by law (December, 1906) the government would deprive them of their churches, in which case they must have resorted to worship in private houses. But in October, 1906, the government made the announcement that the faithful would be allowed to continue the use of the church buildings, on condition of making some simple formal declaration. Rome, however, after hesitating a little, forbade the acceptance of this offer. In January, 1907, the government, still with the hope of alluring the Catholics into adopting a *modus vivendi*, passed an act permitting the Churches to form themselves into "Associations" of common law. Some days later Rome rejected the offer, saying that it aggravated the offensiveness of the previous proposition. In spite of these discouragements however, a third Plenary Assembly of the bishops was convoked with the same object as before—to discuss and

try to discover what would be their best course. After some vague and fruitless discussion, one of the prelates proposed that each parish priest should enter into a contract with his mayor, for the use of the church building. The assembled bishops accepted the proposition; and most surprising of all, the Pope, when he was consulted, did the same. But after the bill was drawn, his Holiness objected to a certain clause inserted by the government, prohibiting foreign monks from acting as parish priests on the ground that it was "vexatious." Thus the whole scheme of accommodation completely broke down once more, and the last chance vanished of an honest and equitable common understanding. The cause of the failure was mutual hatred and bitter feeling. This, whenever it reached a certain degree of irritation, converted each difficulty as it arose in the controversy into a fresh obstacle to reconciliation. So well was this state of things understood by the members of the government that after a while they ceased altogether making proposals of any kind. They felt that the mere fact of their offering a suggestion doomed it to rejection. This distrust on Rome's part can easily be understood. "*Timeo Danaos, et dona ferentes.*"

On the other hand, M. Briand was ready to welcome individual propositions which had the look of being helpful to the Church in its present desperate condition. Thus he was glad to accept the proposal made by the Abbé Lemire [the solitary priest among the deputies] whose tall form in the Chamber commanded the respect of the entire body, the Clericals alone excepted. The Abbé asked if the Mutual Benefit Societies, which the priests would form under common law, would receive from the State the funds which had formerly been in the hands of the Church for the benefit of the aged clergy. An amendment to this effect was passed. Thereby an amount of nineteen millions of francs out of the Church's

wealth might have been saved. M. Lemire expressed an additional wish that the same funds as before should continue to be employed in keeping up the masses for the benefit of the "pious Founders." M. Berger proposed the amendment in the Senate, and here also it was accepted.

The passage of this bill by the French Parliament was thus a very great benefit to the Catholics, not only morally but materially, since it preserved to them as much as a fifth part of the former ecclesiastical property—a capital of forty-eight millions of francs. Mgr. Fuzet forthwith hastened to Rome to point out how opportune, at this critical moment, the Mutual Benefit Act was, and on his return made this announcement to the Press. He said, "I limited myself when in Rome to putting the question, 'Will it be possible for the Ecclesiastical Benefit Societies to form themselves into acknowledged Associations?' To this the Holy Father answered, 'I give my consent.'" It was too good, however, to be true. Only a short time after, the Roman newspapers denied that any such authority had been given by the Pope, inasmuch as a merely oral approval was insufficient. In short, Rome rejected the Ecclesiastical Benefits proposal made by Mgr. Fuzet, as she had rejected all the rest. Presumably the Curia did not want to put itself under obligation either to M. Lemire, a republican, or to Mgr. Fuzet, who was a liberal; or else she was aiming to keep the French Clergy closely in her own grip. But it was a blow, and one that had the look of cruelty; since it struck both at the aged clergy, and also at the pious endowments bequeathed by the dead. All this was sacrificed. The only palliation was the papal announcement at the time, that "the departed Founders would have the benefit of two thousand masses, said on their behalf by the French monks in Rome."

What after all are the results to religion which have been produced by the Separation? They are not so

important as one might think. Looking at the Churches from the outside, nothing is changed. The priests continue saying mass in the same Churches as before. The faithful continue to attend more or less numerous, according to time and place. Here and there there is a country church abandoned, or another threatened by decay. All the world knows how hard Barrés labors, and what talent he displays in his effort to save these sacred walls (yet he is not a believer). Bishops' palaces are turned into libraries or museums, and seminaries have their quarters changed into barracks or colleges. This is the look of things upon the surface. The Separation has brought to light the wealth of some dioceses, and emphasized the poverty of others. If at Toulouse, Montauban, Lille, the archbishop has found a palace to live in, the archbishop of Tarentaise in the Alps is lodged like a pauper. The only bishop who continues to occupy his episcopal residence is the bishop of Rodez, and he does so by paying rent. But what is more serious is the falling off of funds in nearly all the dioceses, together with the scarcity of candidates for the ecclesiastical vocation. The bishop of Périgueux complains in 1910 that the subscriptions in his diocese are ridiculously small. Of the five hundred parishes in the diocese of Bayonne, only one-half pay the amount needed. Paris, Lyons, and Lille alone cover their expenses. Yet even here in Paris, the very richest parishes—St. Honoré d'Eylau, St. Philippe du Roule, the Madeleine—are like the rest in showing diminished receipts. The first announcement of Separation was defied by Catholic enthusiasm. This gradually failed, however, and the efforts of the people relaxed. At the same time, as an offset to these depressing results, in the great centres at least, the fact is undeniable that there is more practice of religion than there was before. The faithful have begun to feel that they owe a duty to their Churches. Persecution is

apt to re-kindle faith which long-continued ease had made lukewarm; or, to put it otherwise, the wind which blowing on the hearth scatters the ashes, revives at the same time the languishing sparks. So that the result of the Separation on the whole was a distinct revival of Catholic activity especially in the cities.

The bishops felt on their part they now enjoyed greater freedom. They no longer dreaded vexatious annoyances, or deprivation of their emoluments at the hands of the prefect, nor displacement from their office for a mere casual expression of irritation. But the liberty which they gained politically they soon found they were in danger of losing ecclesiastically. First, the Pope suppressed Plenary Episcopal Conventions. Curiously enough, it was a heretic, M. Paul Sabatier, a man very well informed as to Roman affairs, who on the 11th of August, 1907, was able to announce in the *London Times*, that the Plenary Conventions would for the future be discontinued, while the poor archbishop of Paris, one of the highest Catholic dignitaries in France, was actually making his preparations to hold the Conferences in December. This shows how little the Curia troubled itself about the French clergy. Three days later, on the third of December, this suppression was announced in the Roman *Corrispondenza* (the official paper). The country parts of France have certainly suffered from the Separation, whatever may be the case as to the cities. This was to be expected. A rural environment, with a regular life of patient toil, imparts a repose and balance of disposition, which through being habitual become men's second nature, and which, if destroyed by any cause, it is almost impossible to restore. The understanding had hitherto been that the government should pay on the people's behalf the salaries of the clergy, in return for their administration of baptism, confirmation, marriage, and burial. Now,

however, Catholics are told that for the future they themselves are to be responsible for the clergy's maintenance—an announcement which, at first, however it may be later, they refused to believe or to agree to. The country clergy, on their part, do not regret their new freedom from the dictation of superiors, nor the abandonment of the idea of creating religious "Associations." But where and how are they to get their bread? Already hundreds of their number have taken up different forms of secular work—stock-raising, bee-raising, farming, printing, and the like. Candidates for the sacred office, according to statistics published by M. de Narfon, have decreased in all the dioceses, sometimes by as much as one-half. Parents find that since the State no longer guarantees priests' salaries, livelihood by the sacred profession is too precarious. Even the bishops point out in their charges the life of persecution to which the clergy are subjected. How then can parents be expected to devote their sons to such a destiny?

"*Spies and a Reign of Terror.*" In his keen and striking book, *Le Bilan de la Séparation*, M. de Narfon gives the above heading to his final chapter; and in the course of it makes the remark that even at dinner-parties among the clergy, the guests, if tempted to talk freely about ecclesiastical affairs, keep a careful eye upon their company. At a clerical dinner-party, a *soutane* might conceal a Roman telltale more successfully than in certain salons the evening dress of a gentleman would conceal a professional police spy. Who would like to dedicate his son or his friend to spend his life in such an atmosphere? It is nothing less than stifling. No wonder that the candidates for the priesthood are few.

What we have been saying naturally suggests the subject of the Modernist movement in France. So far as the features of this are common to other Catholic countries, the reader may be referred to Paul Sabatier's enthusiastic,

too enthusiastic, *Les Modernistes*; and above all to a few chapters in Gaston Riou's recent book, *Aux Écoutes de la France qui vient*; where he sketches the disillusionments he found when he came to close quarters with the Modernist *élite*. At this point, however, we should like to point out briefly the different currents of thought and feeling which are now stirring modern Catholic France.

The previous pages have shown the operation of a certain influence which has not only opposed the policy of the bishops but many times succeeded in reversing it. This influence is that of the monastic Congregations—as for example the “Assumptionists”; whose newspaper organ, *La Croix*, is sent to the very smallest villages, to the curé in his vicarage, to the proprietor in his château, and to every notorious bigot in the community. With regard to this paper I affirm distinctly, with sorrow and quite without ill-will, that the prevalent tone of its columns is violent and sometimes vulgar. Its insults and calumnies are as mordant and corrosive as a chemical acid and produce typical excitement. It stands as a religious herald, but it upholds religion even by violent means, and that is against true Christianity; and being read by the clergy everywhere, the result is that the future prospects of any unfortunate curé denounced by it as a liberal are blasted beyond repair. Another newspaper, *L'Action Française*, ably edited and addressed to the “Intellectuals,” is the organ of the more self-confident reactionists. They are clever in organizing public attacks against such as do not hold their narrow-minded patriotic views. They are royalists, and being such, though not necessarily personal believers, they pose as partisans of the Catholic Church; though not infrequently their newspaper contains what are nothing less than insults to the moral teaching of Christianity and to the person of Jesus Christ. Why the Church does not repudiate such allies is a mystery. On the other

hand, Marc Sangnier, a man of high moral character and unimpeachable orthodoxy, founded a League which he called "*Le Sillon*," and which some years ago counted among its members a considerable number of priests with a large band of enthusiastic young laymen. M. Sangnier himself is a man of exalted personal faith, which in his lectures he never attempts to disguise. What happened? The Pope dissolved the League, demanding the personal submission of M. Sangnier; who now, for fear of excommunication, can only conduct noiselessly his paper, *La Démocratie*. In 1908 two other orthodox periodicals, *La Vie Catholique* and *La Justice Sociale*, were suppressed by the Curia. Surely these unexplained proceedings compel us to suspect that their actual inner motive was hostility to the democratic republican spirit which these journals represented. Contrast with this conduct the treatment of the atheistical but royalist newspaper, *L'Action Française*, and we are driven to the conclusion that Rome regards the politics of her children as more important than their faith. Not that she is humanly illogical in doing so, since the government of the Republic is anti-clerical. All the same, this is a dangerous attitude. When the Church identifies herself with any political party, she lowers her sacred dignity in the eyes of her own children, and still more in the opinion of those who are inimical or indifferent to religion. Becoming thus identified, she rises and falls with the party's vicissitudes of fortune; she shares its occasional contempt; she lessens, if not forfeits, her authority over souls; she puts herself on a level, in the eyes of her own servants of whatever rank, with the low quarrels of political elections and the cackle of the political press. An earthly government which denies the existence of a God may descend as low as it likes without being illogical. But surely the institution which represents Jesus Christ in the world has not the moral

right to be equally vile. It is the terrible misfortune of Catholic Christianity in France that the religious enthusiasm and the ardor of its best children not only are of no use to them under present conditions, but may be said, on the contrary, to cause their ruin, whenever their relations with the Vatican are not perfect and their opinions are not identical with the pronouncements of the Curia. Shocking is the state of things when a moderate writer like Paul Sabatier, who is in sympathy with Catholicism, has to pronounce upon its present character the following fatal criticism: "The Curia issues its commands. These commands are obeyed. But alas! the obedience of such true Catholics as honestly mean to serve God and not to make use of Him for their own service, is despondent and discouraged, and they feel even scandalized."

PART SECOND: THE PROTESTANTS

The Protestant world has been less excited by the law of Separation than the Catholic. In spite of the new burdens which it imposes, in spite even of the divisions among them which the change was ready to introduce, Protestants, taken as a whole (leaving out the Lutherans, who were often partisans of the Concordat, being more "ecclesiastically" minded than the "Reformed") have for a long time been calling for the order of things which the present new law brings with it. Long ago the Protestant current fell apart into two streams of tendency, which, though they differed greatly in point of doctrine, were very similar, strangely enough, in their modes of worship and their moral life. The recent removal of the embracing bond of the Concordat resulted, not in uniting these two currents, but in driving them more obviously apart. It soon appeared that a united General Assembly of all the Reformed was im-

possible. The orthodox would have none of it. Doubtless they had their reasons. There was a group of "Moderates," whose peculiar combination of fervor in religious and social affairs with championship of liberty in theological opinion gave a moment's hope that reconciliation might be brought about; even though some of their leaders, Wilfred Monod, Gounelle, and others, were handicapped as peacemakers by their recent notorious abandonment of the Orthodox Synod precisely on the question of the new Protestant organization. However that may be, in October, 1906, the moderates summoned all the Churches in France to send representatives to an Assembly to be held in Jarnac (Charente). Very few orthodox attended. The Assembly itself was only saved from failure—but it *was* saved—by the lofty eloquence of Charles Wagner, who at the critical instant was powerful enough to inspire and fill men's hearts to the full with the spirit of peace and union. Then and there a Society was founded, which, "outside of and above party considerations," was to unite together all Churches which were disposed to prefer religious to ecclesiastical unity. This seemed encouraging. Soon however the fact came out, in spite of the desire of the "Founders," that against their intentions they had actually created a third group of Churches, intermediate between the "orthodox" and the "liberals." This new bent was probably the inward thought of most of the Protestants. But many of the laity saw in this proceeding a step in the direction of rationalism—the *bête noire* of those familiar with the story of Scherer and Colani. Besides this, the Churches of the "orthodox" tendency having made prudent preparations, the shock of the Separation found them duly organized and equipped for the consequences. This consideration greatly influenced the decision of many of the Churches when the time came to decide to what

party they should attach themselves. How could they be rash enough to throw in their lot with a vague "Association of Jarnac," which possibly the next day might be non-existent! How could they separate themselves from their traditional root, the Reformed Evangelical Church, which assured them of their future! I should hesitate to assert this in writing, if it were not that I have it directly from the lips of pastors, whose Churches actually stuck to the orthodox ranks. Optimists might encourage the hope that the orthodox would gradually go over to the moderates. Nothing of the sort happened for this reason: in consequence of a request from many of the liberals to be allowed to join the moderates, moderates and liberals have been steadily drawing together, until last year they came to the point of fusion with each other. Notice too, that now for some time many of the liberal Churches, awaking out of their lethargic isolation, have been welcoming with joy the hand reached out to them by a number of the old orthodox at Jarnac, while the third or moderate party is finding its glory in having had faith enough to mingle, without fear of being lost, among brethren holding different views. Still further, the mentality of a purely orthodox mind is so different from that of a liberal, that one can scarcely blame the former for refusing to coalesce with the latter. Rather, the characters deserving censure seem to us to be those who, while really heterodox in their opinions, have nevertheless joined themselves to the orthodox for no better reason than in order to profit by their organization, and there are not a few who belong to this class. There are many Protestants who think of God as better pleased with a superficial belief in an extensive range of doctrines, whereas our goal is profound devotion and real self-denial.

As was the case with the Catholics, the Separation sorely tried the generosity of the Protestants also. In

1905 their budget had been calculated by Professor Raoul Allier as two million, four hundred and sixty thousand francs. Today it amounts to more than three million, one hundred thousand. It is a surprising fact in the history of French Protestants that since the Separation their good works, their religious enterprises have continued to increase in number (instead of diminishing) in proportion to their budget of expenses. It is fair to say, however, that some of the Societies find more difficulty than formerly in collecting the amount necessary to make ends meet. M. Allier notices the fact. It is mostly in towns that the people are in the habit of giving. The country parts, even where the peasantry are well off, scarcely give at all. The city spends, the country economizes. There are deeper reasons, however, in the present instance. Many of the Protestant pastors shocked by the withdrawal of State support left their Churches to seek their livelihood otherwise. The only advantage of this action of theirs was in the case of certain localities, where the decline of Protestant population no longer justified their being severally kept up. At the same time, while reviewing the general condition of the Protestant Churches resulting from the new law, it is astonishing that in this time of pressure several pastors of diverse denominations are supported in some of the larger southern villages where, to all appearances, one would be quite sufficient. In most regions, indeed, as the Department of Les Hautes Alpes, religion suffers cruelly for the want of pastors. Yet it is all the more cheering to see in other quarters that the supply of the ministry, seriously embarrassed as it has been for some years, is actually at the present moment encouragingly on the advance. One remarkable phenomenon in French Protestantism is worth noticing. Philanthropic enterprises are more prosperous than the Churches. While the Churches seem to be in almost as low a state as they

were a few years ago, or at best are having fluctuating success according to the spiritual power of their leaders, a host of charitable movements, especially medical, have become enormously popular with the faithful. What is still more extraordinary, the great efforts for Christian evangelization both in and out of France, while they are not without the support and sympathy of religious people, are being conducted, not by but without the direct instrumentality of the constituted Churches. In a word, the Church, as if stricken with a kind of paralysis, is no longer, as formerly, the inspirer and leader of benevolence, but benevolence or charity has become the director and leader of the Church. The fault is with the very ideal of the Church, more conservative than active. A mark of this spirit may be found in the unintelligent manner in which the faithful choose their pastors. Sometimes they do so without really knowing the candidate; sometimes again they select him for his ecclesiastical opinion's undisturbing affinity to their own; still more frequently perhaps for his agreeable relations to his official predecessor, with no other view than to keep peace in the house; while, on the contrary, philanthropic work demands a different order of recommendation altogether, namely, definite ability to carry it on.

Let us quote an example. So far as the young are concerned, while the Church has remained nearly as incapable as ever, the Christian Associations have done an amazing work in collecting and benefiting members of both sexes. It is truly remarkable to see how directly these Associations bring high moral and spiritual influence to bear on modest groups of "students" and of young people in the Christian Lyceums, so as not infrequently to furnish as pastors for the Churches capable young men whose help the Church itself had besought in vain. Most Paris Churches, however, are progressing on that line.

The Protestant press is not very flourishing. The journal *Foi et Vie* is the only one which, animated with a Protestant spirit, represents modern thought and ideas. Its circulation is announced as having doubled. A building, as an audience-hall for the purpose of lectures, is on the point of being erected. The courses given in the former quarters have proved a great success. *La Revue Chrétienne*, of somewhat more modest dimensions, frequently contains solid contributions from the pen of distinguished Protestant writers.

Let us now come to a general conclusion. There are many of the French people who have become weary of the free thought, as shallow as it is cold, which has prevailed among us for twenty or thirty years. Taine's intellectualism, Renan's dilettantism, no longer hold undisputed sway. Part of the present generation honestly desires, nay, it is truer to say, thirsts with a passionate thirst to know the whole truth of things, God included, if indeed there be a God. On the other hand, there is a general feeling that we need, each one of us, to lay upon our life some rule for its guidance; we need to have a frame of regulated conditions within which to pass our existence; we need some kind of discipline for its training. Popular teaching itself, though the born enemy of the Church, agrees with the rest of the world in these opinions. Indeed, as a literary task it would be deeply interesting to trace the approach of this new Spring, this gradual new Springtide, which is now beginning to blossom in the human mind. We are using the phrase "spiritual tide" in its widest and worthiest sense when we affirm that at this moment it is conspicuously on the rise in the best French minds. It is not the Church which has called forth this movement. Rather she has fought it by attacking Modernism, which is one of its forms. Nevertheless, she intends using this actual upheaval to her advantage, and often succeeds in

directing the rise of these new streams of life into the channel she has formed of strictly legal methods. Too frequently however, she diverts it to political purposes, even to electoral uses. There is the Bishop of Orleans, Mgr. Touchet, the very man who sent a memorial of protest to the Pope, after the first Plenary Assembly; have we not seen him, within the last few months, make the proposition that the Catholics should abandon their schools, and throw in their disposable funds to the treasury of the electoral campaign? This sort of thing is done too often. The Church, whose solitary use and function is to spiritualize, or give of the spirit to the world, is found to be actually doing the reverse and materializing the world's spirit. These things are a pain to us. We are not among those who desire the Church's death. On the contrary, we wish it may live. But while it lives, we crave for it the rectitude of conduct and the spirituality of purpose which alone give her the right to live.

A book has recently appeared under the title *Ce qu'on a fait de l'Eglise*, by five anonymous priests, who seriously, sadly, and even with tears, have drawn up an indictment against their sacred Mother. We could wish from our heart that such a book were impossible; and now here it is. And Rome will suffer from it, even while declaring its condemnation. As regards Protestants, their Churches suffer from intestine strife and doctrinal disagreements. Even extreme evangelicals do not avoid these difficulties. Some fifty years ago, complains one of the most venerated orthodox pastors of our time, orthodox on one side and liberals on the other fought each other squarely in the face, each of them expressing themselves in the terms of their most extreme views. But let this dear man regret these old days; we do not. Actually the intellectual positions taken up lie scattered along between the extremes. A change has come over us which it is useless to blame. Faith is not less keen, though it is

more enlightened. A new impulse, a craving for progress, are the features of the day. We must not fear then for our faith, but rejoice for it. The honor of any Church is always to be looking forward, without pride yet without fear, thankful for the spiritual treasures it has gathered in the past, and confident that it will surely develop in the future, if it keeps alive the glorious spirit of its Master.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS.¹

The first volume of the Encyclopaedia was noticed in this REVIEW, Vol. II (1909), pp. 95-99. Since that time five volumes have been issued, coming down to "Hyksos," and five or six more will be required for the rest of the alphabet. As announced in the Preface, the ambition of the editor has been to include everything that falls under the broadest definitions of religion and ethics; as a matter of fact many things are included which have only a remote relevance to either. The articles on "Bards" (Breton, Irish, Welsh), "Arthurian Cycle," "Feinn Cycle," on "Fiction," on the "Drama," are of this kind; it is remarkable that "Drama," which covers, in its ten divisions, all climes and times, has no place for the religious plays of the Christian Middle Ages.

A considerable class of articles deals with the physical and biological sciences: *e.g.*, "Atomic Theory" (Greek, Indian, Mohammedan, Mediaeval and Modern), "Attraction and Repulsion," "Biology," "Environment" (biological), "Evolution" (biological), "Development," "Degeneration," "Atrophy," "Atavism." There are many articles on philosophical subjects, such as "Epistemology," "Continuity," "Cause, Causality," "Certainty" (logical), "Attention," "Forgetfulness," "Beauty," "Form" (aesthetic), besides articles on individual philosophers—Hegel, *e.g.*, claims twenty pages. Economics has its share: *e.g.*, "Consumption," "Distribution"; there are legal articles on "Forgery," and a definition of "Delict." Finally, mention may be made of articles which are written, not on subjects, but on words. Thus the author who undertook to furnish an article on "Emancipation" saw nothing to do but to descant on as many senses and uses of emancipation as he could think of, from the separation of church and state to Ellen Key; with perhaps unconscious humor—the author is a German—the bibliography begins with Münsterberg's *Die Amerikaner*. Many of the articles named are in themselves very good; but an Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics is not the place where a reader in search of enlighten-

¹Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings. Vol. II (Arthur to Bunyan), 1910; III (Burial to Confessions), 1911; IV (Confirmation to Drama), 1912; V (Dravidians to Fichte), 1912; VI (Fiction to Hyksos), 1914. Charles Scribner's Sons. Each volume (about 900 pages), \$6.00.

ment on such subjects would look for it, and every library which possesses this work is sure to have the works of reference to which the inquirer would naturally go.

What principle determined the selection of subjects in some fields is not evident. We have articles, for example, on "Cecrops," "Centaur," "Charites," "Danaids," "Gorgon," "Graiai," "Harpies," but none on Demeter or Dionysus (and no references to the general article on "Greek Religion"); separate articles are given to many places of no especial religious mark, but "Eleusis" receives no notice; the "Camel" has four columns to himself, but the writers have not discovered his religious significance or his moral qualities.

In many cases a subject seems to have been divided on an alphabetical scheme of countries or religions, without considering whether there was anything to put into the pigeon-holes thus provided. Thus, under "Atheism," after a general sketch of antitheistic theories and an article on Buddhist atheism, we come to one on "Atheism (Egyptian)," beginning, "No trace has yet been found of any definite atheistic teaching in Egypt," in the absence of which the author fills a paragraph with some illustrations of a *carpe diem* attitude to life and the hereafter. Thereupon follow a very thin article on atheism among the Greeks and Romans and three short but competent ones on India, which brings us to "Atheism (Jewish)": "Atheism as a system of thought has no place in Judaism, and there is no equivalent for the term in the Hebrew language or literature." The contributor to whom it fell to write on the Mohammedans was not much better off for real atheists, but gives an interesting account of various dualists, skeptics, and agnostics. A more striking example of what this method leads to is the article "Creeds," which has rubrics for the Babylonian and Egyptian religions! *In fugam sacri* the authors write about some of the general religious notions and beliefs of the peoples in question. On the other hand, the author to whom Moslem creeds were assigned confines himself to the profession of faith, and does not even mention the existence of theological creeds in the proper sense.

The plan of the Encyclopaedia makes a great deal of duplication and repetition inevitable, especially between general articles on religious phenomena and articles on particular countries or religions; but this, while it adds to the bulk of the work, is for the convenience of the reader.

It is inevitable that in a work which maps out the field for the first time there should be serious omissions. Thus, there is no

article or entry for "Attributes, Divine," though it is evidently much more closely related to religion than "Attraction and Repulsion," which gets nearly a page, and though the Attribute Controversy is a large and highly significant chapter in the history of mediaeval Moslem and Jewish theology. There is none on "Confession, Auricular"; none on "Chasidism" (or Hasidism), one of the most important movements in modern Judaism, though there is one on the "Hasideans" of Maccabaeae times. Other omissions which I have noted incidentally are, "Bardesan," "Carvakas," "Chu Hi," "Constantinople," "Dionysius Areopagita," "Dositheus, Dositheans," "Fourier, Fourierism," etc. Under "Druses," we are bidden see "SECTS, Christian," a company in which the Druses will be surprised to find themselves!

The high quality of the individual articles set in the first volume is well maintained. The editor has been singularly successful in enlisting not merely competent but eminent contributors, and in keeping them. And—what does not always follow from great reputations—the authors have done their work honestly and with evident interest. One or two might be named who are plainly tired of saying the same things in lectures and popular series and new encyclopædias, and their weariness communicates itself to the reader; but such cases are few. The articles move pretty evenly on the plane of the educated, but not specially learned, reader, and the impression of solid learning united with sane judgment which the first volume made is confirmed by its successors.

Of conspicuous excellence are the articles on India—religions, peoples, places, persons. The materials collected by the British government in its various Surveys and Reports, and the co-operation of scholars who have been in this service and add to what is in print intimate personal knowledge, make it possible to treat this field with exceptional thoroughness. The reader will not complain of the resulting disproportion. But he may ask whether China, for example, has been as well provided for as conditions permit. No such question arises about the articles on Mahayana Buddhism, which have fallen into excellent hands (Anesaki, de La Vallée Poussin, Takakusu).

Some articles of conspicuous note in Volume II are: "Aryan Religion" (O. Schrader), "Assam" (Gait), "Bab, Babis" (E. G. Browne), "Berbers, North Africa" (R. Basset), "Bhakti Marga" (Grierson), "Bible in the Church" (E. v. Dobschütz), "Bodhisattva" (Poussin), "Brahmanism" (Jacobi). In Volume III there is a comprehensive article on the "Celts" (J. A. MacCullough). The

article on "Christianity" (Garvie) is written from a dogmatic point of view; the author expressly rejects at the outset the "religious-historical method" (*not* the loud-voiced "religionsgeschichtliche Schule," but the application of historical method to the Christian religion), and in fact the article, so far as it deals with the beginnings of Christianity, is chiefly a controversial discussion of various modern theories (Pfleiderer, Harnack, Loisy, Orr, and others). It is perfectly proper that the dogmatic construction of Christianity should have place in the Encyclopaedia, as Buddhist or Moslem doctrine has; but the reader has a right to expect that it shall also be historically presented, as other religions are; not specifically exempted from the application of historical method on theological or apologetic grounds. The volume contains several long composite articles ("Calendar"—80 pages; "Charity, Almsgiving"; "Charms and Amulets"; "Chastity"; "Circumcision"; "Communion with Deity"). In the first of these, in an excellent presentation of the Jewish Calendar by Poznanski, an inexcusable misprint occurs on p. 117 and is twice repeated on p. 123, by which the Seleucid era is transformed into the "era of the Seljûks"(!), which the Jews are said still to continue to use. American readers will be mildly amused by the conclusion of the article by Dugald Macfadyen on Horace Bushnell; Bushnell's ideas were introduced into English religious thought by Alexander Mackennal and Charles Berry, "but, owing to want of sufficient theological training, the representatives of the monistic tradition have strayed into pantheism." When, "for want of sufficient theological training," a monist takes to straying into pantheism, he is in great danger of keeping on in the same direction, and landing in theism before he knows it!

Volume IV includes extended composite articles on "Cosmogony and Cosmology," "Death and Disposal of the Dead," "Demons and Spirits," "Disease and Medicine," "Divination." The article on "Confucian Religion" is singularly meagre; that on "Covenanters" is longer than "Crusades"—a somewhat provincial estimate of historical dimensions!

In the fifth volume special attention may be called to the article on "Dravidians," particularly the first part (by Crookes). There is a long article on "Dress"; "Dualism," in some sense or other of twoness, is discovered among the American Indians, Egyptians, Jews, and other peoples. "Education," "Ethics and Morality," "Expiation and Atonement," "Family," "Fasting," "Festivals and Fasts," "Fate," are the titles of comprehensive articles, carrying us to all parts of the globe, and distributed among numerous

authors. The article on "Egyptian Religion" (by Petrie) does not attempt much more than a classified inventory of facts about the religion—catalogues of sacred animals and gods, beliefs about the dead and funerary customs, etc.

Volume VI brings, among others, an article on "Fortune" (which is not always properly distinguished from astrological fate); E. F. Scott treats "Gnosticism" soberly—a subject which has on many minds the effect which South is said to have attributed to the Apocalypse. In this part of the alphabet fall also the entries, "God" (composite), "Gospels" (Burkitt), "Greek Religion" (Farnell), "Harranians" (D. S. Margoliouth—somewhat meagre), composite articles on "Health and Gods of Healing," "Hearth and Hearth-Gods," "Heroes and Hero-Gods," "Holiness," "Human Sacrifice." Special mention should be made of W. Crooke's masterly article on "Hinduism."

In conclusion we can only repeat what was said in our notice of the first volume: The *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* must have a place in every reference library, and is an indispensable tool to every one who undertakes either the study of religious phenomena, or of particular religions, or of the history of religion as a whole. The editorial control will doubtless be firmer as the work proceeds; the prevailing level of the individual contributions is extraordinarily high, and the bibliographies appended to the articles are in general good both in inclusion and exclusion. Instances like Iverach's "Caesarism," in which none of the works of first rank on the subject is mentioned, are conspicuously infrequent.

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ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS. H. A. A. KENNEDY, D.D., D.Sc. Hodder & Stoughton. 1913. Pp. xviii, 311. \$1.50.

Dr. Kennedy has given us a book which is in many ways important and valuable. As its title shows, it is an attempt to consider the relationship of Pauline theology to the contemporary cults of the Roman Empire. In successive chapters he discusses the influence of Stoicism, Astralism, the Orphic movement, Jewish affinities with the Mystery-religions, the general characteristics of the chief Greek and Oriental cults, Pauline terminology and the central conceptions of Paulinism as compared with those of the Mystery-religions, baptismal rites, and sacramental meals.

As a collection of facts this will be of much use to the theological student, especially so far as it concerns the Mystery-religions rather

than Paul; it is remarkably complete for the size of the book. It should, however, be noted that Mithraism is excluded for chronological reasons, and the Hermetic literature is included, and there will be a difference of opinion in many quarters as to whether this procedure is either justifiable or consistent. It suggests, what may possibly be the fact, that the origin of the book was the desire to controvert Reitzenstein rather than to investigate anew the whole field, and that so far as matters are dealt with outside the field covered by Reitzenstein, they are accretions due to Dr. Kennedy's scholarly desire to be complete.

As to the relationship of Pauline teaching to the facts of contemporary religion, I must admit that I differ wholly from Dr. Kennedy, and do not feel shaken in my views by his hostile though always courteous criticisms. I hope that I do not misrepresent his position by saying that he is inclined to think that the greater part of Pauline ideas can be better accounted for by the influence of the Old Testament than by contemporary Hellenistic thought, though he admits that this may have affected Pauline terminology. Faith, not sacraments, is the preëminently Pauline teaching, and Dr. Kennedy's contention is that this is ignored by those of us who are, roughly speaking, followers of Reitzenstein.

The reply to Dr. Kennedy is not quite simple, and to make it intelligible it is necessary to indulge in a little criticism of his position, which he will, I trust, not regard as personal, or as intended to derogate from the value attached to his book. In common with so many Scotch scholars, he seems unconsciously to reflect back his own enlightened Protestantism into the Epistles, and he talks about sacraments which work *ex opere operato* without sufficient sympathy for the Catholic interpretation of this doctrine. It is necessary to insist that the Catholic is much nearer to early Christianity than the Protestant, and there is not in Catholic eyes any antithesis between faith and sacraments: faith is the necessary attitude which is brought (or perhaps it would be better to say which brings men) to the sacraments. Paul saw a clear antithesis between faith and the works of the law, and therefore he argued this point at length. But neither he nor any one else saw any antithesis between faith and sacraments. The discovery, if it be one, that such an antithesis exists was reserved for the Reformation, and the cardinal defect of Dr. Kennedy's book is that he never looks at early Christianity except through the spectacles of Protestant theology. The reason why there is very little about sacraments and a great deal about faith and ethics in the Pauline Epistles, is because the position of the

sacraments was not denied by any one within the circle of Hellenistic Christianity. The relation of faith to law was disputed, and the relation of ethics to religion was misunderstood, and therefore we have a great deal about these problems in the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians. That, however, does not prove that Hellenistic Christianity was not sacramental any more than the complete absence of any discussion in the British Parliament in the twentieth century as to the advantages of monarchy proves that there was no British king; it only proves that the monarchical principle was not in dispute. The proof that that principle was accepted in Parliament is that it was used at intervals as the incontrovertible basis of argument or as the last word in discussion; and in the same way the proof that the Hellenistic Christianity to which Paul belonged was sacramental is the fact that he uses the sacraments, just as he does the Resurrection, as the basis of argument with regard to disputed questions. I am therefore unable to see the force of Dr. Kennedy's remark on page 233, in which he controverts the contention in my *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, that an unethical view of baptism can be traced in some of Paul's antinomian opponents, and quotes passages which show the existence of other forms of antinomianism. No doubt he is right; but to disprove that some men are black, it is insufficient to show that others are white. Dr. Kennedy's exegesis of Romans 3 and 5 may be perfectly correct; but it does not alter the fact that in Romans 6 Paul connects baptism with his argument in a way which suggests that some people had failed to realize that the union with the death and resurrection of Christ which it affected brought with it ethical responsibilities. It is true that Paul frequently connects the forgiveness of sins with faith; but that is no argument, unless it can be shown that he had reached the position of those Protestants who see an antithesis between faith and sacraments. Moreover, it is a fact that he never suggests that baptism was ever a matter of dispute, and he never stops to argue about it. But was the preliminary requirement faith or the works of the law? That point *was* disputed, and he argues it at length. Again, was the consequent result an ethical responsibility or libertine freedom? That again was in dispute, and is consequently argued.

My objection then to Dr. Kennedy's method is that if we follow it, we overlook the essential features of controversial letter-writing, and repeat the mistake of the Tübingen school; which turned the controversies of the Church into the foundation of Christianity, and led directly to a view of Paulinism which, however admirable, seems to

be based on ideas unknown until the Reformation—an epoch which, with all its faults, I cannot help regarding as one of real progress and not mainly the return to a primitive standpoint.

I have been unable to resist the temptation of emphasizing the points on which I differ from Dr. Kennedy; but I can sincerely thank him for an interesting and learned book. In reviewing, as in controversial letter-writing, it is the points of difference which are apt to come to the surface.

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ST. PAUL, A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY. ADOLF DEISSMANN, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. xix, 316.

Professor Deissmann has written a valuable and suggestive book on the Apostle Paul in such untechnical language that the general reader will find it as interesting as it is instructive. The author is a recognized master in the field of Graeco-Roman life and thought, and he has the additional advantage of having made two well-planned journeys to the East in recent years. His object is to penetrate through the dogmatic "Paulinism" of the schools, and see the great missionary living and working in his ancient environment. The purpose of the book is achieved; for even though one may dissent from some of the writer's conclusions, the reader gets a fresh and vivid impression of the Apostle's personality as it must have appeared to those who knew him in the flesh.

A few points deserve special mention. Dr. Deissmann accepts as genuine ten of the epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul, all of which he regards as letters rather than formal epistles. He also uses the Pastorals in a way which indicates that he believes them to contain certain genuine elements. The question whether the Apostle was set free after two years' detention in Rome is left open. He agrees with most modern critics in holding that Rom. 16 is a short note sent to Ephesus, and he thinks that our Epistle to the Ephesians is the letter to the Laodiceans mentioned in Col. 4 16. The South Galatian theory, which is held by many scholars, is rejected in favor of the older view, that the recipients of Paul's letter lived in the so-called "region of Galatia." Professor Deissmann rightly emphasizes two seemingly opposite aspects of Paul's nature—his mysticism, and his interest in the practical side of religion. These are the two keys which unlock his profoundest thoughts. Faith is union with God in fellowship with Christ; but Deissmann expressly repudiates the view of scholars like Heitmüller and Lake, that

baptism and the Lord's Supper are the means by which the Christian enters into fellowship with Christ. In view of this position the reviewer is surprised to read that the primitive disciples "possessed in baptism and the Lord's Supper two institutions which may be called, in the ancient technical sense of the word, the two Primitive Christian mysteries" (page 117). It is certainly a great gain to see in the Pauline ideas of justification, reconciliation, forgiveness, redemption, and adoption, so many different figurative expressions, each taken from the life of the time, for the same fundamental religious experience, namely, salvation in Christ. For Paul Christ was more than Messiah. He was Lord and Spirit; and in him the poorest and most helpless soul could come into union with the infinite life of God.

There are three appendices, four useful indices, and an excellent map of the Mediterranean world in the time of Paul. In the longest appendix Deissmann discusses in detail the well-known Delphic inscription relating to the proconsul Gallio, and concludes that the Apostle arrived in Corinth early in the year 50 and departed late in the summer of 51.

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NEW YORK.

DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AND THOUGHT IN ANCIENT EGYPT. Lectures delivered on the Morse Foundation at Union Theological Seminary by JAMES HENRY BREASTED, Ph.D., Professor of Egyptology and Oriental History in the University of Chicago. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Professor Breasted was able to avail himself of material for the treatment of his theme which was not open to his predecessors, and he has also used other material which they passed by. The substance of earlier treatises has been drawn from that immense mass relating to the innumerable pantheon of Egypt, details of which are largely late and come from a debased period in the history. Previous treatment has been almost encyclopedic in character, but without the ease of reference attaching to the alphabetic arrangement. There has also been a radical defect in most writers, in that they have failed to see any of those changes and advances of conception which are usually denoted as evolution. At least one author has stated baldly that there was no development in the Egyptian religion. The historical method has been woefully absent in the majority of cases, and there has been a lack of that constructive imagination which is essential to the presentation of any great theme.

The most important documents not previously available are the so-called "pyramid texts" of the V and VI dynasties. To be sure, an edition was published and a translation made by Maspero in the eighties of the last century. But the version was doubly imperfect, owing to the lack of a reliable copy of the originals, and also to a very meagre acquaintance with the orthography, grammar, and vocabulary of the period. In the interval since, the second of these difficulties has been largely remedied, and the first has been removed within the last five years by the publication of a definitive edition of the original, made at an enormous expenditure of time and pains. Thus a series of documents has been made available to the student, taking him back many centuries nearer the beginnings of things. These documents were composed within the space of a century and a half, and they give unmistakable evidence of a process of evolution capable of proof by chapter and verse.

Material already at hand has been neglected heretofore. Separated from the "pyramid texts" by the interval between the V and XII dynasties, is a papyrus, long since published in facsimile, usually known as the "Tale of the Eloquent Peasant." Less than thirty years ago this writing was described by one of the foremost of German scholars as almost entirely unintelligible. But since then it has been resolved, and has been found to be one of the most intensely human documents which antiquity has bequeathed to us. It illustrates the emergence of a moral sense and a demand for righteousness between man and man which had not been known to exist at so early a period.

Besides these documents Professor Breasted has used a multitude of writings from all periods of the history, and he has not only treated them in their historical order but he has shown how they illustrate the relations between religion and morals, their mutual interaction and their influence on popular conceptions. Thus he has again demonstrated that there was a decided development and evolution, and that the changes are capable of exposition.

The book shows throughout not only a thorough and profound scholarship, but also constructive ability and remarkable appreciation of the striking points in the history. It would be impossible to find Professor Breasted's superior in fineness of feeling and sympathy, or in brilliancy of portrayal. His treatment of the religious system introduced by the "heretic" king Amen-hotep IV—Ikhнатon of the XVIII dynasty—illustrates preëminently these specifications. The conception of a world-religion which here comes to expression is so enticing as to cause one nearly to forget any doubts

whether political considerations did not figure in the matter, as well as the ideal of a universal domination of the sun-god.

The ten chapters which compose the book show the successive steps in the development. Various elements entered into the process. Natural phenomena, particularly the sun and the river, together with the type of constitution of the state, supplied both material and form. From the very beginning, the Egyptian was much concerned with the hereafter and preparation for it, and much space is necessarily devoted to these subjects. On account of the dominating position occupied by the king as the son of a divine father and the immeasurably inferior position of mere men, it was not till well along in the history that moral considerations came to the fore, both in the present life and its consequences in the future. The king alone was considered to be the subject of immortality, and the thought of a hereafter for the ordinary man was of slow growth. With the territorial expansion due to foreign conquest under the XVIII dynasty and the consequent widening of the horizon beyond the limits of the narrow native valley, occasion was afforded for the conception of a world-religion. But this enlargement of view was too bold and ambitious for the popular mind, which cared more for immediate personal interests than for the ideals of a religion which was universal in its scope. The pendulum swung back again in the following periods till formalism, sacerdotalism, and magic displaced the ideals of writers and royal reformer, and there came the lowered standards which furnish most of the materials for the delineations of the ordinary work on the Egyptian religion.

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PAGANISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN EGYPT. PHILIP DAVID SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.
Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. viii, 225. 6s.

This little volume has a pathetic interest as the last and not quite completed work of a young scholar already known as a man of unusual promise and of substantial accomplishment. It is a brief review of the most important influences of Egyptian religious and social ideas upon the earliest development of Christianity. It has the great merit, rather rare in the work of specialists, of weighing the evidence with the utmost impartiality. There must have been no little temptation to exaggerate the Egyptian element in the constructive forces of Christian faith and practice; but Mr. Scott-Moncrieff has guarded himself with great discretion at every point.

He has sought to show precisely how large a debt Christianity owes to Egypt without any effort to make this debt as large as possible. We venture to doubt whether he would have written the final words added by the editor "to round out the chapter," namely: "In any case it is evident that to Egypt . . . the Christian world owes monasticism."

While the author's attempt is mainly to give the results of others' investigations, he offers at every stage his own original interpretation of these. The volume makes, therefore, with its abundant reference to the principal authorities, a welcome manual for the student of Christian origins.

ROMAN LIFE AND MANNERS UNDER THE EARLY EMPIRE. LUDWIG FRIEDLÄNDER. Authorized English Translation, Vol. IV. Appendices and Notes. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1918.

There is, says Plato, a certain ancient quarrel between poets and philosophers; but a later age has seen them united in another almost as sharp. All authors are liable to have the opinion about publishers which led Southey's friends to honor his toast to Napoleon—"because he had hanged a bookseller." Martial, to take an instance from the work before me, had a somewhat similar feeling. And all students of antiquity will sympathize with authors in the matter of Friedländer's great thesaurus of ancient life. What could have induced the German publishers to issue the seventh edition without the notes? Of what use would the book be to the student (of all persons) without the references for the thousands of facts here massed relative to ancient life?

There was no help for it. Messrs. Freese and Magnus, translating this great companion to classical studies into English, naturally were bound to take the last edition, and they rendered it from the seventh. The demand for the references and authorities led to their being issued in a fourth volume, translated by Mr. A. B. Gough from the sixth edition. And meantime an eighth edition appears in German, with the apparatus.

However, here we have the whole work in an English form, and every student of the Roman Empire in English-speaking lands will be grateful, while he wonders why it was never done before. And those who are not familiar with the work may well be glad to turn to it, and for a guinea possess the most complete and encyclopaedic book that was ever (one imagines) written on a nation's life. For such readers a word may be said on Friedländer's plan. He maps out the life of the Roman world into great areas; e.g., the

theatre and the games, the court, travel, religion, *belles-lettres*, and under each heading pours forth his amazing collection of facts, and very readably too.

At the same time there is a certain drawback in Friedländer's method. He covers a period of four or five hundred years, and his illustrations are drawn from descriptions of very different dates and places. This is of course legitimate enough, especially when we are given, as we now are, the sources of the data and can more or less check them for ourselves. In all scientific history the principle is conceded of filling gaps with material from a similar place in a parallel development. This is freely done by the experts in the early history of man; e.g., in completing one and another series that shall show the development of the stone tool or weapon. So that Friedländer may very well complete his picture, let us say, of the games by references to the crocodiles and Saxons of Symmachus. It is a curious thing, by the way, that some of the most illuminating material we have upon the beast-fights comes from Symmachus's period, contributed by himself and Claudian. And yet, if we are not careful, a series of fabrics—this woven of Juvenal and Claudian, a piece from Cicero on elephants, let us say, and bits from a dozen other authors—may in the end give us not a true picture. For while in many things culture is stationary throughout the Roman Empire—as, for instance, it has been remarked that tools show no improvement or development—it is still the case that the five centuries with which we are concerned differ profoundly.

It may be urged too that such a method as we are considering must of necessity deal chiefly with the external aspects of life, while if we are to grasp the real life of a people it can be done only by a closer knowledge of its formative or representative men and women. Whether the latter be significant, as in case of Synesius of Cyrene, or insignificant, as in the case of Apollodorus of Athens, the contemporary of Demosthenes; or whether it is a group of contemporaries in Egypt writing casual letters of no importance to any one but the recipients and not of any consequence even to them very long, does not perhaps matter. The main thing is that life has to be studied in a life or a series of lives. Nothing else will give it; not even, as we know, histories of thought or of dogma.

None the less, a great encyclopaedia, organized and controlled by a great scholar of the widest reading, written in a way that permits the coexistence of interest and thoroughness, and subjected in appendix, note, and reference to the reader's own judgment, is an asset of high value to any one who has to do with the early centuries

of our era in any aspect of their influence. So that there should be a wide welcome for the English translation of Friedländer's *Sitten-geschichte*.

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THE EARLY CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF THE MONUMENTS. A. S. BARNES, M.A. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xx, 223. \$1.50.

It is a good book that Mgr. Barnes has written. Although it appears in "a series of manuals for Catholic priests and students" (entitled *The Westminster Library*), it is worthy of a much broader circle of readers. Not only is it evident that the author is intent upon discovering the truth and telling it, but his work is marked by real candor and critical discrimination. To say that the book reports only the most familiar common-places of Christian archaeology is by no means to disparage it. That is what it is for, and it fulfils its purpose very well. I know no other book which would serve so well to provide the cultured reader with a brief and readable orientation in the field of Christian archaeology. Mgr. Barnes is known chiefly by his learned and sumptuous monograph, *St. Peter's in Rome*. Were he not well acquainted with the whole field of Christian archaeology, he would not have been able to do this simple work so well.

The monuments *do* cast "light" upon the history of the Early Church; but the written history of the Church casts still more light upon the monuments, which would be dark indeed without this illumination. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that the author in the first part of his book, *The Growth of the Church in the First Three Centuries*, depends chiefly upon written records. He has selected topics which receive new emphasis and illumination from the study of the monuments. The titles of the chapters are: I. The Apostles at Rome; II. The Earliest Converts; III. The Blood of the Martyrs; IV. The Collegia and the Catacombs; V. The Christianizing of Rome.

Part II. treats of "The Witness of the Monuments to Christian Dogma." It must always be remembered that the written word is the only adequate expression of the dogma of times gone by. Without it the pictorial symbolism of the early Church would be unintelligible. The "monuments" serve chiefly to reveal the popular prevalence of a dogma otherwise well known, or they may point more precisely to the age in which it first became popular. What

one first wants to know, therefore, is the *date* of the monument in question. That consideration the author has generally left out of account. He contents himself with proof of the prevalence of the dogma *some* time before the fifth century. He deals frequently with controverted points, where the point of the controversy lies in the answer to the question, How early? One cannot find fault with the author for devoting one chapter to "The Witness of the Monuments to the Primacy of the Holy See." The monuments *do* bear witness to the primacy of Peter (which is at least as plainly set forth in the Gospels), and to the claim of the Bishop of Rome to a similar primacy. But the unanswered question is, How early? And is it not a far cry from Damasus to Hildebrand?

I must challenge the author sharply on one point, though I agree with him even there in substance. He says: "There is always a further distinction by which St. Peter is given a rank superior to his brother Apostle [Paul]. It is not merely that he is on the right hand of our Lord while St. Paul is on the left. To that rule there are several exceptions." Now the fact is that in the monuments of the fourth and fifth centuries, whenever the two Apostles are depicted on either side of our Lord, it is St. Paul that is on the right and St. Peter that is on the left, and to this rule there are few exceptions. It is not only on the sarcophagi and other sepulchral monuments that we have the Apostles in this position, but also, more solemnly and emphatically, in the great mosaics of the basilicas. It is vain to affirm that "the question [of the relative dignity of the right and left] was finally decided in favor of the dexter side only by the rise of the science of chivalry." For this is a distinction of immemorial observance; it was familiar to the Jews, and it is strikingly employed in the Gospel. The mere fact that the early artists placed St. Paul almost invariably on the right shows that they followed a rule and recognized the distinction. In the ancient mosaic which decorates the triumphal arch of St. Paul's in Rome the Apostle to the Gentiles occupies as usual the post on the right of Christ. Immediately below this arch two modern statues represent the Apostles in the reverse order—St. Peter is on the right. Mgr. Barnes proceeds: "The mark which most frequently distinguishes St. Peter in the earliest representations [they are none of them anterior to the fourth century] is that our Lord is depicted in the act of handing to him a roll or a volume, an act which is sometimes explained by the accompanying inscription, *DOMINUS LEGEM DAT.*" I am disposed to think that St. Peter receives the roll simply because he is on the left. The Lord's right

hand being engaged in the gesture of instruction or benediction, it is only with his left he can hold the roll of the "new law." Thus the monuments, far from affording a salient proof of Peter's primacy, actually *seem* to contradict it. I say "*seem*," for there is no doubt that the Roman Church in the fourth century attached great importance to the primacy of Peter. The fact that in the official art of the Church Paul appears in the place of honor is an enigma. I seek to explain it by the consideration that Paul represents "the Church from among the Gentiles," Peter, "the Church from among the Circumcision." Such are the inscriptions we find attached to two symbolical female figures in the Church of Sta. Sabina, and the Gentile Church is on the right. In the apsidal mosaic of the Title of Pudens similar figures (though without any inscription) are depicted behind Peter and Paul, and again it is the Gentile Church which has the place of honor. Originally, no doubt, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were depicted in the lower part of this mosaic, as they were in so many other places, and Bethlehem must have been as usual on the right, as symbolizing the manifestation of Christ to the Gentiles (through the Magi). History had accorded the place of honor to the Gentile Church; the Church of the Circumcision was no more than a reminiscence. The Church of Rome was conscious of its Gentile character and proud of it. My notion is that this is the feeling which placed Paul, in solidarity with Bethlehem and the personification of the Gentile Church, on the right hand of Christ. It may have been thought that the honor of receiving the law made up to Peter in some measure for the position of inferiority into which he was forced.

"The Witness of the Monuments with regard to Holy Baptism" is the author's next topic. It must be confessed that the witness with regard to the age and form of baptism is meager and ambiguous. Here it would have been very much to the point to date the monuments. The claim that infant baptism and baptism by affusion were practices of the earliest Church is a claim which has more truth than evidence on its side, to use an expression of Jeremy Taylor's. There is more interest in "The Witness of the Monuments to the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist." But again it must be remembered that pictorial symbols can never define dogma so sharply as do words. If one holds the dogma of transubstantiation, it is natural enough to see it expressed in the fish as it is used for a symbol of the Eucharist. But does it really express that precise dogma more clearly than any other dogma which acknowledges a real though spiritual participation in Christ?

In no case is a sense of perspective (implying an accurate dating of the monuments) more necessary than in "The Witness of the Monuments to the Communion of Saints," *i.e.* to the practice of prayer for the dead and to the dead. The fact that there is nothing of the sort here may perhaps be excused by the popular character of the book. But between the simple inscription, *VIBAS IN PACE ET PETE PRO NOBIS*—an unreflective cry of the heart—and the medieval doctrine and practice which absorbed the greater part of men's piety and constituted the keystone of ecclesiastical finance ("high" as well as "low"), there lies a long history and a great transformation.

In the concluding chapter of this part the author writes about the supposed portraits of Christ, the Virgin, and the Apostles, with more discrimination than do some Protestants.

In the third part—"The Development of Church Buildings"—the author is in his own special field, and permits himself to elaborate in some detail certain personal observations and theories. He has interesting observations to make about the form of the Constantinian churches in Rome and the transformations they underwent. He justly opines that these great churches, together with those in Jerusalem and Constantinople, fixed the traditions of Church architecture. He has interesting remarks to make about the orientation of the churches, but it does not seem to me that he has come near to solving the problem. It used to be the fashion for archaeologists to endeavor to explain why one or another church in Rome has its portal facing east and its altar at the west end. Some practical reason could generally be adduced to explain such a breach of the "rule." It was tardily recognized that the *rule* in Rome—the invariable rule during the first half of the fourth century—was to place the altar at the west end. This the author rightly recognizes. But he falls into error when he asserts that this was peculiar to Rome. It was characteristic, so far as I know, of *all* the churches which Constantine built, whether at Rome, at Jerusalem, at Bethlehem, at Tyre, or at Constantinople. That observation casts a dim ray of light upon this obscure subject. Constantine apparently had a fancy for opening the door of the church towards the rising sun. He stubbornly confused sun-worship with Christianity. It is by no means clear to me why the generation which immediately followed him resolutely turned their churches the other way.

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FRIEDRICH BLASS'S GRAMMATIK DES NEUTESTAMENTLICHEN GRIECHISCH.
 Vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage besorgt von ALBERT DEBRUNNER.
 Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen. 1913. Pp. 346.

Blass's *Grammatik* (well known to English readers in a translation of the first edition) appears now in an entirely new form. The material is much the same, but it is much more conveniently arranged, all less important matters being grouped in separate paragraphs in small type. It is to be regretted, however, that the renumbering of the sections makes obsolete all the references to earlier editions found in existing commentaries. The chief advantages of the original work, especially the quotation of the Apostolic Fathers and of variant readings in New Testament manuscripts, are still retained, and in addition the abundant new literature on the grammar of papyri, inscriptions, and other Hellenistic Greek has been diligently used and cited. In comparing the new edition with the old, one is impressed with how rarely this fresh information modifies Blass's earlier conclusions; it rather confirms them. His remarks on prose rhythm are, however, entirely omitted as being now generally discredited. The hand of the new editor shows itself to advantage in the rewritten introductory paragraphs and in an excellent but all too brief summary on vocabulary (§ 126). Since its first publication in 1896 Blass's Grammar has been the only New Testament grammar which was both complete and modern. In its fourth edition it is not only more readable than ever before, but it has been brought completely down to date.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. CRAWFORD H. TOY.
 Professor Emeritus in Harvard University. Ginn & Co. 1913. Pp.
 xi, 639. \$3.00.

The study of the world's religions has been revolutionized, almost within our own time, by the adoption of the historical method. An imposing array of scholars, some among their books and others among the long-buried remains of antiquity, have been busy with the discovery of new facts or with the reinterpretation of the old evidence in the light of modern knowledge. Meantime anthropology and sociology, latest born of the humanities, have sufficiently developed to be of service to the investigator; and now no treatment of a historic religion is deemed complete which does not pay full attention to its remote origins and to its social setting. For the purpose of presenting in compact form the results of contemporary research

Professor Morris Jastrow of the University of Pennsylvania began to edit, about twenty years ago, a series of Handbooks on the History of Religions. Three volumes—on India by Professor Hopkins of Yale, on Babylonia by the general editor, and on the religion of the Teutons by De la Saussaye of the University of Leiden—had already appeared before the publication of the present work.

Professor Toy calls his manual an *Introduction to the History of Religions*. The title is a little misleading, since one might suppose that we have here an introductory survey of the several religions in their historic development. Works of this sort have been published before, the latest being the *Orpheus* of M. Salomon Reinach, whose uncompromising opinions, somewhat truculently expressed, have in France provoked a veritable "battle of the books." But Professor Toy's treatise belongs, rather, to the field of comparative religion; its object is "to describe the principal customs and ideas that underlie all public religion," in other words, to preface the examination of the different faiths of mankind by an analysis of what is common to every one of them. His volume, the fruit of protracted research and meditation, enjoys the distinction of being the first in any language to attempt this task from a purely objective standpoint and in a comprehensive manner. The difficulties attending such a pioneer study are immense; to have overcome them so successfully is an achievement for which the author will receive the congratulations of every serious student.

Few subjects have suffered more at the hands of well-meaning amateurs than comparative religion. What Tyler once wrote of serpent-worship—that it had fallen into the hands of speculative writers "who mixed it up with occult philosophies, Druidical mysteries, and that portentous nonsense called the 'Arkite Symbolism,' till now sober students hear the very name of ophiolatry with a shiver"—applies equally to many other topics within this field of learning. Even competent scholars have sought to find in ancestor-worship, sun-worship, totemism, or fetishism, keys to all the mythologies. Against such tendencies to exaggerate the importance of particular aspects of religion the present book provides a wholesome corrective. Indeed, the writer's consistently agnostic attitude and the severely critical way in which he lays bare the weak points in many a fashionable theory are among the most valuable features of the book. Significant instances of his cautious treatment occur in the discussion of the divinization of animals and corn-spirits (pp. 112, 116), in the analysis of the evidence

for the existence of totemism among civilized peoples (pp. 211 ff.) and for "high gods" among low races (pp. 46 ff.), and in the examination of theories of sacrifice associated with the names of Robertson Smith, Dr. J. G. Frazer, and MM. Hubert and Mauss (498 ff.). The author seemingly lacks either prepossessions or prejudices, unless indeed he may be said to have a prepossession for whatever encourages individual initiative and freedom of thought, and a prejudice against whatever cramps and binds the human spirit. This judicial temper enables him to present well-balanced accounts of such institutions as the priesthood (pp. 526 ff.), monachism (p. 556), and sacred books (pp. 561 ff.), as well as to discover seeds of good in beliefs and practices so generally reprobated as idolatry, magic, divination, and taboo.

These very characteristics, which most commend the book to the scholar, are likely to repel the general reader, who may weary of the reiterated expressions of dubiety and may feel some irritation at the author's unwillingness to express more decided opinions on matters of controversy. The style of the work, though it suffers from the extreme condensation necessary in a textbook, is often admirably pithy and sententious: "Man has shown himself practical in all stages of religion; he is always the center of his world, and treats objects and theories with sole regard to his own well-being" (p. 46); "The aim of religion has been, and is, to banish magic from the world" (p. 406); "Divination is an inquirer, and its virtue is obedience; magic is an investigator, and its virtue is achievement" (p. 407); "A true monotheism has never arisen except as a criticism of polytheism" (p. 464). Such sentences compress much wisdom in little space.

The materials of the book are distributed among eleven chapters, which deal respectively with the nature of religion, the soul, early religious ceremonies (including those at birth, puberty, marriage, and death), early cults (including plant- and animal-worship, ancestor-worship, and cults of generative powers), totemism and taboo, gods, myths, magic and divination, the higher theistic development (a discussion of polytheism, dualism, and monotheism), social development of religion (a discussion of sacrifice, the priesthood, the church, and monachism), and finally scientific and ethical elements in religious systems. This enumeration will show how widely Professor Toy has cast his net. There are few aspects of comparative religion which do not receive here due attention. More space should have been devoted to fetishism, even if the special characteristics of that cult be limited to West Africa, as the author

apparently holds. Man-gods, as distinct from divine chiefs and kings, might have been more fully treated, especially in the light of Dr. Frazer's interesting researches; and the same remark applies to the cult of saints and holy men generally. The Trinity concept and Mariolatry are two subjects which would have repaid comparative study. Prayer receives no independent treatment. This is regrettable, considering how much attention has been given to it both by anthropologists and psychologists. The reviewer, personally, would like to have had more space assigned to primitive manifestations of religion, and less proportionately to the higher cults; but doubtless such an arrangement was not in harmony with the purpose of the series to which the work belongs.

A book of this sort offers such a wide range of subjects, many of them highly debatable in character, that a notice of it must necessarily deal with a few points selected almost at random from the great number which present themselves. It is a satisfaction to find that the author holds so firmly to the conception of religion as a social product, a conception illustrated by him in many ways; for example, in the study of ceremonies and of the idea of "sacred" (pp. 97 f., 108), and throughout the chapter on the social development of religion, which contains an especially valuable discussion of the church as a voluntary association for worship. It is toward the church, as Professor Toy remarks, that society has hitherto moved (p. 538). On the vexed question of the "origin" of religion he assumes a prudent position: the beginning of religion "is not to be referred exclusively to any one order of ideas; it springs out of man's total life" (p. 160). "Religion is man's attitude toward the universe regarded as a social and ethical force; it is the sense of social solidarity with objects regarded as Powers, and the institution of social relations with them" (p. 1). He is at one with the most recent investigators in recognizing as the basis of the religious feeling, the conception of a life-force existing in all natural phenomena (pp. 5, 48, 101 ff.); but *mana*, as this life-force is coming to be called, might have taken a more prominent place in his discussion. The chapter on magic, in particular, would have profited by a fuller recognition of the implications of this conception, and the Christian doctrine of "grace" might have been profitably illustrated by reference to it. The cult of generative powers—a difficult theme—is here handled soberly and conservatively, yet with full recognition of the important place which it has occupied in many religions. The long account of totemism, reflecting the current interest in this subject, owes much to Frazer's monumental treatise, but contains

an original presentation (pp. 215 ff.) of the conditions favorable and unfavorable to totemistic organization. Though Professor Toy is able to show that many features, such as exogamy, totemic designations, descent from the totem, and the like, are not invariable concomitants of totemism as we now find it, he concludes, nevertheless, that it is a definite social institution, which deserves study in and for itself (pp. 191 f.). This conclusion is especially gratifying in the light of some recent attempts to get rid altogether of totemism. With totemism is linked in the same chapter an admirable survey of taboo; but it is not clear why the two should have been thus united, since totemic taboos form only a small fraction of the whole number of such regulations. In any case the vast importance of taboo entitled it to a chapter by itself. Chapter VIII on magic and divination comes so late in the book that the author, when discussing taboo (pp. 256 f.), is obliged to anticipate to a certain extent his treatment of magic. The present arrangement has the further disadvantage of separating the chapter on the higher theistic development from the two which deal with gods and myths. Of these, the former contains much valuable evidence on the little-known subject of clan gods (pp. 271 ff.), and the latter includes some terse criticisms of that sciolism which has recently foisted itself on the attention of scholars under the name of Pan-babylonianism (pp. 384 ff.). But the reader must be content with these very partial indications of the wealth of material which Professor Toy has succeeded in compressing within less than six hundred pages.

As to minor points, it may be said at once that the work preserves throughout a high level of excellence. The writer has gone to the latest and best books in each division of his field; and in Semitics he speaks as one having authority. Positive misstatements are extremely rare. It is, however, not true to say that a seven-day week was approached independently in Babylonia, Hawaii, Java and Ashantiland (p. 253), or to imply that all Australian initiation ceremonies are regarded as established by the mythical ancestors (p. 371). The general impeccability of his treatment compels a reviewer to dwell on Professor Toy's sins of omission rather than those of commission. It might have been well to mention the evidence for Zeus as an oak-god (p. 335), and for the diverse origins of flood legends (p. 365). That some myths arise as reflections of savage society and that others are pure allegories from the start, would have been worth stating and explaining. Westermarck's suggestive theory of human sacrifice as a sort of collective life in-

insurance deserved at least a passing reference. Other omissions will suggest themselves to the attentive reader; but the wonder is that the author, covering so vast a range, has not left out many more points of greater importance. On the whole the only serious lacuna is that of a preliminary chapter—which need not have been a long one—setting forth the history of the science of religion; and for this Professor Toy's own article in the *International Monthly* (1900) might have served as a basis. The proof-reading is well-nigh faultless: the text appears to contain no misprints; and among the hundreds of references only a few trifling errors have been noted (e.g. p. 59, n. 1; p. 280, n. 2; p. 587, l. 5).

This book is likely to remain for many years the text on comparative religion in American universities. To make it still more useful for teaching and study, the reviewer would suggest that a pronouncing index to the proper names be added; and further, that in the footnotes specific references by pages be inserted where these are now lacking. The bibliography at the end of the work is scholarly and sufficiently extensive; it would, however, be a great gain if the references were more elaborately classified and also were accompanied by brief descriptive notes, as was done by De la Saussaye in the preceding volume of the series. A bibliography of this sort would itself be a contribution to the study of comparative religion.

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UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

KYRIOS CHRISTOS. GESCHICHTE DES CHRISTUSGLAUBENS VON DEN ANFÄNGEN DES CHRISTENTUMS BIS IRENAEUS. WILHELM BOUSSET. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 474. 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ s.

The sub-title of the volume describes its scope. Disregarding the academic frontier between New Testament theology and the history of early Christian doctrine, Bousset discusses the chief epochs in the development of Christian belief and thought concerning Christ, from the primitive Palestinian conception of Jesus, the Son of Man, with its reflection in the gospel tradition, and the early Gentile Christian worship of Christ as Lord, through Paul, the Johannean writings, Gnosticism, the worship of Christ in the sub-apostolic age and the types of Christianity evolved from it (Ignatius, Hebrews, 1 Clement, etc.), the Apologists (Logos-theology), to Irenaeus, who stands between two ages and marks a natural halting place in the history of the doctrine of Christ.

This history can be understood only when Christianity is set in its environment and brought into connection with the religious

movements of the times, and Bousset endeavors to do this for every stage in the development. For this undertaking he was well prepared by his former investigations of the Judaism of New Testament Times, the Chief Problems of Gnosis, and others.

That Gentile Christianity rapidly assumed a form widely different from the primitive type represented by the church in Jerusalem is plain on the face of the New Testament, and Paul is commonly regarded as the author of the conception of Christ and his work which prevailed in the Gentile church. To this view Bousset also would subscribe; but he lays stress on the fact that Paul's starting-point was not the Jewish Christianity of Jerusalem, but that of a Gentile Christian community in which Christ was already the object of religious worship under the title, "Lord" (*Kýrios*).

The Pauline transformation of Christianity into a redemptive religion—salvation through the death and resurrection of Christ—and the relation of this presentation to the current mysteries, are set forth from various points of view. The method pursued, however, gives us a series of special investigations, rather than a constructive whole; and if the reader gets either a clear definition of the problem or a historical apprehension of the process, he will have to get it for himself. The same criticism applies in varying degrees to other parts of the book. In the chapter on Paul, indeed, it does not appear that the author has grappled with the problem as a whole; and though he is at pains to explain how such a development was possible in Paul, he does not show why it was in itself inevitable.

Many things in the volume invite discussion, but the limits of this review forbid. It must suffice here to say that in it Bousset has made an important contribution to the investigation of early Christianity, and if we add that it raises many more questions than it solves—what can be better in a book than that?

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. W. C. ALLEN AND L. W. GRENSTED. T. & T. Clark. 1913. Pp. viii, 302.

This volume is apparently meant to be a statement of assured results in the field of New Testament Introduction as conceived at present by one of the clergy-training schools or theological colleges of the Church of England. The writers, Messrs. Allen and Grensted, respectively Principal and Vice-Principal of Egerton Hall, entertain the "hope that this book may be of use to students in theological colleges, and to others." Mr. Allen discusses the Synoptic

Gospels and Acts; the remaining books are assigned to his colleague. The questions at issue are fairly stated, and the conclusions reached are in the main traditional, the authority of Harnack being manifest at many points. Of special interest is Mr. Allen's theory of the dates of the Synoptic Gospels. The Second Gospel, he thinks, was originally written at Jerusalem between 44 and 50 A.D. by Mark who himself translated it into Greek at Antioch and perhaps republished it at Rome before or after Peter's residence there. The First Gospel, which is a Greek work from the start, was composed at Antioch about the year 50, while the Third Gospel was written by Luke either during Paul's imprisonment in Caesarea or during his first imprisonment in Rome, when Acts also was written. This theory may conceivably prove to be in part correct, but the evidence adduced for it in the present brief discussion hardly warrants its acceptance.

J. E. FRAME.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

GREAT TEXTS OF THE BIBLE, edited by J. HASTINGS, D.D. John xiii-xxi; pp. vi, 458. James-Jude; pp. vi, 433. 2 vols. Scribner's. \$3.00.

The homiletical treatment of the Bible is perhaps an inevitable evil. It is probably necessary to spoil the Bible by cutting texts out of it and preaching sermons upon them. But the method is only justified when some great word has seemed to the student as he read it suddenly to stand out from the page in letters of burning gold, and has demanded to be proclaimed upon the housetops. The only justification for preaching upon texts is that as the preacher studies, a text suddenly seems to smite him upon the face with an absolutely new meaning, while immediately all the rich experience of his lifetime seems to crystallize around it, and lo! a sermon is formed in his mind. The most immoral book which a preacher could have in his library would be a book which would rob him of this intimate personal experience, the very fire of preaching, and try to show him an easier way. One cannot wear to any advantage second-hand clothes in the pulpit. In order to preach a sincere sermon on a text, one must either have discovered it or re-discovered it himself. It may be that it was natural for somebody, upon reading the first two words of the text, "I am the Way," to record his inner experience in this manner (as given on page 108 of the first of these volumes): "(1) Man's need is satisfied only by a person. (2) Christ supplies man's need of a leader. (3) Christ would not be so great a person if he were not more than man. (4) Every

word in the text is emphatic and remarkable." But how dull a sermon would you and I write upon this ready-made frame! The mistake of a book like this, to which Dr. Hastings has lent his eminent name, is that it tries to make sermonizing easy by dumping into various great texts a hodge-podge of other people's thoughts upon them. The result has none of the personal unity and practical suggestiveness of a volume of real sermons.

We do not deny that these volumes are well done and much above the average of such books, and might aid some preachers in their busy lives to "get a sermon" quickly; but we advise such men far rather to buy a good commentary, or a good life of Christ, or a good book of history, or a few great biographies, and leave these *Great Text* volumes alone. We guarantee that in the reading of the life of one great man or woman the average preacher will receive more help and find more suggestive lines of thought for sermonizing than in the whole twenty volumes of this series.

J. EDGAR PARK.

WEST NEWTON.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT IN GERMANY. OSWALD KÜLPE. Tr. from the 5th ed. by Messrs. Patrick. The Macmillan Co. 1913.

This is not a book of importance for scholars. But on account of the inaccessibility of much of the literature with which it deals, it may prove useful as a text-book or for popular reading.

THE MESSAGE OF THE DISCIPLES FOR THE UNION OF THE CHURCH.

PETER AINSLIE, Minister of the Christian Temple, Baltimore, Maryland, President of the Commission on Christian Union of the Disciples of Christ (Fleming R. Revell Company, pp. 212. \$1.00), contains three lectures delivered before the Yale Divinity School, on the following subjects:

The Message of the Disciples of Christ;

The Origin of the Disciples of Christ;

The History of the Disciples of Christ;

together with an appendix containing

The last Will and Testament of the Springfield Presbytery, by B. W. Stone;

A Declaration and Address by Thomas Campbell, and a Bibliography.

This book states in a clear and succinct way the teaching of the Disciples of Christ, and the relation which they wish to sustain toward other religious bodies. The writer is a representative Disciple, and while he speaks only for himself, no doubt his book would be accepted by the great majority of his brethren as a very

satisfactory statement of their position, aim, and history. The style of the book is smooth and flowing, partaking of the grace, elegance, and sweetness, of its highly esteemed author.

HALL LAURIE CALHOUN.

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY.

THE SHORT COURSE SERIES. Edited by Rev. JOHN ADAMS. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 60 cents each.

The character and purpose of this series of little books is admirably indicated in the opening words of the general preface:

"Few preachers or congregations will face the long courses of expository lectures which characterized the preaching of the past; but there is a growing conviction on the part of some that an occasional short course, of six or eight connected studies on one definite theme, is a necessity of their mental and ministerial life. It is at this point that the projected series would strike in."

The books are suggestive and useful to overcrowded ministers.

THE GOD WE TRUST. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS. (The Cole Lectures for 1913.) Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 203. \$1.25.

The title of this book is infelicitous in that it lacks characterization. It could head as well a dozen different books on religion. The chief place might fitly have been given to the sub-title—"Studies in the Devotional Use of the Apostles' Creed." This gives the reader at once the key.

It is popularly supposed that our age cares little for creeds and, for the most part, rejects them. Professor Ross has seen more deeply. He believes that one of the profound desires of our time is for a systematic view of religious truth, somewhat akin to the old-fashioned "plan of salvation." He does not attempt to set forth such a system; his aim is not directly doctrinal. But he takes the Apostles' Creed and endeavors to exhibit it as the basis for an intelligent and devout religion. To him the Creed is the embodiment of experience, facing both the facts of primitive Christian history and the life of today. He emphasizes therefore not so much the historic meaning of the different articles of the Creed nor their theology, as their value for spiritual development. Those are equally unwise who claim that the whole Creed must be held in its original significance, and those who reject it altogether. "There remains the possibility of using the Creed, if we be in general agreement with its drift, as the vehicle of an act of Faith, in which we associate ourselves with our predecessors in the Church, while we hold

ourselves free from the tyranny of words, and claim the legitimacy, when we require it, of changing the interpretation of the words of the symbol."¹

In furtherance of his aim Professor Ross interprets the "I believe in" of the Creed not as an expression of intellectual assent but as a thrice-repeated act of self-committal. "'I commit myself to God' (who is thereupon described in terms fitted to stimulate confidence); next, 'I commit myself to Jesus' (who is thereupon described in terms of selected points in character, origin, and career); finally, 'I commit myself to the Holy Ghost' (who is described in terms of certain of His operations in human society)."²

Professor Ross insists that the real meaning of any article is not the idea its words may convey to us, nor even the idea as originally expressed by its framers; but it is the thought underlying the original expression. Thus he holds that the religious worth of the phrase, "conceived by the Holy Ghost," is that "it emphasizes the responsibility of God for all that Jesus from the beginning was."³ This important canon of interpretation he applies with uniformly reverent handling and a deep insight into human experience and the Divine character; though his treatment of the different articles is not likely to be regarded as equally satisfactory.

The punctuation of the book is often poor. Capital letters (page 53) make a statement refer to Jesus which can only have reference to St. John. The essay will not satisfy one who conceives that his use of the Creed must be limited to the literal meaning of the words before him. But to one who is restless until he has grasped the underlying meaning, the book will furnish food for thought, trustworthy guidance, and the inspiration which comes in face of deep things.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI. FATHER CUTHBERT, O.S.F.C. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 446.

Since Paul Sabatier's *Vie de S. François d'Assise* was crowned by the French Academy and awarded the Guérin prize twenty years ago, a host of Franciscan scholars—Boehmer, Goetz, Paschal Robinson, Père Alençon, Lemmons, Little, Van Ortroty, Ehrle, to mention but a few—have been at work in every nook and corner of Europe to discover the least scrap of testimony that could throw light on the life and teachings of the most popular saint of the Roman calendar. Father Cuthbert has studied the vast deposit of Fran-

¹ P. 14.

² P. 19.

³ P. 69.

ciscana with great diligence and thoroughness, and has given us the most delightfully written life of the *Poverello* that has appeared since Sabatier's. The author confesses that the new material found in the last score of years, like Celano's *Tractus de Miraculis* and the better texts of the *Opuscula*, has not brought to light many facts or sayings that "have not been in some way recognized in the hitherto accepted story of the saint"; but he nevertheless thinks this new material of great value in enabling us to set the facts and teachings of Saint Francis' life in clearer sequence and more authentic relations to his age and time.

The most conspicuous result of the newer discoveries, and one which Father Cuthbert himself confesses is unexpected, is the testimony which the new documents bring to the essential truth of the popular conceptions of Saint Francis. Critical study has generally shattered popular ideals. But in this case, says Cuthbert, "the wider our knowledge of the sources of the Franciscan story becomes, the more accurate appears that traditional estimate of Francis, which has been kept sacred in the people's mind through all the ages since he lived" (page 418).

This is really the text of Father Cuthbert's biography of Saint Francis. The book is a most faithful and fascinating work of piety, in which the author openly and sometimes almost ecstatically rejoices in the wealth of documentary evidence confirming his vision (already amply confirmed by faith) of the *Poverello* of Assisi. On almost every page of Father Cuthbert's work the adoring disciple is visible. Sabatier's book is that of a sympathetic brother of Saint Francis, rejoicing in his limitless charity and unqualified humanity; Father Cuthbert's is the proud vindication of Saint Francis as the father of the strictest of the communities bearing his name, and the guardians of the *Portiuncula*, the most sacred spot in the Franciscan legend. For Father Cuthbert is a Capuchin.

It is this enthusiastic discipleship that gives Father Cuthbert's work both its strong and its weak points. The glow of conviction in it, joined to a delightful narrative style and a fine feeling for the beauties of nature and human character, gives the book a charm which is sustained from the beginning to the end. In this respect the book is worthy to stand beside the remarkable work of the French scholar. But at the same time, one feels the dangers attendant on this ardor of discipleship.

In the first place, the treatment of Saint Francis is too intimate. The author again and again presumes to read the mind of Francis and his companions, to assign them motives, to attribute to them

feelings, which they may or may not have had. He tells what Saint Francis' thoughts were on leaving Rome after the reception of Pope Innocent III (page 92), pronounces on the sincerity of a sermon (page 175), knows of the influence of romantic chivalry on the Saint (page 273), analyzes the workings of his mind when confronted by a condition requiring action (page 394). In all this Father Cuthbert uses categorical language. If pressed for its justification, he would have to confess that, while consonant with the sources we have of the Saint's life, it runs beyond them in its enthusiastic desire to know his inmost thoughts.

The same enthusiastic devotion seems to us somewhat to mislead Father Cuthbert in the use of his sources. He has mastered the abundant sources and literature on Saint Francis with rare diligence. There is nothing to be desired in the *amount* of documentation that Father Cuthbert adduces. But when it comes to the discrimination of his sources we feel that the author is weak. He heaps up instances instead of weighing testimony. One gets the impression that all the mediaeval legends of the Saint are of equal value, and that any reference to him is sacred *because* it is a reference to him. Whether an event is related in the biographies of Celano, or the Three Companions, or the *Speculum Perfectionis*, or the *Conformitates*, or the *Fioretti*, it is accepted with apparently "equal thanks." So all the trivial miracles of the legends are told (pages 116, 140, 210, 212, etc.), with no attempt at all to probe their origin, with no apparent doubt of their perfect actuality; the "critical" effort of the author being exhausted in placing them in their correct setting in the Saint's life. What can we think of the scientific attitude of a mind that can treat the wolf of Gubbio episode as Father Cuthbert does on page 164! The legend of the taming of the wolf by the courageous exhortation of Francis comes to us as a charming allegory from the *Fioretti*. Father Cuthbert finds "two curious supports for its substantial authenticity" in recent years: one the discovery of the *Passio S. Verecundi*, which "puts it beyond doubt that Francis came to Gubbio at a time when the country was being ravaged by hungry wolves" (as if the legend could have any other source!), and the other, that a wolf's skull was found embedded beneath the ancient walls of the church of San Francisco della Pace in Gubbio (as if the legend could have any likelier result!). These discoveries are about as substantial an authentication of the miracle of the wolf as the demonstration that they had ovens to bake bread in in Galilee, or that there was an abundance of fish in the Lake, would be a substantiation of the miracle of the loaves and fishes.

Again, in his enthusiasm for the beloved Saint Father Cuthbert makes his influence so great at the very beginning of his preaching career (1210) that it was by Francis' sermons that the alliance of Majores and Minores in Assisi was accomplished (in spite of the contempt with which the families of the rich looked on this insane young man who had deserted their ranks to lead a life of evangelical poverty); although Father Cuthbert naively adds in the next paragraph: "It may be that the presence of the emperor's forces almost at their gates had something to do in bringing about this act of civic concord." The reader acquainted with the mediaeval history of the northern Italian towns will judge whether the preaching of Saint Francis or the presence of Otto IV's German troops had most to do with the temporary promotion of civic concord in Assisi.

With Father Cuthbert's acceptance of all the miracles of Saint Francis and of his disciples we cannot quarrel. There is absolutely no ground for argument between those who accept miracles and those who do not; for the reason that the documentation of miracles is also offered by those who accept them. But it gives one a curious feeling of the limitations of "scientific" scholarship to find Saint Anthony of Padua's miracle of attracting the fishes, which flocked to the shore like the oysters in *Alice in Wonderland*, soberly handled a few pages away from the keen analysis of the *Regula prima* and an exhaustive sifting of the relations of the Third Order to the original Franciscan community. On the treatment of the miraculous, then, we will not enter; it being to us also, in spite of the withering scorn of Father Cuthbert, "a more plausible theory that Saint Francis, to ease the itching of his body, scratched the wounds in hands, feet, and side," than that they were imprinted there by the seraphic rays from the vision on Monte Alvernia.

The chapters on Francis at the Fourth Lateran Council (Book II, chapter 6), on Brother Elias (Book III, chapter 5), and on the Third Order (Book III, chapter 6), seem to us particularly good, although a high standard of literary excellence is maintained from cover to cover. Once make allowance for the rather distorting influence of the author's personal devotion to Saint Francis as an impeccable father, and of his acceptance of the miraculous wherever it testifies to the enhancement of Francis' glory, and the book is a most delightful piece of work. Its charm of style is increased by the inclusion of a dozen beautiful full-page half-tones representing the scenes of the saint's labors and devotions.

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

SYNDICALISM, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION. J. RAMSAY McDONALD. Open Court Publishing Co. 1912. Pp. vii, 74. 60 cents.

AMERICAN SYNDICALISM: THE I. W. W. JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS. Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 264. \$1.25.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD. PAUL F. BRISSENDEN. University of California Press. 1913. Pp. 82.

"Syndicalism is the most modern phase of the revolutionary movement. It can with perfect safety be dubbed revolutionary, but to call it socialistic would elicit the protests of many syndicalists to whom 'socialism' is a mere middle-class reform, and to call it anarchistic would also be unwise, as an even larger number of them believe syndicalism to be the only true socialism. . . . In syndicalism there is a synthesis of elements: the socialist indictment of capitalism and part of the socialist programme; the anarchist method and ideal; and the unionist idea of organization in trade or industry." (Brissenden, p. 1.) The syndicalist proposes to substitute industrial unionism for trade-unionism; men performing different kinds of work in the same shop, some high-paid and some low-paid, may organize into different unions which bring all in the same *trade* together, or may organize into one great union which includes everyone at work in the shop, regardless of his particular trade, the latter form constituting the industrial union. The I. W. W., which is the American syndicalist organization, is thus in direct opposition to the American Federation of Labor, of which Gompers is President, as that organization is based fundamentally on the trades-union idea. The I. W. W. has bitter words for the "union scab," the carpenter who remains at work when the bricklayers' union engaged on the same building has called a strike. The syndicalist wishes to substitute a wider humanity, a "class-consciousness," for the narrower (but more effective!) "craft-consciousness" which breaks up labor into groups which may work at cross-purposes. But the syndicalist would still be miles away from the American Federation of Labor if the latter made this change in policy. The A. F. L. seeks to get the best conditions of work and pay for labor *within* the present social order, with the wage-system and private ownership of capital; syndicalism, holding all capital to be robbery, attacks the wage system itself, and proposes to take over the shops and mines and railroads for the workers themselves. But it does not intend, as does socialism, to do this by political methods. The syndicalist is sick of the slippery ways of politics, and has seen too many labor leaders debauched and turned respectable by political advancement. "Direct action," he proposes;

strikes and yet strikes; *sabotage* (damaging machinery, spoiling goods, misdirecting shipments, irritating the capitalist in a thousand secret ways); no violence, because the employer has the army behind him (which means no violence when it is of no use); and finally, as the great dream of the near future, the "general strike"—all labor is to fold its hands, show the employing class how helpless it is without labor, and then take over the control of industry from the nerveless hands which drop it. There are two classes, the exploiters and the exploited, between whom no peace is possible. Patriotism, which would make the worker of one country side with the capitalists of that country against his real brothers, the workers of another land, is a cruel delusion from which men must be freed.

The syndicalist has his idealism, his wide humanity, and his religion, though he proclaims, "No God, no master!" The philosopher of syndicalism, Sorel, has prepared a mythology for him, the centre of which is the "general strike," which Sorel explicitly declares a myth, and defends on the ground that myths are necessary. Sorel is supposed to draw his philosophy from Bergson, but the reviewer will stand sponsor for the statement that Bergson does not consider himself to blame for it.

For an interesting impressionistic picture of the syndicalist movement, Mr. Brooks' book is to be recommended warmly. It is interesting, sympathetic, and fair—Mr. Brooks has talked with the men who are in the movement, and knows their point of view. But it is not a book about the American I. W. W. There is scarcely any concrete information in it as to who they are, how they are organized, what they have done, how important they are, what their relation to the French syndicalists is. Mr. Brooks writes as if his reader knew the facts. Splendidly documented, with a bibliography of 28 pages, Mr. Brissenden's book really gives us the facts as to the beginning of the I. W. W. in 1905. The imposing bibliography tells how much the movement counts for, as few other things would. Mr. McDonald's book is clear and readable, and not open to great criticism, but not much more can be said for it.

B. M. ANDERSON, Jr.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION. A HISTORY OF ITS ECONOMICS AND OF ITS RELATION TO THE STATE. CHARLES LEE RAPER. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. xi, 331. \$1.50.

This is a general survey of the various matters of prime importance to a right understanding of the railroad problem of our day.

It treats railroad transportation historically from its beginnings to explain conditions; it deals with railroad transportation at the present time in various countries to test conclusions; it gives statistics on various points; and it develops theories on fundamental matters. Dean Raper modestly insists—even to the extent of putting it on his title page—that the work is based upon President Hadley's *Railroad Transportation*. It is indeed apparent that the earlier book has had its influence in the writing of the later; and this is particularly true in regard to the respect with which the doctrines advanced by Hadley are treated by Raper. But when it comes to subject-matter there are whole topics which have acquired importance since the earlier book was written. This reviewer has only examined with care that part of the book dealing with the Interstate Commerce Commission, as that is a subject with which he has had much to do of late years. The development of the powers of this Commission to its present control over our railroads has all been wrought since the earlier book was written. That history the present book tells with sufficient detail to make plain to the reader the overshadowing importance of governmental regulation of interstate transportation. And however much the Dean of North Carolina University may feel with the President of Yale University that railroad rates should be based upon the value of the service, in accordance with the theories which usually appeal to the economists, he is sufficiently alive to the tendencies of the times to note the progress going on in confining rates to the cost of the service, in accordance with the doctrines which lawyers usually fall back upon. Under governmental control he sees that some working principle like this is inevitable in order to have a fixed basis for accommodating the conflicting interests of different parts of the country. Indeed, when the coercive power of the State is invoked it must be exercised upon established principles founded on return for expenditure made in performance of the service, if we are to have a government of laws—not of men. The old days of economic development under benevolent despotism passed away with the new era of commission control; and in the latest decisions of the Supreme Court—so late as not to have found their place in this book—the end of all possibility at law of establishing rates without regard to traffic costs has come, for better or worse.

BRUCE WYMAN.

CAMBRIDGE.

A HISTORY OF SOCIALISM. THOMAS KIRKUP. 5th edition, revised and largely rewritten by EDWARD R. PEASE. Adam & Charles Black. 1913. Pp. xii, 490. 5s.

For a book essentially popular, both easy and delightful to read, this is probably the most satisfying statement yet made. It was greatly improved in its fourth edition, shortly before the author's death. This final, fifth, edition is as completely up to date as it is possible to bring it.

No man was more competent than Edward R. Pease to do this severe task of revision and rewriting. It is in the best sense a history, but it is also a criticism and an interpretation. The somewhat too bookish character of Mr. Kirkup's work is admirably supplemented by the long and active experience of Mr. Pease. In bringing the author's work into line with the "reformist" type of socialism, Mr. Pease does no violence to the spirit and sympathy of Mr. Kirkup. That the latter would have seen in Sidney Webb, the real successor and peer of Karl Marx is open to question, but there is much to justify the opinion. The volume is enriched by the discussion of Syndicalism, and by Chapter XIII on the modern International, one of the most significant developments of the movement. Its bibliography is also excellent.

The writer of this notice is constantly asked, "What is the best book on Socialism?" The question is a little grotesque; but so far as it has to be acted upon for more general readers, the answer has uniformly been "Read Kirkup's fourth edition."

One may say this a good deal more confidently of the present volume.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE.

PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY. G. F. Putnam's Sons. 1913. Vol. I, pp. vi, 168. Vol. III, pp. vi, 201.

These volumes contain papers read at meetings of the Reorganized Society, from 1906 to 1911. Among those of interest to a wider circle than the Society are: "The Genesis of the Common Form of Public Worship in our Non-liturgical Churches," by Professor Williston Walker of New Haven (I, 81); "The Letters of Einhard," translated by Henry Preble of New York (I, 107); "The Growth of the Layman's Power in the Episcopal Church," by Doctor D. D. Addison of Brookline (II, 63); and a discussion of the origin of the stigmata of Saint Francis, by Professor Henry J. Weber of Bloomfield, N. J. (II, 175).

THE CAMBRIDGE MANUALS OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE. Cambridge University Press. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 40 cents each.

This is a series of hand-books whose range is almost that of an encyclopaedia, but whose treatment of its subjects is more extended. These subjects wander from Spiders (No. 36) to Plato (No. 69). A typical volume is *English Monasteries* (No. 68), by A. Hamilton Thompson (pp. 168). It gives an excellent account of the different religious Orders with their discipline and daily life, and details of the monastic buildings.

LETTER

THE EDITOR OF THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW:

Sir—In reviewing my *Rise and Fall of the High Commission* in your April number, your reviewer comments upon the “enormous” number of times I have cited my earlier books. I am afraid that the adjective, “enormous,” will give many the impression that the volume is based to a greater extent than is true upon material already utilized. The citations of my earlier books are actually seventeen in number; seven of which refer to the text, seven to bibliographical material there printed in full, and three to documents there printed for the first time. It seems to me that the error is due to inadvertence rather than intention, but that it is likely to create misapprehensions.

Very truly yours,

ROLAND G. USHER.

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MYSTICISM AND MODERN LIFE¹

FRANCIS G. PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This College cherishes the memory of its founder, whose benefactions were untrammelled by denominational conditions, but whose faith in the principles of his communion was lifelong and profound. It is therefore appropriate to set apart one day in the year when some aspect of these principles shall be presented to the College, not only as a tribute to the founder, but as a recognition of the religious comprehensiveness and ecclesiastical catholicity which it is the privilege of students here to enjoy.

What, then, are the dominating traits which mark the Society of Friends, and which determine its place in the history of religion? What are the principles which issue into that spiritual serenity and assurance, which no experience is severe enough to disturb and no persecution has been merciless enough to destroy? The Friends, we must answer, offer a distinguished illustration of that type of religious life which in many forms, ancient and modern, Christian and extra-Christian, is defined as mysticism, or that illumination of the spiritual nature which proceeds from immediate communion of the soul with God. The word "Mysticism" has become so loosely applied to whatever is obscure or esoteric that it suggests to many minds, not the most certain and

¹ An address on Founder's Day at Bryn Mawr College, May 13, 1914.

compelling of realities, but that which is merely mysterious or misty. The Germans meet this misapprehension by discriminating between two words: "*Mystizismus*," or the cult of the supernatural, as in Oriental theosophy or Occidental spiritualism; and "*Mystik*," or a spiritual faith in the immediate revelation, the doctrine of the Inner Light. A touch of "*Mystizismus*," it must be admitted, was often betrayed in the visions and ecstasies of the earlier Friends; but Quaker mysticism has been, in the main, singularly restrained and tranquil, consistent with prudent business, practical politics, and sober common sense. The central movement of religious life among the Friends has been a pure stream of living faith, transmitting from age to age the Master's parting promise that when the Spirit of Truth was come, it should guide men into all truth. Mysticism assumes the essential integrity of the human soul, its affinity with the Eternal, its partaking of the Divine nature, its capacity to break the chains of sin and attain the freedom of the spirit. Mysticism universalizes religious experiences which to other habits of mind are occasional or intermittent—worship, prayer, inspiration, faith, sacraments. It is difficult even for the most convinced of sacramentalists to condemn the doctrine of a continuous sacrament expressed by an English Friend—"I very much doubt," he writes, "whether, since the Lord by his grace brought me into the faith of his dear Son, I have ever broken bread or drunk wine, even in the ordinary course of life, without the remembrance of, and some devout feeling regarding, the broken body and the blood-shedding of my dear Lord and Saviour."

Nor is the company of such believers limited to the communion of Friends, or to any single period of Christian history. On the contrary, the mystical conception of the religious life, the supreme and convincing assurance that the soul of man has the capacity to respond to the

spirit of God, and is freed by this communion from all dependence on external authority, runs like a golden thread through the dark texture of Christian doctrine and binds together centuries and creeds which have little else to share. Across the Christian centuries speaks the Jew Philo: "God has breathed into man from heaven a portion of his own divinity"; "The soul of man is an indivisible portion of that divine and blessed spirit." A century passes, and Plotinus bears witness: "The wise man recognizes the idea of the good within him; this he develops by withdrawal into the holy places of his own soul." Other centuries pass, and Bernard of Clairvaux, preacher, administrator, and saint, gives his testimony: "It is in the spirit, not of sound but of penetration, not talkative but effective, that union with God occurs." Still other centuries pass and the Dominican Tauler preaches: "Revelation must take place in the spirit, for God is a spirit, and our created spirits must be lost in the uncreated." Thus through the ages this serene message is renewed. "Madam," said the Franciscan to Madame Guyon, "you are disappointed and perplexed because you seek without what you have within; accustom yourself to seek God in your own heart and you will find him." The Quakers, in short, whom the provincial theologians of England in the seventeenth century fancied were intolerable heretics, and four of whom Puritan New England hanged for pestilential non-conformity, were one link in a long chain of witnesses of the spirit, which runs all the way from the Gospel of John to the poetry of Emerson, and whose continuity justified the New England mystic in his faith that

"The word by seers or sibyls told
In groves of oak, or fanes of gold,
Still floats upon the morning wind,
Still whispers to the willing mind.
One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world hath never lost."

Such is the spiritual pedigree of Quakerism, or rather such is the unexhausted and perennial life of the Spirit from whose abundance the stream of Quakerism, like many another movement of mysticism, flows. At this point, however, one is confronted by a further and practical question. What place has this life of the spirit among the needs and problems of the modern world? Are not these beautiful traits of quietism—detachment of mind, the surrender of silence, the waiting for God, which have adorned the history of the Friends—inappropriate, not to say impracticable, under the conditions of modern life to which one must now inevitably conform? Is not this a time of action, initiative, service; a time to look out and not to look in; an age when not even the silence of a Friends' Meeting can shut out the appealing call of an unredeemed and inequitable world? Is not the mystic, like the monk of the Middle Ages, saving his own soul, instead of setting his soul to save the world? Is he not tempted by the self-indulgence of meditation, when he should be stirred to the heroism of self-sacrifice? Longfellow's monk, walking on the terrace of Amalfi, looks down upon the town below:—

“Wondering unto what good end
All this toil and traffic tend,
And why all men cannot be
Free from care and free from pain
And the sordid love of gain,
And as indolent as he.”

May there not be something of this self-deception in spirituality, the mistaking of laziness for holiness, the withdrawal from others for one's own sake, instead of the sanctifying oneself for others' sakes?

There are many circumstances of modern life which might reasonably encourage this impression that mysticism and efficiency are mutually exclusive. A mind

profoundly concerned with communion with God might, it would seem, fail to hear the call to the service of man. Quakerism, like the monastic system, might appear to be a beautiful survival of an age which is gone. The conspicuous and pretentious organizations of ecclesiasticism, the increasing use of ceremony, ritual, art, and music as handmaids of religion, and the persistent substitution of doctrinal conformity for spiritual faith—all these characteristics of modern Christianity might seem to set the religion of the mystic in an eddy of the present age, where the elect few might move in their little circle of emotion while the current of the time swept by to other ends.

Yet this impression is in fact as superficial as it is common. One has but to recall the history of philosophy to be assured of the fundamental place which emotion must always hold in a genuine and effective religious life. A century ago the greatest of modern theologians, in the first expression of his mind, defined in epoch-making phrases the nature of religion. It was, he said, not knowledge, "for the measure of knowledge is not the measure of piety"; nor was it action, for behind all action lay a region of passive acceptance and contemplation. Religion thinks, but it is not the thought; it acts, but it is not the action. And if neither thought nor conduct, neither the reason nor the will, reveals the nature of religion, then its primary organ of expression must be sought within that third region of human experience which is occupied by the emotional life. "Your feeling," taught Schleiermacher, "in so far as it expresses the universal life you share, is your religion." "It is to be one with the Infinite, and to share in every moment the life of the Eternal." This sense of dependence is absolute, not to be balanced against any reaction of thought or deed; and in it is the source of the piety of the race. The feeling of absolute dependence leads us

past the region of inter-working causes and effects, and into the presence of the Power which controls the whole. It is but another name for our consciousness of God. In this philosophical justification of mysticism the history of modern theology began. The emotional life had found a place in philosophy. The sphere of feeling lay deeper in the religious consciousness than either doctrine or action could penetrate. The mystical experience might utter itself in theology, or in service, or in both, but these more conspicuous streams of consciousness, if they ran full and free, reported the hidden source from which they sprang, high up among the hills of God. The mystic in his search had pushed up the stream of faith to the spring from which it flows. He had entered the central shrine, which is hidden from logic or from effort, but lies open to the receptive heart when the spirit of surrender meets the Spirit of Grace.

All this the Quakers, though often in untutored ways, have seen and taught. The philosophy of religion confirms their intuitive faith. Yet this appreciation of the place of feeling is not the end of the philosophy of religion. A stream is not completely traced when one has discovered its source. A lake which has no outlet, even though it lie on a mountain top and reflect an unclouded sky, becomes a brackish pool. It is the same with the mystic's communion if it does not flow down into the channel of thought and will. Religious feeling becomes morbid, introspective, and even poisonous, if it be left to sun itself on the heights. "Master, it is good for us to be here," said Peter to Jesus on the Mount of Transfiguration, "Let us make three tabernacles"; not knowing what he said. But the Master's ear heard the cry of the demoniac boy at the mountain's foot, and the white and glistening raiment was cast aside that the work of healing might be done, and the vision above justified by the task below.

"Not always on the mount may we
Wrapt in the heavenly presence be.
The shores of thought and feeling know
The spirit's tidal ebb and flow.
The mount for vision—but below
The paths of daily duty go;
And nobler life therein shall own
The pattern on the mountain shown."

Here, then, is the first test which the mystic has to meet. He is tempted by the very vision which he so distinctly sees. The sufficiency of the communion may alienate him from the task of life. The common duty may seem flat and colorless after the shining of the upper air. Yet, on the other hand, if it should happen that the mystic, instead of being content with detachment and quietude of soul, descends from the height to the task, then he comes with a rare endowment of power. The vision has idealized the world. The healing of the boy is in the strength of the Mount. If the spring, which might linger in the hills above, hastens to the plains below, then it brings them refreshment and verdure. A curious dilemma therefore confronts the mystic's faith. He has discerned the source of all vitalizing religion, but this discovery is unavailing unless the feeling in which religion rises flows down to spend itself in ways which are often remote from the mystic's habit of mind. To have no touch of mysticism in one's religion, to be content with an external, doctrinal, superimposed tradition instead of a vital experience, is to live on a left-over faith, to borrow or inherit instead of discovering and owning. But, on the other hand, to have no outlet for one's mysticism is as when a sacred Jordan ends in a Dead Sea, on whose surface one may float, but from whose waters one may not drink. Two solemn alternatives, therefore, meet the mystic's experience. Either it is the most sterile of meditations or it

is the most productive of inspirations. The mystic can do nothing by halves. If he retreats from the world, it is with a lofty indifference which may reach even a mood of scorn; if, on the other hand, he serves the world, it is with the irresistible power of a living faith. He must do nothing or much. If he uses his talent, more is added to it; if he hides it, there is taken away even that which he hath.

If this is the philosophy of mysticism, it becomes most interesting to inquire how far the Quakers have met the test. Have the satisfactions of Quietism made them indifferent to the cry of the modern world, or have they turned the stream of their mysticism into the fields of service, as modern science turns an idle river to irrigate a barren plain? What do we owe, in modern thought or in modern service, to the Society of Friends? It must be admitted that few modern thinkers of the highest rank are the direct product of Quakerism. The classic expressions of its literature move for the most part within the limited circle of their own ideals, and are contributions to spiritual autobiography rather than explorations of philosophy or nature. A faith, however, cannot be called intellectually sterile which can claim the two most permanent narratives of the life of the soul—the Journal of George Fox and the Journal of John Woolman—with which documents of confession nothing in Christian literature can be compared except the Confessions of Augustine and the Thoughts of Pascal. And even if it be admitted that the practice of piety has been the dominating theme of Quaker literature, it does not follow that religious mysticism is in its nature intellectually unfruitful. On the contrary, the two most important influences on the theology of the nineteenth century have their origins in this consciousness of communion with the Eternal, and still carry to multitudes of students the authority of this personal assurance.

Schleiermacher became in turn preacher, professor, philosopher, and theologian, the most versatile and masterful of German teachers, of whom every serious student of ethics, aesthetics, Greek philosophy, or Christian history must still take account; yet Schleiermacher was bred within the circle of Moravian piety. It was, as he said, the maternal womb in which his faith first woke to consciousness. Not his erudition only, or his eloquence, or his administrative skill, have given him his permanent place in the history of theology, but the association of these varied activities with the mystic's faith, and the solution of doctrinal problems by the test of the Christian consciousness.

Even more impressive is the case of the one American contribution to philosophy which by general consent is accepted as original, typical, and permanent—the consistent and confident mysticism of Emerson. Argument, demonstration, even discussion, seemed to him superfluous. “If any one asks me for my reasons,” he said, “I am helpless.” He had but to report what the Oversoul whispered to him. The mind was, according to his teaching, primarily not an instructor, but a listener. “He on whom the Soul descends, alone can teach.” “Within man is the soul of the Holy, the wise silence, the universal beauty, the Eternal one.” What his followers called transcendentalism, appropriating inaccurately a phrase of Kant, was but the mystical assurance which transcended proof, and which sang with Jones Very:

“In finding Thee are all things round us found,
In losing Thee are all things lost beside.”

The unparalleled illumination and insight which give to Emerson his quality of timelessness is but an illustration of the truth which George Fox, in unstudied eloquence, taught in his Journal: “As people come into subjection

to the Spirit of God and grow up into the image and power of the Almighty, they may receive the word of wisdom that opens all things, and come to know the hidden unity of the Eternal Being."

It would appear, therefore, that the transition from mysticism to lucid and epoch-making thought is not only practicable, but may even reach the loftiest expression. When, on the other hand, we turn to the world of action the evidence becomes much more convincing. One of the facts which must suggest some self-reproach to the conscience of those Christian communions which claim the largest numbers and authority, is the modest part which they have taken in the great social movement of the modern world as compared with those whose opinions have seemed unsound or whose practices have been unecclesiastical. Wherever Christian teaching has been dominated by supreme concern for salvation in another life, there the habit of other-worldliness has tended to induce a depreciation of the vicissitudes of this world, and has accepted present evils as a preparation for eternity. Wherever, on the other hand, the worth and dignity of the individual soul have been deeply realized, and its immediate and personal communion with God has been the supreme desire, there the sins and wrongs of society which obstruct that communion have been the natural object of attack. The curious consequence has been that many of the greatest names in the history of social reform and redemption are those of men and women whom the theologians of the Church might describe as heretics. The anti-slavery cause, the reformation of prisons, the care of the insane and the feeble-minded, the beginnings of scientific charity, and the securing of political rights for the masses of the people—all these crusades, in which the new spirit of social service began, call to mind personalities in whom the spirit of Christian consecration was more conspicuous

than the habit of ecclesiastical conformity. Samuel Gridley Howe, in whom, his biographer said, were combined the spirit of Sir Galahad and the Good Samaritan; Joseph Tuckerman, the first American to formulate the doctrines of modern charity; Dorothea Dix, the frail young school-teacher who revolutionized the care of the insane—all these were devoted to the social salvation of others on earth rather than to their own personal salvation in heaven. All confessed themselves unable to meet the tests of Christian dogma which prevailed in their time, but all were ready for the welcome of Christ: "Come ye blessed of my Father. . . . For inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these least, ye have done it unto me."

Of this practical obedience to the call for Christian service the Society of Friends has been a distinguished example. From this unassuming and often despised communion, rooted in the faith of mysticism, there has grown an almost unparalleled efflorescence of applied Christianity. No other Christian body was so soon or so consistently committed to the cause of anti-slavery. In 1688 the Friends of Germantown offered the first official protest presented by any religious body on this subject. In 1783 the first English petition for the abolition of the slave-trade was laid by Quakers before the House of Commons. The same sense of humane responsibility has led the Friends to their conspicuous service of the Negro, the Indian, and the Oriental; to the free and undenominational education of both sexes in schools and colleges; and to leadership in the movement, now at last world-wide, for the abolition of war, and of the almost equally ruinous wastefulness of the preparation for war—a wastefulness which now, it is said, involves the six Great Powers of Europe in an expenditure of more than one and one-half thousand millions of dollars a year. A communion whose cornerstone is the essential integrity and spiritual potentiality

of the humblest human soul, cannot view without protest this degradation of humanity, or surrender its faith in the final triumph of reason even among the ruthless ambitions of political affairs.

Among such witnesses of mysticism in action there are two of such pre-eminence that they must be specially recalled. The work of Elizabeth Fry in the prisons of England was equally remarkable for what it found, for what it accomplished, and for the agent of reformation. It found a condition both of law and of discipline incredibly mediaeval and shocking; a law prescribing no less than three hundred crimes, even such as the robbing of a hen-roost or the larceny of five shillings, as punishable by death; and a conduct of prison discipline so incredibly brutal and debasing that jail-fever and jail-madness were almost equally familiar. It accomplished the transformation of the law of England from one of revenge to one of reformation; rescuing from the gallows all offenders except those guilty of another's life or treason to the State; ending the disgraceful history of England's convict-ships and convict-settlements, and converting the behavior of women in prison from that of brawling mendicants to that of restrained and self-governed penitents. Most remarkable of all was the personality through whom this epoch-making work was done. Mrs. Fry was bred in the tranquil environment of English affluence, a Gurney of Earlham, descended from Friends through both parents, the great-granddaughter of Robert Barclay. She became the wife of a wealthy merchant and the mother of twelve children. No circumstances could have appeared less suggestive of heroism or sacrifice. Her life seemed completely preoccupied by maternal obligations and by devotion to the stricter practices of the Society of Friends. Publicity offended her taste and enthusiasm was foreign to her habit of mind. Yet the call to service was irresistible and the word of

her Master was in her ears: "I was in prison and ye visited me." The filthy wards of Newgate became the scene of her cleansing ministries, and the Inner Light which illuminated her face shone into the hearts of the depraved and condemned. Mysticism was not only consistent with action, but gave to it a composure, fortitude, and assurance which made their impression equally on the felon in her cell and the Queen on her throne.

Even more notable in its fusion of feeling and action was the work of John Bright. Up and down Great Britain he preached the gospel of popular liberty, the rights of the plain people, the iniquity of a tax on bread, the extension of the franchise, and the cause of the North in our Civil War; and unlike most agitators and reformers he lived to see all the causes which he loved triumphant, and to receive the almost universal admiration of a career which had begun amid the clamor of opposition and contempt. Yet throughout all those years of unremitting contention and protest, Bright was sustained by the habits and instincts bred in the Society of Friends. "He always remained a Friend," says his biographer, "both in his heart and his life." "Religious feeling was the very basis of his life." "He practised the silence of his sect and drew thence the strength of his soul, the purity of his heart, and the quality of his speech." Lord Morley said that "the most impressive and pure piece of religion he ever witnessed was John Bright reading a chapter of the Bible to his maid servants, shortly after his wife's death, in his beautiful and feeling voice, followed by the Quaker silence." What a revelation is here of the source of Bright's political wisdom, and even of his unrivalled eloquence! Behind the stream of his argument lay the fountain of his feeling. Through his work as agitator was revealed his detachment from self-interest and pride. His invective was tempered by quietude of spirit. His social programme expressed

his faith in the capacity of each humble human soul. His politics were the flower of his religion.

These indications of the nature and possibilities of mysticism are not without instructiveness, even for those whose religious habits may be very remote from that of the Society of Friends. Mysticism as a religious practice has proved itself unadapted to many, probably to most, Christian lives. The average experience cannot rise into this high region unaided, and demands the spiritual support of external, visible, and authoritative standards or forms. Priesthoods, rituals, ceremonies, and creeds sustain many a life which cannot trust itself. Mysticism is thus a faith for the elect, adequate for those only who need no support but God. To these the unbroken silence is more eloquent than the most stately ritual, the presence of God more convincing than any creed concerning him, and the Quaker Meeting, not bare and empty, but rich and full with the Eternal Presence. Yet, even for those not disciplined in this surrender of silence, the mystic's faith must remain the beginning of spiritual efficiency. Nothing can be a sufficient substitute for this personal assurance of the Inner Light. All the externalities of religion are scaffoldings which steady the structure while it is building, but other foundation can no man lay than the life of God in the soul of man. It is not an accident that in many Anglican churches, and this year in a cathedral of the Protestant Episcopal Church, provision has been made for a Friends' Meeting, that amid the elaboration of ritual which to many minds is the best interpreter of Christian faith, there may be the even more profound appeal of silence, simplicity, and self-surrender. By so much as the religious life is a tradition or a dictation instead of an experience, by so much it remains a shaky, tremulous, and temporary possession. By so much as any life attains this personal communion, by so much is its faith secured against the

storms of change, and as the scaffoldings of authority or conformity fall away the simple stability of the Christian character is revealed. On this foundation one may build as he please, wood, stubble, or precious stones, and each man's work will be tested by the fire of experience; but beneath all diversities of Christian ministrations lies this fundamental fact of the need of man for God and the answer of God to man. The Apostle says that in the Jewish Law a veil was interposed between the soul and God; "which veil was taken away by Christ." That is what happens when one passes from conformity to communion, from the external authority to the inward witness. A veil is taken away, and with unveiled face the worshipper beholds the glory of God and may be changed into the same image.

Here, then, is the place of mysticism in modern life. It does not satisfy the common and legitimate desire for intellectual definiteness or for aesthetic persuasion. A reasonable, prosaic, work-a-day religion, adapted to a practical world, may have in it little of mysticism, and may even view the mystic's practices of piety with an amused contempt. Mysticism, either in its passionate fervor or its silent restraint, is likely to remain a privilege of the initiated, an inner shrine of confidence which many do not presume to enter. It is not every one who can satisfy his piety with Whittier's confession:

"In calm and cool and silence once again
I find my old accustomed peace among
My brethren, where perchance no human tongue
Shall utter words; where never hymn is sung,
Nor deep-mouthed organ blown, nor censer swung,
Nor dim light falling through the pictured pane.
There, syllabled by silence, let me hear
The still small voice which reached the prophet's ear."

Yet, when it comes to those conclusive evidences of character and completely generous types of service, where

utility, expediency, and even obligation, halt and nothing is effective but a sheer self-effacing committal of life to its best, then that complete quietude of spirit which steadies and lifts conduct out of self-consideration and pride can be derived from nothing but the habitual consciousness of a Divine will to which one habitually submits the problems of life.

"The true mystic quest," it has been lately pointed out in a most erudite and brilliant study of Mysticism, "may as well be fulfilled in the market as in the cloister; by Joan of Arc on the battle-field as by Simeon Stylites on his pillar"; by "energetic no less than contemplative powers." "The real achievements of Christian mysticism are more clearly seen in Catherine of Siena regenerating her native city, Joan of Arc leading the armies of France, Ignatius creating the Society of Jesus, Fox giving life to the Society of Friends, than in all the ecstasies and austerities of the Egyptian 'fathers in the desert.'"²

That fusion of mystic communion with ethical passion, of the energetic and the contemplative powers meets us in its purity when we trace the spiritual experience of Jesus Christ. Not a church, or a creed, or a form, sustained his spirit and made sacrifice a joy, but the habitual intimacy with his Father, and the convincing call to do the Father's will. "I seek not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me." "I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do." "Father, not my will, but Thine be done." To lack this consciousness of mystical communion may not be to fail of conventional conformity, or of respectable morality, but it may well meet the Master's judgment of those who depended on external sanctions and supports, "Yet hath he not root in himself; for, when tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by he is offended." To have that root

²E. Underhill, *The Mystic Way*, 1913, p. 45 ff.

in oneself is to secure a vigorous and varied growth both of thought and of action. To feel oneself an instrument is to do one's work with a keen edge. Philosophy is most convincing when the mystic's experience enriches the reason; action is noblest when the Inner Light shines through the self-effacing deed. "Peace," a Friend has written, "is just as much a positive and vivid experience as pain. It is not the cessation of experience, but the reconciliation of the soul to the Master-Power." That was the discovery which made Florence Nightingale, at the end of a life of intense activity and masterful administration, find her peace in the words of a sixteenth century mystic: "True religion is to have no other will but God's." "Mysticism," the same servant of humanity said at another time, "is but a hard word for the Kingdom of God within."

THE MOTIVE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN RELIGION

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"We read in the Book of Genesis that, after our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, 'Behold, this man has become *as one of us*, to know good and evil.' . . . Before this first 'enlightenment,' the Lord God was alone to be considered, and the man could be regarded as a mere instrument for his satisfaction. But this was now forever out of the question. He might be managed by hope of Heaven or fear of Hell; he might even be destroyed; but as long as he retained the power to know, he constituted by that very fact an end in himself, an 'other' even for the Lord God, and he could be moved, or morally obliged, only by an appeal to his personal interests."

"No individual can, therefore, with a clear consciousness of what he is choosing, consent to be eternally damned—either for the glory of God, as the older gospel put it, or for the glory of society, as it stands in the gospel of today. If the glory of God is not also my glory and the salvation of society is not also my salvation, then God and society are necessarily strangers to me, and their good can be for me neither a moral obligation nor a psychologically conceivable motive."

These passages, which I have printed elsewhere,¹ I venture to reproduce on the ground that they state, if somewhat baldly, not indeed all that is important for an individualistic philosophy, but what is most distinctive and necessary. And thus they enable us to see the full dimensions of the question which I shall endeavor to answer, namely, whether the spirit of a free man is compatible with that reverence for the universe and desire for unity with the universe, conceived always as a personal universe—or, more concretely, with that worship

¹ *Individualism*, New York, 1911, pp. 90 and 27.

and love of God—which I shall assume to be implied in any genuine religion. I need hardly say that the usual answer to the question would be negative. Those who stand firmly enough for the right of self-assertion in the presence of our fellows would be likely either to deny the authority of religion or at any rate to hold that self-assertion has properly no place there. And traditional Christianity, while teaching the doctrine of a personal relation to a personal God and, in the doctrine of personal immortality, affirming, almost distinctively, the worth of the individual soul, treats this worth, hardly as a right, but as a gift, and holds that though a man may stand upright in the presence of his fellows, in the presence of God his attitude must be one of self-abnegation and self-effacement—of submission. On the other hand, in Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*,² in which I should say that the *motif* of the "free man" is rendered for the most part admirably, it seems to be implied that a free man's religion is necessarily a religion of self-sufficiency. This states my question: Does the individualistic motive imply a spiritual self-sufficiency?

I

The question carries us back, to begin with, to the meaning of individualism as a social and ethical motive. And here it is clear that most of the historic formulations of individualism, especially those of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, presuppose an exclusive and self-sufficient individual. Mind your own affairs—do as you please—every man for himself—*laissez faire*—that government is best which governs least—such expressions imply, upon their face at least, that no individual is directly interested in his neighbor. The same implication is contained in the conception of an original

² *Philosophical Essays*, London, 1910.

"state of nature" antecedent to the formation of society, whether we think of it as a state of warfare, with Hobbes, or as a state of moral purity, with Rousseau. While a more idealistic motive may be found for most of these expressions, the element of authority that is put forward and made prominent, even as a basis for "reason," is that of natural instinct. By nature the human individual is impatient of restraint; he is exclusive and self-sufficient; and, therefore, his good as well as his freedom consists in being "let alone." In such an exclusive being there appears to be no ground either for a love of God or for a love of his fellow-man.

Or for moral obligation. It is this "isolated individual" of the older individualism that accounts for the present tendency, both in popular philosophy and in the philosophy of the schools, to claim that the sum and substance of morality is to be "social." In this view "individualism" becomes a synonym for vice, the idea being that the essence of all immorality lies in the taint of self-regard. Yet for moral support this social conception of morality appeals, not less than the older individualism, to the authority of instinct; and even more distinctly in so far as it seeks the help of the biological doctrine of natural selection to prove, as Professor Dewey puts it, that all our instincts are directed outward—upon objects. Socially speaking, this means that in the order of nature our instincts are created for the welfare and preservation, not of ourselves, but of our kind. And from this is drawn the ethical inference that virtue consists in self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice for the common good.

Such is the current antithesis between individualism and the social conception of morality. In my opinion both conceptions rest upon an incoherent, if not indeed a crudely materialistic notion of the relations of individuals in society. In both I should say that attention is

concentrated upon the irrelevant idea of a spatial group to the entire exclusion of the condition necessary to constitute a society, namely, the consciousness of individuals of one another. When we speak of the "isolated individual" (with the implication that individuality consists in isolation), and conceive that individual freedom consists in being let alone, we are thinking of society as a group or aggregate of mere bodies, of which each must be separated from the others by an interval of empty space if it is to be marked off, not indeed as an individual but as a unit; for no individual can be regarded as "isolated" who knows his fellows and is known by them. And when we conceive that social unity necessarily implies self-sacrifice, what we have in mind is not the unity of personal sympathy, but the kind of unity that is attempted when, for example, two bodies seek to occupy the same space or swallow the same food. If we remember that the essentially social relation consists not in spatial aggregation but in spiritual communication, we shall see that there is no necessary connection between social unity and self-sacrifice. The "rule of the road" should be enough to suggest that one of the first fruits of communication is freedom for each to go his own way.

Nor is there any implication of self-sacrifice in the fact that human beings are by nature social. When Aristotle says that man is a "political animal," he means simply that man above all other animals is so constructed as to find his good in the society of his fellows. And this is shown most conspicuously when men come together, not for purposes of commerce or protection, but for recreations and games. Here the "social" motive is pure and undefiled. Yet no one enters a game for the purpose of losing to his fellows; on the other hand, no one cares to play a game with any but his friends. And in calling man a distinctively "political" animal, what

Aristotle has prominently in mind is our possession of organs of speech—as well as of hearing. In other words, man above all other animals is fitted for *conscious communication* with his fellows. And this brings us again to the point that the significance either of the individual or of society is a question, not of units nor of groups, but of consciousness.

This I take to be the logical motive of individualism; this is the ground upon which I stand for the supreme worth of the individual. The right of the individual to assert himself rests, not upon natural instinct, not upon his bodily separateness from others, but solely upon the fact (and it is valid only so far as this is the fact) that he is a conscious agent, who not only acts but knows what he is doing, not only moves but knows whither he is moving, and is thus so far enabled to choose his own ends and to direct his own way. In a word, the logical basis of individualism is not “nature,” but self-consciousness. No authority resides in natural instinct. A heedless good nature is as valueless morally as a blind selfishness, and not more lovely. The moral question is not a question merely of how we are constructed; it is not a question of fact, but of value. But value is constituted by consciousness. To know is to evaluate; to be known is to be of value. A watch is of value only to one who knows what it is. If the watch knew itself it would have a value for self and the right to assert itself. Now man (so far as we know) is distinguished from all other animal species by the fact he alone is self-conscious to any considerable degree. Those who seek ethical illumination in the conception of man as a biological species seem to forget that man is the only species that can be said to have a history, a culture, a science, a society. In a word, man is the only animal who knows that he is an animal. Upon this ground, and upon this alone, rests the right, or the possibility, of regarding the wel-

fare of our race as an end. But this race self-consciousness is but the counterpart of an even more distinct individual self-consciousness which compels each of us to regard himself as an end.

To see that this logical motive stands for a genuinely ethical fact, we have only to turn our attention to the institution of marriage. From a biological standpoint the sex-instinct, with its peculiar intensity and pervasiveness, is simply an admirable arrangement of nature for the perpetuation of the species. The current "social" theory of ethics rests for the most part upon biological grounds; and these also are the grounds which underlie the programs of eugenics and the denunciations of "race-suicide." The assumption is that nature, like the stock-breeder, "so careful of the type she seems, so careless of the single life," cares nothing for the personal relation. And in animal marriage, in which personal choice may be supposed to play a rather small part and passing gratification the greater part, it must be admitted that the personal relation seems unimportant. Here indeed marriage may well be regarded as a means for the ends of others. But to any man or woman about to marry, the preservation of the race is a matter of last importance, and even the raising of a family is only secondary. For them marriage is first of all the realization of the demands of their personal lives. If this be dismissed as mere "self-absorption," then we may point out that the sacredness attached to this personal relation is widely regarded as a fair measure for estimating the status of any form of morality or religion. Not that other ends are excluded. On the contrary, I should say that there must be few persons for whom parenthood is not an important part of self-realization. The point is that the moment I become conscious of an instinct working within me, a new end has appeared; in the consciousness of self a new person is created; and whatever may

have been the purpose of the instinct for others, its purpose is now mine, to be fulfilled as I shall discover to be best for me. As a self-conscious person, I am no longer a means for alien ends but an end in myself.

Individualism stands, then, not for the license of unrestraint but for the dignity of the personal life. To be a person is to be self-conscious. As compared with any of the lower animals, every normal human being must be regarded as distinctively a person; and thus, with Kant, we should say that nothing is more intolerable than the subjection of one human will to another. But even within the range of human life there is a wide variation in the degree to which a will may be said to be personal rather than purely instinctive or animal. In the logic of individualism a will is personal so far as it is self-conscious, reflective, and thoughtful. To give a definite meaning to a much abused word, individualism stands for the rights of "personality." And thus it reflects the point of view of a humane culture as opposed to that of a naturalistic science. In the vocabulary of misuse "culture" is often associated with narrowness of sympathies, while "humanity" is identified with bare animality. We excuse our fellow who yields to sensuous impulse on the ground that he is "merely human." In the vocabulary of individualism "human" and "animal" are terms of contrast. And the point of contrast lies in the fact that the human being knows himself. His action is a matter, not of force but of motive, not of causes but of reasons. This is what I mean by culture. Not that an individualist claims to hold a monopoly of thoughtfulness. The issue lies between outer fact and inner meaning. Naturalistic theories of life are based exclusively upon the outer fact as *observed* in the behavior of others. Individualism takes its stand upon the meaning as *experienced* in the consciousness of living, and holds that the meaning is always personal and

individualistic. Culture is the development of that meaning.

Such I take to be the *motif* of self-assertion, the *motif* which in the end underlies all of the forms of individualism. The rationalism of Kant, the irrationalism of Nietzsche, the crude utilitarianism of *laissez faire* and "every man for himself," are only so many attempts to state the significance of a self-conscious being as an end in himself. How one such end is to be co-ordinated with another in a social order, would be a chapter in itself. Here I shall only suggest in passing that, while the world is full of the sacrifice of ends to ends, this sacrifice is nevertheless everywhere diminished to the extent that men clearly grasp their own ends and have a sympathetic insight into the ends of their neighbors. The development of such insight constitutes the meaning of culture and civilization. And except as our personal ends are completely realized, not merely treated each as one in a quantitative apportionment, the social problem is not solved.

Here, however, we are concerned chiefly with the individualistic motive. When we fix our attention upon the implications of self-consciousness, it becomes clear, I think, that while self-consciousness implies self-assertion, there is no implication of self-sufficiency or exclusiveness. Rather must we say that the *consciousness* of self involves necessarily a consciousness of outer realities and at the same time of personal needs that call for real satisfactions. And it is only in the deeper aspirations of *self* that we are able to conceive of greatness in our fellow-men. Hence I should say that there is nothing in a philosophy of self-assertion which is incompatible with modesty and reverence. As an intelligent man I do not pretend to know more than my physician, though before following his advice I may insist upon being convinced. Nor may I refuse to

respect Hegel because I fail to understand him, though I shall decline to accept as my own what I do not understand. These are feeble illustrations, but they may serve to suggest that an infinite reverence for wisdom and goodness is not incompatible with a sense of our own responsibility and worth.

Nor is self-assertion incompatible with a generous sympathy for our fellows. On the contrary, I should say that the need for sympathetic intercourse with our fellows is one of the foundation-stones of an individualistic philosophy. No one can satisfy himself, materially or spiritually, in an empty world. In an empty world no one can assert himself. It lies in the very nature of the individualistic motive that the "others" that we seek are personal. And, on the other hand, only an intensively self-conscious person can love with sincerity and conviction. Individualism rejects a self-effacing love and demands that love be reciprocal. But for an individualistic philosophy the very essence and quintessence of "life" is to be found in the responsive communication of mind with mind. In this lies the real significance and worth, the genuinely "social" value, of all co-operative activity.

Just for this reason, however, will an individualist refuse to commit himself to all the interests that are recommended to him as "social." And in this point lies the practical significance of individualism as against the current "social" conception of morality. It seems to me that much of what is called "social" at the present time is merely expansive. Individualism is intensive, and holds that, in any genuine sense, the relations of men are social only so far as they know one another, and therefore that a relation ceases to be social so far as it ceases to be personal. *Nil humani a me alienum*—this I may say truthfully and even longingly. But everything is alien to me which lies outside of my imagination.

I cannot be said truly to love a brother who is only a social unit; and to bestow a dispersive affection upon "humanity," filling my life with ends to which individually I can give but scant personal attention, is to dissipate the very essence of life and to make our human existence, full indeed of activity and bustle but spiritually mean. How one may best distribute one's attention is a matter of personal equation. From an individualistic standpoint, every extension of fellowship makes life only the richer. But no fellowship is genuine except so far as it is a meeting of minds.

II

I have pointed out that the development of self-consciousness is culture. In the deepest implications of self-consciousness we pass from culture to religion. From an individualistic point of view, religion is simply the further extension of that logic of self-importance which issues from the self-consciousness of the cultivated man. But here again it is all-important to remember that self-consciousness is not, and cannot be, self-absorption. To be self-conscious is only to be intensively thoughtful and reflective. Strictly speaking, I should hold, all consciousness is in its measure both a process of reflection and a consciousness of self. But we properly emphasize the *self*-consciousness of the deeper and more deliberate acts of reflection because here, in the more vivid sense of the presence of *realities*, we become more vividly aware of ourselves as contemplating these realities. There is a common tendency, however, to assume that a reflective attitude involves an absence of contact with reality. This was never more clearly exhibited than in the "social" emphasis of our time, which in countless ways expresses the idea that culture is the antithesis of life. I cannot but believe that this is

a superficial inference from the fact that a thinking man is committed to a certain degree of *physical* solitariness and is apt to be much occupied with books. Only a moment's reflection is needed to see that a man who reads books is in contact with men, and with a wider circle of men than he who does not read. And except in an irrelevant physical sense, no man can be said to be in contact with the men of his own time and place except as he knows them; nor does he know them deeply, except as (after the fashion of serious literary criticism) he knows them self-consciously. Now just as, upon the ordinary plane, our consciousness of our fellows is the counterpart of our consciousness of self, so, I should say, is the consciousness of the larger realities of philosophy and religion the fruit of those moments in which the consciousness of self is keenest and most vivid—when, for example, I pause to face the inevitable fact that I shall die, and that to future generations all that you and I find worth while will seem as ghostly and unreal as to us the life of the Dark Ages. No man, says William James, can steadily contemplate the fact of his own death. Indirectly, this may serve to remind us how rarely we really face the eternal realities, and at the same time how rarely our consciousness comes really “home.”

All religion is thus the outcome of a deeper self-consciousness; it is this deeper self-consciousness which brings us face to face with the eternal realities. I have pointed out that man alone among the animals may be said to have a history or a culture. It is an anciently accepted belief that he alone is capable of having a religion—because, we may now say, he alone is a self-conscious person. Animal life, so far as we can see, has a very limited range either of memory or of anticipation. We have only to think of this to see how remote from the stage of animal life must be, not only

the sense of personality, but any questions regarding either the significance of the person or the significance of the world. The significance of the world is a question only for one who can raise the question of his ultimate personal fate; and for him the world can have no meaning which does not include a full meaning for himself. In other words, not only are the belief in God and the belief in personal immortality generally found together as a matter of historical fact; they belong together in the logic of our self-consciousness. For, in the last analysis, religious belief is simply the largest implication to be drawn from ourselves as conscious beings. A religion of individualism rests upon the ground that consciousness is throughout personal.³

Hence I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject as unbelievable any form of religious belief which failed to provide an eternal, and an eternally distinct, meaning for his personal self. And thus he would reject the religion of absolute idealism of Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, in which "all that matters is the whole," and the whole is likewise the only genuine person or individual. This doctrine he would condemn as in contradiction to the meaning of that experience of personality from which absolute idealism is derived. Thus also he would reject those oriental religions which, upon grounds emotional or intellectual, place our highest good in the extinction of the self, or (with Mr. Bradley) conceive that the personal self is to be realized in a higher and superpersonal reality. In an individualistic philosophy there may be many degrees of the personal, but nothing higher than the personal; and whatever conception we may form of the

³ Scientific psychology to the contrary. In speaking, however, of "impersonal mental states," I should say that we are thinking, not of any fact of consciousness, but of some one of the several objects used by psychologists to "represent" consciousness, such as an image (in a mirror), a photograph, a book, or a piece of writing—something which can convey an idea or represent an object to a thinking person, but which itself knows nothing.

universe as a personal reality, monistic or pluralistic, whether God be one person or many, or many and also one, *this* person who has now emerged in self-consciousness, is, with all his ignorance and shortcomings, a person once for all, and any reality in which his distinctness is obscured will be, not higher, but lower. Finally, I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject any interpretation of Christianity in which the significance of the individual were conceived, not as a right, eternally won by the creative power of his self-consciousness, but as a matter of grace; any interpretation in which the individual is conceived to save his life by losing it—to gain eternal life by extinguishing his individuality; or any in which the individual is conceived as a means for the glory of God. After our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, “Behold this man has become as one of us, to know good and evil.” *As one of us*—this seems to me to embody in a most striking way the logic of the situation. A being who knows can no longer be regarded as a means for the ends of any others. As a knowing being he holds an eternal place, as one of us, in the kingdom of ends.

Equally, on the other hand, would an individualist be bound to reject a religion of mere emotion, a religion of desirable experience, such as that commonly offered by the psychology of religion; or a pragmatic religion, as proposed by William James, which is content to accept God as a satisfying conception. In the logic of self-consciousness no experience is significant except as it is revealing, and no desire is satisfied except by an “other.” In this sense an individualist is an “intellectualist,” and holds that all that gives dignity to experience, and marks it off from digestion, is the illumination of idea. Immersion in mere “experience,” even religious experience, is but one form of intoxication among others. Nor is “morality touched by emotion” better than, but only

rather worse than morality untouched by emotion—except as “emotion” stands for a cognitive contact, however vague, with a larger reality. “Intellectualism,” as I conceive it, does not compel us to deny that “emotion” may be cognitive. Intellectualism is merely a conscientious attempt to give to all of our experience a coherent meaning and a logical justification—to bring it to the test of truth. This is not to make light of religious experience, but only to insist that religious experience is meaningless except as it is a revelation of the divine.

And upon similar grounds an individualist would refuse to be satisfied with a religion which is merely sociological—a religion of humanity. In the church in recent years it seems that the trend of things has been in the direction of putting society in the place of God, of substituting social betterment for personal religion, and business management for other-worldliness. Precisely the same trend is indicated in the tendency of our colleges to substitute utilitarian and vocational ends for intellectual discipline and liberal culture. Both tendencies are the outcome of a view of life controlled by the point of view of naturalistic, positive science. And it is hard to escape the conviction that, in the church and the college no less than in the laboratory of research, this emphasis upon the social and practical covers a large measure of scepticism with regard to the more spiritual realities of culture and religion.

Individualism expresses the point of view of an intensive self-consciousness. Such a standpoint is not hostile to a generous humanitarianism, but it stands first for the spiritual significance of humanity, for human welfare as a spiritual rather than a barely economic fact, and for “life” as the activity of a self-conscious agent rather than a merely “vital process.” Traditionally, the church has expressed this point of view in assuming that its

special function was to focus the attention of its members not so much upon "life" as upon death—in other words, upon their eternal rather than their merely temporal significance. And a similar point of view has been expressed by the schools in assuming that their function was to introduce the men of here and now to the best thought of other places and other ages. I have already suggested that much that is presented as "social" might properly be called "expansive," and to a cultivated man much of it seems merely superficial. The very first attempt to find ourselves, through a process of reflection, shows us that the humanity to which we belong is far wider than the humanity of here and now, or of vaguely "future generations," upon which the attention is focussed in the so-called social standpoint. Any sympathetic insight into the meaning of the literature and philosophy of past times must lead one to feel that there is something peculiarly obtuse in the notion that the past is dead; or that a present unilluminated by the past (however determined by it) can properly be called life. In our own time we are confronted by a positivistic science which thinks that it has finally purged the world of fact from the taint of human motives. Nothing would more quickly disturb this belief than a study of its obligations to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle; and nothing would do more towards revealing the significance of our science for life and for culture.

Passing from culture to religion, I need only point out that any stage of reflection which reaches the question of our ultimate fate as individuals must inevitably reveal to us that each of us is in the presence of a reality much greater in scope than the scope of humanity. To my mind the problem of religion is nowhere more clearly or decisively suggested than in the gulf between the two things which filled the soul of Kant with ever increasing wonder and reverence: "The starry heavens above me

and the moral law within me." In the logic of the situation these two stand at the opposite ends of the universe; and thus they enable us to grasp in our imagination the full scope of the problem known as the problem of religion and science. For the objects commonly studied by physics, chemistry, and biology, and even by geology, are all by comparison familiar and home-like, and many of them are our blood relations. It is the astronomical universe, yet not the universe as seen in the calm beauty of a star-lit night but the universe as pictured in the imagination of the astronomer, terrifying in its vastness, prostrating in its total impersonality and absence of reference to anything human—it is the contemplation of this picture that stirs the deepest questionings regarding the fate of the soul. Here we are bidden to remember that the earth, which is to us so vast, is but one of the minor planets in one of countless systems; that only very recently, geologically and astronomically speaking, has the earth supported life, and yet that the human race has existed for several hundred thousand years. But only for a few thousand years does the race seem to have been very human or to have had any clear consciousness of itself as a race; and of the millions upon millions of souls who have lived during this historic period, for each of whom doubtless, as for you and me, his own life and the fate of his own soul has seemed to be the central and important fact of the universe, the names of only a few survive. What, then, does the world know about you or me? What, indeed, is the whole realm of life but a fortuitous concourse of atoms at one point in an infinity of space and time?

And yet—"the moral law within us." For the sweeping impetus of this naturalistic point of view is suddenly checked before the fact that here alone (as we see it), in this small corner of the universe, do we find bodies that not only move but know that they move, and, in-

stead of yielding to alien "laws of nature," direct their own movements. In this fact of self-consciousness lies "the moral law within us." And before this fact the majestic vastness of the astronomical universe seems to fade into relative insignificance. For if we are to speak of *significance*, if the majesty of the universe is not merely a matter of size, then here alone, in the life of men, and most of all in the life of thoughtful men, lies the revelation of significance. This is the starting-point for all affirmations of significance; this alone reveals the "majesty" of the universe. And not only for significance, but for positive character. For it is not only the grandeur of the universe that reflects our humanity; a human point of view is equally implied in every detail of its description.

What, then, does the contrast mean? Is our self-consciousness a merely exceptional and fortuitous fact? Personally, I find it difficult to conceive what such a statement would mean. Or are we to say that our consciousness of self is a revelation, not merely of our own nature, but of the nature of the universe; in other words, that "nature," as apprehended by natural science, is but one manifestation of a universe which is essentially living and personal and takes account of us? This, I should say, is the problem for a religious belief. For individualism not less than for any other philosophy of life, the possibility of religion depends upon the answer to this question.

And therefore, with a hearty sympathy for the spirit of the "free man" expressed in Mr. Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*, I am unable to see that his view of the universe furnishes any justification either for freedom or for worship. Mr. Russell, seeing in the universe nothing but pitiless force, calls upon man "to sustain alone . . . the world that his own ideals have fashioned," "proudly defiant of the irresistible

forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation." But neither in politics nor in religion can freedom consist in walking alone. "Freedom of speech" would be only travestied by permission to print a newspaper which no one would read. The demand for freedom is a demand to be heard and to receive the response of a fellow. Even the Stoics, whose philosophy Mr. Russell's closely resembles, justified their freedom and their scorn of the (external) world on the ground that the universe is fundamentally rational. Through the rationality of the universe their freedom became effective. There is no freedom in an empty world, and no final freedom of the spirit in a world that takes no account of us. In a world of significance we may assert our significance, and each of us his own significance, without qualification; if anything is significant, I am significant. If, however, our human culture is but a passing cosmic phenomenon, then—then, indeed, the most rational attitude we can take (if any attitude be rational) is not to take ourselves seriously. We may find pleasure and profit in cultivating a kindly humanity, but to give to our social relations the dignity of religion is merely to remind ourselves that in the last analysis they are lacking in significance.

So much for the logic of the individualistic motive. I have made no attempt to present this motive in the warmer light of concrete personal experience. But I have tried to show that the motive fundamental to individualism is personal life. In religion individualism stands for the eternal and distinct significance of the personal self; but this very self-assertion expresses an infinite thirst for the kind of satisfaction that we get in living communion with personal "others." Religion expresses that infinite need of life which is inevitable to a self-conscious being. In the tumult of daily living the need may be forgotten in an eager absorption in the

present, or it may lose courage under the burden of dismaying responsibilities, when life seems an illusion and eternity unreal; but when in a quiet hour we are at home with ourselves, then I think that to each of us it seems nothing less than calamitous that there should be any part of the life of the universe which you and I, each in his own person, may not actively and self-consciously share. But life is at once knowledge and love. These two motives, which for Plato expressed the meaning of philosophy and made philosophy divine, are mutually implied in the consciousness of self; and both are contained in the motive of personality. In religion individualism seeks that infinity of personal knowledge and personal love which is expressed in the love of God.

DRUNKENNESS

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The familiar process of the elimination of factors from a confused equation is bringing a new stage of progress and of hope in dealing with the form of delinquency which is most distinctive of the English-speaking nations. Until now the forces of alcoholism have nearly always been given the choice of weapons. Too often unreason and ill-restraint have been matched against their like, with the result of only further intrenching the hostile power.

The nature of the evil that goes with the harmful use of liquors is being analyzed. Such use is a vice; but it is not all a vice. It quickly becomes in large part a disease. The chemical effect of alcohol upon body and brain, certainly when taken in other than minute quantities, sets up a morbid condition and undermines self-control at a rate far more rapidly and to a far greater degree than even the enlightened conscience could anticipate. Alcohol gives wings to evil intention, sweeps the will far beyond where it had intended to go, and leaves it much less capable of recovery, than would any normal exercise of an evil choice—if the phrase may be allowed. It is impossible to study many cases of inebriety without reaching the clear conviction that though the inebriate does loosen the foundations of the tower which falls upon him, he can have had no remotely adequate conception of the burden with which he was to be crushed.

Such an approach to the subject may remind us that up to a century ago insanity was looked upon as nothing but a weird, dehumanized type of moral reprobation.

The beginning of humane and penetrating consideration for the insane came as it was understood that their condition was not an unconscionable one, and that the persistent and comprehensive application of remedial and hygienic methods could mitigate and sometimes bring to an end what had been thought to be a hopeless condition.

Today the thick and almost desperate fog of alcoholism—which often seems to penetrate all our minds and make us incompetent of incisive thought with regard to it—is being shot through by the thousand rays that are generated by the new convergence of science with sympathy. The results of this *Aufklärung* are beginning to show themselves in every one of the intricate and vexing complications with which the use of alcohol afflicts personality and civilization. This new light, in a sense, does not make the problem less difficult. It does not suggest that a less degree of concern than now exists with regard to it will be adequate. It rather indicates the need of larger resources and deeper devotion. But it gives assurance that there are concrete lines of action, which, if thoroughly followed out, will at no distant day bring profound and far-reaching gains.

The setting of alcoholism off by itself as a disease at once leads to a further step in the analysis. Fundamentally alcoholism is but the highly exaggerated expression of an antecedent morbid condition of the nervous system. Alcoholism gives such a condition scope and momentum which by itself it would never have. Alcoholism reacts upon the inner state, greatly intensifying it. But when all this has been allowed for, the underlying difficulty, which would exist apart from any alcoholic habit, is a trouble of the mind. This is the key-note in all treatment of alcoholic patients; and to the discerning practitioner it suggests that all the ingenuities of medical therapy must have their climax in a moral appeal to the sovereign will. The method would

seem to be to bring the machinery of human intelligence and co-operation to bear upon the super-effects of the man's fault, and after helping him clear away these, to bring the incitement for the better choice to his self-afflicted soul.

Along with a more inward knowledge of the nature of alcoholism has come a much more discerning measure of its social results. The whole system of laws covering the use and effects of alcoholic drinks seems to proceed from the possibility of violent crime committed by intoxicated persons. While judicious people have recognized alcohol as the source of many evils besides crimes of violence, they have been apt to turn from such consideration lest they should be classed with the fanatical temperance reformer. In effect, therefore, the new attitude towards the results of the abuse of alcohol is coming with a peculiar freshness of appeal to all sorts of people throughout the country. The direct results of the intoxicated state are now seen to represent only a minute fraction of the injury which is inflicted upon the community. Considering that all the serious phases of sexual immorality are involved deeply with intoxicating liquor, it is probably not too much to say that the specific tendency of human nature to throw the reins on the neck of its impulses by means of alcohol is responsible for a greater proportion of all the forms of degeneracy, including the birth of degenerate types, than all other causes put together.

A community so deeply alcoholized demands both to be studied minutely and exhaustively, and to be dealt with throughout from that point of view. It may be said that instead of such thorough diagnosis and any such statesmanlike program, we have had in the past only a sort of very determined application of exorcism; which has by no means been without its value, but could never touch the complication of keys that precipitate the

result and together can in the end prevent it. There is developing, under no centralized organization but with a keen community of interest, a comprehensive forward movement against the evils of alcoholism, which more or less consciously takes its suggestion from such a great public health campaign as that against tuberculosis.

In the first place, the treatment of individual cases of inebriety is being completely reconsidered and recast. Perhaps the best indication of this change may be given by an outline of the new system for the public treatment of drunkenness which has been developed by the State of Massachusetts during the past ten years.

Drunkenness associated with crime, vagrancy, or serious disorder continues to be punished in much the same way as before; but for alcoholism as a thing by itself there is a succession of three stages, all worked out from the new medical point of view with regard to drunkenness. Up to the number of two arrests in the course of a year, the young offender is dismissed the next morning after his arrest without being brought to trial. After that, on being arrested and brought to trial he is placed under probation in charge of a special officer of the court to whom he must report frequently, and who endeavors both to restrain and re-enforce him. If offences continue, a more definite punishment is felt to be needed, and a fine is imposed. The imposition of a fine, however, is not allowed to become equivalent to imprisonment. If the man is not able to pay his fine, his fine is made probationary. He is given a certain period under the charge of the probation officer in which to earn his fine. This procedure came about more easily when it was seen that to confine the drunkard who could not pay his fine was imprisonment not for drunkenness but in a sense for debt.

In due time, if the rake's progress continue, some form of institutional care becomes clearly advisable for the sake

not only of the man himself but of his family and of the community generally. At this stage comes the State Hospital for Inebriates at Norfolk. To this hospital men may either be committed by the courts, or, as happens now in three-fourths of the cases, they go voluntarily. The voluntary cases naturally have a decided advantage, as they come prepared to co-operate in their own treatment. In general this hospital is limited to men under forty years of age, or men who have not had a long history of alcoholism.

The Norfolk State Hospital has 1,000 acres of farm and wood land, and provides a variety of occupations in the open air the year round. There is in general a distinct feeling of loyalty on the part of the patients to the institution and its administration. While the system includes good food, productive work, and sound hygienic conditions generally, its chief reliance is upon a genuine personal relation between the physician and the patients, as they are called. The decisive effort on the part of the superintendent is gradually to gain the confidence of each man so as to be able finally to reach the skeleton in the closet; and there always is one—the sin, the sorrow, the indignity, the defeat—which is more or less consciously rankling at the centre of his being. The knowing physician, possessed of this secret through patient, unaffected fellow-feeling, can begin confidently to erect the scaffolding of a reconstructed life; and the man's soul, no longer transfixed within itself, begins to join gladly and with a sense of revelation in the labor. This, at any rate, is the history of a substantial proportion of cases.¹

¹Whether any of the various types of drug-treatment, for which so much is claimed, have any value, is a matter of doubt. In certain cases, drastic chemical action may for a short time restore the balance of nervous energy to the nerve centres, some of which have become congested, some atrophied. If the patient, during this interval, by summoning all his moral resources, can fasten his hold again upon a normal conception of life, he may have a favorable chance of recovery. But there can be little question that the best way to bring about and to confirm a sound moral perspective is through such all-around physical and moral hygiene as is practised under the Norfolk system.

After a stay of a few months the patient becomes acquainted with the after-care officer, also a physician, who, like the superintendent, chose his work for the love of it. He is put in possession of all the facts gained by the superintendent and his assistants with regard to the case. On the one hand, he proceeds to prepare the mind of the patient for going back into normal environment, and, on the other, he visits the man's family, his employer, his clergyman, and any helpful friends, so as to secure for him a reception that will be as conducive as possible to his welfare and progress. The after-care physician continues to visit each discharged patient for a period of months, so as to get for him the most out of every favoring influence.

Carefully collected statistics for the past five years show that twenty per cent. of the former patients have been completely abstinent, and another twenty per cent. have at least maintained a distinctly better standard of self-control than before their stay at the hospital. In due time it is to be hoped that in every community throughout the state there will be citizens who will be ready to take up the responsibility where the after-care physician leaves it. This would considerably reduce the number of those who return to the hospital a second or a third time; and it would—with the proposed development of a detention colony for confirmed cases where they should be kept under gentle constraint for life—effect a very marked decrease in the number of inebriates, which are so great a menace to nearly all communities.

These different stages of treatment, as worked out in a public experiment, no doubt represent broadly a method which will be adopted by private initiative. Certainly the probationary stage and the after-care stage challenge the study and aid of all responsible moral leaders in our local communities. They can in fact do much to raise the standard of intelligence and

training for the probation and parole service. In particular, the church has a distinctive opportunity; for the new developments in the treatment of alcoholic patients throw stronger emphasis than ever upon influences of religion, brought to bear in the light of psychological knowledge.

The two institutional stages, whether under public or private control, will however in large numbers of cases be a necessity. The hospital stage, aside from removing the inebriate from temptation, takes him out of the atmosphere made by those anxieties and importunities of undiscerning friends which seem only to fix the tendency more irrevocably. The detention colony stage, under humane direction, is clearly a mercy to all concerned.

The first step in any great public contest with disease is the care of the afflicted and the isolation of contagious cases; and be it remembered that in many subtle ways alcoholism is the central factor in a complication of infecting evils. The next step consists in the broadest, most exhaustive measures for removing liability to disease.

Here we need to aim directly at reducing those tendencies of mind and body which make easy victims for alcohol. It is one of the new principles of education that attention trained in one direction does not mean attention ready for application in every other direction. Attention must be trained to the specific subject. There must be an increasing number of persons on the staff of the churches, the schools, the charitable agencies, the specialized philanthropies, the secular benevolent associations, and perhaps, above all, the great manufacturing establishments, who shall for the prevention of intemperance urgently promote a varied, consecutive, comprehensive program for the care and enhancement of physical and moral vitality. No one who is at all

familiar with the growth of the system of social service in the large cities, but will recognize the great potencies which exist in it for the rearing up of a new generation which shall be distinctly less susceptible to alcoholic attack.² It cannot be taken for granted, however, that such a result will be gained and held in substantial degree unless every aspect of social reconstruction is under continuous experimental study with this precise end in view. In all the training of motherhood and the care of infant life, the medical inspection of children in the public schools, the preparation of children for appropriate vocations, the protection of adolescents against the peculiar and intense moral dangers that beset them, the organization of recreation for children and young people, and the guidance of their spiritual life—at every stage the program will provide that the specific tendencies towards alcoholism be specifically anticipated and intercepted. We may expect that the study of the psychology of alcoholism, which is proceeding rapidly in connection with curative efforts, will be constantly throwing back important clues for use in such preventive service.

The third phase of a wide and far-reaching public health campaign must be to remove so far as possible the chance of exposure to disease, to attack the provoking unit in all its dark lurking places. Alcohol has to all intents and purposes the same relation to the disease associated with it as have the germs of tuberculosis to the great white plague. It is true that the medium of alcoholism is appropriated voluntarily and that its dissemination is promoted under an enormously powerful business motive. But these facts do not affect the principle; they only complicate and baffle its application.

²There are some gratifying signs that organized industrial unrest, instead of dallying with alcoholism or assuming that it is a mere by-product of poverty, to be sloughed off by economic progress, is coming to recognize in it an intolerable obstacle to any working-class program.

Here too the method of patient, exhaustive analysis must be followed. The greater, more hurtful evils of the liquor trade must be set off by themselves, and separately disposed of. So much of the sentiment of the community as is ready and available for a single telling step must be organized for that step. As an instance of this policy, the so-called "bar and bottle" law on the Massachusetts statute book registered the conclusion that the sale of bottled whisky to the man who had already been drinking should not be permitted; and there is good reason for tracing to this law the lower rate in the increase of the figures for drunkenness in the state.

Perhaps the most striking fact in this connection is the changed attitude of the medical profession within very recent years as to the place of alcohol. Today the margin of utility or permissibility allowed by medical science to alcohol, whether as beverage or medicine, is narrowing almost to the vanishing point. On account of the psychological and ethical dangers involved, large numbers of men never previously committed to total abstinence are taking that position. Many of the foremost European scientists have become convinced abstainers and prohibitionists.

It seems not unlikely that practically all use of alcohol will be considered as producing the disease of alcoholism, and that within a generation the movement for the abolition of its public sale will be far advanced. To secure, to enforce, and to retain such a result will involve one of the most profound enterprises in moral organization and education which civilization has yet seen. Towards this great end every step in the struggle with any phase of the alcohol problem, even aside from its direct result, has its important contributory value. The final triumph will come when the man who has worked to protect his own home and neighborhood, the man who has resisted a danger to his own and his community's economic and

civic interests, begins to see that by universalizing such experience broad forms of prohibitory legislation and administration will become practicable and inevitable.

Each gain in the release of the individual from the fetters of the disease, in the community-prophylaxis that cuts down the number of the victims, in the restriction of the spread of the dangerous medium, means so much re-enforcement for the consummate victory. Underneath every sort of effort, however, should run the consciousness that the appetite for alcohol is but a blind outreaching for exaltation, for the fulfilment of life; and that so high a day of emancipation as that of the final release of the energies of a nation from alcohol can come only through opening up to the people all the avenues to more abundant life. The result so won will carry in itself the protection against any of the reactions that are sometimes threatened, and will have in it unexpected potencies for those other and further ends towards which social democracy is set. It is indeed not impossible that the movement against alcohol, with all its traditions of incoherence, may first exemplify the varied application of analytical social science gathered up into a "new synthesis," whose outcome shall be the equivalent of a revolution.

THE GROWTH OF THE INCARNATION

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The purpose of this article is to study the incarnation in ethical terms. And that means to study it as an ethical process, as concerning the whole life of Jesus. It is a common tendency to identify the incarnation with the conception or the birth of Jesus, to make it an event in a moment of time. As the atonement has too often been limited to the death of Jesus, instead of being treated as the outcome of his whole atoning life, so has the incarnation too often been limited to his birth. But if we are to treat it in ethical terms, we have to deal not simply with the incarnate birth but with the incarnate life.

The necessity of so regarding the incarnation results directly from the Christian belief in God as moral or personal. The incarnation is the expression of the Christian belief about God and man and the relation between them. It must therefore be expressed and interpreted in Christian terms. And the Christian belief is that God is a personal, a moral being, and that man is made in the image of God. Therefore the incarnation must itself be understood as personal and moral if it is to be understood in accordance with the Christian thought.

Now a physical event can be expressed as taking place in a moment of time, and the results that come from it as following in accordance with physical necessity. A clock made and wound up contains already in itself the whole process of its unwinding. So if the incarnation be regarded purely in physical terms, it may be identified with the moment of conception or birth, and the resulting

life will follow by a process of physical necessity. But if the incarnation be primarily moral and personal then it cannot take place all at once. All morality, as we know it, takes the form of time. It is essentially a process. Morality must grow if it is to be morality at all. The old theory that Adam was created perfectly righteous to start with is a theory of moral contradictions. Adam could no more have been created righteous than he could have been created thirty years old. Development in time is an essential quality of righteousness.

If the incarnation is to be the expression of the relation between God and man, it must then be expressed in moral and personal terms. Only thus can it have moral significance for humanity. And it can be so expressed only if it follows the laws of all morality, only if it is regarded as a process of moral and spiritual development. The incarnation concerns the whole life of Jesus. In dealing with the incarnation, we deal with the process and development of the incarnate life.

This thought may be put in a somewhat different form. The Christian belief in God is that God is personal. If therefore He is to be revealed, He must be revealed through personality. If He is to come into contact with human life, that contact must be achieved through personal means. Apart from the Christian concept, the tendency has been to find God given in ways that are impersonal. He has been revealed in signs and omens, in the voice of the thunder, in the flight of birds, in the entrails of the sacred victims. Or if revealed through men, it has been where men have ceased to exercise their full personal powers, through dreams, through unconscious swoons. In all these methods there lurks the thought that God in Himself is impersonal and that therefore He cannot be revealed in personality. The Christian thought is just the opposite. As God is personal His means of revelation must be personal. If He is to be given to human

life, He must be given through human life at its highest, that is, in its supremely personal form. And the supreme personal expression of human life is in Jesus Christ. The incarnate Son is the revelation of God, the Word of God, in and through human life. And therefore the incarnation, which is the supreme expression and revelation of God, must be concerned with the whole person of Jesus, with all that constitutes his character, his growth, his struggle, his victory. The incarnation as a personal fact must be in the form of a personal life. It is a process that concerns the whole life of Jesus. Begun in the manger cradle, God is there manifested in the beauty of the life of the child. But a deeper manifestation is given in the boy as he finds himself at home in his Father's house. A still deeper manifestation is given in the man. And the incarnation is in its fullest sense complete when that manhood is made perfect through suffering, and when in the victory of the cross Godhood and manhood are forever joined in the risen and ascended life. Each stage manifests the divine according to its capacity. But God can be manifested only as the fullness of humanity gives divinity the fullness of expression. The incarnation is not an event in a moment of time. It is the process of the incarnate life.

This position may be misunderstood. It is not that Jesus grows merely as a human being, and that the divine life comes to him as a reward. That would be to lose the essential idea, and therefore the religious value, of the incarnation, to supplant it by an apotheosis, to think of a man becoming God instead of God becoming man. But Christian belief sees in Jesus not first the ascent of humanity to God, but first the gift of God to humanity. The incarnation is no less a gift from above because it takes place in a process rather than in a momentary event. Rather is it true that that gift can take place only in a process, for only so can spiritual gifts be given.

The union of God and man is given from above. But that union can take place only in and through personal receptivity. God and man cannot be joined as things are joined. They can be united only in a personal life. That union becomes more and more perfectly realized in the development of the perfect life.

This thought of the process of the incarnate life has manifold advantages. It gives deeper meaning to the whole life of the Christ. His birth, his death, his resurrection are not isolated events. They receive their meaning from his life as a whole. The birth is the beginning of a process that concerns his whole life. The cross is the summing up of a process that began at birth. The resurrection and the ascension are the eternal results of a life that has won the perfect victory. These events have their meaning not in themselves but as the outcome and expression of the whole life. They are Mounts of Transfiguration, the sacramental expression of that union of divine and human which through his whole life was becoming ever more perfectly realized. They are the sacraments of the incarnate life.

This thought gives greater meaning and a deeper sanctity to the church year. We are to live over again the life of Christ. Through him we are to win for ourselves union with God. We are to make his experience our own. Day by day we are to walk the path he trod. From Advent to Ascension we are to bear within our hearts the birth, the dying, and the rising of our Lord. These events are the expression of that perfect life which was manifested that we might have life and that we might have it more abundantly.

This concept of development also casts light on the problems of the knowledge and the righteousness of Christ. To begin with his knowledge, the question is how the union of divine and human in him was compatible with the limitations of a genuinely human knowledge.

The problem is comparatively a new one in theology. The older orthodoxy mostly took it for granted that as he was divine he must have been omniscient, that even in the cradle he must have been possessed of all the knowledge of the eternal God.

This theory was evidently due to an inability to conceive that God and man could actually be united. It was a part of the Greek dualism, which believed that God and man could come together only if God ceased to be God or man ceased to be man. The thought was that if God came into human life it must be at cost of human limitations. All these must disappear at the influx of divinity. But if we believe that God and man can really come together, that God can be manifested in human life, then we shall get rid of this antagonism. We shall believe that God's life can be manifested even in the limitations of humanity. We shall not begin with a premise that prevents us from reading the New Testament as it stands, and that dehumanizes the Christ. We shall be able to ask fairly the question, What was the nature of his knowledge and what were its limitations?

It is natural that some persons should shrink from such a question. It may seem due to an irreverent curiosity, it may seem to raise questions which are beyond our knowledge and which it is unprofitable to discuss. To such objections two answers may be made.

In the first place the problem is squarely put before us in the New Testament. The limitations of his knowledge are there clearly indicated. St. Luke says that he "advanced in wisdom." He himself asks for information. And in one passage, which the most radical criticism maintains to be an authentic saying of Jesus, he declares "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark 13 32). We cannot avoid the question if we are to study the New Testament. To treat it as useless is to be wise above that which is written.

Secondly, it is of supreme importance that we should know "the mind of Christ." He is the heart of the New Testament. To Christian faith he is himself the Word of God. If we are rightly to understand him and his message, we must not shrink from an inquiry into his self-consciousness. We must seek to understand him as perfectly as we can. To be afraid to do so is to show lack of faith in Christ himself.

There have been two unsatisfactory methods of treating the problem. So far as the older theology showed any interest in the question, it tended to approach it on the basis of the distinction between the "two natures" of Christ. It ascribed omniscience to his divine nature and limitations to his human nature. Thus he was at once omniscient and limited. When he said that he knew not the day or the hour, he meant that he knew it not "as man." "As God" he knew everything that God knows.

That answer creates more difficulties than it removes. It sharply separates between his divine and his human nature. It does not really hold that God and man have met together in him. The union is only what has been called a "local" or "spatial" one. There is no real personal union. This is a bit of the Nestorian heresy, which tended to separate Christ into two separate persons. Even more serious is the effect of this theory on the moral character of Christ. To suppose that he said that he knew not, when all the time he knew "as God" and not "as man," is utterly contrary to the openness and simplicity of his character. It puts him in the company of those who make casuistical use of "mental reservation." This solution must be definitely abandoned.

Of more importance today is the so-called doctrine of the kenosis. The word, meaning "emptying," is of course taken from Phil. 2 7 (Cf. R.V.). The whole passage, Phil. 2 5-11, is interpreted to mean that the pre-existent

Christ in becoming man voluntarily "emptied himself" of the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. He thus lived his human life under human conditions, and having completed his life by obedience unto the death of the cross, was then restored to the possession of the divine attributes. Thus by the act of self-emptying, or kenosis, the divine life was lived under human conditions.

The purpose of this theory is good. It recognizes that the New Testament does not represent Christ as omniscient, and it tries to give a reason for the limitations of his knowledge. But the theory, good as is its purpose, creates more difficulties than it removes. It misinterprets the meaning of "Person" in the doctrine of the Trinity. It conceives of the second "Person" as an independent personality. And if the thought is carried out to the third "Person," it represents the Trinity as consisting of three personalities, three "people" in our modern sense, and thus destroys belief in the unity of God. The theory virtually implies tritheism. It is noticeable that this theory is held by many who hold closely to the "orthodox" theology. It is difficult to see how such persons reconcile their theory with the accepted doctrine of the Trinity. They would doubtless allow, indeed insist, that the word "*persona*" in the Trinity does not mean "person" in our modern sense of an independent personality. And yet, while maintaining this, they conceive the second Person of the Trinity as acting as a separate independent personality apart from the supreme personality of God.

It is but putting the same thought in another way to say that this theory misinterprets the belief in the pre-existence of Christ. It confuses the pre-existence of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity, with the pre-existence of the total personality of Jesus of Nazareth. It makes pre-existence apply not only to his divine but

to his human nature. It thinks of a pre-existent man. The result is logically to deny that our Lord had any real human soul or spirit. It is the old heresy of Apollinarius, that the Logos took the place of a human soul in Jesus. The theory thus destroys the real humanity of our Lord, and lands us in inextricable difficulties.

The exegetical support for the theory in the passage in Philippians is extremely slight. The kenosis with which St. Paul is dealing is an ethical kenosis rather than a metaphysical one. He is thinking of the divine life manifested in self-sacrificing service even to the death of the cross. And while in presenting this thought he starts undoubtedly from the idea of pre-existence, an idea familiar to the Hebrew mind, which ascribed pre-existence to all things that had enduring reality, yet St. Paul never thinks of interpreting that pre-existence in any such way as to destroy either the unity of God or the genuine humanity of Jesus. To build this elaborate theory of a metaphysical kenosis upon St. Paul's doctrine of the ethical "self-emptying" of Christ in loving sacrifice, is to construct a theory that has no sound exegetical basis. For both theoretical and exegetical reasons this theory of the kenosis as an attempt to explain the self-consciousness of our Lord must be abandoned.

Far simpler than either of these two attempts is the method of approach previously suggested. The difficulties largely disappear if the union of divine and human in Jesus is conceived of as progressive. First of all is to be remembered the essentially Christian thought of the union of God and man. God and man are not opposed. The divine need not cease to be divine in order to enter the human, and the human need not cease to be human in order to receive the divine. The incarnation is the expression of the divine purpose, the perfect unity of God and man. And secondly it is to

be remembered that as that union is a moral and personal one it takes place in the form of moral personality, that is, in the form of growth. The union at each stage of growth is in accordance with the possibilities of that stage.

With these thoughts we approach the problem of the self-consciousness and especially of the knowledge of our Lord. And in accordance with them we shall expect to find that his knowledge is progressive and takes place along the lines of his human development. We shall expect to find each stage perfect in its kind, but we shall not expect to find a perfection beyond that which each stage demands. His knowledge is no less divine because it comes to him along the lines of human development. His knowledge has the limits of his human experience, but of an experience that is perfect in its kind. He learns in the family, in the synagogue, through the reading of the Scriptures. In all ordinary things his knowledge was that which was possible to the conditions of his time. We shall not expect to find in him an infallibility with regard to matters of history or science. We shall expect to find divine insight coming to him ever more perfectly as the union of God and man in him is ever more perfectly accomplished. When that perfect union is fully won, then shall the limitations of knowledge be done away. It is said even of us that then shall we know even as we have been known (1 Cor. 13 12). That full knowledge is the ultimate possession of him in whom the union of God and man was finally accomplished through the process of the incarnate life. But we shall not expect to find omniscience in those stages at which the complete union was not yet accomplished.

Does this thought of a development rule out his authority in moral and spiritual matters? Two things are to be said. In the first place, even in ordinary matters we know little of the limits that would belong to a life

perfect at every stage, untouched by sin. Sin is constantly a disturbing factor that vitiates our knowledge. Even in earthly matters there are depths unguessed by us. And we doubtless see in his relation to things of human experience a depth of perception and a reach of knowledge from which sin shuts us out.

And secondly, this is supremely true of spiritual things. His life in every stage is perfect in that stage. No sin blots his consciousness of God. The growing expression of the divine in him, unvexed by human failure, makes him the supreme possessor of moral and spiritual insight. No moral or spiritual error could have entered the life whose very source was the eternal and revealing Word of God. There are things he did not know, but in moral and spiritual matters he could never have supposed that he did know when he did not. Such error is due to sin. In that perfect life, progressive though it be, no sin interferes with the perfect expression of the divine character. In all moral and spiritual truth we go with confidence to him who revealed the very mind and heart of God. He that hath seen him hath seen the Father.

Viewed in this way the whole life of Christ becomes a perfectly real life. If he were without our limitations, he could have known no genuine human struggle. He could not have lived the life of faith. Prayer would have been unnecessary and unreal. Even the cross could not have been the supreme victory of faith, triumphing by reliance on the divine will. It would have been at the most the endurance of a few hours of suffering. All this unreality is brought into his life unless the divine in him were realized in genuine human form. The limitations of his knowledge, due to the progressive development of the incarnate life, were absolutely necessary if the incarnation was to have moral and spiritual significance. Only thus could there have been in him

the supreme victory of faith, only thus could there have been won the perfect righteousness of his sinless life.

Thus from the subject of his knowledge we are brought directly to the subject of his righteousness. How was that righteousness realized, and what was its relation to struggle and temptation?

The guide to the discussion must be found in the two thoughts already emphasized. In the first place, divine and human actually meet in Jesus. Therefore the divine does not set aside the human. The Christ is no less divine because the divine is realized under the forms of human experience. And in the second place, that realization must be progressive. Divine and human can meet only in moral personality, and the form of moral personality is growth.

This element of growth has especial application to the righteousness of Christ. Righteousness by its very nature must develop. It cannot be given perfectly at the beginning. It must be won through struggle and victory. At the beginning there can at most be innocence, sinlessness. Orthodox Christian theology has always held that this sinlessness was given to Jesus as a native endowment. This view rightly expresses the thought that we cannot regard Jesus as the mere product of the race with all its sinful antecedents. We see in him a new beginning of humanity, in the strictest sense a new birth from above. Yet such a native endowment is wrongly interpreted if it is thought to exclude the need of struggle and temptation in the attainment of his positive righteousness. To make that righteousness a necessary result of his sinless endowment would be to unmoralize his life. And it would contradict the New Testament, which declares that "though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered" (Heb. 5 8). It was thus that he was "made perfect." If his righteousness is to have creative power

over us, it must be won in conflict. "It behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God" (Heb. 2 17). The incarnate life must be realized through a moral process. Only thus can it bring to us the saving life of God. The problem with which we have to deal is not simply the sinlessness but the positive righteousness of Christ.

Although this article is dealing with an interpretation of Christian belief rather than with the apologetic approach to that belief, it may nevertheless not be out of place to indicate that it is far easier to approach the question of belief in Christ on the basis of his positive righteousness rather than on the basis of his negative sinlessness. It is the hardest of all things to prove a universal negative. To do so requires a complete knowledge of every possible contingency. And apart from belief in Christ, as a basis for that belief, to attempt to prove his absolute sinlessness is to meet with the difficulty that attends the proof of every universal negative. We know very little of the life of Jesus, and from the little that we do know to prove to an unbeliever the fact of his complete sinlessness is practically impossible. The belief in the sinlessness of Christ is the expression of an antecedent belief in him; it cannot be made the basis of that belief. The starting-point must rather be made with his positive righteousness. That positive righteousness stands written clearly before us. It sets a new standard for the world's righteousness. From him comes a new ideal of righteousness which dominates the world's history. We cannot independently of him construct a standard of righteousness and then condescendingly apply it to him, and ask whether he comes up to it. He applies to us a standard far higher than we could have created without him. We do not judge him. He judges us. All judgment is committed unto

him because he is the Son of man. As the supreme expression of humanity, he is the standard which commends itself to the conscience of mankind. His positive righteousness sets a new standard for the world. On the basis of that new ideal of righteousness we can win belief in him, and hence we can believe in his sinlessness. We must first emphasize his positive righteousness rather than first his negative sinlessness.

With this thought in mind, we return then to our special subject. How was that righteousness related to temptation and struggle? How is temptation possible to a perfect life? Are not our temptations the result of the sin that doth so easily beset us? If Christ was perfect, must he not have been above temptation?

So it has been maintained. It has been held that temptation implies sin, for without sin there is nothing to which temptation can appeal. Consequently if Christ were sinless, he could have had no possibility either of temptation or of sin. To be capable either of sinning or of being tempted is to have at least the beginning of an evil impulse. Christ was then by his very nature incapable of sinning, and he stood above the reach of all temptation.

Let us look first at the consequences and then at the logic of this view. As to consequences, it is first to be noted that such a theory is absolutely untrue to the New Testament. Jesus is there represented as undergoing genuine human experience. His ministry begins with a struggle against temptation. The Epistle to the Hebrews says that he was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4 15). The same Epistle says, "For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted" (2 18). He who holds the previous view definitely departs from the teaching of the New Testament. And secondly, this view makes the moral life of Jesus unreal. He is removed

from such a struggle as we have to endure. His life is therefore without moral significance for humanity.

As to the logic of the theory, it rests on a double fallacy. In the first place, it confuses temptation with sin. Temptation is a good. It is essential to the moral life. Only by the struggle against temptation can true righteousness be achieved. To yield to temptation is sin. To feel temptation and to struggle against it is a mark of all morality. It was the Spirit by which Jesus was driven into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil. The capacity of being tempted came not from an evil impulse but from the presence of the Holy Spirit. It is false logic to confuse temptation with sin.

And secondly, this theory confuses a moral process with a moral result. It is true that the highest moral result is given when temptation is so conquered that it can be resisted without a struggle. But such a result must be the outcome and not the beginning of a moral process. There is the greatest difference between one who has never felt temptation and one to whom temptation has ceased to appeal because it has been overcome. Such a development is not sin, but is necessary to any character that is to be one of positive righteousness. This theory then overlooks all moral development in Christ, confuses the result with the process by which that result is reached, and essentially denies his positive righteousness. The theory must be abandoned. The temptation and struggle of Jesus must be regarded as real, and as a necessary part of his perfect righteousness.

But just there comes the difficulty. In our own experience temptation and struggle are so bound up with sin and moral failure that it is hard for us to conceive what temptation would have been in a life apart from sin. How was it that the sinless life of Jesus could have known any moral struggle and temptation comparable to our own?

No doubt the mystery cannot be perfectly solved. But there are certain considerations that are helpful in the approach to it. In the first place, it is to be emphasized again that we are dealing with the positive righteousness of Christ and not simply with a negative sinlessness or innocence. Mere innocence might exist apart from struggle and therefore apart from contact with the world. But positive righteousness must be achieved through struggle. It will lead us to think of Christ as having a positive work to do in the actual world of human experience.

Secondly, it is to be remembered that although Christ was perfect he did not live in a perfect world. He lived in a world in which there was sin, and in which sin involved its consequences of suffering and misery. We have not to ask the theoretical question, What would be a perfect character in a perfect world? That question might lead us merely to theoretical abstractions. We have to ask the definite question, What was the perfect character in the world of sin? We have to deal with the historic fact of the perfect righteousness manifested in sinful conditions.

With these two considerations in mind, we may then ask this question, As a character becomes more perfect, does it feel more or less keenly the sin of the world? The answer is easy. True righteousness feels the pressures and power of sin as the weak sinning character can never feel it. Because St. Paul is himself strong, he writes, "Who is weak and I am not weak?" His strength means that he must bear the weakness of others. In the same way righteousness feels the presence of sin. The text, "To the pure all things are pure," is sometimes wrongly interpreted. It is equally true that to the impure nothing is felt as impure. It is only purity that feels the burning horror of the impure. Thomas Hobbes said, "*Adeo sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem*"

recidunt.” It is only differences that are perceived. Those who live within the roar of Niagara are said to be unconscious of its presence. If they leave it, then they feel the difference. So is it true of the tumult of sin. They who live in the very midst of it, yielding to it and living according to it, are unconscious of its presence. The more perfect a man is, the more does he feel the fact of sin, the more fully does he realize its destructive power.

And that sin cannot be escaped by turning one’s back on it and trying to forget its presence. In no such way can righteousness be won. Sin cannot be bounded spatially. No man can say, Sin is there and I am here, free from its presence. To run away from it is to be partaker of it. The more perfect a man is, the more fully must he feel the fact of sin, the more fully must he feel his duty and responsibility concerning it. There is no righteousness but missionary righteousness. A selfish righteousness is a contradiction in terms. To flee to the desert and there to seek righteousness is to turn one’s back on the only road in which righteousness can be won. The righteousness of the righteous man can be found only in relation to the sin of the world.

There are two ideals of righteousness in the New Testament. The one is the Pharisaic ideal. The word “Pharisee” means “separatist.” The Pharisaic righteousness was to be won by separation from all that was sinful. Righteousness was conceived of almost as a quantum, a certain amount of it in the world, and not enough to go around. “The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours” might well have been the Pharisaic motto. The more righteousness a man had, the more was he separate from those who did not have that righteousness. Sin was conceived of almost in spatial terms. I can escape it by getting away from it. It can exist there without affecting me here. That Pharisaic ideal led to an iso-

lated self-culture, to the seeking of righteousness in selfish seclusion.

The other ideal is that of the righteousness of Christ. His righteousness drives him into contact with the sinful world. In him the sin-consciousness was at its highest point, and just for that reason he was the friend of publicans and sinners. Simon the Pharisee said of him, "This man, if he were a prophet, would have perceived who and what manner of woman this is which toucheth him, that she is a sinner." But he knew her sin far better than Simon did. And because he knew it, therefore he suffered her to touch him. His life must come into contact with sin, whatever its depth and vileness. His own purity could be maintained only if it became a purifying power to the world. St. Paul in almost paradoxical form sums up the secret of the righteousness of Christ, when he says that him who knew no sin God made to be sin on our behalf. His very perfection can be won only by making himself to be sin for others. The absolute righteousness of his life demands the deepest contact with the sin of the world. That righteousness can be maintained only as it is a saving power against sin.

Hence his temptation. His temptation was to seek some other ideal of righteousness than that which could be won through the saving and cleansing contact with sin, a contact which should be at once the means of cleansing others and the only way in which his own life could be kept clean. When the Pharisee heard the cry "Unclean," he kept himself aloof. But Jesus touched alike the physical and the moral leper. His own cleanliness could be preserved only by touching the life of the unclean. Because he knew no sin he must indeed be made sin for us. What must that fact have meant to him whose inner life was perfectly pure, who felt the horror of sin most deeply because of his own perfection? Yet that very repulsion from sin drove him into contact with it. He

must meet it with all its consequences. He must treat it as though it were his own. Only by giving himself for others could his own righteousness be won. Must he not often have echoed the wish of the Psalmist, "Oh that I had wings like a dove! Then would I fly away and be at rest"? But not so can he do his task and win his righteousness. His wearied feet must walk through the crowded streets, until finally they tread the way of the cross.

The upbuilding of that perfect righteousness must have meant a struggle against sin far keener than we can know. The higher the righteousness, the more intense the struggle, the stronger the temptation to flee from contact with sin and to win righteousness in seclusion. Perfection is tempted more than imperfection, for it makes its own temptation. Only perfection can know the horror of the contact with sin, the contact without which perfection itself cannot be attained. The righteous Christ must bear others' burdens, until, making them his own, he conquers in the fight for his own righteousness and for the righteousness of the world.

The conflict between these two ideals of righteousness is the conflict between two ideals of what it is to be the Christ. As the Christ, Jesus is called to be the founder of the kingdom of God. What is that kingdom and what are the forces by which it is to be established? They are not physical forces. To command that stones be made bread, to trust in the divine power for support against material downfall, to bow the knee to Satan in compromise, these seem to be the way of strength. But not so is the Christ called to walk. He must tread the path that leads to human failure, he must walk the way of the cross. The leader of the twelve brings before him the temptation of his life: "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall never be unto thee. But he turned and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art a stumbling block

unto me; for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men." The divine way is the way of sacrificing love, of identity with human weakness and sin. And that way must be trod in faith. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me! nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." The divine way is the way of self-sacrificing righteousness, the way that to man's judgment seems so weak. And that way ends in the cross, a human failure and a divine victory. Therein is the Christ made perfect through suffering, therein does he win his own perfect righteousness. And that perfect righteousness achieved in sacrifice becomes the creative source of a new world. "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." The kingdom of God is established, and the law of that kingdom is self-sacrificing love.

The person of Jesus will always be infinitely deeper than we can understand. But this much we know. In him we see God manifested in human life. If we are sure that God is thus truly manifested, we shall not be afraid to see the Man. We shall see him in the limitations of his knowledge and in the struggles of his will. Only thus does the divine enter the human. In those limitations and in that struggle "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." In those limitations we see the victory of faith, in that struggle we see the perfect righteousness. In him who "advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men" we see the presence and the power of the Incarnate Life.

PENSIONS FOR THE CLERGY

WILLIAM LAWRENCE

BOSTON

The conditions of modern life and the demands for efficiency are pressing the question of salaried workers and wage earners. Salaries and wages are not large enough to enable them to lay up sufficient money for old age. Efficiency demands early retirement from the most active fields of service; division of labor and expert work offer few new openings for those who have passed middle life; the children have not wages or salaries large enough to support their aged parents; adequate life insurance is too expensive for most. The community as a whole must keep its members from suffering and starvation. Hence the demand for retiring- or old-age pensions, under systems whereby all the people in their active days pay taxes for the support of a part of the people in their old age.

Whether the systems be of the state, of a corporation, of a university, or of a Church, the principles are much the same. I mention a few.

Pensions are not charity. They are an extension of the salary or wage beyond the working years. The distribution of the cost of pensions may be varied. The final result is that the cost falls on a large number of people, most of whom in their turn will be benefited directly or indirectly by the system; for in the last resort society as a whole cannot let people starve, and therefore must in some way meet the cost of food and support of the helpless aged. The pension system is one way, and with increasing frequency is felt to be the best way to meet the situation.

Pensions are costly; more costly than most people, even those who are supporting and passing bills for the pensioning of teachers, policemen, and other public servants, yet realize. The bankruptcy of a number of pension systems shows this.

If a man earns his living and supports his family for forty years, and then with his aged wife comes upon a pension system for ten years, that last term involves one-fifth of their whole mature life expenditure; and the payment of pensions to persons disabled for life in early manhood is very costly. Hence the state, great corporations, colleges, and the Churches face a great problem. The science of pensions is yet in its infancy. Besides the necessity of pensions and their costliness, a few other lessons have been learned.

Except for a small and fixed or slowly increasing constituency, the capitalization of pensions is out of the question. The Carnegie Foundation for the pensioning of college teachers, limited to a small and select constituency, has already been obliged to have its capital enlarged, and its fixed charges are steadily increasing. When one considers the pensioning of several thousand persons of an increasing constituency, such as the school-teachers of a state, the ministers of a denomination, the capitalization of a safe system would run into scores and hundreds of millions of dollars. Pensions must be raised as salaries are raised—from the annual incomes of the constituencies.

A pension system to be safe and successful must be compulsory. Voluntary systems have thus far been confined to very limited amounts of aid, and most of them have some charity endowment behind them. It is one of the singular freaks of human nature that men and women who approve highly of voluntary systems for pensions do not go into them or else do not stay in them long. Only compulsion or contract holds them.

The assurance of a living pension in old age gives buoyancy and confidence to the worker during his active years. Herein is the secret of efficiency. The worker works without anxiety for the future support of himself and wife; he can retire from work when his strength is waning, and thus enable an active man to take his post and sustain the efficiency of the work. How many an aged pastor today is disintegrating the parish which his active years have built up! The people, children of his pastorate, cannot honorably turn him out to suffer. They are unable to pension him and at the same time pay an active rector. He realizes and regrets the situation; it cuts him to the quick: so do the people. With fineness of character on both sides, the years may wear on with quiet dignity until his death. Sometimes the strain is too great, and through the fault of no one, only the lack of a pension system, the loving pastorate of a generation ends in disaster to pastor and people.

Again, it is clear that any pension system, to be safe, must be based upon a broad basis of actuarial study and figures. A corporation, a state, or a Church cannot guess what amount it must lay aside this year in order to meet the pension liabilities twenty-five years hence. A multitude of questions and conditions enters in—the average duration of life of those in that particular constituency, their age of entrance into active service, their age of retirement, their chances of early disability, their ratio of increase in numbers, etc., etc.

Averages can be calculated only upon the basis of a knowledge of hundreds, better thousands, of persons in the same sort of constituency. For instance, the fact that clergymen live longer than persons of most other callings adds heavily to the cost of their pensions. How much longer? How much greater cost? Only a skilled pension actuary can tell after exhaustive study of large numbers.

What about the pensioning of Clergy? Is it advisable? Is it possible? The Protestant Churches are committed to the liberty of their ministers to marry. We believe heartily that this is best for the Church and the people. The Churches are therefore committed to such a support of the clergy with their families as will enable them to work with efficiency and buoyancy. The question may well be asked as to whether the salaries of most of the clergy today are not so limited as to hamper seriously their efficiency. A pastor who puts several hours a day into family cares, household details, and petty economies, who cannot buy books, is not, unless he be an exceptional man, as efficient as if he had an adequate salary. Laymen have a direct interest in this. Meagre salaries mean inefficient service. Small salaries of able and faithful men involve wasteful business. The Churches must, if the clergy are to do more efficient work, give thought and energy to the invention and development of measures leading to the increase of active salaries. Deeper spiritual life, finer spiritual enthusiasm, and better business methods, are needed for this. One great step towards this increase, the most practical step at this time, is a pension system whereby, although the immediate salary is not enlarged, the minister escapes the necessity of saving for old age and also does better work in his relief from anxiety, while the parish gains better results and is not in danger of being burdened with an aged pastor unable to do his work. The laity too are relieved from perpetual calls upon their charity in behalf of the aged clergy and their families. Whether the Churches will be able to create such a system or systems is a problem now before us. The need is great; the practical difficulties are great; we shall gain nothing by blinking at them.

The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to the study of the subject by sketching a system which is being placed before the Protestant Episcopal Church.

The principles of the system were approved by the General Convention of that Church last autumn. The subject is now before the several dioceses for their consideration, as to whether they are willing, and, if willing, are able financially to enter the system. Upon their response in the next year or two rests the answer to the question as to whether the system will be carried through.

In approving this system the Church has risen to the determination that it is neither fair nor economical for the parishes to pay mere living salaries to the clergy during their years of active service, and then throw them and their families upon charity. The support of the clergy means and involves their support until death, and, even beyond their death, the continuation of support to widows and minor children.

The way to accomplish this is not to ask of each parish the impossible task of paying its rector a salary large enough to enable him to save sufficient capital for old age and for his widow and orphans, but to ask each parish or missionary board while it is paying the active living salary to pay also into a central pension fund a certain amount, a certain percentage on the salary, which, placed at compound interest, will later pay the pension of the rector when he retires or is disabled, and will pension also the widow and minor children.

Such a system demands for its safety and success exact and scientific actuarial work and a strong and responsible organization. As to the first, answers to a carefully prepared questionnaire including all essential questions have been received from ninety-eight per cent of the 5,600 clergy. These answers, having been codified and classified by an expert, have been given to an expert pension actuary with other information and the proposed rules of the service. When his findings have been received, the authorities of the Pension Fund will be in a position to notify the parishes as to the exact

cost to each one of the pension system. The proposed pensioners will include all the clergy who are in church-work. A minister who is a professor in a college, for instance, would look to other sources for pay and pension.

As to organization, trustees elected by the General Convention have been incorporated in New York as the Church Pension Fund, and have opened an office in Wall Street, New York, for preliminary study and work. In that office will be kept up to date from month to month a record of every clergyman of the Church, his age, position, salary, etc.; for as every clergyman is canonically connected with some diocese, these data can always be known and every change immediately recorded.

In theory the central office will keep in connection with every parish and clergyman. In practice the central office will work through the authorities of the diocese to the parishes and clergy, this being simpler and placing responsibility upon the diocese.

Each year each diocese will hear from the Church Pension Fund what amount—a ratio based on the salaries and other conditions of the clergy in that diocese that year—it must pay into the Church Pension Fund treasury in order to insure the full pensions of its clergy; and the various parishes will be assessed their proportionate amount. If a diocese does not pay its assessment on any given year, the clergy resident in that diocese in that particular year will upon retirement have deducted from their pension the proportionate sum with interest lacking on that year; for if no money for that year has been on compound interest, there is no money to pay out.

The Church Pension Fund is not a charitable institution; it does not pretend to give something for nothing. It is a holding company, which, basing its work on scientific and actuarial study, pays out with interest

what it takes in, and the amount so realized will be sufficient to meet its obligations as they come through the retirement, disability, or death, of the clergy.

Until the final actuarial results have been made up, the precise figures cannot be given; but from an approximate calculation based upon answers from seventy-five per cent of the clergy, the following results can be estimated. If the Church through the parishes and other organizations pays out to the clergy each year in salaries nine millions of dollars (rectories being valued for rent at fifteen per cent of the salary), the parishes and organizations should also pay through their dioceses into the Church Pension Fund an amount equal to seven per cent of the salaries, or \$560,000. This would insure the following pensions: Upon retirement at the age of sixty-eight, a clergyman ordained at the usual age and in active service will receive from the central Church Pension Fund an amount equal to half his average life salary. Those ordained later will receive proportionately less. The system however departs from scientific exactness in assuring a minimum pension of \$600 and a maximum pension of \$2,000. That is, there will be a slight loading on the parishes paying large salaries for the benefit of the whole body, but the extreme cases are so few that the loading will be very slight. The age of sixty-eight may be thought high; but each year added increases greatly the resources of the Fund. Moreover, a disability-clause which promises a pension equal to forty per cent of the last salary enables a man to retire, if necessary, at any age. To the widow of a clergyman is promised an annuity equal to one-half of the pension her husband would have been entitled to during marriage, with a minimum of \$300. To each minor orphan child under seven is promised an annuity of \$100; to each child between seven and fourteen, \$200; for each dependent minor over fourteen, \$300. The widow's burden is thus lightened

according to the number of her children, and their education is considered. These statements and figures are in the rough, and are of course subject to modification by rules according to varied conditions. This proposed system is now before the dioceses for their consideration. The difficulties are great and should be frankly stated and met.

I. The pension system is costly. Can the Church as represented in dioceses and parishes afford it? That is for them to say. Without the system, the clergy, their widows and orphans, will continue to be dependent upon the chances of charity, and will be held up to society, as they often are now, as piteously needful and appealing for help. No calling, not even of the ministry, can retain the respect of the people while standing in the role of a pauper.

Without the system, the laity will be subject to continual calls for contributions, of the wisdom of whose distribution they can have no knowledge. The system once started, no appeals will again be necessary. Without a pension system, the ministry will be liable to fall behind other high callings in efficiency.

II. In this explanation I have thus far omitted to mention the tremendous problem of accrued liabilities. What are they? Suppose a clergyman ordained at twenty-eight is now fifty-eight and the pension system is starting. For the next ten years, until his retirement at sixty-eight, the money will flow into the treasury for his pension. When, however, he comes to receive his pension, there will be in the treasury only the amount with interest that has been paid in for ten years. Where is the money that should have been paid in for his first thirty years of service? It is not in the treasury but in the pockets of the laity, who, because the system was not started thirty years ago, have not been called upon to pay. This sum, the liability of those thirty years,

is the "accrued liability"; and it takes only a moment's thought to appreciate what an enormous sum that would be in a body of 5,600 clergy. Perhaps thirty or forty millions of dollars. It is the neglect to consider or provide for the accrued liabilities and the happy optimism that things will all come out right somehow, that has been the undoing of a number of pension systems, and that will lead others within a few years into bankruptcy.

The Church Pension Fund sets the problem of accrued liabilities aside as an entirely separate problem from the active system. The active system could begin and go on without any thought of accrued liabilities. In that case, the pensions of men soon retiring would be almost nothing. Yet "almost nothing" is a little more than they would get without any system. The clergy retiring a few years hence, those retiring twenty and thirty years hence, would receive larger and larger pensions until upon the passing of the present body of clergy, the full system would be running and the full pensions paid. But to ask the churches to increase their fixed charges for clerical support by five or six hundred thousand dollars and at the same time to wait for a generation for the full results, would demand greater patience than could be expected even of the Saints.

The fact is, that with \$3,500,000 in hand to meet to a certain degree the accrued liabilities and the system started, the Church can begin immediately to pay pensions of considerable and steadily increasing amounts, and at the close of a generation with the \$3,500,000 expended, the system will go of itself. In other words, this sum, although exhausted, will have accomplished more than an endowment many times larger could accomplish. It will have started a great and beneficent pension system. With speed once on, the resources and power within will keep the system moving.

The strong hope of the Church Pension Fund is that those laymen of the Church of keenest business insight will see the enormous advantage to the Church, the clergy, and especially the laity, in the immediate creation of a pension system which will pay to a certain degree the accrued liabilities as well as the earned pension.

A sum, say, of \$3,500,000 in the hands of the Church Pension Fund would enable the Church to meet with some adequacy the accrued liabilities, and would commit the Church to a pension system which would afterwards go of itself; which could not run into bankruptcy; which would place the clergy in a dignified position before the public; and which would release the laity from the frequent appeals for help in behalf of the aged clergy and their dependants.

III. A pension system, to succeed in holding its full constituency, must be in some sort compulsory. How can a Church make a condition of compulsion? I do not see how loosely organized Denominations can. This, it seems to me, is an insuperable difficulty to scientific pension systems in Congregational Denominations. The difficulty is very great even in a more closely knit organization like that of the Episcopal Church. There can be no satisfactory compulsion unless there be real penalties. The money to be paid to the Church Pension Fund is not a contribution or an offering or a response to an apportionment. It is an assessment to be met under agreement; for if the pension is expected, the money or assessment must be paid in order that it may go on interest. It is for the parishes to decide through their dioceses as to whether they will accept or invent some form of penalty which will compel payment or result in the loss of certain privileges. In one or two dioceses where a pension system of the clergy is in action, parishes which have not paid their per-

centage as called for are by canon disfranchised for that year. They lose the privileges of seat and vote in Convention. This does not get the money; their property cannot be sold for taxes; but it brings a strong pressure upon them, probably the strongest the Church can exert. Even that, however, is not such pressure as the state can exert for non-payment of taxes. Whether the parishes of the Church through their dioceses will be able or willing to bring any such pressure or compulsion upon themselves, is a question. Some penalty or form of compulsion there must be.

The point that the Church Pension Fund has to make clear is that this is a business proposition; that it is either a system or nothing. It is a contract or agreement which the parties must be under a compulsion to meet—a compulsion stronger than hope or good intention; under such an obligation as must bring the results. Perhaps some form of penalty or compulsion better than that which I have suggested may be discovered.

The alternative is now before the Episcopal Church;—in the consideration of its aged clergy, their widows and orphans, will it continue in its present condition, detracting from the dignity of the clergy, irritating to the laity, and with the present movements in education and society, liable to keep the Church less and less efficient, endangering its spiritual work and leadership? or will it enter upon a system which will place the clergy and their dependants in a position of far greater buoyancy, cheer, and dignity; which will enable men of weakening powers to give place to those younger and stronger; which will keep our parishes manned with vigor; which will enable every clergyman to feel that wherever he is, in South, West, or East, he has in his old age fair treatment from the Church; which will enable every clergyman during his active service to give himself fully and freely without carking cares and anxiety for the future of himself,

his wife, and his children, to the spiritual work of the Church?

Again I say, this question of the pensions of the clergy is not charity, but efficiency, the spiritual leadership of the Church in the coming years.

In attempting to solve for herself this great problem, the Episcopal Church believes that she is leading the way towards meeting in a thoroughly scientific manner a pressing social question, and that her work will be of great value, not only to other Churches but to great commercial and industrial organizations, to banks, railroads, and factories, even to states and governments.

THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE CROSS OF CHRIST

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

In a recent number of *The Harvard Theological Review*,¹ Professor Douglas Clyde Macintosh of the Yale Divinity School outlines in a very interesting manner the religious system to which he gives his adherence. For "substance of doctrine" (to use a form of speech formerly quite familiar at New Haven) this religious system does not differ markedly from what is usually taught in the circles of the so-called "Liberal Theology." Professor Macintosh has, however, his own way of construing and phrasing the common "Liberal" teaching; and his own way of construing and phrasing it presents a number of features which invite comment. It is tempting to turn aside to enumerate some of these, and perhaps to offer some remarks upon them. As we must make a selection, however, it seems best to confine ourselves to what appears on the face of it to be the most remarkable thing in Professor Macintosh's representations. This is his disposition to retain for his religious system the historical name of Christianity, although it utterly repudiates the cross of Christ, and in fact feels itself (in case of need) quite able to get along without even the person of Christ. A "new Christianity," he is willing, to be sure, to allow that it is—a "new Christianity for which the world is waiting"; and as such he is perhaps something more than willing to separate it from what he varyingly speaks of as "the older Chris-

¹ VII, 1 (January 1914), pp. 16-46.

tianity," "actual Christianity," "historic Christianity," "actual, historical Christianity." He strenuously claims for it, nevertheless, the right to call itself by the name of "Christianity."

It is, no doubt, a kind of tribute to Christianity—this clinging to its name to designate a religious system which retains so little of what that name has heretofore been used to express. Clearly, the name "Christianity" has become an honorable one under its old connotation, and has acquired secondary implications which do it credit. Mr. G. K. Chesterton has lately called our attention in his serio-comic way to the extent to which such secondary implications have attached themselves to it in the speech of the common people. The apple-women and charwomen, the draymen and dustmen, it seems, are accustomed to employ it in a sense of which we can only say that it lies somewhere between "sane" and "civilized"; which "signifies that which is human, normal, social, and self-respecting." "Where can I get Christian food?" "Where can I find a Christian bed?" These are natural forms of popular speech with which we are all familiar. And, adds Mr. Chesterton, when the modern idealist puts away wine and war and dons peasants' clothes in imitation of Tolstoy, and parts his hair in the middle as he has seen it parted in paintings of Christ, the democracy will most likely pass its scornful judgment on him by simply demanding, "Why can't he dress like a Christian?" By some such immanent logic "Christianity" has apparently come to mean to Professor Macintosh, "rational," "ethical"; and we can observe him, when wishing to express his vigorous rejection of "a particular theory of redemption"—this "particular theory of redemption" being the Christian doctrine of the Atoning Sacrifice of Christ—merely declaring of it roundly that it is "not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover

essentially unchristian because opposed to the principles of sound morality."²

We certainly feel no impulse to deny that whatever is Christian is rational and moral. And we are profoundly interested in such indications as are supplied by the form of Professor Macintosh's declaration, that the general mind has been so thoroughly imbued with this fact that men instinctively reason on the subaudition that when we say "Christian," we say "rational," "moral." But surely it cannot be necessary to point out that we may not determine the contents of a historical system after this fashion. Shall we deal so with Buddhism or Mohammedanism or Mormonism, with Romanism or Calvinism or the new "Liberalism"? If we find doctrines taught by these systems repugnant to reason and morality, we (so far) reject these systems. We do not forthwith declare that these (alleged) irrational and immoral doctrines can therefore have no place in these systems. We can deal differently with Christianity only on the assumption that Christianity is through and through and in all its parts in complete accordance with right reason and sound morality. The assumption is, no doubt, accordant with fact. But we are not entitled to make it prior to examination. And the first step in this examination cannot be taken until the contents of Christianity have been ascertained.

To argue that a doctrine is not Christian because it is not reasonable or moral, in a word, is to argue in a manifestly vicious circle. It is to confuse the historical question, What is Christianity? with the rational question, What is true? And it can result in nothing other than replacing historical Christianity by a "rational" system of our own, or, to phrase it in Mr. Chesterton's language, in "turning the Christians into

² P. 18. Cf. p. 35, where this judgment is repeated: "being irrational, it cannot be of the essence of Christianity"; not being "rigidly moral," "it must be pronounced essentially unchristian."

a new sect, with new doctrines hitherto unknown to Christendom." Nietzsche, Mr. Chesterton reminds us, insisted that there never was but one Christian, and He was crucified; the improvement now offered, Mr. Chesterton hints, may consist in suggesting that perhaps even that single Christian was not a "Christian." Certainly, the "Christianity" which is constructed on the principle, not that it consists in the religion founded by Jesus Christ and practised ever since by His followers, taught of Him, but that it shall contain only what commends itself to our ideas of "reason" and accords with our ideas of "morality" runs a considerable risk of becoming a Christianity which stands out of all relation to Christ and to whatever has heretofore passed for Christianity. It offers us, in point of fact, merely a Rationalistic system—taking the term in its broader historical and not in its narrow philosophical significance.

Clearly, Christianity being a historical religion, its content can be determined only on historical grounds. The matter scarcely requires arguing; and we may be permitted, perhaps, at this point to content ourselves with simply referring to the very lucid statement of its elements made by H. H. Wendt in the opening pages of his *System of Christian Doctrine*, as also in an earlier pamphlet devoted to the subject. "The Christian religion," remarks Wendt with admirable point³—

"is a historically given religion. We cannot by an ideal construction or by deduction from a general notion of religion, determine what constitutes its genuine essence. We must rather seek to determine this essence by such an objective historical examination as we should give it were we dealing with the determination of the essence of some other historical religion."

Again⁴:

"In a scientific presentation of Christian doctrine, as we have already seen, one side of its criticism and positive justification must

³ Die Norm des echten Christentums, 1893, p. 3; cf. p. 23.

⁴ System der christlichen Lehre, I, 1906, pp. 23-24; cf. pp. 3 ff., 42 ff.

be directed to the proof that the doctrine presented is also genuinely Christian doctrine. How is this proof to be made? The recognition of the fact that Christianity is an entity which is historically given, and is not to be ideally constructed, is of fundamental importance for answering this question. . . . The question of the genuine Christianity of the Christian doctrine to be presented is, as a matter of principle, not to be confused with the question of the truth and the value of this doctrine. From our incidental conviction of the truth and indispensableness of Christianity there easily arises the assumption that a religious conception, if it is true and valuable, must also be genuinely Christian. But from the scientific standpoint it is self-evident that it must first be proved what conceptions are genuinely Christian, and only then the truth of these Christian conceptions be tested. Even when a capacity for ever-advancing development is recognized for Christianity and for Christian doctrine, the question of the authentic Christianity of any conception presented as Christian remains at bottom a historical one. For the question of what constitutes the ground-type of Christianity and of Christian doctrine, by which it is to be determined whether anything can still pass as Christian or not, is just as certainly to be answered historically as, for example, the question of what belongs to the ground-type of the Buddhist religion and doctrine."

There is really no mystery about the matter. The process by which it is determined what is a truly Christian doctrine (something very different from what is a true Christian doctrine), or what the Christian religion really is, differs in principle in no respect from the process by which we determine what is an old Hellenic doctrine or what Ritschlism really teaches, what is the nature of Islam or what is the essence of the Pragmatic philosophy. In the very nature of the case such questions are purely historical and purely objective in their character, and the answers to them are not in the least advanced by any judgments we may pass upon the rationality or morality of the several doctrines or systems which come under our survey.

The justification which Professor Macintosh offers for permitting his subjective judgments of rationality and

ethical value to intrude into the determination of the purely objective question of "What is Christianity?" he draws from a theory, which he very earnestly advocates, of the proper method of procedure in determining "the essence" of "any historical *quantum*." This theory might well have been derived, by the simple process of transferring it to historical quantities, from the metaphysical doctrine of "essence" propounded of late by our Pragmatic philosophers. Out of the general Pragmatic doctrine that "reality must be defined in terms of experience"⁶—or, as even more sharply expressed, that "reality is experience"⁶—these thinkers have evolved the notion that the "essence" of anything is not what it is, but what it is, not merely to but for me; not that which makes the thing precisely the thing it is, but that in the thing, whatever it may be, which I find needful for the realization of a purpose of my own. "The essence of a thing," says William James,⁷ "is that one of its properties which is so important for my interest that, in comparison with it, I may neglect the rest." Applying this astonishing doctrine to historical entities, and especially to Christianity, which is the historical entity in which at the moment he is interested, Professor Macintosh feels able to argue that the essence of Christianity is not that in Christianity which makes it the particular thing which we call Christianity, but that in Christianity which he finds it desirable to preserve in constructing what he considers the ideal religion. Since the essence, as he tells us with the emphasis of italics, "is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose*," and the right purpose is, of course, the realization of the true ideal, the essence of the Christian religion is necessarily "that in the totality of the religious phe-

⁶ John Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. x.

⁶ F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, p. 463.

⁷ *The Principles of Psychology*, 1906, II, p. 333; *Text-Book of Psychology*, 1898, p. 337.

nomena of Christianity which is a necessary factor in the realization of the true ideal for humanity, and of the true ideal for human religion in particular"; or, varying the language slightly without altering the sense, "whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular."

The odd thing is that Professor Macintosh does not betray any consciousness of the outstanding fact that, in the process of his reasoning, he has transmuted the question which he started out to discuss, namely, What is essential to the retention of Christianity? into the fundamentally different one, in which he is himself perhaps more deeply interested, of What in Christianity is it essential that we retain?—namely in order that we may build up "the ideal religion. Unless we judge it to be still odder that he does not seem to have considered what would be the effect of the application of this method of determining the essence of a religious system to other religions besides Christianity—although he expressly presents it broadly as the proper method of determining "the essence of the Christian religion, or, for that matter, the essence of any historical *quantum*." If the discovery "in the totality of the religious phenomena of Christianity" of something which we judge "necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular" justifies our calling that particular thing the "essence of Christianity" and ourselves, on the strength of our retention of it, "Christians"; would not the discovery of such an element in "the totality of the religious phenomena" of, say, Mormonism, equally justify us in declaring that element the "essence" of Mormonism and ourselves Mormons on the strength of our retention of it in our ideal religion? And surely we cannot doubt that

Mormonism does possess in its composite system, however deeply buried beneath its own *bizarceries*, some truly religious and even some truly Christian elements—from which, indeed, we may believe, it derives whatever vitality it exhibits as a religious system; and certainly we cannot avoid retaining these elements as we build up our ideal religion. Or, if we seem to go too far afield in adducing Mormonism as an example, let us think for a moment of that active Christian sect known as the Seventh-Day Adventists. Undoubtedly, in the “totality of the religious phenomena” exhibited in the life of the members of this sect, there are many elements which must abide in any ideal system of religion. Do these elements therefore constitute the “essence” of Seventh-Day Adventism? And does our retention of them in our ideal construction justify our calling ourselves Seventh-Day Adventists?

It may not be an unpleasing thought to Professor Macintosh that, discerning something of value in each of the great religious movements which have stirred the waters of humanity, and preserving for the purposes of his ideal religion all that he sees in them of value, he may conceive himself to have therefore embraced “the essence” of each of them in turn, and to have thus acquired the right to claim for himself the name of every one of them. It may please him thus to think of himself as at once a Fetishist and a Shamanist, a Brahmanist and a Buddhist, a Confucian and a Mussulman, as well as a Jew and a Christian; perhaps also at once a Romanist and a Protestant, a Pelagian and an Augustinian, an Arminian and a Calvinist—for surely there is *something* of permanent value even in Calvinism, and if so, that is its “essence,” and he who holds to the “essence” of Calvinism is surely a Calvinist. We have no wish to deny that Professor Macintosh’s claim upon the one name may be as sound

as upon another. But we confess to a doubt of the value of so diffused a claim upon names representing movements historically so distinct. And we confess to something more than a doubt of the validity of the method of determining "the essence" of historical entities which may lead to results so very embarrassing.

It must be admitted that the notion of "essence" has not always been dealt with lucidly by the metaphysicians. Cicero, indeed, who introduced the term into the Latin language, defined it very sensibly as "the whole of that by which a thing is, and is what it is"—a definition happily echoed in Locke's "the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is." And that essentially this remains the meaning of the term until today in general philosophical usage, we may be assured by Rudolf Eisler's definition of it. "*Essence (ousia, essentia)*," says he,⁸ "is, ontologically speaking, that which constitutes the reality (*Selbst-Sein*) of a thing, its most proper, abiding nature, in distinction from its time-and-space-conditioned, changeable existence." Even an activist like the late Borden P. Bowne⁹ without hesitation speaks in the same sense of "essence" as just "the nature of a thing": "We believe that everything is what it is because of its nature, and that things differ because they have different natures. . . . The nature of a thing expresses the thing's real essence; and we hold that we have no true knowledge of the thing until we grasp its nature." To him, of course, as Being is just action, and a thing as conceived just a "conceived formula of action," the essence of a thing consists in a law "which gives both its coexistent and its sequent manifestations." But this concerns only his ontology. Under its guidance he writes:

"Now this rule or law which determines the form and sequence of a thing's activities, represents to our thought the nature of a thing, or

⁸ *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*,³ 1910, p. 1774.

⁹ *Metaphysica*, 1882, pp. 59-60.

expresses its true essence. It is in this law that the definiteness of a thing is to be found; and it is under this general form of a law determining the form and sequence of activity that we must think of the nature of the thing." "In the metaphysical sense, the nature of a thing is that law of activity whereby it is not merely a member of a class, but also, and primarily, itself in distinction from all other things." "When then we speak of the nature of a thing under the form of a law, we regard this law as entirely specific and individual and not as universal. The nature has the form of a law but applies only to the single case."

In one word, to Bowne too, the "essence" means just the specific quality of a thing.

Nevertheless already a half-century ago James McCosh could write of "essence": "It is a very mystical word, and a whole aggregate of foolish speculation has clustered round it."¹⁰ He had perhaps been reading the section on "essence" in Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, without the assistance of William Wallace. "Still," he adds hopefully, "it may have a meaning." Whether he could have spoken so hopefully, had he had the discussions of our Twentieth-century Pragmatists before him, we can only conjecture. Certainly they have done what they could to confuse the matter, and it may be a fair question whether under their definitions the term "essence" retains any meaning at all. What is called its "essence" certainly ceases to have any significance for the object whose "essence" it is said to be; and, being transmuted into merely whatever the changing observer in his changing moods may find from time to time in an object utilizable for his varying purposes, has whatever significance it may retain rather for him than for it. We observe in the mean time that the Pragmatists have great difficulty in carrying their discussions of "essence" through consistently on these lines. The real meaning of the term is continually making itself felt, and advertising to the reader the artificiality of the construction which is being commended to him.

¹⁰ *The Intuitions of the Mind*,² 1869, p. 152.

William James's discussion is particularly instructive in this respect.¹¹ Every object, he explains, has an indefinite number of attributes. But we, being finite, cannot attend to all these attributes at once. We must, by the necessity of the case, make a selection. And we shall inevitably make our selection according to our interests. The attribute to which we attend under the influence of an interest at the moment governing our attention, is not more "essential" to the object than any other attribute to which another observer, led by another interest, or ourselves at another time, governed by another interest, may attend. The object "is really *all* that it is"—a statement which seems to assure us that the essence of an object is "really" all that by virtue of which it is what it is, and that is very much the old definition of "essence." But *we* must "attack it piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness in which the elements of Nature exist, and stringing one after another of them together in a serial way, to suit our little interests as they change from hour to hour." Thus the "essence" of the object may seem to us to be a different attribute at each successive moment. And that leads James to declare with the emphasis of underscoring: "*There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing.* The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion becomes a very unessential feature upon another." This, however, can only mean that there is no single property among the many which belong to the object "really" which is "absolutely," that is to say, always and in every contingency, essential—to us, for our interests and purposes. Our interests change, and with the change of interest the quality of the object to which we attend also changes. This is not to say, of course, that there are no properties of an object which are absolutely, that is indispensably,

¹¹ The Principles of Psychology, 1898, I, pp. 332 ff.

essential—to it, that is to say to the preservation of its integrity as the very thing that it is. That this cannot be said is already made plain when it is declared that the object “is really all that it is.” That little word “really” has confounded all of James’s reasoning. And so he proceeds to tell us that “the elements of Nature exist” “in solid fulness”; and that it is only our partial, piecemeal dealing with them that hides this fact from us from time to time. Things, then, have “really” a “solid fulness” of properties by virtue of which they are objectively what they are; and this fact cannot be altered, though it may be obscured, by our habit—it may be a necessary habit—of attending to this “solid fulness” of elements one by one, and emphasizing each as it may meet a transient (or permanent) interest of our own. What things “really” are—that is what is essential *to them*; what in them meets an interest of ours (transient or permanent)—that is what we find essential *for our* (transient or permanent) purposes.

It is quite proper for James to say, therefore, that those properties which we are accustomed to select out of an object in accordance with “our usual purpose,” “characterize us more than they characterize the thing.” They are, no doubt, properties of the thing, and so far characterize it. But they need not be the particular properties of the thing which are most characteristic of it and form its specific quality. They are only the particular qualities of the thing by virtue of which it is most usually serviceable for us, and which therefore most constantly attract our attention. It is not implied, therefore, that there are no qualities which particularly characterize the thing, make it the thing it is, and so constitute its “essence.” It is only recognized that we do not always, or commonly, select these properties for contemplation. When we are making selections of properties in accordance with our interests, we

rather commonly, or always, select elements in the object which, because they are essential to *our* purposes, characterize *us* rather than the object. It is passing strange, therefore, that James should now go on to define the "*essence of a thing*," as "that one of its properties which is so *important for my interests* that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest." This, he has told us, is not "really" "*the essence of the thing*"; *that* lies elsewhere, and *this* is only the element in the thing which is essential to *my purpose*—which surely is a very different matter; unless, indeed, our particular purpose at the moment happens to be to determine what the "*essence of the thing*" is, in which case we may perhaps select out the particular properties which, constituting the essence of the thing, meet also our present purpose.

It is, of course, the Pragmatic point of view which, intruding here so many years before its formal announcement, forces this logical saltation upon James. From this point of view, he despises all questions of "*inner essence*"¹² as mere hair-splitting abstractions, and insists that "we carve out everything" "to suit our human purposes."¹³ Accordingly he suddenly asserts here, without any justification in the preceding discussion, that "the only meaning of essence is teleological." A thing *is* just what it is good for, and, let us add, just what it is good for to me—and now. He has given us no reason, however, to believe that this is the case. He has only given us reason to believe that our interest in things is apt to be focussed on whatever we find serviceable to us, for the moment or permanently. That this is not all that the things are, however, he tells us himself, when he tells us not only that "the properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour" in accordance with the purposes which dominate observation, but in express words that "the reality

¹² Cf. Pragmatism, 1907, p. 107.

¹³ Pragmatism, pp. 251 ff.

overflows these purposes at every pore." Surely it cannot be pretended that the properties which constitute the "concrete fact" "vary from man to man and from hour to hour," and are never more than what meets our purposes, which the reality that they constitute "overflows at every pore." And surely it is legitimate to inquire what then these properties are which enter into and constitute this "concrete fact," from the richness of which men may select what suits their purposes from time to time, but which in its richness "overflows" these purposes "at every pore." On the face of it this is the problem of "the essence" of the "concrete fact" in question.

Except that it seems to show a somewhat more formal respect for objectivity, F. C. S. Schiller's definition of "essence"¹⁴ does not differ essentially from James's. He speaks, of course, from his activistic standpoint, to which "the activity is the substance; a thing *is* only in so far as it is active." "So it is the activity," he explains, "which *makes* both the 'essence' and the 'accidents,' both of which are as it were 'precipitated' from the same process of active functioning." "'The essence,'" therefore, he proceeds, "is merely such aspects of the whole behavior as are selected from among the rest by reason either of their relative permanence or of their importance for our purposes." He is recognizing nothing but activities. Some of these "activities" are "relatively" more permanent than others. Some of them are more important for us than others. We are to call either the one or the other of these sets of "activities" the "essence" of the object under consideration. Which? The former give us an objective criterion; the latter, a subjective one. Both are activities; but the latter only are conceived Pragmatically. If the latter be employed as our criterion, we are fully on William

¹⁴ *Humanism* (1903),² 1912, p. 225.

James's ground. If the former, we seem to be as fully off of it; we seem to be allowing that the "essence" of a thing is what makes it persistently (at least "relatively") the thing that it is, not what we discover in it serviceable to us—which is what we shall have if the latter criterion be employed.

How the two criteria—objective and subjective—can be conciliated, does not appear. Schiller does indeed tell us that they "are, of course, convergent." And he explains this by remarking that "a permanent aspect is naturally one which it is important for us to take into account, while an important aspect is naturally one which we try to render permanent." We shall have to take his word for both declaration and explanation. An aspect taken into account because it is permanent is surely one selected on grounds relative to the object; it tells us what the object itself is, or, if we prefer that mode of statement, how the object itself behaves. And an aspect taken into account because it is important for us (we assume that it is not significant that the "for us" has dropped out of the second clause) is one selected on grounds relative to us, to "our purposes"; it tells us what we find in the object (or its behavior) which is serviceable to us. How these two criteria can be said to "converge" passes our comprehension—unless indeed we are to think circularly as well as activistically, and conceive that motions in diametrically opposite directions will meet—on the other side of the circle. It must be admitted that Schiller's statement is not free from suggestions of such a circular movement. If an aspect of the behavior of an object under our contemplation is to be held "important for us" because it is permanent, one would think that its observed permanence would precede our interest and determine it; and that, in such a case, we could scarcely say that the "essence" of the object, identified with this permanent aspect of its

behavior, is determined by our interest. And yet we are immediately told that we can render permanent an aspect of the behavior of such an object in which we chance to be interested; or at least that we may try to do so, presumably hopefully. One would like to know how he is to go about trying to make permanent an aspect of the behavior of an object under his observation; and if we can render an aspect of it permanent because it is important for us that it should be so, why cannot we create this aspect for ourselves in the first instance, that it may serve our purposes?

We may take it that Schiller's disjunctive is merely another illustration of the difficulty of carrying out the programme of the subjectivation of the "essence," and that it therefore bears witness only to the fact that the "essence" of an object cannot really be conceived merely as that in it which is essential for me—which is of importance for my purposes—but will continue to present itself as that in the object which is essential for it—which is necessary to its integrity, to its remaining the precise thing it is. That is to say, those aspects of the whole behavior of an object which are permanent constitute its "essence," and that quite independently of their "importance for us." It is important, of course, that we should take cognizance of them and adjust our behavior to them, for they constitute reality, that actual environment upon which we react. Hardness, for example, does not enter into the essence of a stone-wall because it serves an interest of ours and can be made serviceable to us. It enters into its essence because it is "there," quite independently of its serving an interest of ours; and it is important for us to recognize that it is "there" because the recognition of realities serves interests of ours, and realities have a very unpleasant fashion of revenging themselves on those who do not recognize them. It is the hardness of the stone-wall

which determines our interests, not our interests which determine its hardness; and it would be very difficult to understand how we should go about rendering its hardness permanent, because we found it important for us. We may discover many good reasons on the other hand, why it would be well for us to render permanent our recognition that a stone-wall is hard. The assumption of an "external world" which ordinary experience makes, as Schiller himself allows, "works splendidly."¹⁵

It is upon some such flimsy philosophical basis that Professor Macintosh, transferring the matter to the sphere of historical entities, develops his method of determining the "essence" of historical movements. It must be allowed that, in applying to this new class of objects the principles laid down by the metaphysicians, he proceeds with a consistency which fairly puts the metaphysicians to the blush. He is seeking what he indifferently speaks of as a valid "definition," "the real nature," the "essence" of the Christian religion. In order to obtain this, he lays down with great firmness and with the emphasis of italics the general proposition that "the essence," that is, the essence of any "historical *quantum*," "is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose*." The "unrelieved subjectivity" of this proposition is obvious, and he seeks to mitigate it, but only by insisting that "the controlling purpose" which is to determine the essence of an object "must be the right purpose in the given situation." He explains this to mean that it must be "the purpose to realize what under the circumstances is the true ideal." Thus we obtain what he regards as two "normative principles" which it is necessary to observe in extracting "the essence" from any historical entity. They are: "in the first place, the essence must be in the total actuality"; "and in the second place, the

¹⁵ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 459.

controlling purpose must be the right purpose." "In short," we read (again in the emphasis of italics), "*the essence is whatever is both present in the actual and demanded by the ideal.*"

Why the essence of any historical entity must be something found not only in it but also in our ideal, is not made clear to us, and we profess ourselves unable to divine. We appear only to be given a formula by means of which we may get rid of the historical entity and substitute for it our own ideal; we are to recognize as the essence of the historical entity nothing that we do not find in our ideal. Shall Protestant investigators then declare that the essence of Romanism must be identified with what is common to Romanism and their ideals? Or Rationalistic investigators declare that the essence of Protestantism is what is common to Protestantism and their ideals? In that case Romanism is merely defined as really Protestantism, and Protestantism as really Rationalism. The matter is not relieved by the expedient taken to guard against error. "To guarantee that what is taken as essential is the real essence," we read, "what is taken as the ideal must be the true ideal." What is to guarantee that what is taken as the ideal is the true ideal, we are not told here, but afterwards it is intimated that "what this true ideal is, must be determined by a critical philosophy of values," which leaves us in great concern to know whose "critical philosophy of values" is to have this decisive function committed to it.

A third normative principle is now, however, invoked. What is under these rules extracted as the essence of any historical entity must, we are told, "be able to maintain itself after it has been selected and separated from all that is unessential"—that is, we infer, from all that to the investigator seeking the "true ideal" seems harmful to that ideal. Accordingly, "in addition

to being the highest common factor of the actual and the ideal, *the essence must be vital enough to persist in separation from all that must be eliminated.*" "The essence of the actual, then"—we reach now the final summing up—"is that element in the actual whose continued existence is demanded by the true ideal, and which can retain its actuality and vitality after the elimination of all objectionable elements from the actual at the demand of that same ideal."

The process of extracting the essence of any historical entity which is commended to us by Professor Macintosh is now before us. It is in brief the following. First, by "a critical philosophy of values," determine independently for yourself what is the true ideal. Next, go to the historical entity in question with this "true ideal" in your hand, and select from this historical entity whatever seems to you fitted to promote the "true ideal." This is "the essence" of that historical entity—provided only that when you discard all in it which is not in your judgment fitted to promote your "true ideal," enough is left to call the essence of anything. If not enough is left, then say that that entity has no "good essence" and discard it *in toto*. Clearly, in this process, the historical entity is nothing; our ideal is everything. We have simply sunk the historical entity in our ideal; and it almost has the look of a concession that it is still allowed that what is called its essence shall actually be found in the historical entity.

Applying this method of extracting the essence of historical entities to the Christian religion, Professor Macintosh has naturally no difficulty in moulding Christianity to his own taste. He tells us that the result reached is that "the Christian religion" "must be in essence whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in par-

ticular." Obviously, then, the contents of "the Christian religion" are not determined by the contents of "actual phenomenal Christianity"—and by this must be understood not merely the Christianity which happens to be actual at any one moment, but any and all Christianity which has ever been actual in the course of its entire history—but by the contents of "the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular." The "true ideal" of religion—that is, of course, the investigator's ideal of what religion ought to be, determined, no doubt, by his "critical philosophy of values"—is thus simply substituted for Christianity, and given its name. The only connection which this ideal can claim with "actual phenomenal Christianity"—that is, any Christianity which has ever actually existed—will be dependent on the presence in "actual phenomenal Christianity" of elements which are in harmony with it and may, therefore, be preserved. Whatever in "actual phenomenal Christianity" agrees with "the true ideal" of religion is preserved; the rest is discarded; and the total ideal religion,—inclusive, of course, of the elements thus "taken over" from "actual phenomenal religion" because already present in the ideal religion, and also, of course, of all else that is contained in the ideal religion which was not present in "actual phenomenal Christianity,"—receives the name of "the Christian religion." The process is exceedingly simple. "Our religion" is certainly Christianity, because *real* Christianity is, of course, just "our religion." Everything else in "actual phenomenal Christianity" is to be discarded because it is not included in "our religion."

The particular religion to which, under the name of "the ideal religion," Professor Macintosh reduces Christianity by this process, proves, as has been already intimated, to be indistinguishable from that which is generally professed in the circles of so-called "Libera

Christianity." How he arrives at the conviction that this is "the ideal religion" and therefore essential Christianity, he does not fully explain to us. It emerges as such in his pages as the culmination of an exposition of the fundamentally moral character of Christianity as he conceives it—a moral character attributed to his "Christianity" because it is an element "common to actual Christianity and to ideal religion." If we understand Professor Macintosh at this point, he defines Christianity on this ground as the "religion of moral redemption," and then distinguishes it from other religions of moral redemption by the particular quality of the morality of which the redemption wrought by it consists. Christianity, he says, "is the religion whose 'miracle' or 'revelation' consists in the experience of *moral* 'salvation' or 'redemption.'"¹⁶ To the objection that "a moral element is to be found in other historical religions also," he seems to reply that this need not invalidate the claim of Christianity to be the moral religion by way of eminence—if, that is, the quality of the morality brought by it to its votaries may be shown to be superior to that offered by other moral religions. This he affirms to be the fact, and he fixes on the term "Christlike" to express the specific quality of specifically Christian morality. Accumulating emphasis upon this quality he declares, then, that "Christianity is the religion of deliverance from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike attitude towards a Christlike superhuman reality." Repeating this with further elaboration, he declares again: "There is good ground to suppose, then, we take it, that redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality and ultimately to a Christlike fellowship with God, accomplished in the life of men by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christ-

¹⁶ The echoes of Rudolf Eucken's language may be noted, but we do not stop to advert to the matter.

like dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual, is the essence of the Christian religion."

It is important to observe that these statements contain much more than was prepared for by the preceding argument. We have travelled very rapidly and very far and have arrived very unexpectedly at a very definite dogmatic result. Not only is the character of the morality involved in the Christian "redemption" defined as "Christlike" without sufficient justification or even explanation, so that we get a particular standard of morality, and one, be it observed, quite external to the subjects of religion, and wholly dependent on the truth of history for its validity and its very meaning. But we also have a particular manner—and that a very astonishing manner—in which the moral revolution asserted to take place in the subjects of the Christian religion, is wrought, made, without any, we do not say merely justification, but preparation in the preceding discussion, a part of the definition of that religion. It is wrought, we are now suddenly told, "through a Christlike attitude towards a Christlike superhuman reality"; "by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christlike dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual." The essence of the Christian religion is thus made to consist not merely in the fact that it brings a moral redemption, and not merely in the specific character of the morality which it brings, but still further in the particular manner in which this moral redemption is produced. We do not stop now to press the question of what is involved with respect to the relation of Christianity to the historic Christ in the definition of this morality—and everything else significantly Christian—as "Christlike." We merely ask the warrant for the particular manner in which the moral revolution which is declared to be the essence of Christianity is asserted to be accomplished. Professor

Macintosh gives us none. At a later point, it is true, we are told that this is involved in "the essence of the Christian gospel," and that this is derived from "the religious example of Jesus." "The Christian evangel," we read, "is the gospel of the power of God manifesting itself in a Christlike morality on condition of the cultivation of a life of Christlike religious devotion. It is the gospel of the universal possibility of redemption as a human religious experience, through following the religious example of Jesus, taking the attitude of sonship towards the 'God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.'" We have difficulty, however, in accepting mere repetition as justification. And we observe that Professor Macintosh can only profess in any case to be "practically certain" that the attitude here declared to be of the essence of Christianity on the ground that it was the attitude of Jesus, was really "the religious attitude of Jesus"; and indeed contends strenuously that it is not absolutely necessary for the validation of his "Christianity," thus made to hang entirely on the example of Jesus, that there ever should have been any Jesus to set this example. Nor have we discovered any reason given by him justifying the belief that if there was a Jesus and this was His attitude to God, it is capable of being imitated by us; or indeed whether, if it were imitable by us, it would have the effects asserted for it. The upshot of it all is merely that it is dogmatically declared to us, with no reasons rendered, that the ordinary "Liberal" construction of Christianity is the only true Christianity, and its fundamental postulates constitute "the essence of Christianity." On the face of it this declaration rests on nothing more solid than that the ordinary "Liberal" construction of Christianity seems to Professor Macintosh the "ideal religion," and it pleases him to call what he thinks the "ideal religion," "Christianity."

Even Adolf Harnack did better than that. It is quite true, as Alfred Loisy points out,¹⁷ that Harnack does not speak really as a historian but as a dogmatician, in those brilliant lectures in which he advocates his personal religious opinions¹⁸ under the name of "the essence of Christianity," and which, Ernst Troeltsch tells us,¹⁹ have become "to a certain degree the Symbolical Book of all those who follow the historical tendency in theology." But he had at least the grace to profess to derive his idea of what Christianity is from historical Christianity, and his argument at least formally runs, that this and nothing else is the essence of the Christianity which was launched into the world by Jesus and has been lived by His followers. He tells us accordingly²⁰ that it is "a purely historical question" which he undertakes, and that therefore it is to be dealt with absolutely objectively; we are simply to ask what Christianity is without regard to what "position the individual who examines it may take up in regard to it, or whether in his own life he values it or not." His historical point of view is so marked, indeed, that he even declares that though we must start from "Jesus Christ and His Gospel," it is impossible to get "a complete answer to the question, What is Christianity?" "so long as we are restricted to Jesus Christ's teaching alone"; we must look upon Him merely as the root out of which the tree of Christianity has grown. "We cannot form any right estimate of the Christian religion unless we

¹⁷ *L'Évangile et l'Église*,³ 1904, p. ix: "The definition of Christianity according to Harnack—is it that of a historian or only that of a theologian who takes in history what suits his theology? The theory which is expounded in the lectures on *The Essence of Christianity* is the same as that which dominates the learned *History of Dogmas* which the same author has published. But has he really deduced it from history, or has he rather only interpreted history according to the theory?"

¹⁸ Loisy, p. v, justly calls the *Wesen des Christentums*, "a profession of personal faith in the form of a historical sketch."

¹⁹ *Die Christliche Welt*, xvii (1903), 19, p. 444.

²⁰ *Das Wesen des Christentums*, 1900, 56–60 thousand, 1901, Lect. 1. E. T., *What is Christianity?* 1901, pp. 7, 8, 10, 11, 15.

take our stand on a comprehensive induction which shall cover all the facts of its history." "What is common to all the forms it has taken, corrected by reference to the Gospel, and, conversely, the chief features of the Gospel corrected by reference to history, will, we may be allowed to hope, bring us to the kernel of the matter."

We could not easily have fairer historical professions. The pity is that Harnack's actual procedure corresponds so ill with them. He certainly does not approach his task in a purely historical spirit. He brings with him to the investigation of the teaching of Jesus, for example, a whole body of presuppositions, under the influence of which he forces his material into preconceived moulds. And he certainly does not derive his conception of Christianity from an induction from its entire phenomenal manifestation; he simply makes his reconstructed version of Jesus' Christianity the sole Christianity which he will recognize. Troeltsch²¹ accordingly is compelled to pronounce Harnack's critics right when they declare that "his *Wesen* is no purely empirical-inductive work, but includes in it strong religio-philosophical preconceptions by which it is deeply influenced"; nor can he deny that Harnack treats the gospel of Jesus alone as the essence of Christianity and "works up the details of Jesus' preaching into an idea of Christianity, which he then merely illustrates from the later history of the Church, partly by pointing to departures from it, partly by emphasizing what is consonant with it in further developments."²² What Harnack invites us to do is thus in point of fact merely to recognize as "the essence of Christianity" the "religion of Jesus" as he has reconstructed it under the influence of his own naturalistic

²¹ As cited, p. 486 f.

²² Cf. W. Sanday's remarks, *An Examination of Harnack's What is Christianity?* 1901, pp. 16 ff.: "And yet in spite of these explicit promises, the criterion that Harnack really proposes throughout his book is his own mutilated version of the teaching of Jesus."

postulates. Before we can follow him we must be assured that what he presents as such was really "the religion of Jesus," and that "the religion of Jesus," in his sense of that phrase, is really Christianity. We do not need to adopt Loisy's standpoint to perceive the justice of his criticisms at these points. And surely a remark like this cuts to the bottom:

"If what is desired is to determine historically the essence of the gospel, the canons of a sound criticism do not permit us to resolve in advance to consider as unessential what we are now inclined to think uncertain or unacceptable. What is essential to the gospel of Jesus is what holds the first and the most considerable place in His authentic teaching, the ideas for which He strove and for which He died, not that merely which we believe to be still vital today. . . . In order to determine the essence of Islam we shall not take, in the teaching of the Prophet and in the Mussulman tradition, what we may consider true and fertile, but what was actually of most importance to Mahomet and his followers, in point of belief, ethics, and worship. Otherwise with a little good will we might discover that the essence of the Koran is the same as that of the Gospels—faith in the clement and merciful God."²³

It is interesting and not uninteresting to observe in passing the diametrical opposition of the methods by which Harnack and Loisy, each, seek to extract the essence of Christianity. If Harnack, having reconstructed from the evangelical narratives a Jesus to fit his naturalistic presuppositions, sees in this reconstructed Jesus at once the entirety of Christianity and will allow nothing to enter into its essence but what he finds in Him, Loisy perceives in the Jesus to which he looks back through the stretches of history only the germ out of which his Christianity has expanded. It is Harnack, it is true, who writes²⁴:

"Just as we cannot obtain a complete knowledge of a tree without regarding not only its root and its stem but also its bark, its

²³ As cited, pp. xiv ff.

²⁴ As cited, p. 11.

branches, and the way in which it blooms, so we cannot form any right estimate of the Christian religion unless we take our stand upon a comprehensive induction that shall cover all the facts of its history."

But it is not Harnack's but Loisy's method which this figure suggests. "Why," demands Loisy²⁵—

"Why ought the essence of the tree be thought to be contained in a single particle of the germ from which it has proceeded, and why will it not be just as truly and more perfectly realized in the tree as in the seed? Is the process of assimilation by which it makes its growth to be regarded as a change in the essence, virtually contained in the germ; or is it not rather the indispensable condition of its existence, of its preservation, of its advance in a life always the same and incessantly renewed?"

Harnack, he contends,²⁶

"does not conceive of Christianity as a seed which has grown—first a potential plant, then an actual plant, identical with itself from the beginning of its evolution to the present moment, and from its root to the tip of its trunk; but as a ripe, or rather, a decayed, nut which must be shelled if its incorruptible kernel is to be reached. And Harnack tears off the shell with so much perseverance that the question arises whether anything will remain at the end!"

Perhaps with a little idealization, we may represent to ourselves the fundamental ideas embodied in the divergent views as involving essentially some such conceptions as the following. Harnack wishes to see the essence of Christianity in what is constant in the entire history of the Church, and just on that account seeks it in the primitive beginnings of Christianity—in those primitive beginnings, no doubt, as reconstructed by him on the basis of his postulates. He therefore makes primitive Christianity, the Christianity of Jesus Himself (as he reconstructs it), the standard of all Christianity; that alone is Christianity which is to be found in the preach-

²⁵ As cited, p. xxvi.

²⁶ As cited, pp. xxix, xxx.

ing of Jesus. Loisy wishes to view Christianity as a constant development, as finding its reality not in its germ but in its full growth. The gospel of Jesus is merely to him the root of the Church; the Church is the living development of the gospel; the essence of Christianity is its historical evolution, which in every part is the necessary outcome of the complex of circumstances in which it lives.²⁷

When he lays aside figures and speaks plainly, Loisy, it is true, finds difficulty in maintaining himself at these high levels. At one point, indeed, he seems to work rather with the ordinary logical conception of "essence" in his mind, according to which "it denotes the common quality or qualities which are found in all the members of a class."²⁸ He makes in effect a genus of Christianity by cutting it up into periods; and, extracting the characteristic quality of each period in turn, he compares these together and concludes that what is common to all is the essence of Christianity and what is peculiar to each is the differentiation of each period.²⁹ No doubt there may be obtained thus a conception of what has persisted through all ages of Christian history; and this may, in a sense, be called "common Christianity." But what will be the result, if perchance Christianity has become apostate in any one age and has recovered itself ("come to itself" like the Prodigal Son) only after a period of general corruption? Obviously, at the best, such a method must confound "the essence of Christianity" with the minimum of Christianity, and presents no great advantage in this respect over that thoroughly misleading method of determining what is essential to Christianity, dear to the hearts of all "indifferentists," which

²⁷ Cf. Troeltsch, as cited, p. 445.

²⁸ McCosh, as cited, p. 152.

²⁹ As cited, p. xv: "If common traits have been conserved and developed from the origin until our day in the Church, these are the traits which constitute the essence of Christianity. At least the historian cannot recognize any others; he has no right to apply any other method than that which he applies to any other religion."

seeks it in what is common to all those who in any age "profess and call themselves Christians"—extension through space taking here the place of Loisy's extension through time. What is common to all who call themselves Christians, whether as extended through time or space, is, of course, just the minimum of Christianity; otherwise those forms of professed Christianity or those periods of Christian history in which only the minimum of Christianity is or has been confessed would be excluded. The "essence of Christianity" and the minimum of Christianity are not, however, synonymous expressions. If choice were confined to these two, it would be better to follow Loisy in his ecclesiastical evolutionism and discover the essence of Christianity in the maximum of Christianity, in Christianity in its fullest growth and vigor.

The evolutionism of Loisy is reproduced in Ernst Troeltsch, though of course with all the involved temperamental and environmental differences.³⁰ Troeltsch bids us³¹ keep in mind that the conception involved in the phrase "the essence of Christianity" is historically inseparably wrapped up with the modern critical evolutionary point of view. The Romanist, he says, does not speak of "the essence of Christianity," but of the faith of the Church, and distinguishes only between the complete knowledge of that faith which is expected of the clergy and the less explicit knowledge of it which may be tolerated in the laity. Nor would old orthodox Protestantism have used the phrase. It would have said, "the revelation of the Bible," and have distinguished only between fundamental and non-fundamental articles. Even for the Enlightenment, the phrase would

³⁰ Six articles entitled "Was heist 'Wesen des Christentums,'" published in *Die Christliche Welt*, xvii (1903), Nos. 19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29. These articles have been reprinted in Troeltsch's *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 1913, pp. 386-451, but we cite from the articles.

³¹ P. 483.

have had no significance. It spoke with Locke of "the reasonableness of Christianity" and rationalized the Bible, making the post-Apostolic Church responsible for all untenable dogmas. It is with Chateaubriand and his *Génie du Christianisme* that the notion first emerges into sight; that is to say, it is a product of Romanticism. And it is to the German Idealists and especially to the Hegelians that we owe its development. By it is not meant Christianity as a whole—this is external appearance—but that which unfolds itself in the phenomena of Christianity, "the idea and power" which has dominated Christianity through all its history and determined its varied phenomenal forms. It is "the internal spiritual unity" which binds all these phenomenal forms together and which can be reached only by a process of historical abstraction. Serving himself heir to the Hegelians (with the necessary corrections),³² Troeltsch accordingly looks upon Christianity as, like other great coherent complexes of historical occurrences, the development of an idea which effloresces progressively, incorporating into itself and adapting to its uses all alien material which lies in its path. The isolation of this idea to thought is, in his view, the discovery of the essence of Christianity. The essence of Christianity is, therefore, an abstract notion by means of which the whole body of the phenomena which constitute Christian history is reduced to unity and explained.

It must not be imagined, however, that this wonderful informing idea which is to be distilled from phenomenal Christianity can, in the opinion of Troeltsch, "be simply abstracted from the whole course and the totality of the manifestations of Christianity in its historical development." A distinction, it is asserted, must be drawn between the phenomena which express the essence and those in which it is suppressed.³³ The historical

³² P. 484.

³³ P. 534.

forms must be subjected to a criticism according "to the ideal which informs the chief tendency."³⁴ This ideal may most conveniently be discovered, Troeltsch thinks, in the classical expression of Christianity in its origins.³⁵ But even there distinctions must be drawn. The primitive age must not be assumed to be a perfectly unitary complex. We must ask, What in the primitive age contains what is really classic? No doubt we shall find this in the figure and preaching of Jesus. But we must not forget that the figure and preaching of Jesus must be reconstructed. And for this reconstruction we need something more than the Synoptic Gospels. We need Paul and John, and more. "We do not find our foundation in the historical Christ, the Christ after the flesh, but in the spirit of Christ, which was disengaged by the destruction of the earthly manifestation in death."³⁶ The "words of Christ" are not Christianity; rather faith in Christ and the spirit which proceeds from this faith and operates in the community—this is Christianity. This spirit, however, did not exhaust its efficiency in the Pauline and Johannine Gospels; the totality of the Christian development is involved. In its elements continually present themselves, which were, no doubt, present in the primitive age, and in the light of the later development may be recognized as having been present in it, but which certainly only manifest themselves later and in particular circumstances. "We must recognize them as contained in the essence of Christianity and as important for the determination of that essence; we must look upon them as effects of the spirit of Christ: but we do not find them expressed in the primitive form in itself alone, and indeed cannot even directly attribute them to it."³⁷ So clear is it that we cannot derive the essence of Christianity exclusively from its primitive form; this essence "cannot be an

³⁴ P. 535.³⁵ P. 578-9.³⁶ P. 580.³⁷ P. 581.

unchangeable idea which is given once for all in the teaching of Jesus." Rather—

"the essence must be a somewhat which contains in itself energy and mobility, productive power of continuous reproduction. It can certainly not be denoted by a word or a doctrine, but only by an idea which includes in itself from the first mobility and fulness of life; *it must be a self-developing spiritual principle*, a 'germinative principle' or a seed-thought, as Caird has it, a historical idea in Ranke's sense, that is, not a metaphysical or dogmatic conception, but a spiritual force which contains in itself a life-aim and a life-value, and which unfolds in its consistency and power of adaptation."³⁸

The continuity—the unity binding the multiplicity of forms together—is, Troeltsch admits, no doubt, difficult to trace. It cannot lie simply in the preaching of Jesus, as persisting in all forms of Christianity as their basal element; nor yet in an abstract, generic idea common to all varieties of Christianity. It does not consist in any formulated conception, but in a spiritual power embracing in itself many ideas. Nor are we done with it when we are done with historical Christianity. In determining the essence of Christianity we must take in present Christianity as well as past Christianity; yes, and future Christianity too—if we believe in any future for Christianity. Thus from an abstraction, the essence of Christianity becomes an ideal.³⁹ We cannot avoid transforming it thus if we stand in any vital relation to Christianity. We study its history that we may learn from it. What we thus learn must be applied to the present, and must be projected also into the future. Thus the "divinatorial imagination" of abstraction necessarily passes into that "prognosticational imagination" which presages the further unfolding of the basal idea.

"Determination of essence is modification of essence. It is the extraction of the essential idea of Christianity from history in such

³⁸ P. 581.

³⁹ P. 651.

a fashion that it shall illuminate the future; and at the same time a vital survey of the present and the future world together in this light. The repeated determination of the essence is the repeated historical reorganization of Christianity. This can be avoided by none who seeks the essence of Christianity in a purely historical manner, and at the same time believes in the progressive power of the essence. Only those can take a different course who look upon Christianity as an outworn and transcended historical organism or who understand Christianity from an exclusively supernatural revelation in the Bible."⁴⁰

This apparently means that Troeltsch is aware that in the process of extracting "the essence" of Christianity from its phenomenal manifestation, he is moulding it to his own ideals, and that he considers this natural to one in his position—one, that is, who looks upon Christianity as a growth and yet is concerned for its continuance in the world. We find him a little later, accordingly, speaking not merely of "the essential elements of Christianity" but rather of "the abiding and essential elements of Christianity." The notions of "abidingness" and "essentialness" have, however, in themselves nothing in common; and we only confuse ourselves, when we are seeking to discover the essence of Christianity, if we insist that what we find "essential" must be what we consider will be "abiding." We are here very near to employing the term "essential" again in the sense of "essential to us."

Troeltsch does not glose the essentially subjective character of the method of determining the essence of Christianity which he proposes, nor does he fail to perceive the danger which accompanies it of passing, without observing it, beyond the limits of Christianity into a new religion only loosely connected with Christianity.⁴¹ These things, he says, simply must be recognized and faced. Then he continues⁴²:

"These remarks show our attitude towards one of the strongest assaults made of late years upon the Christianity of the essence of

⁴⁰ P. 654.

⁴¹ P. 682.

⁴² P. 682-3.

Christianity, as Harnack and his friends understand it. Eduard von Hartmann, who already somewhat earlier called the so-called Liberal theology the self-decomposition of Protestantism, will not permit the left-wing Ritschlians—therefore, above all, Harnack and those of like mind with him—to pass any longer as Christians. Their essence of Christianity is, he intimates, the abandonment of Christianity; and their Christianity is a self-deception due to their training and sentiment. What they maintain to be Christianity is their modern religious conviction, which has only a loose connection with the real spirit of Christianity, and which clings all the more anxiously to a few accidental historical supports. The proof which Hartmann offers of this view is as instructive for the whole question of the essence of Christianity as for the question of the maintenance of its continuity. For him, in a purely historical sense, the essence of Christianity lies in the conception of God-manhood; and he explains this conception in a Pantheistic sense of the unity of the Divine and human spirits; and declares it the great idea of Christianity, which only needs to be separated from the myth of the incarnation of God in Jesus, and to be freed from all theistic-personal traits in the idea of God, to be able to enrich the religion of the future. That means, however, very clearly that Hartmann too will recognize as essence only what has in his eyes a relatively abiding importance; with him too the essential is what is valuable for the future, as he understands it. But because this abiding element can obtain for him its full further significance only by elimination of essential conceptions of historical Christianity, the revelation-significance of Jesus and the personality of God, therefore Christianity, despite it, is for him in its entirety a transcended epoch, and those are already fallen out of the continuity of Christianity who do not make the conception of God-manhood central, but by giving it an externally historical connection with some words of Jesus persuade themselves that an ethical Deism, without significance either for itself or for the future, is the essence of Christianity."

The question raised here, says Troeltsch, cannot be argued; the difference lies in the point of view. But the reader will scarcely be able to agree that a mere strong counter-assertion on the part of Troeltsch and his friends that they know themselves to possess a better objective-historical conception of Christianity than Hart-

mann, and to preserve with it a personal religious continuity precisely in what is essential to it, is a sufficient refutation of Hartmann's strictures. Their "Christianity" is confessedly not the Christianity of the past; as Troeltsch elsewhere acknowledges,⁴³ it is not the vital Christianity of the present; and it can become the "Christianity" of the future (as he also allows)⁴⁴ only if Christianity may suffer a sea-change into something possibly richer, but assuredly exceedingly strange—and yet remain Christianity. Whether it can perform this feat is the real question of "the essence of Christianity" as expounded by Troeltsch.

It is, of course, precisely Troeltsch's evolutionism which commends his presentation of "the essence" of Christianity to our evolution-obsessed generation. And a purer evolutionist than he, Edward Caird,⁴⁵ reminds us in more direct language that "evolution in human history includes revolution." If we are to distort (as Caird does) Tertullian's *anima naturaliter Christiana* into a prophetic pronouncement that what we call Christianity is the natural production of the human soul, as man struggles slowly towards the "consciousness of himself and of his relation to God," there is no reason why we should not understand that this so-called Christianity, as it reacts on its changing environment, takes on many forms and passes through many phases, connected only as the successive, though varying, expressions of the "growing idea of humanity." And there is no reason why these phases, as they succeed one another, should not advance by a zig-zag motion, which may often seem (and indeed be) retrogression, or should not sometimes even bring con-

⁴³ Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben, 1911; cf. Harvard Theological Review, V, 4 (October 1912), p. 459.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Troeltsch speaks of the change which Christianity has passed through in the hands of those who think with him as a "transformation."

⁴⁵ Article, "Christianity and the Historical Christ," in The New World, VI, xxi (March 1897), p. 10.

tiguous phases into a relation of direct opposition to one another; Caird tells us that the condition of development "is rebellion against the immediate past." Only, then, let it be distinctly understood, Christianity has lost all content. It is no longer a religion, but religion, finding its expression through varied forms: and the forms through which it finds its expression, whether of thought or of sentiment or of practice, are indifferent to it, so only the underlying religious impulse is there. It is only natural, therefore, that Jean Réville, for example, in endeavoring to tell us what "Liberal Protestantism" is—he might just as well have said "Liberal Christianity," he tells us himself—takes much this line.⁴⁶ It is not to be denied, of course, that there is a sense in which it may very properly be said that the essence of all religious movements is just religion. It is this primal instinct of human nature which gives its vitality to every form of religion from Fetishism up to—well just short, let us say, of the religions of revelation, if it be allowed that there is such a thing as revelation. Here we have the thing which all religions have in common, and by virtue of which they live in the world. We may abstract everything else from each of them in turn, and, leaving to each only the pure religious impulse and its products, may plausibly maintain that in this we have "the essence" of every religion which has ever existed or which can ever exist. Only, in that case, it is clear, we must allow that there never has been and never will be at bottom more than one religion. The "essence" of Christianity, so conceived, and the "essence" of Fetishism are the same; and we may, on the ground of holding

⁴⁶ Liberal Christianity, E. T. 1903, p. xi; cf. p. 200: "The profession of faith of Liberal Protestantism or of Liberal Christianity—for these two names are interchangeable—is wholly summed up in the single precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul and thy neighbor as thyself." It does not trouble itself, however, as to who or what this God is which its 'single precept' requires it to love" (pp. 64, 76, 120, 194).

to its "essence" call ourselves with equal right by either name. In holding the "essence" of one, we hold the "essence" of all. It was under the influence of some such conception that the late Auguste Sabatier lost himself in rapture over what he seemed to himself to see, in the way of real unity in the midst of apparent diversity, in any average congregation of "Christian" worshippers. There is the aged woman who has no other conception of God than the white-bearded old man with eyes like coals of fire she has seen in the pictures in the big Bible on the parlor-table. And there is the young collegian imbued with a pure Deism by his philosophical course at the university. And there is the disciple of Kant who holds that all positive ideas of God are contradictory and who can allow of God only that He is the Unknowable. And there is the proud Hegelian who knows all about God, and knows Him to be the All. Moved by a common piety all these bow down together and adore. I do not know, says Sabatier, if there is a spectacle on earth which is more like heaven!⁴⁷

From such a standpoint, the cry Back to Christ! can have, as Caird does not fail to remind us, little meaning. The adjective "Christian" is employed to describe the movement which goes by this name only because that particular movement of religious development is supposed, in point of fact, to have taken its temporal beginning in Christ, or to have reached in the rise of Christianity a decisive—or at least an important—stage of its development, or merely perhaps to have received from Christ or from the rise of Christianity some impulse, more or less notable, the memory of which is preserved in the name by which it thus is accidentally designated.

⁴⁷ Discours sur l'Évolution des Dogmes, pp. 21-22; cf. the comment on it by H. Bois, *De la Connaissance Religieuse*, 1894, pp. 35 ff. Also Jean Réville, *Liberal Christianity*, E. T. pp. 61 ff.: "You may hold doctrines most dissimilar and even irreconcilable concerning the essence of God and God's government of the world, and yet be equally good and faithful disciples of Christ."

It is in any case an illusion to suppose that we can find in Christ "the true form" of the movement which is thus more or less loosely connected with His name; that would be, Caird suggests, "seeking the living among the dead."⁴⁸ If we speak of Him as the "seed" out of which the "plant" of Christianity has grown, we are merely using tropical language which very easily may be deceptive. We may imagine that "there is an implicit fulness in the seed which is not completely repeated in any subsequent stage in the life of the plant"; but then we must allow that this fulness in the seed is very "implicit" indeed; and we should not do amiss to bear in mind that "we can know what is in the germ only by seeing how it manifests itself in the plant." We must, in plain words, interpret Christ from Christianity, not Christianity from Christ. It strikes the reader with a sense of unreality, therefore, when writers like Troeltsch, committed to an evolutionary view of Christianity, are found laying great stress on primitive Christianity and particularly on the personality and teaching of Jesus. No sooner does Troeltsch establish the "classical" place of primitive Christianity and especially of Jesus for the interpretation of Christianity, to be sure, than he forthwith sets himself to unravelling the coil in which he has thus involved himself. We do not say he succeeds in unravelling it. But that only shows that his evolutionary conception of Christianity is not only inconsistent with the significance he has established for Jesus as not merely the germ out of which it has grown but its Founder; but, being inconsistent with it, is untenable. We can look upon the stress laid upon primitive Christianity, and on the person and teaching of Jesus, by writers of this class, in a word, only as concessions to undeniable fact; fatal concessions to a fact

⁴⁸ Caird employs the phrase, not directly of the cry Back to Christ! but illustratively of the parallel cry, Back to Kant!

which, when fairly allowed for, refutes their entire point of view. Christianity, clearly, is not a natural evolution of the religious spirit of man, with a more or less accidental connection with the man Jesus; it is a particular religion instituted by Christ and given once for all its specific content by His authority.

The manner in which Troeltsch establishes the "classical" significance of "the person and preaching of Jesus" for the determination of the "essence" of Christianity, is meanwhile worth observing somewhat more closely on its own account. His acknowledgment of the universal recognition of "primitive Christianity and behind primitive Christianity the person and preaching of Jesus" as bearing this "classical" significance is itself a concession of the highest importance. He is, no doubt, dissatisfied with the manner in which the classical significance of primitive Christianity and the person and preaching of Jesus is ordinarily established, because of the involution in it of, as he explains, "the presuppositions of the popular antique supernaturalism" and because of the position of absolute authority in which it leaves primitive Christianity and Jesus. He desiderates, therefore, a new grounding for the acknowledged fact, a grounding which will invoke and issue in nothing which is unacceptable to "the purely human-historical conception." He explains⁴⁹:

"What is in question is a purely historically grounded significance of primitive Christianity for the determination of the essence. Such an one is, of course, actually at hand in the fullest sense, and is easy to point to. The authentic meaning of a historical phenomenon is contained most strongly and purely in its origins; and if such a statement can apply only in a qualified sense to complicated culture-forms like, say, the Renaissance, it certainly applies without qualification to the prophetic-ethical religions, which receive their entire life from the personalities of their founders, require their adherents constantly to renew their vitality from the primitive sources, and therefore connect their names and essence in the closest way with

⁴⁹ P. 379.

their personalities; it especially applies in an unqualified sense to Christianity, which prescribes to its adherents more rigidly than any other religion the continual nourishment of their religious life from contact with the Founder, and in its Christ-mysticism⁵⁰ has produced a unique phenomenon which corresponds with especial clearness with this circumstance. Accordingly, it is self-evident that the determination of the essence should adhere before all to the primitive period, and look upon it as the classical age."

We may look askance at some of the things that are said in this extract, but one thing emerges with great emphasis. Christianity certainly did not just "grow up"; it was founded. And subsequently to its founding, it has not "run wild," gone off in this or that direction according as some contentless "informing spirit" or "germinal life" within it may have chanced to lead it; it has been held strictly, more strictly than any other religious movement, to its fundamental type, by constant references back to its foundations. For whatever reason, on whatever ground, it has kept a constant check upon itself lest it should depart from type, and has shown an amazing power, after whatever aberrations, continually to return to type. Its eye has been fixed not merely in forward gaze but in backward as well. It has manifested a unique capacity of growth, justifying its Founder's comparison of it to the mustard-seed and to the leaven; but, after all is said as to the transformations it has suffered, its slacknesses, its degenerations, its failures, its growth has lain not in the gradual development of a content for itself, but in the steadily increasing assimilation of its environment to itself. In this respect too it has been like the mustard-seed and the leaven to which its Founder compared it; it has grown at the expense of its environment, not being moulded by it, but moulding it. It has accordingly remained amid its changing surroundings, and through all the forms which it has occasionally taken, essentially the same; and

⁵⁰ On this Christ-mysticism, cf. also J. Réville, as cited, p. 123.

its "nature" is to be ascertained, therefore—like the "nature" of other stable entities—simply by looking at it. "Divinational imagination," and "prognosticational imagination" are all very well in their place, and we have no wish to deny that there is a place for them even in estimating the meaning and movements of Christianity. But observation is the proper instrument for the ascertainment of the nature of stable entities, and in spite of the "varieties of Christianity" in time and in space, it will broadly suffice for the ascertainment of what Christianity is.

It is clear then, and it may be taken as generally acknowledged, that Christianity is not merely a form which religion has spontaneously taken in the course of developing culture, but a specific religion which has been "founded," and the specific content of which has been once for all imposed upon it at its foundation. It is in the strictest sense of the terms, a "positive religion," a "historical religion"; and its content is to be ascertained not by reference to what we may think "the ideal religion," but by reference to the character given it by its Founder. This is the real meaning of a procedure like Harnack's, when, after proposing to determine the nature of Christianity from its total historical manifestation, he really seeks and finds it solely in what he has brought himself to look upon as "the religion of Jesus." His procedure here is not in itself wrong. His fault lies primarily in the critical method by which he ascertains the "religion of Jesus"; or, to speak more exactly, by which he imposes his own ideal of religion upon Jesus as "the religion of Jesus." Thus he is led to present as "the religion of Jesus" a religion which is as different as possible from the actual religion of Jesus, and the result of that is that he completely separates "the religion of Jesus" from the religion which He founded, and is compelled, therefore, to treat Christianity in its entire

historical manifestation as a radical departure from "the religion of Jesus"; or, to put it brusquely, as a religion quite distinct from that which had been introduced into the world by Jesus, although it has usurped its place and name. In these circumstances, naturally, he could not fulfil his promise to present Christianity from "a comprehensive induction that should cover all the facts of its history." He could only present what he had determined to be "the religion of Jesus" as genuine Christianity, and illustrate from the subsequent history the greatness of its departure from the original type, and the occasional efforts which have been made to return more or less fully to it; perhaps also the abiding presence throughout its whole history of a persistent, if vague, apprehension that some such religion lay in the background, until at last at the end of the accumulating centuries, through great throes of labor, the "Liberal" theology has thrown off the superincumbent accretions and recovered the pure gospel; or, at least, recovered it in its essence; for the acknowledgment is inevitable that "the religion of Jesus" in its completeness, just as it lay in His own mind and heart, was His own, belonged to His time and circumstances, and cannot be brought back again, in its completeness, in our day. All we can do is to recover what in it is of "permanent validity."

In thus setting "the religion of Jesus" and historical Christianity over against one another in a relation which can be called nothing less than antipodal (whatever larger or smaller qualifications may be insisted upon) Harnack is speaking, of course, as the representative of the "Liberal" theology in general. It has become the traditional historical postulate of the "Liberal" construction of the early history of Christianity that the "religion of Jesus" was at once overlaid by the "faith of the primitive community", and this in turn by the dogmatic constructions of Paul. Thus Paul emerges to view as "the second

founder" of Christianity, and the Christianity which has propagated itself through the ages is held to derive from him rather than from Jesus.⁵¹ Two deep clefts—between Paul and the primitive community and between the primitive community and Jesus—are imagined to separate historical Christianity from the teaching of Jesus; and across these, we are told, we must somehow find our way if we are to recover the teaching of Jesus, as across them the teaching of Jesus would have had to find its way if it were to determine the development of historical Christianity. It is to this conception of the course of early Christian history that William Wrede gives perhaps somewhat extreme expression when he declares—we avail ourselves of Harnack's words here—that "the second gospel," that is, the teaching of Paul over against "the first gospel," that is, the teaching of Jesus, "is something entirely new, that it, as far as it contains what we call historical Christianity, presents a new religion, in which Jesus Christ Himself has no, or only a most remote, part, and that the Apostle Paul is the founder of this religion."⁵² And it is from this point of sight that Wilhelm Bousset, for example, twits "the orthodox" with "basing the truth of their whole system and the form of their faith on a fantastic mythical-dogmatic interpretation of the life of Jesus by Paul."⁵³

⁵¹ Cf. W. Wrede, *Paul* (1906), E. T. 1907, p. 179 ff.: "It follows then conclusively from all this that Paul is to be regarded as the *second founder of Christianity* . . . for Paul it demonstrably was who first . . . introduced into Christianity the ideas whose influence on its history up to the present time has been deepest and most far-reaching. . . . This second founder of Christianity has even, compared with the first, exercised beyond all doubt the stronger—not the better—influence. . . . Through long stretches of church history . . . he has thrust the greater person whom he meant only to serve utterly into the background." Cf. p. 165 f.: "The name 'disciple of Jesus' has little applicability to Paul, if it is used to denote a historical relation. . . . He stands much further away from Jesus than Jesus Himself stands from the noblest figures of Jewish piety."

⁵² Harnack, *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*, II, 1911, p. 216.

⁵³ Address on "The Significance of the Personality of Jesus Christ for Belief," printed in the *Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress*, 1911, p. 209.

One great difficulty—certainly not the only one nor even the greatest one—which stands in the way of this reading of the course of primitive Christian history, arises from Paul's vigorous repudiation of the honor thrust upon him. He emphatically denies that he is the teacher of a new gospel⁵⁴ and explicitly represents himself as in his teaching but repeating the common gospel of Christ which had been taught from the beginning; and that especially in those very items in which he is declared to be most violently the innovator. To adduce but a single instance—that with which we are at the moment most immediately concerned—Paul, in the most natural way in the world and with a simplicity which confounds every effort to discredit it, declares that he did not invent but received from his predecessors in the teaching of Christ's gospel the great central fact—it is made the head and front of his offending—"that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures," that is to say, the Christian doctrine of atonement in the blood of Jesus.⁵⁵ We may believe, however, that it is rather the insuperable general difficulties which spring at once into sight when an attempt is made to construe Christianity as rather Paulinism—with its involved relegation of Jesus, as Wrede puts it, "utterly into the background" (though He is still inconsequently declared the greater person of the two)—which has caused this construction of primitive Christian history,

⁵⁴ Cf. E. von Dobschütz, TSK, 85 (1912), p. 364: "Paul calls his preaching gospel, the gospel; in conflict with the Judaisers, he vigorously denies that there is any other gospel (Gal. 1⁴, 2 Cor. 11⁴); another gospel exists just as little as there exists another Christ." But Wrede (as cited, p. 166) does not hesitate to say there was another Christ: "The being whose disciple and apostle he wished to be was not actually the historical man, Jesus, but another." This contention indeed lies at the very root of the theory expressed by the phrase "the double gospel" in the New Testament.

⁵⁵ Wrede can only say in a footnote (p. 112, E. T. p. 168), that "it requires a very literal interpretation of Paul's words to make out that what was delivered to him includes 'died for *our* sins'"—a remark which is very naturally cited by von Dobschütz (p. 342, note) with a subaudition of derision.

long dallied with, to begin to crumble just so soon as it has been given clear and unvarnished statement and its logical consequences exhibited. It is not without its significance that a single recent number of a theological journal⁵⁶ contains side by side two articles in which the attempt is made to close up again the yawning gulf that has been opened by the speculations of the "Liberal" theology between Jesus and Paul. The circumstance that the two writers proceed to their common end by precisely opposite methods—the one by denying that Paul was a "Paulinist,"⁵⁷ and the other more reasonably by pointing out that Jesus was Himself very much of a "Paulinist"⁵⁸—only exhibits the more clearly the precise nature of the difficulty which is created by attempting to set Paul in opposition to Jesus and emphasizes the more strongly the intolerableness of the situation induced.

We need not, however, go beyond Harnack himself to learn both the intolerableness and the untenableness of this construction of primitive Christian history. In an address delivered before the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress, held at Berlin in the early days of August 1910, under the title of *The Double Gospel in the New Testament*,⁵⁹ Harnack as decisively as von Dobschütz repels the notion that Paul was the author of a new gospel, and shows as clearly as von Dobschütz that the germ of Paul's teaching is to be found also in that of Jesus, although he still

⁵⁶ Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 85 (1912), Heft 3.

⁵⁷ G. Kittel, *Jesus bei Paulus*, pp. 366-402. By a drastic criticism of the text followed up by an artificial exegesis, Kittel manages to deprive Paul of everything which would markedly separate him from the "Liberal" Jesus.

⁵⁸ E. von Dobschütz, *Gibt es ein doppeltes Evangelium in Neuen Testament?* pp. 331-336. Von Dobschütz's thesis is that "the contrast between Jesus and Paul, as it has been set forth by the newer theology, especially since the publication of the *Volkshücher* of Bousset and Wrede, is possible only when the Gospel of Jesus has been greatly reduced and, on the other side, the traits of the preaching of Paul which lead away from the Gospel of Jesus are strongly emphasized in a one-sided manner" (p. 346).

⁵⁹ *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*, II, 1911, pp. 211-224 (E. T. in the *Proceedings and Papers of the Congress*, 1911, pp. 97-107).

rests rather more than von Dobschütz under the illusion that the gospel of Paul differs from that of Jesus in important particulars.⁶⁰ He therefore speaks of "a double gospel" lying side by side in the teaching of the New Testament writers, and indeed persisting side by side throughout the entire history of the Church. The problem of the origin of what he calls "the second gospel," that is, "the preaching that the Son of God descended from heaven, was known as man, through His death and resurrection brought to believers redemption from sin, death, and devil, and thus realized God's eternal counsel of salvation"—just "Paulinism" in the tradition of the "Liberal" theology—he carries back with complete confidence to the beginnings of the Christian community. He says⁶¹:

"The declaration that Christ 'died for our sins according to the Scriptures' Paul calls a traditional, therefore a universal Christian article of belief of the first rank; and he says the same of the resurrection of Christ. It is accordingly certain that the original apostles and the Jerusalem community shared this belief and doctrine. This is also attested by the first chapters of the Book of Acts, the trustworthiness of which in this respect is incontestable. The problem must therefore be carried back chronologically from Paul to Jesus' first disciples. They already preached the atoning death (*Sühnetod*) and resurrection of Christ. If they preached them, however, they also of course recognized them as the principle articles, therefore as 'the gospel' in the gospel, and this is evident in point of fact in the oldest written Gospel which we possess, that is, in that of Mark. The whole work of Mark is so disposed and composed that death and resurrection appear as the aim of the entire presentation. Mark may certainly have been influenced by the Pauline preaching; but the same structure has been given to the Palestinian Gospel of Matthew too; it will not have been new then to the Palestinian Christians."

⁶⁰ Therefore von Dobschütz (p. 364) notes: "I must accordingly, however, repel also Harnack's formula of the 'double gospel' which is found in the New Testament, however much I approve of its purpose to bring the apostolic preaching again to its rights. I think that Paul and the others would have one and all protested against it; they were not conscious of any difference and would have acknowledged none."

⁶¹ P. 216 (E. T. p. 101).

If Harnack's eyes are still so far holden, that he does not yet see that what Paul found in the primitive disciples they in turn found in Jesus Himself, he is still able to go a certain distance towards the recognition of this great fact also. We find him saying⁶²:

"Jesus' proclamation comes so far into consideration here as He preached not only the necessity and actuality of forgiveness of sins, but undoubtedly placed His Person and His Work in relation to it. He not only laid claim to the power to forgive sins, but at the celebration of the Last Supper He brought His death into connection with the deliverance of souls. This may indeed be disputed, but this much is at any rate certain, that attachment to His Person, that is, discipleship, was His own provision. He, however, who attached himself to Him must have found and known Him as somehow 'the Way' to the Father and to all the benefits of the Kingdom ('Come unto me')."

Why these utterances of Harnack's should have aroused the wide-spread interest which they have is a little difficult to understand. Not only do they seem very much a matter of course—and Harnack himself reminds us that they have always been common property (not even Strauss, says he, disputed them, and Baur fully acknowledged them)⁶³—but he had himself years ago set them in a clear light and partly in even more suggestive form, in his lectures on *The Essence of Christianity*. "If we also consider," says he there,⁶⁴ "that Jesus Himself described His death as a service which He was rendering to many, and that by a solemn act He instituted a lasting memorial of it—I see no reason to doubt the fact—we can understand how this death and the shame of the cross were bound to take the central place." He even calls attention there to that very significant fact, that the death of Christ, being looked upon as a sacrifice—as it confessedly was by His very earliest disciples—"put an end to all blood-sacrifices";⁶⁵

⁶² P. 218 (E. T. p. 103).

⁶³ *What is Christianity?* p. 156.

⁶⁴ P. 160.

⁶⁵ Pp. 156 ff.

surely not (as Harnack inconsequently suggests)⁶⁶ because it showed that blood-sacrifices were in themselves meaningless (it was itself looked upon as a blood-sacrifice), but because (as is implied in Harnack's own words) this was to Jesus' followers the only true blood-sacrifice and left no room for any other. "This death," he is impelled himself to write,⁶⁷ "had the value of a sacrificial death; for otherwise it would not have possessed the power to penetrate into that inner world out of which blood-sacrifices have issued"—which surely is as much as to say, with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that it actually cleansed the consciences of men while other sacrifices did not avail to cleanse them, that it satisfied the demands of the uneasy consciences of those who were suffering under a sense of their guilt.

That there is something still lacking in these acknowledgments is of course true. Something of what is lacking is supplied by von Dobschütz's somewhat more hearty recognition of the saving value which Jesus Himself attached to His death.⁶⁸ That He looked upon His death, not as an untoward accident befalling Him or as a hard necessity breaking off His work but as an instrument for the accomplishment of His mission, von Dobschütz shows with sufficient solidity. And

"We have still three declarations in which Jesus expresses Himself to His disciples—certainly only to them—with respect to the redemptive significance of His death, suggestively, figuratively, yet sufficiently distinctly; I mean the declaration about ministering and giving His life *ἀντὶ πολλῶν* (Mk. 10 ⁴⁵), the declaration about the Body and Blood as symbols of the New Covenant (Mk. 14 ²⁴), and the declaration, transmitted to be sure only in the Fourth Gospel but certainly original, about the hazarding of

⁶⁶ P. 158.

⁶⁷ P. 157 (German ed. p. 99).

⁶⁸ Pp. 352 ff. Harnack is inclined to deny to Jesus the saying recorded in Mk. 10 45, Matt. 20 28, especially its last clause (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1912, xxii, p. 9); of von Dobschütz's three passages, he would allow therefore only one (Mk. 14 24) to be direct evidence of Jesus' teaching.

His life in conflict with the adversary who menaces His people (Jno. 10¹¹); three varying figures, all of which come at last to the recognition by Jesus of His death as necessary for the completion of His work, viz., for uniting men again with God, by an expiation removing the guilt which separated them, overcoming the Evil One, establishing the indissoluble covenant relation predicted by the prophets. I can find no decisive reason for excising these three declarations from the genuine tradition of Jesus. What has been adduced against them proceeds from *a priori* presuppositions which seem to me unjustified, such as that Jesus could not foresee His death, to say nothing of predicting it. Neither His own dismay at Gethsemane, nor the conduct of the disciples, their flight and their despair, gives any justification to such a contention. They remain psychologically thoroughly intelligible, even with respect to the perception and salutariness of His death. And then these declarations are, so to say, necessary for explaining the fact that the Apostolical preaching from the beginning deals with the redemptive significance of Jesus' death as with a settled fact, while yet remaining entirely without clarity as to the 'how' and seeking after varying explanations, all of which, however, ultimately move in directions more intimated than inculcated by these declarations of the Lord."

In order to reach the truth we need only take one step more and frankly recognize that these declarations are central to Jesus' conception of His mission.⁶⁹ And this step we must take not less on account of the declarations themselves (Jesus says expressly that He "came" for the distinct purpose of "giving His life as a ransom for many" and with great explicitness declares the sacrificial character of His death) than on account of numerous other less direct but no less real references to the significance of His mission as redemptive, and in order that the whole subsequent historical development may not be rendered unintelligible (the very disposition of the matter of the Gospels is determined by this presupposition, and the whole preaching of the disciples turns on it as its hinge). No doubt Jesus is

⁶⁹ Compare the discussion of the matter in *The Princeton Theological Review*, XI, 2 (April 1913), pp. 259 ff.

thus implicated in the presentation of Christianity as specifically a redemptive religion; "an appearance is created," to use Paul Wernle's phrase in an analogous connection, "that Jesus Himself is responsible for the momentous dogmatic development, and encumbered the simple, eternal will of God with a minimum of dogma and ecclesiasticism"⁷⁰; an appearance, we may add, which is not deceptive, as Wernle would have us believe, and with an amount of "dogma" which cannot justly be called a "minimum." This is, however, only to permit Jesus to come to His rights in the matter of His teaching; and to allow Him to found the religion which He tells us He came to found, and not to insist on thrusting an essentially different one upon Him because we happen ourselves to like it better.⁷¹ These declarations of Jesus as to the redemptive significance of His death cannot be denied to Him; their meaning cannot be eviscerated by studiously minimizing expositions,⁷² and they cannot be deprived of their cardinal position in the religion which He founded.⁷³ In point of fact, Jesus announced His mission as not to the righteous but sinners; and what He offered to sinners was not mere exemption—or if even that word retains too much reminiscence of a price paid, say immunity—but specifically redemption.

In the mind of Jesus as truly as in the minds of His followers, the religion which He founded was by way of eminence the religion of redemption. Perhaps we could have no better evidence of this than the tenacity with

⁷⁰ *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*,³ 1904, p. 58.

⁷¹ A very pleasantly written exposition of Jesus' relation to "the double gospel" may be found in Lic. theol. Martin Schulze's brochure, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, 1897.

⁷² We permit ourselves merely to refer here to the treatment of these by James Denney, *The Death of Christ*,³ 1903, pp. 11–60. E. D. Burton's attempt to make "to give His life a ransom for many" mean to give His life, not His death (Biblical Ideas of Atonement, 1903, pp. 113 ff.) surely requires no refutation.

⁷³ Cf. what Paul Feine says, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1910, pp. 120 ff.

which those who would fain retain the name of Christianity while yet repudiating its specific character, cling to the term "redemptive" also as descriptive of the nature of their new Christianity, identified by them with the religion of Jesus. Professor Macintosh, for example, wishes still to describe his new religion as "the religion of moral redemption"; though he discriminates the notion which the term connotes with him as its broad sense, as over against "the narrow sense" which it bears in its customary application to Christianity. By "redemption" he means, however, merely "reformation;" and these are not only the narrow and the broad of it; they are specifically different conceptions, and the employment of the two terms as synonyms cannot fail to mislead. For our part, we prefer the perhaps brutal but certainly more unambiguous frankness of William Wrede.⁷⁴ He conceives "the religion of Jesus" on the same lines as Professor Macintosh's "Christianity," and roundly denies on that very account that it can strictly be called a religion of redemption, contrasting it with Paul's precisely on this score. He does not deny that "redemption" may have a wider meaning also, according to which we "may say of all real religion that it is and intends to be redemptive." But he knows very well that "it is not of this general truth that we are thinking when we characterize particular religions as religions of redemption." And since in his view the emphasis in the religion of Jesus "falls on individual piety and its connection with future salvation," he remarks simply, that "no one who set out to describe the religion which lives in the sayings and similitudes of Jesus could hit by any chance on the phrase 'religion of redemption,'" while on the other hand, with respect to Paul, "everything is said when we say that he made Christianity the religion of redemption." It tends to obscure the fact that a religion is being ascribed to

⁷⁴ Paul, pp. 177 f.

Jesus which is not in the accepted ("narrow") sense of the word "redemptive," to characterize the religion which is ascribed to Him so emphatically as "redemptive" (in the "wider" sense of the word), especially when it lies on the face of the record that the religion which Jesus founded is a redemptive religion in the narrow sense, that is to say, has the Cross set in its centre.

Its redemptive character has not, then, been imported into Christianity from without, in the course of its development in the world—whether through the instrumentality of Paul or of some other one. It has constituted its essence as a specific religion from the beginning; without which it would cease to be the religion that Jesus founded, and that, retaining the specific character impressed on it by Him, has borne His name through the centuries known from it as Christian. Precisely what Christianity was in the beginning, has ever been through all its history, and must continue to be so long as it keeps its specific character by virtue of which it is what it is, is a redemptive religion; or rather that particular redemptive religion which brings to man salvation from his sin, conceived as guilt as well as pollution, through the expiatory death of Jesus Christ.

So clear is this that even an observer who approaches the matter from a very general point of view, and seeks only, as a student of philosophy, to determine from the outstanding facts what the real nature of Christianity is, cannot miss it. Josiah Royce,⁷⁵ asks himself "what is vital in Christianity?" using the term "vital" much in the sense which is ordinarily attached to the term "essential." "That is vital for an organic type," he explains, illustratively, "which is so characteristic of that type that, were such vital features changed, the type in question, if not altogether destroyed, would be changed

⁷⁵ Essay III. in the volume, *William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*, 1911.

into what is essentially another type." In seeking an answer, he naturally brings the "Liberal" and what he calls the "Traditional" answers into comparison. "Is Christianity essentially a religion of redemption," he inquires, "in the sense in which tradition defines redemption? Or is Christianity simply that religion of the love of God and the love of man which the sayings and the parables so richly illustrate?" For the former view, he notes, is pleaded "the whole authority, such as it is, of the needs and religious experience of the church of Christian history; the church early found, or at least felt, that it could not live at all without thus interpreting the person and work of Christ." For the latter is pleaded that "the doctrine in view seems to be, at least in the main, unknown to the historic Christ, in so far as we can learn what He taught." Nevertheless he has no hesitation in rejecting the latter view, or in ascribing the former to Jesus. "As a student of philosophy, coming in no partisan spirit," he declares, "I must insist that this reduction of what is vital in Christianity to the so-called pure gospel of Christ, as He preached it and as it is recorded in the body of the presumably authentic sayings and parables, is profoundly unsatisfactory." The historic church was led to support the opposite view, he asserts, by "a sense of religious values which was a true sense." And despite what he (erroneously) believes to be the testimony of the records, he refuses to believe that the "Liberal" view can fully represent our Lord's own conception of His religion. He argues:

"For one thing Christ can hardly be supposed to have regarded His most authentically reported religious sayings as containing the whole of His message or as embodying the whole of His mission. For if He had so viewed the matter, the Messianic tragedy in which His life-work culminated would have been needless and unintelligible. For the rest, the doctrine that He taught is, as it stands, essentially incomplete. It is not a rounded whole. It looks beyond

itself for a completion, which the Master Himself unquestionably conceived in terms of the approaching end of the world, and which the church later conceived in terms of what has become indeed vital for Christianity."

That one who does not profess to approach the question with which he deals "as an authority in matters which are technically theological," and who has accordingly been led astray by those upon whom he was compelled to depend for the statement of the facts—and whose own interpretation, we must add, of the significance of the conclusion that he reaches leaves so much to be desired—should yet have seen thus clearly, and been led to assert thus strongly, that Christianity is, in its essence, "a redemptive religion" and that "what is most vital in Christianity is contained in whatever is essential and permanent about the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement," seems a notable testimony to the obviousness of the main facts. Had Royce understood that these elements in the Christian religion which he finds vital to it were not introduced into it by the followers of Christ in their interpretation of His religion, but were inserted into it as its very heart by the Master Himself, we may fancy with what increased emphasis he would have insisted upon them as the very essence of this religion.

Professor Macintosh tells us, to be sure, that if this is Christianity, "he would have to confess not only that he is not a Christian, but that he does not see how he ever could be a Christian." It is a sad confession, but by no means an unexampled one. Every Inquiry Room supplies its contingent of like instances, and Christianity had not grown very old before it discovered that the preaching of Christ crucified was unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness. The only novel feature in the present situation lies in the proposal that if one cannot or will not accept the

Christianity of the crucified Son of God, we shall just call what he can or will accept "Christianity" and let it go at that. This may seem an easy adjustment; but it is attended with the inconvenience of transferring our interest from things to mere names. The thing which has hitherto been known as Christianity appears to remain the same, however we deal with the name by which it has hitherto been known. And that thing enshrines the Cross in its heart. Paul Feine does not in the least exaggerate when, in the opening words of the section in his *Theology of the New Testament*⁷⁶ which speaks of Jesus' own teaching as to His death, he writes:—

"It has been the belief and the teaching of the Christian Church of all ages and of all Confessions, that Jesus, the Son of God, in His sacrificial death on the cross wrought the reconciliation of men with God, and by His resurrection begot anew those who believe in Him unto a living hope of eternal life. This belief forms the content of the hymns and prayers of Christian devotion through all the centuries. It filled with new life the dying civilization of Greece and Rome and conquered to Christianity the youthful forces of the Germanic stock. In the proclamation of Jesus the Divine Saviour who died for us on the Cross, still lies even today the secret of the successes of Christian missions among the heathen. The symbol of this belief greets us in the form of the Cross from the tower of every church, from every Christian grave-stone and in the thousands of forms in which the Cross finds employment in daily life; this belief meets us in the gospel of the great Christian festivals and in the two sacraments of the church. . . ."

Enough; there can be no doubt what Christianity has been up to today; and there can be no doubt that what it is now proposed to transfer the name to is an essentially different religion. Have we not had it for a generation past dinned into our ears that it is an essentially different religion? that precisely what Paul did, when he substituted "the religion about Jesus," that is, the

⁷⁶ P. 120.

religion of the Cross, for "the religion of Jesus," that is, the "Liberal" reconstruction of what Jesus Himself taught, was to introduce a new religion, a religion, to recall Wrede's characterization, more unlike the religion of Jesus than the religion of Jesus was unlike Judaism?⁷⁷

It seems merely frivolous to declare in one and the same breath that Paul introduced an essentially new religion when he supplanted "the simple gospel of Jesus" with the religion of the Cross, and that this new religion of the Cross is not essentially deserted when a return is made from it to "the simple religion of Jesus." The two religions are, in point of fact, essentially different, and no attempt to confuse them under a common designation can permanently conceal this fact. He who looks to be perfected through his own assumption of what he calls a Christlike attitude towards what he calls a Christlike superhuman reality—though he considers that the term "Christlike" may without fatal loss be a merely conventional designation—is of a totally different religion from him who feels himself a sinner redeemed by the blood of a divine Saviour dying for him on the Cross. It may be, as Troeltsch seems to suggest, that "Liberal Christianity" lacks the power to originate a church and can live only as a kind of parasitical growth upon some sturdier stock.⁷⁸ It may be that it is not driven by internal necessity to separate itself off from other faiths, on which it rather depends for support. It is otherwise with those who share the great experience of reconciliation with God in the blood of His dear Son. They know themselves to be instinct with a life peculiar to themselves and cannot help forming a community, distinguished from all others by this common great experience. We have quoted the opening words of

⁷⁷ If Wrede be thought a mere extremist, let the words of Paul Wernle (*Anfänge*,² 1904, p. 112; E. T. I. p. 158 f.) be considered.

⁷⁸ As cited, p. 681.

Feine's remarks on Jesus' teaching as to His sacrificial death. The closing words are worth pondering also. They run⁷⁹:

"Let it be said in closing that in the two declarations of the ransom-price and the cup of the Lord's Supper there lies church-building power. Jesus did not organize His community; He founded no church in His earthly labors. But the Christian Church is an inevitable product of the declaration of the expiatory effect of His death for many. For those who have experienced redemption and reconciliation through the death of Jesus must by virtue of this gift of grace draw together and distinguish themselves over against other communities."

There is indeed no alternative. The redeemed in the blood of Christ, after all said, are a people apart. Call them "Christians," or call them what you please, they are of a specifically different religion from those who know no such experience. It may be within the rights of those who feel no need of such a redemption and have never experienced its transforming power to contend that their religion is a better religion than the Christianity of the Cross. It is distinctly not within their rights to maintain that it is the same religion as the Christianity of the Cross. On their own showing it is not that.

⁷⁹As cited, p. 148.

BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

HANDBUCH DER ALTORIENTALISCHEN GEISTESKULTUR. ALFRED JEREMIAS.
J. C. Hinrichs, Leipzig. 1913. Pp. xvi, 366. 10m.

THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL UNDER THE KINGDOM. ADAM C. WELCH. T. &
T. Clark. 1912. Pp. xvi, 305.

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL FROM THE EIGHTH TO THE FIFTH CENTURY.
MOSES BUTTENWIESER. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xxii, 350.
\$2.00.

THE RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. H. WHEELER ROBINSON.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii, 245. 75 cents.

ROOT-DETERMINATIVES IN SEMITIC SPEECH. SOLOMON THEODORE HALÉVY
HURWITZ. Columbia University Press. 1913. Pp. xxii, 113.

The astral theory, of which Dr. Jeremias is now the leading exponent, concerns itself only with ultimate (that is, stellar) origins of religious ideas and procedures. It does not discuss the ethical and religious significance of cults. The astral lore, it is held, took different forms in different lands. The form it took in Israel is set forth in minute detail by Jeremias in *The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient East*. In this Manual he sketches the main principles of the Secret Lore, that, as is maintained, starting from Babylonia, or finding its best expression there, penetrated the whole East, and is reflected in the mythical, legendary, and historical narratives that embody the truths indicated by the celestial phenomena—monotheism and trinitarianism, conflict and redemption, death and the beyond. No argument is conceived to be necessary except to set side by side celestial phenomena and the corresponding facts of earthly life. The astral element of mystery appears, Jeremias remarks, in the fact that Moses and Ezekiel receive the plans of sacred buildings by divine revelation. His theory leads him to combat the opinion, held by Eduard Meyer and others, that Hebrew prophecy and messianism were derived from or deeply influenced by Egyptian ideas. Rather, he says, both Egypt and Israel give expression, each in its own way, to the common cosmic lore of the Orient (that is, in mundane phrase, we have in this case independent origination, under

similar conditions, in the two countries). He adds, however, that Israel impressed on all this astral lore a noble ethical significance. While this volume throws no light directly on the nature of the Old Testament religion, it contains, mingled with its fancies, suggestions that the instructed reader will be able to use with advantage.

The three works standing next in the list given above traverse practically the whole field of Old Testament religious thought. Dr. Welch discusses the stories of JE, prophecy before Amos, the prophets Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, and the book of Deuteronomy (he omits Micah as adding nothing to the preceding books, and Zephaniah as forming a transition to Deutero-Isaiah). Professor Buttenwieser includes all the writing-prophets from Amos down, except that he says little of Zechariah and nothing of Nahum, Obadiah, Haggai, and Malachi. Mr. Robinson's survey takes in the whole of the period from the early legends to Daniel. All three writers, cordially accepting the general conclusions of recent criticism, devote themselves to the exposition of the ethical and spiritual characteristics of the advanced thought of the times considered.

The points in the prophetic thought on which Dr. Welch lays stress are Yahweh's aloneness, his moral government of the world, and his peculiarly intimate relation to Israel. He recognizes the fact that Israel shares certain religious features with other peoples, and he remarks properly that what is important for our judgment of the Old Testament is not this common heritage from the past but the conceptions characteristic of the great Israelite thinkers. Yet he does not always keep this distinction in mind. He finds it noteworthy that even in the Pentateuchal narratives Yahweh is spiritual (that is, disassociated from external nature) and practically omnipotent, able to do whatever is necessary for the realization of his designs. But tribal gods are everywhere credited with these qualities. The distinction of the prophetic thought lies in the use that Yahweh is held to make of his powers. Further, Dr. Welch's habit of translating Old Testament language into terms of modern thought leads him insensibly to ascribe to the prophets broad quasi-philosophic generalizations and a well-rounded system that we cannot be sure they had distinctly in mind. To distinguish between the implicit and the explicit is not to detract from the epoch-making character of the prophetic conception of the world. One may doubt, for example, whether the Deuteronomic reformers held distinctly "the great conception of a nation filled throughout with the sense that it has its own character to preserve and its own work to fulfil, and is more interested in these things than in asserting its place in

the world" (p. 223). But the general treatment of the prophetic writings is good. Naturally, there is no little repetition, since the ideas discussed are everywhere the same; but this rather increases the rhetorical force of the presentation. It may be added that the difficulty that Welch and Battenwieser find in construing Hosea 1 and 3 may be lessened by the supposition that chapters 2 and 3 4 f. (in which the smooth flowing discourse differs so greatly from the ejaculatory style of 4-14) are not by Hosea, and that the episodes of 1 2-9 and 3 1-3 are free dramatizations of ideas suggested in chapter 2.

Dr. Battenwieser, after some general remarks on the prophets' consciousness of divine inspiration (a result of their sense of communion with God) and their vision of the ultimate regeneration of mankind, makes a detailed examination of the ideas contained in the writings attributed to Jeremiah. To bring out these ideas he subjects the chronological arrangement and the Hebrew text to a sharp criticism, in the course of which he offers numerous fresh suggestions, with full citations of recent works. Jeremiah, in fact, presents the culmination of prophetic spiritual experience, and his struggles, defeats, and victories are here set forth in a clear and helpful way. Sections worthy of special attention are the description of the temple-sermon (which is held to have consisted originally simply of 7 2-15, 21-26), and the analysis of the narrative of chapters 37, 38, 34, 32 35-5, 21, containing an account of the persecution of Jeremiah under Zedekiah. The view that the preservation of the utterances of the prophets was due to their disciples rather than to themselves (held by several recent critics) is here vigorously combated. Since, however, we have no sufficient data on this point, it will be wise to reserve opinion. As to the prophetic conception of the punishment destined by Yahweh for Israel—whether it was inevitable and what was to be the final outcome—various opinions are held by commentators. Battenwieser agrees with those who think that the threat of doom is unconditional, that the prophets do not hope (and, he adds, do not desire) that it will be set aside by their preaching. These differences of opinion are due, doubtless, in part to the nature of the text, which is in some places vague, semipoetical, and ill-arranged, and thus admits of different interpretations. It must be borne in mind also that the utterances of the prophets are not to be treated as if they were articles in a carefully drawn-up creed. Their inspiration proper depended on their conviction of religious truth; their judgments of historical issues were affected by their momentary emotions, which they could not help identifying with the will of God. They all (except the Deuteronomists and a few others)

thought the moral and religious condition in Israel desperate (their picture is perhaps too highly colored), demanding no less than the wiping-out of the existing national life. But such a conviction would not be incompatible with some element of hope, some instinct that Yahweh, as protector of his people, would find a way of escape consistent with his moral requirements. It is true that the larger hope is expressed not by the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries but by the seers of the sixth and following centuries; yet Isaiah and Jeremiah thought immediate deliverance possible. However, the prophetic views concerning the fate of the nation Israel are not of great importance, since they do not affect their general moral and religious principles. The same thing may be said of supposed references and allusions to a "world-catastrophe," of which, if belief in it existed in Egypt, Canaan, or Israel, we know very little. Certainly there is no evidence that such a belief materially affected the religious development of Egypt and Western Asia.

Within the limits of a small volume Mr. Robinson has succeeded in giving an intelligible sketch of the Hebrew religion from the crude beginnings to the verge of the reception of the belief in ethical immortality. In successive chapters he discusses the Old Testament idea of religion (moral intensity along with lower elements); the idea of God (personality, purpose to draw men into moral fellowship with himself); the idea of man (unity of body and soul, relation of human spirit to divine spirit, life in Sheol); the approach of God to man (theophanies, prophets, the written word); the approach of man to God (sacred places, seasons, ceremonies and persons, moral holiness); the problems of sin and suffering (forgiveness, cosmic evil); the hope of the nation (the kingdom of God, nationalism and universalism); and, finally, the permanent value of the Old Testament (its relation to the New Testament, to philosophy, to experience). In this sort of historical treatment there is the obvious advantage that it enables the writer to bring out clearly the lines of progress of the thought and the conditions, internal (great personalities) and external (foreign influences), that induced or favored the progress. Illustrations of this fact may be found throughout the volume; see, among other points, the remarks on the contribution of Semitic animism to the Old Testament conception of religion (p. 46 ff.), the statement of the character and function of the spirit (pp. 81 f., 111), the qualifications to be made in estimating the moral excellence of Old Testament religion (p. 42 ff.), and references here and there to the peculiar family relation between Israel and Yahweh. The homely phraseology expressing this relation, inherited, doubtless in part from the old clan

constitution, has contributed greatly to making the Old Testament the source of devotional literature for the Western Indo-European peoples. The length of the period treated by Mr. Robinson has made it impossible for him to consider in detail all the important questions that arise therein. He holds that something in the nature of a covenant took place at Sinai (pp. 38 f., 186 ff.), and that the fact that the people entered into the agreement voluntarily helped to give the Yahweh religion its remarkable virility; but he does not ask what tribes were there represented, and he does not mention the exegetical and other difficulties connected with the narrative of Ex. 18. He does not explain what he means by the affirmation that Yahwism was "essentially moral in principle" (p. 38). Elsewhere he appears to assume that the moral character of the religion varied according to the moral character of the people, as indeed every ancient religion had the morality of the community professing it. He sees in Isa. 53 the belief that all the world is to be brought to repentance and salvation through the suffering of the Servant (Israel) (p. 176 *al.*). He does not notice the view that the reference is to the salvation of blind and disobedient Israelites, nor does he treat carefully the noteworthy apocalyptic passage Isa. 25 6 ff. In connection with the remark on the practical failure of the prophets (p. 122), the significance of the succeeding ritual movement in the general development would deserve extended notice (if there were room for it). On the origin of the Sabbath (p. 139), the opinion that it was originally the day of the full moon should be referred to. Some of the larger questions here involved have been touched on elsewhere by Robinson (see the reference, p. 98, n. 2); and the excellence of his work makes us wish that he would treat at length the Old Testament conceptions of the nature of God, the nature of salvation, the nature of the right and the good, and other points that arise in connection with these.

This is not the place for a technical notice of Dr. Hurwitz's Dissertation, which is purely philological. It must suffice to say that he gives a good sketch of the discussions bearing on the origin of Semitic trilateral and biliteral stems, and that his observations on the question are well-considered and helpful. Such investigations may possibly be of service in fixing the meaning of certain Hebrew words, and may thus aid in the interpretation of the Old Testament; but these researches go back to remote and dim prehistoric times, and for our knowledge of the Biblical vocabulary we have to depend mainly, if not exclusively, on the usage of the historical period.

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DIE MISHNA. Text, Übersetzung, und ausführliche Erklärung, mit eingehenden geschichtlichen und sprachlichen Einleitungen und textkritischen Anhängen. Herausgegeben von G. BEER und O. HOLTZMANN. Töpelmann, Giessen. 1915 *seq.*

This edition and translation of the Mishna is evidence of the increased interest Christian scholars have lately been showing in Jewish literature as a result of a recognition of the fundamental importance of a knowledge of Judaism at the beginning of our era for the understanding of the New Testament. The scholars of the 17th century were fully aware of the value of the rabbinical literature for exegetical purposes, and made those great collections of parallels and illustrations from which later generations borrowed extensively, if not always intelligently. Latterly, even this second-hand wisdom has in great part been thrown out of the "exegetical handbooks" as learned ballast, and consequently the newest commentaries are completely a loss about passages and expressions which were perfectly explained two centuries and more ago. A list of such lapses into ignorance would be instructive—and amusing.

The old collections, however, though they may still be very useful to the exegete, are quite insufficient for the historical study of Judaism. For their purpose, the age of an illustrative example was often indifferent, whereas for ours it is highly important; they intended the elucidation of expressions or passages in the New Testament, we need to understand ideas and feelings—the whole complex structure of a religion. That cannot be done by means of extracts, however extensive and well-arranged; above all it cannot be done in a literature like the Jewish. There is no way but to read largely, to soak one's self, so to speak, in the language, the ways of thinking, of interpreting, arguing, and all the rest. The present edition of the Mishna is meant to encourage and assist such an endeavor, and it is by this aim that it must be judged.

The Mishna has been distributed in parts among a dozen or more scholars, and several parts have already been published. Those before me are *Joma* (Day of Atonement), by Meinhold; *Baba qamma* (on torts and delicts), by Windfuhr; *Challa* (priests' toll from baking of dough), by Albrecht; *Middot* (plan and dimensions of the temple), by O. Holtzmann.

The text is revised, on the authority of manuscripts and early printed editions, vowelled, and punctuated, or rather broken up, in a peculiar—and objectionable—fashion. A translation faces the text on alternate pages, and the notes are at the foot of both pages; the

text critical notes are at the end. Some of the parts (e.g. *Joma* and *Middot*) have long introductions.

The enterprise is not the first of its kind: Professor Hermann Strack has published, with his well-known accuracy, several parts of the Mishna in a revised text with critical and explanatory notes, some of them accompanied by translations; an edition of the whole Mishna, with German translation and commentary, has been in slow progress for many years under the hands of several Jewish scholars, and is still remote from completion.

The different tracts of Beer and Holtzmann's edition vary considerably in execution; some of them have been subjected to rather severe criticism on the philological side—not all of it with a solely philological animus. Certainly it cannot be claimed for them that they have great scientific value for the interpretation of the Mishna—though the title-page seems to profess something of the kind. They are essentially school-books, and there is about some of them a perceptibly amateurish air; but their shortcomings are not such as seriously to impair their usefulness for the readers for whom they are designed.

The publisher has done his part well; the typography is excellent, and the paper sufficiently opaque.

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THE THEOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt. (Studies in Theology.) Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xii, 220. 75 cents.

The aim of this book is thus defined in its preface: "What these pages attempt to do is to present a study of the central and salient features in the theology of the Gospels, taking theology in its stricter rather than in its wider sense." The assumption that the Gospels contain a theology is defended by insisting that "the most elementary and spontaneous experience of the Christian religion, then as now, involved what may be called without inaccuracy dogmatic or theological conceptions."

This means that these conceptions are to be found in the Gospels. "Because they mirror an experience which tends to become conscious of its issues in history and nature, . . . they are Gospels." These theological ideas which belong to an intelligent experience are assumed to be a self-consistent product; there is a theology of the Gospels. To be sure, this theology is, so far as the first three Gospels are concerned, "implicit rather than explicit," which perhaps means that these dogmatic conceptions are not affirmed, but

inferred from the religious utterances of their authors. Still, implicit or explicit, the theology is there. "There is a line of continuity between the first three Gospels and the fourth in point of their theology." There is "a theology of the Gospels."

Do the phenomena of these documents justify this assumption? Dr. Moffatt is too thorough and candid a New Testament scholar not to appreciate the difficulty which many of his readers will have in accepting it. Each of the three Synoptic Gospels presents its author's religious thought; that of the Fourth Gospel comes from a mind of great originality. The words of Jesus preserved in the Synoptics are those of a creative genius. Can we gather all the dogmatic or theological conceptions into a self-consistent whole, and call it a theology of the Gospels? Yes, says our author. At least so far as the "classic and fundamental elements" of Christianity" which it contains are concerned. Jesus, Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, give us one theology.

This thesis is wrought out in Dr. Moffatt's discussion of the Christology of the Gospels. There is no essential difference, it is urged, between the various conceptions of Christ. The latest is the earliest in a more developed form. "Jesus felt that he had a unique personal relation to the Father." "This is the primary factor of the Christology of the Gospels." "The Messianic consciousness is a modification of this." "To Mark Jesus is a heavenly being sent by God as his only and well-beloved son, to accomplish the purpose of his kingdom." "The birth-stories of Matthew and Luke are naïve attempts to express the Christian sense of what was implied in the unique filial consciousness of Jesus." In the Fourth Gospel Jesus' unique sonship is represented as a relation belonging to the divine nature. "His incarnation as the Logos is only a form of that eternal sonship which he enjoyed with the Father as an essential relation with his nature." He is specifically related to the Father as a divine being akin to God in nature and at the same time dependent on Him. "It is the recognition of this filial consciousness of Jesus as the crucial element in the Synoptic Christology which really enables us to understand the continuity between the first three Gospels and the Fourth. . . . When the filial consciousness of Jesus is seen to be prior to the Messianic, the starting-point for the special Christology of the Fourth Gospel is at once gained."

If Dr. Moffatt means by this that the Johannine Christology is, to use his own word, "implicit" in the filial consciousness of Jesus, he makes an assertion which many candid readers of the Gospels will be unable to accept. They will insist that this is not the only

interpretation of that consciousness which preserves its religious value, and explains Jesus' teaching and acts. That Jesus was the Eternal Son of God incarnate is surely a "theological, or dogmatic conception." That this conception was entertained by him, Dr. Moffatt does not undertake to show. He assumes that one who appreciates Jesus' thought of himself, so far as known, will think of him in this way.

The reviewer would ask, why assume this? He ventures the criticism that the unsupported assumption is a serious defect in a book professedly giving results drawn from facts by historical methods. Dr. Moffatt, to be sure, insists that study of the Gospels must be pursued in a religious spirit to find the theology in them, and that this spirit is one of subjection to Jesus Christ. "Before we can safely reason from the Gospels, we have to share their position towards the great personality behind and above them."

But even one who occupies this position is not able to find all the truth he needs without using his mind. He can "safely reason," and he must reason to get conclusions. And if he present what profess to be conclusions drawn from facts, he may properly be asked to show that they are drawn by valid inference.

The thesis of the book then, that the Gospels hold a "theology in the stricter, rather than the wider sense," has not, in the opinion of the reviewer, been made good. One lays down the book feeling that its title stands for an unverified assumption.

But this criticism must not be understood to imply that the book is without interest and value. On the contrary, its author's acquaintance with recent Gospel criticism, and his endeavor to present the thought of the Gospels in the light of that criticism, make it suggestive and stimulating. Dr. Moffatt deals with topics of criticism in a candid spirit. His discussion of problems of interpretation, such as the eschatology of Jesus, or Jesus' self-designation—"Son of man"—is able. The ease of the author's expression makes the book attractive. The obscurity which one now and then finds in a sentence may perhaps be attributed to the compression required by the character of the series to which the book belongs. Its value is enhanced by a bibliography, a general index, and an index of the Scriptural quotations.

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THE PRIMITIVE TEXT OF THE GOSPELS AND ACTS. ALBERT C. CLARK.
The Clarendon Press. 1914. Pp. viii, 112.

New Testament textual critics are accustomed to accept it as a rule that the shorter of two competing readings is more likely to be the true one. This rests on the assumption that the change which produced the variance of reading in different manuscripts was editorial, not accidental. Accident may omit; an addition is usually the result of deliberate alteration. A classical philologist, however, like the Corpus Professor of Latin at Oxford who writes this book, is more familiar with accident than intention as the cause of corruption in ancient texts, and therefore brings a fresh eye to these New Testament questions.

Taking accident as a more important element than Westcott and Hort, or most modern critics, have believed, Professor Clark holds that many of the readings of Codex Bezae and the "Western Text" (which are often longer than those of the Vatican and Sinaitic codices) are probably original. His argument is (1) that, as the papyri show, books in the early centuries were frequently written in narrow columns of ten to twelve letters; (2) that both the Sinaitic and the Vatican manuscripts show many undoubted omissions, where, as is made plain by counting the letters, it is probable that one or more short lines of an ancestor have been dropped; (3) that hence it is likely that many other cases of the same accident took place at an early time; and (4) that these can be detected by counting the number of letters in the disputed readings.

It is indeed the fact that a large number of the additional phrases in the "Western Text" can be explained in this way, and it must be admitted that New Testament critics have too much neglected the significance of this form of accident as a cause of variation. Especially when similarity of ending of two words ("homoioteleuton") appears, the facts presented by Clark are important. It must be said, however, that in the case of the longer passages, like Mark 16 9-20, which he defends as genuine, the evidence from the coincidences between the numbers of letters contained in the passages is not at all convincing, and it will not do to assume that long and important verses and sections omitted by accident from one early copy would have continued absent from texts used in widely distant churches for long periods. In the Book of Acts the theory breaks down, for here the multiples of ten to twelve letters fail to appear consistently, and in any case a large degree of intentional editing (whether by way of enlargement or of diminution) has to be admitted.

The essay collects valuable material, should stimulate to further study, and is a needed reminder of important considerations often overlooked. It illustrates that welcome contributions to textual criticism may be expected from many quarters; but also that no single line of observation, however brilliantly conceived and patiently carried out, will lead to a general solution of a problem which has been complicated by the intricate working of many forces.

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DER BRIEF DES PAULUS AN DIE RÖMER. Ausgelegt von D. Dr. ERNST KÜHL, Professor der Theologie in Göttingen. Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig. 1913. Pp. xvi, 511.

Professor Kühl, with a sincere and affectionate piety, honorable alike to himself and to his venerable instructor, dedicates his commentary to his "highly esteemed and fatherly friend," Professor D. Dr. Bernhard Weiss. There is special propriety in this, for the commentary in the main follows the lines of thought which Professor Weiss has made familiar to his numerous readers.

The book contains no formal introduction, but questions usually treated in introductions are incidentally discussed in the interpretation of passages which suggest them, and the volume ends with a "conclusion" which presents the author's views upon some of them. This may seem to many a regrettable omission, for a reader can estimate more justly and sometimes understand more perfectly an interpreter's comments if he is first told his opinions upon questions of the authorship, date, etc., of the document which he is discussing.

Dr. Kühl accepts the claim which the Epistle makes to Pauline authorship without question or argument. He seems to think that it has been transcribed and preserved without serious redaction or interpolation. 'Εν 'Ρώμῃ, in 1 7, 15, was, he holds, in the original document. The fifteenth and sixteenth chapters were in the Epistle as it came from the hand of Paul, except the section 1 1-20, 24, which was incorporated from a letter of Paul's to the Ephesians; and the doxology was written by Paul, perhaps with his own hand, at the end of the Epistle.

Questions of textual criticism are not often or very fully discussed; though when the form of the text is of special significance for the exegesis, the author gives his opinion and briefly his reasons for it. He holds, for example, that the context demands the reading *ἐχομεν* in 5 1, notwithstanding the support given *ἐχωμεν* in important manuscripts.

The instruction which the apostle gives in the thirteenth chapter concerning the attitude Christians should take towards the Roman civil government, proves that the Epistle must have been written before the breaking out of the Neronian persecution; but the date of its composition is not more closely indicated.

Professor Kühn confidently maintains and repeatedly affirms, as against Zahn and others, that Gentile converts formed a majority in the Church at Rome, though it also included in its membership a Jewish-Christian minority. It is difficult to see why this question should seem so important, or should be capable of such positive decision as Kühn and many others, on each side of the question, contend. If each element was present and enlisted the interest of the apostle, what does it signify whether the Gentile or Jewish converts were more numerous? And if Paul more frequently or with more apparent interest or solicitude addresses his words to the Gentile element, may there not be other reasons for this than their numerical preponderance?

The author presents and develops the theological positions taken in the Epistle more fully and with more manifest interest than the critical and historical problems involved. He reveals in these discussions a conservative temper, but, at the same time, a free and open mind. The limits of this review forbid anything beyond a brief statement of his views upon some of these subjects. The examples given below of his interpretation of important terms or sections in the Epistle will sufficiently illustrate his point of view and the results in general of his exegesis.

He holds, for example, that in 1 3, 4 we have a summary of the Pauline gospel. The conception of the Son of God is plainly from the Old Testament, and the thought of the apostle is occupied with the fulfilment of prophecy in the historical facts of Jesus' life. If the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Son of God lies in the background, it does not find expression in these verses. Paul's conception of the divinity of Christ rests rather upon the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus to a position of divine dignity, through which he became Son of God "in the full sense of the term." So in 9 5 the Christ is from the Jews according to the flesh, but, as exalted at the right hand of God, Paul addresses him, in his inserted doxology, as One who is "God over all, blessed forever"; for Kühn is confident that these words are addressed to Christ and not to the Father.

In his interpretation of 1 4 the Professor holds that in Christ the place of the *νοῦς* in the unregenerate man, is, in Paul's view, occupied by the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* in Jesus Christ. As he maintains that

the same Spirit which pervaded and controlled Jesus is also bestowed upon men who are born again, it does not seem probable that he means to deny to Jesus the possession of *vous*, but only to affirm that, through all his life, it was pervaded and controlled by the Spirit of holiness.

Professor Kühn affirms that the thought expressed somewhat incidentally in 1 17 controls the discussion through the long section which follows as far as 5 10, and that its influence is felt in the sections which follow that. The righteousness of God is the equivalent of the divine forgiveness bestowed upon the *ἀσεβῆς* before repentance, and does not, in itself, involve a moral change; any change or improvement in character is due to the subsequent gift of the Holy Spirit. He contends against Jülicher's views that in justification God enables men by faith to appropriate His own righteousness, and holds that Jülicher is in the wrong when he affirms that Paul would never have been satisfied with the simple reckoning of something which, in truth, did not exist. Justification anticipates and prepares for conversion as well as sanctification. It is essentially negative, the removal of a hindrance to an upright and spiritual life. At the same time, the only salvation offered to men is through this righteousness of God accepted by faith. For all who do not attain this the final judgment must be judged upon their works, and this judgment must be condemnatory of all without exception. The cases suggested in 2 26, 27 are purely hypothetical.

The author is perhaps most original in his full and vigorous discussion of Paul's theodicy, presented in the long section of the Epistle from chapter ninth through the eleventh chapter. He interprets Paul's argument here as involving not only the doctrine that the repentance and salvation of both Jews and Gentiles is dependent upon the divine decree and control, and that, in the execution of His purposes, God makes use of the sin and obduracy of men, but also that all their sins and hardness of heart, illustrated in the attitude of the large majority of Paul's Jewish contemporaries, are due to the will and positive control of God. Even the tenth chapter does not really, but only apparently, qualify this view. This interpretation is not novel; it appears as early as the time of Calvin, perhaps of Augustine. But Kühn holds that Paul is discussing, not a general and eternal principle of the divine government, but rather a problem of his own generation. The fate of past generations is not in the apostle's mind, nor does he forecast the religious character of future generations, for, in his view, the end of the world is near at hand, and the promise of God must be fulfilled before the great catastrophe

occurs. The substitution, in the proclamation of Christianity, of the law of faith for the law of works had, necessarily and by divine appointment, stumbled and hardened consistent Jews who revered the law of God as given in their Scriptures. But the hardening of the Jews opened the way for the proclamation of the Gospel to the Gentiles; which they could the more readily accept, and thus be grafted into the true olive tree. But their engrafting would kindle the jealousy of the Jews and arouse them to seek re-engrafting, and thus all Israel would be saved; not simply a considerable number of Israelites who may be considered the ideal Israel, as Zahn mistakenly interprets, but all Israel, though Kühn does not affirm that this includes every soul in the Israel of Paul's generation.

Dr. Kühn ably defends this thesis. It is not the province of a reviewer to examine in detail his exegesis. But a reader of the commentary cannot avoid raising the question—which it may not be the duty of an exegete to raise or answer—Just where does this interpretation of the apostle's view leave the apostle? Could he, as a man of insight and clear vision, thirty years or so after the crucifixion of Jesus, after all his experience with non-Christian Jews and Jewish Christians, have supposed that within the period of that generation in which he lived, all Israel would renounce its belief in the saving power of obedience to God's law and accept the doctrine of salvation by simple faith in Jesus, under the motive of jealousy kindled by the conversion of Gentiles—however the word "jealousy" may be defined? It seems impossible; and one cannot escape the conviction that the interpretation of a writer must be influenced, if not controlled, by the evidence of the writer's general sanity and power to interpret the facts of life. That a very intelligent man may believe in the speedy coming of the Lord and the end of the age, is easily admitted. Such a belief does not rest upon or reckon with the forces and tendencies which are observed in the social, moral, and religious conditions of one's contemporaries. But that Paul could have believed, about the year 58 A.D., that the Jews were just on the threshold of a sudden and substantially universal acceptance of Christianity, seems incredible. Nor is this much relieved by any reasonable theory of Paul's belief of the power of God and the principle of determinism upon which God is supposed to control the wills and characters of men. For, in Paul's view, God is a god of order, and His control of human life, however absolute it may be, is not arbitrary or lawless. If Paul had believed that all Israel was, in his generation, to pass through an experience like his own on the Damascus road, would he not have depicted this

conviction clearly, with a rhetorical fervor and a pictorial imagination, rather than in a plain and not very correct figure taken from horticulture; and would he not have found a loftier and more inspiring word than "jealousy" to express the motive under which they were to act? It does not seem impossible that Paul may have believed in a speedy coming of the Lord and yet of a continued progress of Christianity after that great event, which would result in the ultimate conversion of all Israel.

There are some general features of the book which merit brief mention in closing this review.

As has already been remarked, the commentary aims to expound the religious convictions of the apostle as expressed in the Epistle, rather than to examine and interpret the terms in which these views are expressed. The literary and religious history of significant terms is here not often discussed with much fullness, and but limited use is made, and then usually by reference to Deissmann's labors, of the recently published Greek papyri.

Dr. Kühl does not believe that the doctrines or rites of the mystery cults had any real influence in Paul's development of Christian doctrine, or his interpretation of the sacraments; though terms thus made familiar to his readers, and certain ideas connected with them may have aided in the expression and transmission of his own views, which were suggested by the Old Testament as interpreted and enforced by his own Christian experience.

Earlier commentaries, even down to those of the last generation, are but sparingly cited, while a limited number of contemporaneous writers are frequently referred to and quoted with approval or disapproval. This feature may add to the value of the commentary for the readers for whom it was especially designed; but for an American reader, the book is, in too large degree, a commentary upon the writings of Zahn, Jülicher, Lietzmann, and a few others, rather than upon the writing of the Apostle Paul.

The text of the Epistle is not printed either in Greek or German, but in its place the author gives a rather full paraphrase of its contents, in sections scattered through the book, thus occupying about eighty of the five hundred pages.

WILLIAM H. RYDER.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

ROME, ST. PAUL, AND THE EARLY CHURCH. W. S. MUNTZ, D.D. The Young Churchman Co. 1913. Pp. xvi, 227.

The chief purpose of this work, or at least its most distinctive feature, is the use of the conceptions of Roman Law to illuminate certain of St. Paul's phrases. In the main the author repeats what Ramsay and Deissmann have said on the same subject. Where he goes beyond them he stretches this method of interpretation too far. There is not much booty to be won in this field. One might summarize in ten pages all that can be aptly said. The author's presentation is less telling than it ought to be, because it is diffuse and repetitious. At one point there emerges a glaring contradiction which suggests some doubt of the author's interpretation as a whole. On page 100 it is said that "the principles of our law" cannot satisfactorily explain St. Paul's phrase "heirs of God." According to the conceptions of Roman jurisprudence "heirs" and "inheritance" implied the very reverse of the conceptions implied in the modern use of these terms. "Birth, not death, according to Roman Law, brought the heir into being." But on page 165, in the discussion of the South Galatian theory, it is said: "By the testamentary law of Rome in the age of Paul, a will was a secret instrument while the testator lived; it took effect at death only, and, moreover, was revocable. Accordingly Roman wills at that time were on these points similar to English wills of today." Whatever the fact may be, the method evidently is precarious. Incidentally it may be remarked that the South Galatian theory had better not be discussed at all if space is lacking to discuss it adequately. It is interjected here irrelevantly.

The title which the author has chosen is a charter of limitless scope—and, unfortunately, he has taken advantage of it. In the case especially of so small a book one might expect (and wish) that the topics, Rome, St. Paul, and the Early Church would be dealt with only so far as they all three have to do with one another. The author, if he has not dealt too much at length with Roman institutions, has dwelt upon peculiarities of St. Paul's character and doctrine which were neither influenced by Roman Law nor influential in the history of the Early Church, and along some lines he has followed the history of the Church well into the Middle Ages. The author warmly combats the prejudice which disparages the forensic element in St. Paul's doctrine; it was good in itself and also valuable as a means of interpreting the Gospel to the Gentile world.

But on the other hand, he would trace to the influence of the conceptions of Roman Law almost all that he accounts bad in the theology of the Western Church and in its discipline—particularly the idea of Papal supremacy. It is, of course, not impossible that the same influence which was salutary to St. Paul worked only mischief to the Church after him; but in the lack of any stringent proof of this, one is more inclined to think that the author's judgment of values is perilously subjective.

WALTER LOWRIE.

ROME, ITALY.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION. F. B. JEVONS. (Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) 1913. Pp. viii, 152.

This is religion in a nut shell—it is a temptation to say, in a pea-nut shell. It includes, besides an Introduction, chapters on Sacrifice, Magic, Ancestor-Worship, the Future Life, Dualism, Buddhism, Monotheism, a short bibliography, and an index.

Readers of Professor Jevons' earlier books need not be told that he brings to his task ample knowledge or that he writes with admirable lucidity. But in putting so much into such small compass, qualifications and explanations are impossible, and the concise statements and broad generalizations leave large room for misunderstanding, when they do not invite it.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A HALF-DOZEN BOOKS.

Our group is varied. It ranges in subject matter from *Gospel Origins*¹ to *The Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life*.² In method of treatment it descends from the severe and comprehensive dialectic of A. Schweitzer (*Paul and his Interpreters*³) to the "popular" level of Holdsworth. In style it includes the new instalment of Edwin A. Abbott's encyclopaedic exegetical notes (*Light on the Gospels from an Ancient Poet*⁴), Fr. Spitta's latest documentary analysis (*Die Syn-*

¹ By W. W. Holdsworth, M.A. From the Scribner series of "Studies in Theology." 1913. Pp. 211. 75 cents.

² By Charles Henry Dickinson. Macmillan. 1913. Pp. 327. \$1.50.

³ From the German Paulinische Forschung by W. Montgomery. Macmillan. 1912. Pp. 253. \$2.75.

⁴ Part ix of the Diatessarica, Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 602.

*optische Grundschrift*⁵), neither of which affords easy reading even for the expert. It includes also, however, the graceful periods of C. H. Dickinson (*Christian Reconstruction*), an expression of noble thought in lofty style by a comparatively unknown writer; alongside of which must be placed T. R. Glover's "Angus Lectures" on *The Christian Tradition and its Verification*,⁶ a little book of great ideas in simple form by a well-known master in the history of our faith.

Of the studies in Gospel origins Spitta's has chief importance. The author is well known for his minute critical analyses of Acts, the Revelation, and the Fourth Gospel, as well as for other contributions to New Testament criticism. Unfortunately Spitta's truly remarkable penetration and exegetical power are obscured by his predilection for theories of source combination in the form $A + B = C$, where A represents an original document free from the elements objectionable to modern criticism, B an inferior and later parallel, guilty of all the blunders and distortions, and C an ingenious redactor who nevertheless betrays the composite nature of his work to the still more ingenious critic. It is almost in spite of Spitta's theory that we profit by his book. True, he takes in general the right line of advance. The majority of gospel critics follow the delusive identification of the document from which the so-called Q material is drawn with the *Logia* attributed by Papias to the Apostle Matthew. In consequence the fundamental non-Markan source is usually reconstructed on the plan of our first Gospel, instead of that of the narrative third Gospel. Q was a *narrative* source, and is much better represented, as well as more fully, in Luke than in Matthew. Spitta does well therefore to designate his book "*Die Synoptische Grundschrift in ihrer Ueberlieferung durch das Lukasevangelium*." It is his characteristic disposition which produces the chief blemish of the work, the wish to vindicate a critically acceptable *Urquelle* by putting all blame on "the wicked partner." One is compelled to ask: How could such a complete and perfect masterpiece have been wholly lost to sight, superseded in all branches of the church by secondary and inferior products? In spite of this besetting sin of proving too much, Spitta's work faithfully and critically studied is always rewarding. He has knowledge of contemporary literature and modes of thought, fearless originality, and remarkable exegetical acumen.

Edwin A. Abbott's literary parallels from the recently discovered *Odes of Solomon* are also rewarding, though they require perhaps still

⁵ From Windisch's series of "Untersuchungen zum neuen Testament." Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs. 1912. Pp. 512.

⁶ Macmillan. 1913. Pp. 213. \$1.25.

greater patience. The work is really the fullest and most illuminating commentary yet produced on these obscure and perplexing mystical poems. Abbott's poetic sense, as well as his large familiarity with Talmudic and primitive Christian literature, give special value to his literary parallels. If we may suggest a direction in which further light should be sought it would be in *El Zohar*, chief work of cabalistic mysticism, affected like the *Odes* by neo-Platonic and Gnostic-Christian thought, but like them also in being fundamentally Jewish in conception and expression.

William West Holdsworth is "Tutor in New Testament Language and Literature in Handsworth College." Why he should have been selected for "A Study in the Synoptic Problem" in a series of *Studies in Theology* which includes James Moffatt's *Theology of the Gospels*, Souter's *Text and Canon of the New Testament*, and Peake's *Introduction*, is itself a problem on which very little light is shed by the book. Perhaps the publishers believed originality could be secured by applying to a writer who had not "been to school in Germany."

From the brilliant author of *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* we know what to expect. Probably there is no more consistent answer than the present volume to the type of interpretation of Paul and Paulinism advanced with such sweeping acceptance in our day by the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule." It will be well to read side by side with Schweitzer's attempt to account for Paul and his "gospel about Jesus" without recourse to any but Jewish influences, the new book on the same subject by C. G. Montefiore. The liberal Jew naturally represents the opposite pole of criticism. Perhaps Clemen's *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources* would serve well as a mediating element. But the weakness of a theory is best seen in its extreme applications. Schweitzer's theory of apocalyptic eschatology as primary in the message of Jesus breaks down when it attempts first to prove that this estimate of Jesus is in no degree morbid or pathological,⁷ and finally to account for Paul and his message on the "eschatological" basis.

Glover and Dickinson contribute interpretations of Christianity from the broad view-point of the history and philosophy of religion. Both are admirable. Glover naturally excels in his first-hand acquaintance with historical conditions in the Empire, but writes more sketchily, disregarding proportion in the interest of immediate impression on his audience. Dickinson treats his subject compre-

⁷ See the author's *Jesus psychiatriisch beurtheilt*.

hensively, as one who after wide and thorough reading and mature deliberation sets forth his best thought in polished language for thoughtful minds, even though unschooled. The writer will be read with pleasure as well as profit, and should secure a wide hearing.

BENJAMIN W. BACON.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

OUR OWN RELIGION IN ANCIENT PERSIA. LAWRENCE MILLS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 193.

Between these covers and under a taking title are brought together lectures delivered at various times during a period of several years. The subtitle runs: "Lectures . . . presenting the Zend Avesta as collated with the pre-Christian exilic Pharisaism, advancing the Persian question to the foremost position in our Biblical research." The author's thesis is that "some of the fundamental articles of our Catholic creed" were first revealed by God to Zoroastrians; that the same ideas later arose spontaneously and independently among the Jews; and that the Persian system exercised a powerful, though secondary, influence on Judaism, and through it on Christianity.

Other lectures are on "The Avesta and The Veda," "The Moral Idea in the Gatha," "Immortality in the Gatha." One very characteristic chapter, with an appendix, is on the eminence of Professor Mills, and the abysmal ignorance and jealous malice of others.

The lectures are printed with the various additions made from time to time to adapt them to different audiences. The author remarks that "readers will easily recognize the later insertions, from the difference in the stylistic flow of the language, as a later and to some extent a more pointed animus imparts greater pungency and vivacity to one's mode of expressing himself." To aid the higher critic, he has enclosed these interpolations in brackets and parentheses. Despite their occasional "pungency," the many interruptions and long digressions, added to an involved and formless style—which the Philistine may conjecture to be modelled on Pahlavi—make the way of the reader hard.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE CANTICLES OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, EASTERN AND WESTERN, IN EARLY AND MEDIAEVAL TIMES. JAMES MEARNS. Cambridge University Press. 1914.

This admirable study covers ground which has hitherto received inadequate treatment in English. The author does not attempt to go into the details of the liturgical use of the canticles, referring the curious in such matters to the article on *Cantiques* by Dom Cabrol, but limits himself to a study of the manuscripts in which the canticles are found. Nor has he sought to make a complete inventory of all existing manuscripts, but he has examined those preserved in a considerable range of Continental libraries, and has classified and indexed the important representatives of each type. The result is the tabulation of a large number of ancient psalters, with a careful study of the canticles used in the various branches of the Christian Church, Eastern and Western.

The use of songs taken from Scripture presumably goes back to the very beginning of Christian worship, but there appears to be no definite information earlier than the fourth century as to what passages were so used. Even by that time the selection of canticles was not definitely settled, and in the Eastern Church the use of the set known as the Nine Odes cannot be clearly traced before the sixth century; though since that period the Nine Odes have been very generally used with only occasional variations or additions.

In the West, however, there has been much greater diversity. The local Roman Use differed from that at Milan, and from the Gallican Use, as well as from the Use of Latin-speaking Eastern Europe and North Africa, and the Mozarabic Use in Spain. Furthermore the monastic use of canticles varied in remarkable degree, not only as between different orders but as between different houses within the same order. Thus Mr. Mearns points out that the monks of Bury St. Edmunds used as late as 1405 a set of canticles which had gone out of use elsewhere in the tenth century. Most of the canticles included in the Nine Odes of the Greek Church were, indeed, universally accepted, but the order in which they appear varies greatly and they are supplemented by a great number of other canticles. Thus in the Mozarabic Use some seventy-eight canticles are listed, while the monastic uses include still others. The evidence of these widespread and interesting variations is clearly tabulated and is a significant contribution to our knowledge of liturgies.

This volume, though small in bulk, represents a large amount of research. Its information is clearly set forth, and the author has done his work so thoroughly that it will not be necessary for others to glean the field again.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE UNCONSCIOUS. MORTON PRINCE, M.D., LL.D. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xii, 549. \$2.00.

The Fundamentals of Human Personality Normal and Abnormal is the subtitle of this volume, and it is from it that we obtain an adequate idea of the scope of the book. It is Dr. Prince's opinion that the psychology of the future will seek its facts in the vast reservoir beneath the level of personal consciousness. This is his very deep conviction after many years of experience in the field of abnormal psychology, which has been recently still further strengthened by the remarks of M. Bergson, who says: "To explore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of consciousness—that will be the principal task of psychology in the century which is opening."

Introspective consciousness, the author believes, reveals to us only a small part of our mental life, and, what is more to the point, it is useless to search there for our explanations. Mental phenomena are likened to the iceberg, of which two-thirds is submerged.

The nature of the subconscious is discussed at some length; for although, as Dr. Prince says, the practical value of the methods set forth in the book are in no way influenced by the choice of a particular theory, yet the theoretical importance of the problem justifies the exposition. On page 253 is a classification which is most welcome as giving Dr. Prince's views in a form free from the possibility of misunderstanding. It is regrettable that this section was not placed nearer the beginning. That there is a certain lack of system in the arrangement of the material is probably due to the fact that the book consists of selected lectures, which consider more exhaustively the subject matter of papers appearing at various times in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. The subconscious is divided into the coconscious and the unconscious. The coconscious is synonymous with subconscious ideas, that is, ideas not in the field of awareness. They are psychic but not psychological. The unconscious consists of conserved dormant neurograms or neural dispositions and active neurograms or neural processes. These neurograms are the impressions made upon the nervous system, and may or may not appear at

some future time in the field of consciousness. This description differs from that of scientists who deny the existence of the subconscious, in that the latter believe that all ideas not in the field of awareness are neural processes, thus allowing for no subconscious or coconscious *ideas*.

Most of the book is devoted to illustrations from abnormal cases of the functioning of these coconscious and unconscious processes. The results obtained especially through hypnotism, automatic writing, crystal-gazing and psycho-analysis, are given at great length. The facts of the famous case of Miss Beauchamp are frequently quoted.

For the general reader the part dealing with personality is particularly interesting. Here we see with what imperceptibly small steps the normal states shade into the abnormal. It is only in degree that they differ. The important fact for an understanding of thought is the conflict of ideas. If an idea with a sufficiently strong emotional setting is in the subconscious, its effect may be seen in the conscious attitude of the individual. Old memories, dormant for years, are the cause of hysterical outbreaks and are also frequently responsible for peculiarities in the normal mind. The coconscious may conflict so thoroughly with the conscious that a double personality is formed. A crucial proof that the subconscious influences the conscious is the fact that a definite idea implanted in the subconscious during hypnotism will, when the patient regains a normal condition, have the predicted effect. The intelligence of the subconscious processes is also forcibly described. Dr. Prince finds himself in close accord with William McDougal's views as stated in his *Social Psychology*, especially in regard to instincts and sentiments. A sentiment is an idea with a strong emotional setting, which directs the action of the individual from the realm of the subconscious. Mood can be explained as the submerged complex of ideas and emotions which guide our thoughts and our selections. Even the social conscious, the "civic," and the "national," patriotism and public opinion, may be explained by unconscious complexes. "All these mental attitudes may be reduced to common habits of thought and conduct derived from mental experiences common to a given community, and conserved as complexes in the unconscious of the several individuals of the community." We read further: "Common-sense depends upon the fact that in the unconscious lie memories, the origin of which we do not remember."

It is particularly pleasing to note that Dr. Prince disagrees with Freud in regard to suppressed sexual complexes being the sole explanation not only of dreams but of all mental abnormalities. To

quote from page 221: "A dream may be the symbolic expression of almost any thought to which strong emotional tones with their impulsive forces have been linked."

We recognize Dr. Prince at his best in this book. The ease of style and the abundance of illustrations drawn from the author's vast experience make his views readily accessible to all. Those who desire to obtain a clear idea of Dr. Prince's theories of mental life and are interested in the mechanism of thought, both normal and abnormal, will find the book of great value.

HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

L'EXCUSE DE NOBLE SEIGNEUR JAQUES DE BOURGOGNE, SEIGNEUR DE FALAIS ET DE BREDAM. PAR JEAN CALVIN. Réimprimée sur l'unique exemplaire de l'édition de Genève 1548, avec une introduction par Alfred Cartier. Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée. Genève, A. Jullien. 1911. Pp. lxxviii, 54. 7.50 fr.

Known in Latin translation, the original French edition was discovered only a few years ago, and is here given a worthy setting. This defence of a Netherlands nobleman who had accepted the Reformed faith, addressed to the Emperor Charles V, is among the most vigorous expositions that ever came from Calvin's pen. In many ways it deserves to rank with his famous letter to Francis I, prefaced to the *Institutes* or his *Reply to Cardinal Sadoleto*. In no writing does Calvin show himself more a master of the forming French language. The value of the publication is greatly enhanced by the editor's careful biography of Jaques de Bourgogne, tracing not merely the circumstances of the publication of the *Excuse*, but the long friendship of that nobleman with Calvin and their unhappy estrangement in consequence of the dispute between Calvin and Bolsec regarding predestination.

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIAEVAL HISTORY. Planned by J. B. Bury, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Edited by H. M. Gwatkin, M.A., and J. P. Whitney, B.D. Vols. I and II. The Macmillan Co. 1911-13.

A striking defect in the historical writing of England and America in the past century has been the failure to produce good general histories. Save for the *History of All Nations* translated and adapted from the German under the editorship of the late John Henry Wright,

the English language has nothing that can compare in quality with the French and German universal histories; there is in English no satisfactory history of ancient, mediaeval, or modern times, and no good general history of France, Germany, Italy, or Spain. This fact alone, apart from their other merits of plan and execution, is a sufficient justification for those considerable enterprises, the *Cambridge Modern History* and the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*. It is true that neither of them is a general history in the older sense of the word. They are meant to instruct rather than to entertain; they will not while away long evenings by the fireside or be found, like Gibbon's first volume, "on every table and almost on every toilette." They are written by the co-operative method, and are subject to all the inequalities and inconveniences which such a method involves. The defects of such a procedure are obvious; its justification is that there is now no other way of treating so vast a subject in a scholarly and serviceable manner, and the result, if not a work of literature, is an indispensable work of reference. If such a series of volumes is interesting, at least in spots, so much the better, but it must in any case be comprehensive, critical, authoritative in its scholarship, clear in its presentation, and ample in its references for further inquiry. These are, however, the merits of a good encyclopædia, and if a work of history is to be anything more, it must combine with them qualities of unity, continuity, and proportion, which are extremely difficult to attain and which have been attained in these works in less measure than their inspirer, Lord Acton, hoped for. With all due recognition of the difficulties of treating so wide a field, one could wish that the process of subdivision had not been carried quite so far, and that more regard might have been paid to the example of the various co-operative histories which assign a whole volume to a single author.

The *Mediaeval History*, planned by Lord Acton's successor, Professor Bury, and edited by Professor Gwatkin and Mr. Whitney, follows the general lines of its predecessor. The period from Constantine to the middle of the fifteenth century is treated in eight substantial volumes of twenty or more chapters each. The several chapters in a volume are ordinarily assigned to as many different specialists, and in some instances single chapters have been divided between two authors. There is no continuous narrative, but duplication is reasonably well avoided, and no significant aspect of the period is left untouched. The bibliographies are quite full, and there is a plentiful supply of maps, which are, however, of quite uneven merit and execution and are unaccompanied by explanations.

Of the volumes so far issued, the first deals with the Roman empire of the fourth and fifth centuries and with the new movements of this period in the church and among the Germanic invaders, while the second continues the story from the accession of Justinian to the death of Charlemagne. As was inevitable in a field where most of the best work has been done by Continental scholars, there are numerous German and French contributors of the type of Becker, Diehl, Hartmann, Jullian, Pfister, Ludwig Schmidt, and Seeliger, while Visigothic Spain is treated by Señor Altamira. Dr. Peisker of Graz contributes a most original and striking account of the Asiatic background of the barbarian invasions, followed by a notable discussion of the beginnings of the Slavic peoples. Among the contributions from England are the chapters on social and economic conditions by Professor Vinogradoff, on the institutions of the later empire by Professor Reid, on Roman Britain by Professor Haverfield, and on the early Anglo-Saxon period by Mr. Corbett. Dr. Roby's chapter on Roman law, though competent, is disappointing. The only American contributor, Professor Burr of Cornell, decidedly holds his own with the rest in his account of Pippin the Short. The history of the church receives attention proportionate to its importance in this period, various points of view being represented by Principal Lindsay on the triumph of Christianity, Professor Gwatkin on Arianism, Mr. C. H. Turner on early church-organization, Archdeacon Hutton on Gregory the Great, and Dom Butler on monasticism. Keltic and Germanic heathenism receives special treatment, as well as the conversion of these peoples to Christianity. Mr. W. R. Lethaby contributes a few pages on early Christian art, while the history of thought is represented in the first volume by Mr. H. F. Stewart, the biographer of Boethius, and left out of the second, where a chapter had been promised by Dr. Montague James. On the whole, the history of religion and the history of institutions come off rather better than the history of culture, but all of these subjects seem likely to receive more attention than in the *Modern History*, where the treatment is for the most part dominantly political.

In general, the new undertaking deserves a cordial welcome, as rendering conveniently accessible for the first time in English the results of a generation and more of special studies which have not only put the history of the Middle Ages upon a more secure foundation, but have broadened and deepened our appreciation of their place in the history of European civilization.

CHARLES H. HASKINS.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

JOHN PENRY, THE SO-CALLED MARTYR OF CONGREGATIONALISM AS REVEALED IN THE ORIGINAL RECORD OF HIS TRIAL AND IN DOCUMENTS RELATED THERETO. CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, Librarian of Manchester College, Oxford. The University Press. 1913. Pp. 43. 2s. 6d.

This active young American student of Separatist origins in England adds a fresh monograph to his rapidly growing series of valuable investigations in his special field. He gives the original record of Penry's trial, contemporary extracts from Penry's lost treatise criticising Queen Elizabeth, his defence, and his final remarks on the day before his execution. These documents throw much new light on the charges brought against the young reformer, and the causes for which he died. Mr. Burrage's conclusion, which seems justified by his evidence, is:

"Those connected with the trial apparently treated him with perfect fairness according to the crude customs of that day . . . Penry was condemned because he had allowed himself to *write* (and *publish*) slanderous denunciations, not because he was a Presbyterian or a Congregationalist. We formerly pitied him, because we erroneously supposed him to have been a martyr for Congregationalism—one who had been unjustly put to death for his religious beliefs. We should pity him now still more, because the words for the writing of which he was arraigned did not represent him at his best, but at his worst."

Yet it may be fair to ask further, admitting the justice of the author's conclusions as to the charges and trial, what induced Penry to express the "slanderous denunciations" for which he suffered?

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

FAITH AND THE FAITH. The Bohlen Lectures, 1914. SAMUEL HART, D.D. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xii, 144. 80 cents.

Faith means fidelity and trust; it is set forth in words in "the Faith." Faith is "of the very essence of religion"; the Faith is "necessary for its expression and extension." The Faith is discussed in these lectures on the intellectual side as regards God, and Jesus Christ, and the Spirit. A final chapter on "The Type of Faith" emphasizes the importance of the emotional side of religion. The theology of the book is steadfastly orthodox, without narrowness.

GEORGE HODGES.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE.

LES PRÊTRES DANSEURS DE ROME. Étude sur la corporation sacerdotale des Saliens. Par RENÉ CIRILLI. Préface de M. J. Toutain. Paris, Geuthner. 1913.

In this elaborate study M. Cirilli re-examines all the evidence relating to the Salii in the city of Rome and in the municipal towns of the Roman Empire, bringing to bear the material which he feels the excavations in Greece, Crete, and Italy itself have furnished pertinent to his subject. Against those who, like Helbig and Wissowa, see in the Salii priests of Mars, or those who, like Frazer, regard them as priests whose dances were aimed at securing the fertility of the fields, Cirilli seeks to prove that the Salii were originally guardians of talismans in the form of shields, symbols of Mars. He would furthermore regard their origin as connected with the introduction into Italy of the art of working metal, and would derive their dances from the magic dances of Cretan metal-workers, the memory of which was preserved in the legend of the Curetes. The clashing of the arms which was an essential part of the dance would be then an act of a general apotropaic nature, such as is found among many peoples. We may gladly admit that Cirilli has made his theory very probable; but it is only a theory, and the fact is that we do not know, and that probably we never shall know, the truth about the origin of the Salii.

The book is provided with a satisfactory bibliography and a convenient collection of references to the Salii in ancient literature. The appendix containing the pertinent inscriptions has one fundamental defect, for the provenance of the inscriptions is not given. It is incredible that this should be omitted, and it ought to be equally incredible that there should be no index. But an index seems too much to hope for in such a book.

CLIFFORD H. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE BOOK OF JUDGES and THE BOOK OF RUTH. G. A. COOKE, D.D. The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. 204+22. 2s. 6d.

THE WISDOM OF JESUS THE SON OF SIRACH, OR ECCLESIASTICUS. W. O. E. OESTERLEY, D.D. The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 367. 6s.

Among the least satisfactory volumes in the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges has been the one on Judges. This has now been remedied by the publication of Professor Cooke's excellent commentary. There is presented here in concise and attractive

form the conclusions commonly held by modern scholars respecting Judges and Ruth, except that the author does not recognize in the Book of Ruth a polemical pamphlet directed by a prophetic writer against the narrowness and national exclusiveness of the preaching of Ezra and his priestly school. Dr. Cooke gives an admirable sketch of the primitive and crude character of the early Hebrew life in Canaan, and his comments on the text are sufficiently full to answer all the requirements of the class of readers for whom this series is prepared.

Professor Moulton has well said that Ecclesiasticus offers an excellent example of the evolution of the essay out of the proverb. Ben-Sira shows a marked advance in his method of treatment upon the older collection of Proverbs. Although his book exhibits no great originality, yet the writer of Ecclesiasticus adds to the older material, of which he makes abundant use, a wealth of independent thought which witnesses to a large amount of individuality. The mass of information which the book contains regarding Jewish religious thought and ethics, during a period for which we do not otherwise possess much information, marks it out as a work of high importance. The writer evidently intended to offer to his people a kind of text-book to which men and women might have recourse for guidance in almost every conceivable circumstance of life. He does this, however, with the primary object of setting in clear light the superior excellence of Judaism over Hellenism. In a sense, therefore, Ecclesiasticus is to be regarded as an apologetic work, inasmuch as it aims at combating the rising influence of Greek thought and culture among the Jews.

Such in brief is Dr. Oesterley's view concerning the nature of the book of which he is treating. His notes on the text are most suggestive to the Sunday School teacher (should such ever wander into the Apocrypha) and also to the Hebrew scholar. The latter will find the copious references to the various versions of value.

MAXIMILIAN KELLNER.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

LIGHT ON THE FOUR GOSPELS. From the Sinai Palimpsest. AGNES SMITH LEWIS. Williams and Norgate. 1913. Pp. xi, 226. 3s. 6d.

This volume is from an author to whom Biblical science is greatly indebted for her discovery in 1892 of the Syriac Sinai Palimpsest of the Gospels, and for her publications in the field of Semitic research. It is a popular work, reproducing in part material that

has been published previously in the Expository Times and that has also been used in public addresses.

Mrs. Lewis seeks in an attractive and untechnical way to acquaint her readers with some questions of New Testament textual criticism which have been raised by the discovery and fuller knowledge of the Old Syriac text. The section of greatest value is that comprised in chapters four to nine. Here some of the more important variant readings of the Sinai Palimpsest are given in English translation for each of the four Gospels in turn. The differences between the Syriac and the Greek are made perfectly clear in each instance to those who are unacquainted with either language. A statement is often added as to the important Versions and manuscripts which are in agreement with the Old Syriac text. The way is thus open for the reader to gain some impression as to the extent of the support given by this text to the so-called "Western" readings. Mrs. Lewis, however, is not so much interested to point this out as to vindicate the general trustworthiness of the Sinai Palimpsest, and more particularly to show that its readings can be accepted without detriment to faith. It is but natural that long devotion to this manuscript should make her an enthusiastic advocate of its excellence, and that, too, at a time when the importance of its testimony is generally recognized by New Testament scholars. In the opening chapters she argues for an early date for the Old Syriac translation of which it is a representative, and for the possible perpetuation in that version of some of the very turns of expression used by Jesus in the closely allied dialect of the Galilean Aramaic.

A discussion of controverted points is not to be expected in such a book; nor is it reasonable, perhaps, to demand that there be a more extended and adequate treatment of the textual variants of the Syriac. It is much to be regretted, however, that so little effort has been made to explain, not to say, follow, the principles which must govern in the quest for the original text of the Greek New Testament. There is more than one passage in this little volume which might lead the thoughtful reader to infer that textual criticism is, to say the least, a somewhat whimsical science. An illustration may be found in the following defence of the Syriac reading that Jesus "*was standing* and talking" with the woman of Samaria (John 4 27): "This slight detail of the narrative is found, so far as we know, in no other manuscript. But it is quite in keeping with our Lord's character that He should have forgotten His own weariness, and should have risen to His feet in order to impress more vividly on the woman those great truths which He was reveal-

ing to her. And the change of attitude may have been prompted by an innate feeling of the chivalry which was eventually to blossom out of His teaching. Standing is not the usual habit of the Jewish Rabbi when he is engaged in teaching, so it is all the more remarkable that our Lord should have shown so much courtesy to our sex in the person of one of its most degraded representatives. The little word of *qd'em*, 'standing,' has so much significance, that we cannot suppose it to be a mere orthographical variant" (p. 147).

The book closes with two brief chapters on entirely distinct topics. The first proposes some emendations which Mrs. Lewis believes would help to make the Revised Version of the Bible a more intelligible and more consistent translation; while the last chapter is made up of a series of paragraphs aiming to show how various statements of Scripture have been confirmed by modern scientific investigation and discovery.

WARREN J. MOULTON.

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

JESUS THE CHRIST: HISTORICAL OR MYTHICAL? A Reply to Professor Drews' *Die Christumythe*. T. J. THORBURN. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. 311. \$2.50.

In a brief introduction the author states the views of a few writers who have denied the historicity of Jesus. Then he presents the historical data in support of Jesus' existence. The concept of a suffering Messiah is held to have been no part of pre-Christian Jewish belief, and so could not have supplied the first Christians the model for their messianic faith. This they derived from historical experience. More positive testimony for Jesus' historicity is drawn from the gospels, Paul, Josephus, Roman writers, and Jewish tradition. The second part of the volume deals with the mythological data which opponents have found in the Gospels. After denying the existence of any pre-Christian Jesus-cults, Thorburn refutes the arguments which have been advanced to prove the mythical character of numerous gospel items. He arrives at three conclusions: (1) the *Christ* of Paul is identical with the Jesus of the synoptists; (2) the *Jesus* of the synoptists is a historical person; and (3) the *Jesus Christ* of primitive Christianity is no mere idea subsequently precipitated and historicized as the founder of a religion. The argument, we believe, would have gained in clearness and force had the author distinguished more sharply between the Jesus of history and the Christ of early faith.

SHIRLEY J. CASE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

A SOURCE-BOOK FOR ANCIENT CHURCH HISTORY FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO THE CLOSE OF THE CONCILIAR PERIOD. JOSEPH CULLEN AYER, Jr., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xxi, 707. \$3.00.

Many teachers in this country have long desired to secure a book of collateral readings in the history of early Christianity. The present volume, prepared at the suggestion of the American Society of Church History, presents, in idiomatic translation, a generous selection of representative source-extracts, carefully arranged and well indexed. Save for the fact that running paragraph numbers do not appear at the top of the pages, the printing is admirable. Had the primary division of material been topical, as in Thatcher and McNeal's *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, instead of chronological, it would have been easier to remember what one reads. He who sails through these pages soon gets his sea-legs in spite of the quick succession of short and choppy waves of interest, and feels that he is making steady progress toward a clearly discerned port. The book offers a more vivid view of the manifold activities of the church under the Roman emperors than can be gained from the few dogmatic or hortatory tracts which have hitherto formed the staple of required reading. In addition to the standard pronouncements on creed and conduct, it marshals effectively much material on the actual workings of the church as an institution; for instance, paragraphs 72-78: "The Empire and the Imperial State Church." Here, as elsewhere, Professor Ayer, long a student of ecclesiastical law, has gathered regulations governing the life of the common man; but he does not show so clearly how that elusive and usually inarticulate being reacted toward the state church. American theological students do not have any idea of what the common man heard and saw when he attended the services of Cyprian, and they have the vaguest notions about the more important demands of the hierarchy on the laity. They should therefore enjoy the specific and occasionally picturesque detail here presented with adequate elucidation. The material made easily accessible puts greater variety and life into the study of the history of the ancient church. Those who prepare seminar-papers will regret that the publishers omitted the very suggestive bibliographies that prefaced each paragraph of the original manuscript; but for the average student, as for the pastor, the book will be a boon. Its unusually objective standpoint will make it also very useful in university instruction in early mediaeval history.

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